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ABSTRACT 
 
This work aims to provide an objective portrait of Emperor Karl I and an analysis of 
his early reign in order to help determine his responsibility in the collapse of Austria-
Hungary and to fill the gap in a historiography distorted by both hagiography and 
underestimation. This thesis examines Karl’s character, education, ability, outlook 
and ambitions prior to his enthronement in November 1916, and his attempts in the 
following six months to revive political life, implement administrative and 
constitutional reform and bring about national reconciliation in Cisleithania. The 
Bohemian lands, and in particular the Czech-German conflict, constitute the main 
focus of this study, although developments among Poles, Ukrainians and South Slavs 
are also considered. Since Karl’s chief concern was nevertheless the conclusion of 
peace, foreign policy – in any case inextricably bound to domestic issues in the 
Habsburg Monarchy – is also given due attention. 
The examination of Karl’s pre-war years reveals a not unpromising young 
man. His short heirship, however, involved only a perfunctory introduction to 
statecraft, leaving him lacking in preparation and experience. Yet, contrary to popular 
belief, Karl was not a blank slate; nor was he without his prejudices. Upon his 
accession to the throne, although he enjoyed a remarkably free hand, he threw in his 
lot with the German nationalists. After four months, however, he – or rather his 
foreign minister – retreated under the influence of the Russian Revolution and of the 
American entry into the war. Karl then recalled parliament but did not have the 
resolve, courage, skill or support to build on this initiative. Offered no prospects, the 
political representatives of the Slav nationalities radicalized behind the scenes. With 
the reopening of the House, the irreversible extent of their disenchantment and 
estrangement burst to the fore. Although Karl finally sought to embark on a new 
course, his resolve again faltered and his half-hearted efforts bore no fruit. Largely as 
a result of his earlier mistakes and vacillation, the chance had, in any case, already 
passed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the foreword to his 1925 work on the foreign policy of Emperor Karl I, the German 
historian Richard Fester admitted that he had been unable to pass judgement sine ira.1 
Nor, when writing about the last Habsburg ruler, had several of the protagonists he 
interviewed, such as August von Cramon,2 Alfred Krauß,3 Erich von Ludendorff4 and 
Botho von Wedel5. However, post-war denigration of Karl was not the exclusive 
preserve of disaffected German nationalists. A few bereft servants of the Dual 
Monarchy, grieving for their lost empire, also expressed their frustration, anger and 
contempt towards him. In 1919, Josef Schneider published the anonymous,6 and 
controversial, memoirs of a former court official, who painted an unsparingly and 
unremittingly negative portrait of Karl.7 Two years later, the recollections of Baron 
Albert von Margutti, previously attached to Franz Joseph’s aide-de-camp Count 
Eduard Paar, caused a scandal upon publication, likewise due to the candour of his 
(often spurious) revelations and the bitterness of his attacks on his former imperial 
master.8 No longer bound by etiquette or devoir de réserve, the authors made 
                                               
1 Richard Fester, Die Politik Kaiser Karls und der Wendepunkt des Weltkrieges (Munich, 1925), vi. 
2 August von Cramon, Unser österreichisch-ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkriege. Erinnerungen 
aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtigter deutscher General beim k.u.k. 
Armeeoberkommando (Berlin, 1920). Cramon had been the German Plenipotentiary to Austro-
Hungarian army headquarters. The Austrian general and military historian Edmund Glaise-Horstenau 
later confessed to having written half of Cramon’s book, but complained that the latter had added the 
malevolent remarks on Karl. Cramon later regretted this and, sobered by the Third Reich, told Glaise in 
1936: “I did Emperor Karl an injustice – he was in fact a very noble prince, who wanted the best”, in: 
Peter Broucek (ed.), Ein General im Zwielicht. Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau 
(Vienna/Cologne/Graz, 1980), volume I, p.328. 
3 Alfred Krauß, Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage. Erinnerungen und Urteile aus dem Weltkrieg 
(Munich, 1921). Krauß was a general in the Austro-Hungarian army. 
4 Erich von Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918, 2 vols (London, 1919). 
5 Wedel, the German ambassador to Vienna from late 1916, published no memoirs, but wrote many 
articles in periodicals in the years after the war, for instance: “Zur Wiener Hofpolitik”, in: Preußische 
Jahrbücher, CLXXXI: 3 (Berlin, 1920). Several others are listed in: Fester, xv. His criticism of Karl 
was, however, comparatively restrained. 
6 Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Wilhelm Möller, B/180, 1, II, pp.305-324. Wilhelm Möller, a 
telegraph operator at court and amateur historian, tried to establish the identity of the author. Most 
believed it was the Czech privy councillor Ottokar Mikeš, a chief of section in the emperor’s private 
office (Kabinettskanzlei), who had committed suicide as a result of the Empire’s collapse. Schneider 
himself refused to reveal the secret. According to Glaise, despite the untruths, the account contained 
new elements which only seven or eight people in Franz Joseph’s environment could have known. 
However, the author had obviously been less close to Karl. Möller even believed that an alien hand had 
added the passages on Karl, since he considered Mikeš too dynastically loyal for such violent attacks. 
7 Josef Schneider (editor and translator), Anonymus, Kaiser Franz Joseph I. und sein Hof. 
Erinnerungen und Schilderungen aus den nachgelassenen Papieren eines persönlichen Ratgebers 
(Vienna/Hamburg, reprint, 1984). 
8 The 1923 French translation is used here: Général Baron Albert de Margutti, La Tragédie des 
Habsburg. Mémoires d’un aide de camp (Vienna/Paris, 1923); KA, NMö, 1, II, pp.305, 323-324. 
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abundantly clear that the transition from the old emperor to his great-nephew had 
been a painful, dispiriting and ultimately fateful upheaval. Criticism of Karl, 
irrespective of the source, was usually consistent: he was inadequately educated, 
intellectually middling, childish, naïve, weak-willed, irresolute, fickle, unsuitably 
informal, easily swayed, susceptible to female influences, priggish, a poor judge of 
character, arbitrary, impulsive and rash.9 To many Reich Germans, he was also a 
traitor. The former emperor was, of course, not without his champions. Most 
distinguished among these was Count Arthur Polzer-Hoditz, the former chief of his 
private office, whose book, translated into English as The Emperor Charles, remains 
indispensable.10 Although his admiration and affection for the emperor fettered his 
critical faculty and left a gap in his conclusions, his reliable and insightful account 
was no obsequious panegyric.11 More obviously biased – though not devoid of use – 
was the work of his last secretary Karl von Werkmann, who had followed him into 
exile.12 Minor figures variously acquainted with the emperor also leapt to his defence, 
refuting scurrilous rumours and seeking to secure him a worthier place in history.13 
Yet although he received sympathetic treatment from more important personages,14  
                                                                                                                                      
Margutti himself was long suspected of being the anonymous author above. When asked by Möller, he 
laughed off these claims and pointed to Mikeš. To this day, however, he is referenced as the author by 
the Austrian National Library. 
9 Such judgements appeared in: Moritz von Auffenberg von Komarów, Aus Österreichs Höhe und 
Niedergang: eine Lebensschilderung (Munich, 1921); Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 
Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, 2 vols (Berlin, 1919-1921); Rudolf Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte 
einer Grossmacht. Menschen, Völker, Probleme des Habsburger-Reichs (Berlin, 1932); Carl Freiherr 
von Bardolff, Soldat im alten Österreich. Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben (Jena, 1939). 
10 Count Arthur Polzer-Hoditz, The Emperor Charles (London, 1930). Childhood friend, confidant and 
political adviser, Polzer held this post from February to November 1917, when he fell out of favour. He 
was, in his own words, “one of the few witnesses, perhaps the only one, who ever gained an insight 
into the emperor’s most intimate mind” (p.311). 
11 Polzer, p.46, footnote 1. Polzer kept a diary in which he almost always wrote up his conversations 
with Karl on the evening of the day on which they had taken place. When head of Karl’s private office, 
he noted important conversations with him immediately afterwards in shorthand, and often took down 
his exact words during the conversation. 
12 Karl Freiherr von Werkmann, Deutschland als Verbündeter, Kaiser Karls Kampf um den Frieden 
(Berlin, 1931). 
13 Baron Julius von Szilassy, Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie (Berlin, 1921); Emmerich Zeno 
von Schonta, Erinnerungen eines Flügeladjutanten an Weiland Seine Majestät den Kaiser und König 
Karl. Eine Auswahl von Vorträgen und Aufsätzen des Fregattenkapitän d. R. (Vienna, 1928); Stefan 
Baron Kray, Im Dienste der Kabinettskanzlei während des Weltkrieges. Episoden und Charakterbilder 
aus dem Leben der Kaiser Franz Joseph und Karl. Reflexionen eines ehemaligen Hofsekretärs der 
k.u.k. Kabinettskanzlei (Budapest, 1937); Tamás Graf von Erdödy, Die Memoiren des Grafen Tamás 
von Erdödy. Habsburgs Weg von Wilhelm zu Briand. Vom Kurier des Sixtus-Briefes zum 
Königsputschisten, ed. Paul Szemere and Erich Czech (Zurich/Leipzig/Vienna, 1931); Prince Ludwig 
Windischgraetz, My Memoirs (London, 1921). 
14 Count Ottokar Czernin, In the World War (London, 1919); Prince Sixte de Bourbon, L’offre de paix 
séparée de l’Autriche (5 décembre 1916 – 12 octobre 1917) (Paris, 1920); Arthur Freiherr Arz von 
Straußenburg, Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges 1914-1918. Aufzeichnungen (Vienna, 1924); 
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Karl’s reputation in Austria and Germany – never brilliant since 1918 – was not 
redeemed.15 Slipping towards oblivion, he inspired mostly pity or disdain. In the 
successor states, he disappeared from public consciousness altogether. In Hungary, 
despite his two restoration attempts, he featured in memoirs merely as a “likeable 
peripheral figure”.16 Czechoslovaks,17 Yugoslavs18 and Poles,19 for their part, paid 
scant attention to him in their often one-sided, selective and self-glorifying 
recollections of the road to independence. Several biographies of Karl began to appear 
in the early 1930s,20 but scholarly work remained largely non-existent (with the 
exception of Fester’s above-mentioned book). 
                                                                                                                                      
Stephan Graf Burián, Austria in Dissolution, Being the Personal Recollections of Stephan Count 
Burián, Minister for Foreign Affairs for Austria and Hungary 1915–1917 and 1918 (London, 1925); 
Alexander von Spitzmüller, Der letzte österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich und der Zusammenbruch 
der Monarchie (Berlin, 1929); Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (London, 1930); General Ottokar Landwehr, Hunger. Die Erschöpfung der Mittelmächte 
1917/1918 (Zurich/Leipzig/Vienna, 1931); Ernst Streer Ritter von Streeruwitz, Springflut über 
Österreich, Erinnerungen, Erlebnisse und Gedanken aus bewegter Zeit 1914-1929 (Vienna/Leipzig, 
1937); Hans von Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866-1917, ed. Friedrich Rabenau (Leipzig, 1938); ibid., 
Aus seinem Leben 1918-1936, ed. Friedrich Rabenau (Leipzig, 1940). Interestingly, in light of his 
fraught relationship with Karl, Czernin provided a rather understanding – if patronizing – portrait of 
him in his otherwise unreliable and self-exonerating memoirs. 
15 Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918, 5 vols (Vienna/Berlin/Leipzig, 
1921-1925); ibid., Private Aufzeichnungen, ed. Kurt Peball (Vienna/Munich, 1977); Karl Friedrich 
Nowak, Der Weg zur Katastrophe (Berlin, 1919); ibid., The Collapse of Central Europe (London, 
1924); Gina Gräfin Conrad von Hötzendorf, Mein Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf  (Leipzig, 1935). 
The death of the former chief of general staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf in 1925 spared Karl’s 
reputation from a further blow. Indeed, Conrad had not had time to take his memoirs beyond December 
1914, despite their title. His private notes, first published in 1977, however, provide probably the most 
violent of all attacks on Karl – a true character assassination. Conrad’s friend Karl Friedrich Nowak 
and wife Gina had previously made their own contributions to the subject. 
16 Iván Bertényi Jr., “Eine sympatische Nebenfigur. König Karl IV. im Spiegel von Memoiren 
ungarischer Politiker”, in: Karl I. (IV.), der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Donaumonarchie, ed. 
Andreas Gottsmann (Vienna, 2007), pp.247-268. For instance in: Count Julius Andrássy, 
Diplomacy and the War (London, 1921); Theodor Graf Batthyány, Für Ungarn gegen Hohenzollern 
(Zürich/Leipzig/Vienna, 1930); Count Michael Károlyi, Fighting the World: The Struggle for Peace 
(London, 1924). 
17 Jaroslav Werstadt (ed.), Naše Revoluce, čtvrtletní historický sborník (Prague, 1923-1938); Alois 
Žipek, (ed.), Domov za války. Svědectví účastníků, 5 vols (Prague, 1929-1931); Gustav Habrman, Mé 
vzpomínky za války: Črty a obrázky o událostech a zápasech za svobodou a samostatnost (Prague, 
1928); František Staněk, Politik, tribun, národohospodář, družstevník a buditel lidu venkovského. 
Memoáry a dokumenty, ed. Jaroslav Marcha (Brno, 1927); František Soukup, 28. říjen 1918. 
Předpoklady a vývoj našeho odboje domácího v československé revoluci za státní samostatnost národa, 
2 vols (Prague, 1928); Zdeněk Tobolka, Politické dějiny československého národa od r.1848 do dnešní 
doby, 4 vols (Prague, 1932-1937). 
18 Slovene politician Anton Korošec gave a lecture on “The Genesis of Yugoslavia” in Ljubljana on 
25.10.1925, in: Silvo Kranjec (ed.), “Koroščevo predavanje o postanku Jugoslavije”, Zgodovinski 
Časopis, 16 (Ljubljana, 1962), pp.218-229. 
19 Leon Biliński, Wspomnienia i Dokumenty, 2 vols (Warsaw, 1924). The memoirs of Biliński, the 
former Austro-Hungarian finance minister, were particularly dismissive of Karl. 
20 Jérôme Troud, Charles I, Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie (Paris, 1931); Herbert Vivian, The 
Life of the Emperor Charles of Austria (London, 1932); Bruno Brehm, Weder Kaiser noch König: Der 
Untergang der habsburgischen Monarchie (Munich, 1933); Imre Balassa, Death of an Empire 
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Karl’s supporters, however, were hard at work. His premature end in 1922, in 
pitiable circumstances, for ever established him as a tragic figure. Yet it was on the 
basis of his life, rather than his death, that, on the first anniversary of his passing, the 
future Austrian president Wilhelm Miklas petitioned the Archbishop of Vienna, 
Cardinal Piffl, to initiate the process of beatification. Two years later, the prayer 
league toiling to this end, the Kaiser-Karl-Gebetsliga für den Völkerfrieden,21 
received official ecclesiastical sanction.22 In 1928, it started the publication of its 
yearbook – of little academic use despite the occasional contributions of first-hand 
witnesses.23 After the Anschluss, the National Socialists disbanded the league, 
deporting and killing one of its leading members, Hans Karl Zeßner-Spitzenberg.24 
Nevertheless, the organization was able to resume its activity after the war,25 and, in 
1949, the Vatican announced the beginning of the beatification procedure.26 As its 
conclusion approached, a literary industry emerged, virtually unopposed,27 producing 
tome after tome of hagiographies posing as biographies, in order to bolster Karl’s 
claims to sainthood.28 Munificent, generous, humble, gifted, shrewd, sagacious, pious, 
                                                                                                                                      
(London, 1936); Bertita Harding, Imperial Twilight (London, 1940); Joseph Delabays, La destinée 
tragique d’un monarque pacifique (Cambrai, 1945). 
21 “The Emperor Karl Prayer League for Peace among Nations”. 
22 Eva Demmerle, Kaiser Karl I.: “Selig, die Frieden stiften” (Vienna, 2004), pp.258-259. 
23 Kaiser-Karl-Gebetsliga für den Völkerfrieden (ed.), Gedächtnis-Jahrbuch. Dem Andenken an Karl 
von Österreich gewidmet (Vienna, 1928-1937). 
24 Zeßner had been preparing a biography of Karl and had collected numerous statements and notes 
from eyewitnesses. After the war, his work was completed by Erich Thanner, regrettably without 
sources: Hans Karl Zeßner-Spitzenberg, Kaiser Karl, ed. Erich Thanner (Salzburg, 1953). 
25 The yearbook restarted in 1953 and has continued in the following forms: Die stille Schar: Jahrbuch 
der Gebetsliga (Lilienfeld/Vienna, 1953-1997); Journal der Kaiser Karl Gebetsliga (Vienna, 1998-
1999); Wir über uns: Jahresbericht der Kaiser Karl-Gebetsliga für den Völkerfrieden (Vienna, 2000); 
Jahresbericht der Kaiser-Karl-Gebetsliga für den Völkerfrieden (Vienna, 2001-2010); Jahrbuch der 
Kaiser-Karl-Gebetsliga für den Völkerfrieden (Vienna, 2011). 
26 Demmerle, p.260. 
27 A notable exception was the small article by Rudolf Schermann which argued against the 
beatification of Karl due to his approval of the use of poison gas on the Italian Front:  “Kaiser Karl, 
warum er nicht seliggesprochen werden darf”, Kirche Intern, 11 (1996), pp.30-35. 
28 Heinz von Lichem, Karl I.: Ein Kaiser sucht den Frieden (Innsbruck, 1996); Peter Broucek, Karl I 
(IV): Der politische Weg des letzten Herrschers der Donaumonarchie (Vienna, 1997); Patrick 
Germain, Charles et Zita: derniers souverains d'Autriche-Hongrie (Nice, 2002); Michel Dugast 
Rouillé, Charles de Habsbourg: le dernier empereur (Brussels, 2003); Demmerle, op. cit.; Jan Mikrut 
(ed.), Kaiser Karl I (IV.) als Christ, Staatsmann, Ehemann und Familienvater (Vienna, 2004); James 
and Joanna Bogle, A Heart for Europe: the Lives of Emperor Charles and Empress Zita of Austria-
Hungary (Leominster, 2004). Elisabeth Kovács, Untergang oder Rettung der Donaumonarchie? Die 
österreichische Frage. Kaiser und König Karl I (IV.) und die Neuordnung Mitteleuropas 1916-1922, 
volume I (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar, 2004). The first volume by Kovács – a former professor at the 
Faculty of Catholic Theology in Vienna and member of the Historical Commission for the 
Beatification of Emperor Karl – is nothing short of odious. To her mind, Austria-Hungary fell victim to 
the intrigues and machinations of camarillas of freemasons, Jews, Bolsheviks, Liberals, Atheists and 
Slav nationalists. She gives particular credence to the idea of a masonic cabal fanatically intent on 
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spiritual, noble-minded, moral, progressive, visionary, doughty and brave, Karl had 
apparently been thwarted in his philanthropic designs to end the war and to reform 
Austria-Hungary on a democratic and federal basis by insurmountable difficulties, 
dastardly machinations and dark, pitiless, ungodly foes. His beatification was duly 
pronounced in October 2004.29 There is, however, no respite from these eulogies in 
sight: canonization lies ahead for Karl once a second miracle is validated, while his 
wife Zita’s beatification got underway in 2009.30 
Quite unwittingly, however, Karl’s road to holiness has provided the most 
significant boost to historical research. Indeed, numerous documents were submitted 
to the Vatican – and subsequently verified, and published extensively in 2004 – from 
the otherwise closed Habsburg archive.31 Previously, only a handful of historians had 
been granted (very limited) access to some of the private papers of the imperial 
family, thanks to their close relationship with its members. Unfortunately, this 
association, particularly with Zita, proved fatal to their impartiality.32 As a result, no 
works of academic quality exist on Karl’s life and reign as a whole,33 though useful 
                                                                                                                                      
destroying the Dual Monarchy. This view, however, was not alien to Karl or to Zita, and remains 
popular within the prayer league. 
29 Demmerle, pp.260, 266-267. On the basis of his peace efforts, his social measures and deep piety, 
and of a miracle: the curing of the venous ulcers of a Polish nun in Brazil in 1960. 
30 The president of the “Association pour la béatification de l'Impératrice Zita” is Jean Sévillia, author 
of one of the most recent rhapsodies on Karl: Le dernier empereur. Charles d’Autriche. 1887-1922  
(Paris, 2009). 
31 Elisabeth Kovács (ed.), Untergang oder Rettung der Donaumonarchie? Politische Dokumente zu 
Kaiser und König Karl I. (IV.) aus Internationalen Archiven, volume II (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar, 
2004). 
32 Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Last Habsburg (London, 1968); Tamara Griesser-Pečar, Zita: Die 
Wahrheit über Europas letzte Kaiserin (1985); ibid., Die Mission Sixtus, Österreichs Friedensversuch 
im Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna/Munich, 1988); ibid., Karl und Zita. Ihr kurzes Eheleben in einer 
schwierigen Zeit (Vienna, 2004); Erich Feigl (ed.), Kaiser Karl. Persönliche Aufzeichnungen, 
Zeugnisse und Dokumente (Vienna/Munich, 1984); ibid., Kaiser Karl. Ein Leben für den Frieden 
seiner Völker (Vienna, 1990); ibid., Zita, Kaiserin und Königin (Vienna/Munich, 1991); ibid.,“Gott 
erhalte…” Kaiser Karl. Persönliche Aufzeichnungen und Dokumente (Vienna, 2006); Demmerle, op. 
cit. Brook-Shepherd was the first historian to be granted access to the surviving political and 
biographical material on Karl contained in the Habsburg family papers, and to be privy to Zita’s 
recollections, who delivered them from memory when her diaries and jottings proved insufficient. But, 
aside from her tendentious contributions, his book is a standard biography. Feigl, who also befriended 
and interviewed the erstwhile empress, did not attempt to hide his bias and happily edited inconvenient 
passages. Though not quite impartial, Griesser-Pečar made by far the best use of her contacts with Zita 
and supplemented the information she obtained – and referenced rigorously – with archival research. 
Demmerle was the long-serving assistant of Karl’s son Otto, and wrote accordingly.  
33 Wilhelm Möller, Kaiser Karl I. von Österreich. Eine Lebensbeschreibung. Zusammengestellt aus der 
Presse, Literatur, Mitteilungen und eigenen Ermittlungen (Vienna, 1954); Reinhold Lorenz, Kaiser 
Karl und der Untergang der Donaumonarchie (Graz, 1959); Heinz Rieder, Kaiser Karl: Der letzte 
Monarch Österreich-Ungarns 1887-1922 (Munich, 1981); Jiří Pernes, Poslední Habsburkové: Karel, 
Zita, Otto a snahy o záchranu císařského trůnu (Brno, 1999); Jan Galandauer, Karel I.: poslední český 
král (Prague/Litomyšl, 2004). Wilhelm Möller compiled an extraordinarily extensive piece work over 
twelve years, based on the daily press, war literature, interviews with prominent court and military 
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studies, monographs and articles have appeared.34 In the classic accounts of the 
downfall of the Monarchy, Karl takes up little space.35 There, the conclusions are 
often penetrating and sometimes sympathetic, but, ultimately, always damning.36 
However, the availability of many of his personal recollections, though it 
might not alter this verdict, has for ever changed the nature of research on Karl. The 
last Habsburg monarch was not a prolific writer; he did not usually keep a diary,37 and 
he apparently destroyed most of his secret documents and teleprinter exchanges.38 
Nevertheless, his papers were preserved and ordered by Zita.39 Several of these are 
invaluable, most significantly for this work his jottings from late 191440 and the many 
pages he filled in exile in September 1920.41 These partly compensate for the many 
obstacles facing the student of Karl’s rule. For instance, none of his Austrian prime 
                                                                                                                                      
personalities and his own personal experiences, which contained “932 typed-up pages, 18 flowcharts, 
12 supplementary sheets, 49 audiences given by Karl and published in the press”. Only the above-
mentioned, abridged version was published, though the full work (which contains no footnotes) is in 
the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna (Nachlass Wilhelm Möller, K1). In his biography of Karl, 
Reinhold Lorenz announced the future publication of a complementary volume of notes, which never 
appeared. His papers, which contain much of the material for the book, were, however, deposited in the 
Kriegsarchiv (Nachlass Reinhold Lorenz, (A,B/999)). The absence of footnotes in Galandauer’s recent 
biography is an incomprehensible shame. 
34 Gerhard Kielnhofer, “Kaiser Karls soziale Bemühungen und Reformversuche” (PhD, University of 
Graz, 1965); Robert A. Kann, Die Sixtus Affäre und die geheimen Friedensverhandlung Österreich-
Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1966); Helmut Hoyer, Kaiser Karl I. und Feldmarschall 
Conrad von Hötzendorf. Ein Beitrag zur Militärpolitik Kaiser Karls (Vienna, 1972); Paula S. Fichtner, 
“Charles I (IV): War Leadership as Personal Leadership”, in Béla K. Király and Albert A. Nofi (eds.), 
East and Central European War Leaders: Military and Civilian (New York, 1988), pp.75-84; Andreas 
Gottsmann (ed.), op. cit. 
35 Robert A Kann, The Multinational Empire, Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg 
Monarchy 1848-1918, 2 vols (New York, 1950); Arthur J. May, The Passing of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy 1914-1918, 2 vols (Philadelphia, 1968); Leo Valiani, The End of Austria-Hungary (London, 
1973); A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918 (London, 1990); Alan Sked, The Decline 
and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918 (London, 2001); Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy 
c.1765-1918 (London, 2001); Mark Cornwall (ed.), The Last Years of Austria-Hungary, A Multi-
National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe (Exeter, 2002). 
36 Kann, II, p.239. Kann, for example, wrote that “he failed on all points and everywhere” and that 
“nearly every one of his desperate attempts to stem the impending disaster ended in a situation worse 
than if no attempt had been made at all”. 
37 Karl Freiherr von Werkmann (ed.), Aus Kaiser Karls Nachlass (Berlin, 1925), p.23. Though 
according to Werkmann, during agitated times, he wrote down his experiences and impressions on the 
sheets of a block of paper, as well as the measures he wish to take in future – this was to serve as an 
aide-mémoire. 
38 KA, NMö, 1, II, pp.258, 301-302. According to the operator Möller, who handled many of Karl’s 
personal files, telegrams, teleprints and phone calls personally. However, at least one Hughes teleprint 
survived, reproduced in: UR, II, document 88, pp.340-341. 
39 UR, I, p.13. 
40 UR, II, 3, “Kriegserinnerungen Kaiser Karls”, sine loco, 13.10.1914-24.12.1914 and 24.12.1914, 
pp.49-86. 
41 UR, II, 213, “Persönliche Aufzeichnungen Kaiser und König Karls (21. November 1916 bis 24. 
March 1919), Prangins, Switzerland, 8.9.1920, pp.604-694. 
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ministers – Ernest von Koerber,42 Heinrich Clam-Martinic,43 Ernst Seidler von 
Feuchtenegg,44 Max Hussarek von Heinlein45 and Heinrich Lammasch46 – left any 
literature of note concerning their tenure. Moreover, many of the files from their 
office – including the minutes of the ministerial councils – perished in the fire of the 
Palace of Justice in 1927.47 The diaries and recollections of Joseph Maria 
Baernreither48 – minister without portfolio between December 1916 and June 1917 – 
as well as the diaries of Josef Redlich49 – parliamentary deputy, potential prime 
minister and last finance minister of Austria – remain the best sources of inside 
information on Viennese politics for the period. 
 
Drawing on Karl’s still virtually unstudied papers, on archival research – primarily in 
Vienna, Prague and Berlin – and on the widest possible selection of published primary 
sources in German and Czech, this work aims to assess Karl’s preparation as heir and 
record as emperor. From the moment of his accession to the throne, however, it is 
limited in time and place – to the time when he still had a realistic possibility of 
enacting domestic reforms, and to the places where stakes were highest. 
Before the war, the Czech-German conflict was already the most acute in 
Cisleithanian parliamentary politics, resulting in the closing of the Bohemian Diet in 
Prague in July 1913 (as a result of German obstruction) and the proroguing of the 
Reichsrat in Vienna in March 1914 (as a result of Czech obstruction). The hope for a 
                                               
42 Koerber died in March 1919, having left no memoirs. Very brief recollections were published a year 
later in: Josef Melbourn (ed.), “Mitteilungen und Äußerungen des Dr. Ernest von Koerber über 
Ereignisse und Persönlichkeiten der letzten Zeit”, Das neue Europa, 6:1, ed. Paul Cohn 
(Zurich/Vienna/Berlin, 1920), pp.22-30. The diaries of Josef Redlich represent the most substantial 
source of information on Koerber: Fritz Fellner and Doris A. Corradini (eds.), Schicksalsjahre 
Österreichs 1869-1936: Die Erinnerungen und Tagebücher Josef Redlichs, 3 vols 
(Vienna/Cologne/Weimar, 2011). 
43 A handful of interesting documents are nevertheless preserved in the family archive in Burg Clam in 
Upper Austria. 
44 Seidler’s recollections were serialized in the Neue Freie Presse in 1924, under the title “Aus 
schwerer Zeit”: part I, Morgenblatt, 20.7; part II, M, 25.7; part III, M, 2.8; part IV, M, 9.8; part V, M, 
14.8; part VI, M, 2.9.1924. 
45 Hussarek published an article entitled “Aus den letzten Wochen des alten Österreich” in the 
Reichspost, 11.11.1928, pp.3-5. 
46 There is very little on this period in: Marga Lammasch and Hans Sperl (eds.), Heinrich Lammasch, 
Seine Aufzeichnungen, sein Wirken und seine Politik (Vienna/Leipzig, 1922). 
47 The historian Ludwig Brügel studied these before the blaze, and his Geschichte der Österreichischen 
Sozial-Demokratie, 5 vols (Vienna, 1922-1925) is in some cases the only remaining record. 
48 HHStA, Nachlass Baernreither, K6 and K7 (wartime diaries); K11 (memoirs). Extracts were 
published in: Der Verfall des Habsburgerreiches und die Deutschen, Fragmente eines politischen 
Tagebuches 1897-1917, ed. Oskar Mitis (Vienna, 1939). The full publication of his diaries, under the 
supervision of Fritz Fellner, is expected in 2014. 
49 Fellner and Corradini (eds.), op. cit. 
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compromise – an Ausgleich, or vyrovnání to the Czechs – had faded, as national 
competition became a “zero-sum game”.50 Although Karl often seemed unaware of it 
during his reign, the Bohemian problem remained the most central and contentious 
issue in Austrian politics. In contrast to the Polish and South Slav questions, its 
resolution was not dependent on the outcome of the war and, at least at the beginning 
of Karl’s reign, had no implications for foreign policy or for the dualist structure of 
the Monarchy. It could therefore be resolved prior to the conclusion of peace and 
without Magyar involvement. Accordingly, it constituted the cornerstone of the plans 
for internal reform hatched by buoyant German nationalists – from the Bohemian 
lands and elsewhere – in the first two years of the war.51 To such men, the social, 
economic, industrial, cultural, political and demographic development of the Czechs 
had become a mortal threat to their own national existence and, by extension, to the 
nature of the Monarchy. A wartime memorandum from German parliamentary circles 
made this clear: “Here [in Bohemia], Germandom faces its most advanced, and 
therefore most dangerous, opponent”.52 To be sure, the Czechs ended up at the 
forefront of the movements which brought about the collapse of Austria-Hungary, 
both at home and abroad. Yet domestically, this path had been convoluted, slow, 
uncertain and often ambivalent. The literature on the subject, with several noteworthy 
exceptions,53 was long obfuscated by the mythologizing of Masaryk and Beneš’s 
action abroad,54 of the events around 28 October 1918 – the date of Czechoslovak 
                                               
50 Catherine Albrecht, “The Bohemian Question”, in: Cornwall (ed.), p.91. 
51 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin, Österreich 86Nr.2, volume 21, Tschirschky to 
Auswärtiges Amt, 30.8.1916. As the German ambassador Tschirschky pointed out to his foreign office 
in August 1916, the South Slav question had been all but ignored. 
52 PAAA, Österreich 101, 36, Tschirschky-Bethmann, 26.6.1915. This unsigned and undated 
memorandum entitled “German Bohemian thoughts on the Austrian question” was transmitted to 
Tschirschky, who passed in on to Berlin. 
53 The English-language literature is a little dated but still useful: Z.A.B. Zeman, The Break-Up of the 
Habsburg Empire (Oxford, 1961); Victor S. Mamatey, “The Union of Czech Political Parties in the 
Reichsrat 1916-1918”, in: Robert A. Kann, Béla K. Király, Paula S. Fichtner (eds.), The Habsburg 
Empire in World War I (New York, 1977), pp.3-28; H. Louis Rees, The Czechs During World War I 
(New-York, 1992). Two of the best works on the subject remain unpublished: F.B.M. Fowkes, “The 
Policy of the Habsburg Monarchy towards the Bohemian Question 1913-1918” (PhD, London School 
of Economics, 1967) and Carl W. Chrislock, “Reluctant Radicals: Czech Social Democracy and the 
Nationality Question, 1914-1918” (PhD, Indiana University, 1972). In Czech, the pioneering studies by 
Milada Paulová remain indispensable: Dějiny Maffie: Odboj Čechů a Jihoslovanů za světové války, 
1914-1918, (Prague, 1937); Tajný výbor [Maffie] a spolupráce s Jihoslovany v letech 1916-1918 
(Prague, 1968). To this one must add the works of Jan Galandauer and Zdeněk Kárník, for instance: 
Galandauer, Bohumír Šmeral 1914-1941 (Prague, 1986); Kárník, Socialisté na rozcestí, Habsburk 
Masaryk či Šmeral (Prague, 1996). 
54 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State, Memories and Observations 1914-1918 (London, 
1927); Édouard Beneš, Souvenirs de guerre et de révolution (1914-1918), La lutte pour l’indépendance 
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independence – and of the Czech legion, but has improved considerably.55 In addition, 
in recent years, a particularly rich historiography has appeared, highlighting the 
complexity and ambiguity of national identity in the Bohemian lands.56 
 A solution to the Bohemian problem – and indeed to the fundamental crises of 
Austria-Hungary – was a Herculean task. But in the first months of his reign, Karl had 
enough room for manoeuvre at least to attempt a solution, whether localized or as part 
of a complete reform of Cisleithania, whether through negotiated compromise or 
imperial decree. Moreover, as the supreme civil and military commander of Austria-
Hungary, his power was absolute. That this attempt was barely made, and that his 
failure was ultimately complete, suggests, at the very least, a considerable degree of 
responsibility in his own dismal fate. 
                                                                                                                                      
des peuples, 2 vols (Paris, 1928). Both Masaryk and Beneš, however, recognized the difficulties Karl 
had caused them. 
55 Jan Křen, Die Konfliktgemeinschaft. Tschechen und Deutsche 1780-1918 (Munich, 2000); Otto 
Urban, Die tschechische Gesellschaft 1848 bis 1918, 2 vols (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar, 1994); Ivan 
Šedivý, “České loajalní projevy 1914-1918”, Český časopis historický, 97:2 (Prague, 1999), pp.293-
309); ibid., Češi, české země a velká valka 1914-1918 (Prague, 2001); Hans Mommsen, Dušan Kováč, 
Jiří Malíř and Michaela Marek (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Beziehungen zwischen Tschechen, 
Slowaken und Deutschen (Essen, 2001); Richard Lein, Pflichterfüllung oder Hochverrat, Die 
tschechischen Soldaten Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna, 2011). The publication of 
Zdeněk V. Tobolka’s wartime diary is also of prime importance: Můj deník z první světové války 
(Prague, 2008). 
56 Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans, A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-
1918 (Princeton/Oxford, 2002); Eagle Glassheim, Noble Nationalists, The Transformation of the 
Bohemian Aristocracy (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, 2005); Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L 
Rozenblit (eds.), Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe (New York/Oxford, 2005); Pieter 
M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation, Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, 2006); Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival, Germans 
in Prague, 1861-1914 (West Lafayette, 2006); Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), Creating the Other: Ethnic 
Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe (New York, 2003); Nancy M. Wingfield, Flag 
Wars and Stone Saints. How the Bohemian lands became Czech (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, 
2007); Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls, National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the 
Bohemian lands, 1900-1948 (Ithaca/London, 2008). 
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CHAPTER I 
 
ARCHDUKE CARL FRANZ JOSEPH 
 
Until Gavrilo Princip’s bullet tore through Franz Ferdinand’s neck, his nephew, 
Archduke Carl Franz Joseph, had believed that another twenty or thirty years lay 
ahead of his accession to the throne.1 In fact, after the attack in Sarajevo, the call of 
duty was barely thirty months away. In that time, despite the advanced age of the 
emperor and his own inexperience in statecraft, Karl – as he would become known on 
the throne – took the field and fulfilled almost exclusively military duties. By 
November 1916, battle-tried after postings on the Italian, Russian and Romanian 
fronts, he had risen to the ranks of colonel general and grand admiral.2 Shortly after, 
however, upon hearing of the emperor’s declining health, he returned to Vienna, 
arriving a mere nine days before his death on 21 November.3 The new, twenty-nine-
year-old monarch’s elevation from archducal anonymity4 had occurred through an 
unlikely series of extraordinary events,5 but he had not been entirely deprived of the 
grooming for a future emperor (even though it was nothing like the gruelling 
curriculum imposed on Franz Joseph).6 Indeed, by the age of eight, only his uncle 
Franz Ferdinand and father Otto stood ahead of him in the line of succession. What is 
more, as a result of the former’s ill health, the latter long appeared a more likely heir.7 
Though Franz Ferdinand recovered, his morganatic marriage in 1900 made Karl’s 
                                               
1 Brook-Shepherd, p.3. According to his wife Zita. 
2 HHStA, Hausarchiv, Nachlass Schager-Eckarstau, K1, 3, Franz Joseph-Karl, 1.11.1916; Werkmann, 
pp.18-24, 38-67. In March 1916, he had been given the command of the Twentieth Corps on the Italian 
Front. Despite success in battle, the advance was halted in the wake of the Brusilov Offensive and in 
July, Karl, again promoted, was transferred eastwards to take charge of the planned, but still inexistent, 
mixed Austro-German Twelfth Army. Karl eventually controlled an army front which faced Russian 
offensives in August and September, and in mid-October, he assumed command of another army front 
in Transylvania. 
3 Werkmann, pp.74-75. 
4 NFPM, 18.8.1887, p.4. His birth featured in the “news in brief” section. 
5 HHStA, NMö, K1, 1-3, p.275; Brook-Shepherd, p.5. Möller counted nine incidents which contributed 
to his accession, Brook-Shepherd six: “Execution by a firing squad in Mexico; a suicide in a hunting 
lodge at Mayerling; poison from the waters of the River Jordan; a father’s premature death in a Vienna 
villa; an uncle’s unfitting romance in Bohemia and his assassination on the banks of the Miljacka.” 
6 Egon Caesar Corti, Vom Kind zum Kaiser. Kindheit und erste Jugend Kaiser Franz Josephs I. und 
seiner Geschwister (Graz, 1950), pp.142-143, 194-201, 220-222, 240. 
7 Czernin, p.36; Friedrich Funder, Vom Gestern ins Heute. Aus dem Kaiserreich in die Republik 
(Vienna/Munich, 1952), p.488. 
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enthronement seem inevitable.8 Soon after, imperial officials began to consider 
seriously the question of his education, and duly sketched comprehensive 
suggestions.9 Meanwhile, Karl continued to enjoy a conventional princely upbringing. 
After seven years in entirely female care – particularly in the hands of his pious 
mother Maria Josepha10 – he was assigned a tutor, Count Georg Wallis, from 1895 
until his majority.11 Alongside this, he had a successful spell in public education (as a 
private student) at the Schottengymnasium in Vienna,12 which was curtailed in order 
to start his military training.13 Days after the premature death of his long ailing father 
in November 1906, which left him second in line to the throne, he moved to Prague to 
complete his academic instruction. In two years of study, he received private lessons 
from professors of both the German and Czech universities, according to a plan 
focused on jurisprudence and politics drafted by his friend and confidant Count 
Arthur Polzer-Hoditz.14 Karl’s programme of study largely eschewed minutiae, 
concentrating on fundamental principles and seeking to give him “a clear overview of 
the wide field of political science, an insight into the workings and mechanisms of the 
machine of state” so as to obtain “an overall picture in order always to have his eye on 
the whole when deciding on an individual matter”. Knowing Karl’s character, Polzer 
wrote to Wallis: “I think that the lectures and studies should not be too abstract and 
theoretical, and should instead employ a lively, more Socratic method”. However, no 
compromises were made in constitutional law, its history, and current political and 
                                               
8 UR, II, 1, Otto-Wallis, 22.9.1904, pp.37-39. In a missive addressed to Karl’s tutor in 1904, Otto 
wrote: “Our son Karl who, God willing, is destined one day to become emperor”.  
9 KA, Nachlass Karl von Steininger (III), B/708, Mappe 5. In 1900, Baron Bolfras, the chief of the 
emperor’s military chancellery asked Major General Steininger for his thoughts on the matter, which he 
wrote down in a lengthy memorandum. The fate of these proposals is unclear. 
10 Österreichs Illustrierte Zeitung, Kaiser-Huldigungsnummer, 21.11.1917, p.26. 
11 Wallis, “Aus der Jugend des Kaisers”, NFPM, 17.8.1917, p.7; Archduchess Maria Annunciata, “Aus 
Kaiser Karls Kindheit”, KGJ 1931 (Vienna, 1930), p.12. Wallis had previously tutored Karl’s father 
Otto and uncle Franz Ferdinand. 
12 NSE, K1, 3, school reports, 27.6.1901, 28.2.1902, 27.6.1902, 27.6.1902. He completed the exams for 
the lower form (Untergymnasium) with “excellent” success in June 1901. 
13 Ibid.; KA, Personalunterlagen, Qualifikationslisten, Erzherzog Karl (sic) Franz Joseph; NFPM, 
17.8.1917, p.7. He was made Lieutenant of the First Ulan Regiment in October 1903, le left school in 
the summer of 1904 and after a year of training, his active service began in October 1905 in the 
Seventh Dragoon Regiment in Bohemia. 
14 KA, Nachlass Polzer-Hoditz, B/1499, Mappe, p.1; Kray, p.107; NFPM, 23.11.1916, p.5; 17.8.1917, 
p.7; Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 23.11.1916, p.2; 24.11.1916, p.6; ÖIZ, p.132. The press later attributed the 
plan to a “high-ranking official in the interior ministry”, which the Neues Wiener Tagblatt identified as 
former Czech national minister Antonín Rezek, before retracting this claim. Indeed, Rezek had only 
helped select the tutors. The plan was then approved by Franz Joseph after consultation with the 
minister of education. Karl’s teachers were Professors Ott for canon law, Ulbrich for Austrian 
constitutional law, Pfaff for civil, trade and exchange law, Bráf for national economy, Goll for general 
history and Schmidt for history of art. 
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economic affairs.15 Karl was an able and assiduous student, noted for his quick 
understanding and outstanding memory, unafraid to ask questions and to express 
critical, even iconoclastic, opinions.16 His studies at an end, he rejoined his regiment 
in the spring of 1908 and spent almost four years garrisoned around provincial 
Bohemia before a transfer to Galicia and, ultimately, a return to Vienna.17 As his 
military commanders testified, he performed remarkably well. His report for 1913 
noted: “Firm, decisive character, lively temperament, excellent mental ability, 
exceptionally quick grasp; […] confident and skilful in the leadership of a battalion; 
understands and assesses tactical situations quickly and correctly; has a noteworthy 
capacity for decision; calm, secure and certain disposition”. It added: “Exemplarily 
zealous, benevolent and filled with the most avid sense of duty, he knows how to 
cultivate and to maintain discipline among men and military spirit; exerts an excellent 
influence on the spirit within the officer corps”.18 Thankfully for Karl, who had few 
opportunities to focus on anything else, he loved the army.19 In his spare time, he 
almost exclusively indulged his passion for hunting, as the numerous trophies on the 
walls of his beloved Villa Wartholz in Reichenau showed.20 Once back in the capital 
in late 1912, he continued to discharge his military and occasional representative 
duties,21 and soon began to receive political and state dignitaries at his residence in 
                                               
15 NWT, 23.11.1916, pp.2-4; NPH, 5, p.21. 
16 Demmerle, p.44; Polzer, pp.43-44; NFPM, 23.11.1916, p.5; ÖIZ, pp.38, 132-133. According to Zita, 
Professor Ott, the director of studies, claimed that he had never had a student with such a quick 
capacity for understanding. Polzer felt Karl had learnt more than someone leaving university with a 
doctorate and praised his “phenomenal memory”, on which Goll also commented. Karl was awarded an 
honorary doctorate from each university in January 1917. 
17 PQ, Karl. His regiment was transferred to eastern Galicia in March 1912. Later that year, he was 
made a Major in the 39th Infantry Regiment stationed in Vienna. In May 1914, he was promoted to 
Lieutenant Colonel and in July named Colonel of the First Hussar Regiment. 
18 Ibid. This assessment featured in all his reports from 1908 to 1914, with a few minor alterations. Karl 
was also described as a good marksman with a love of weapons, and as a passionate and dashing rider. 
His areas of skill were fencing, swimming, hunting, photography, bicycle- and motorbike-riding, and 
driving. His knowledge of countries included the whole Monarchy, France, Monaco, Italy, Germany, 
Switzerland, England, and Liechtenstein. In 1908, he spoke and wrote German, French, Italian and 
English fluently, and Hungarian and Czech sufficiently for official use. By 1913, his knowledge of 
legal Hungarian was fluent in speaking and writing. 
19 HHStA, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, K4, Karl-Franz Ferdinand, 22.1.1909; 7.1911. 
20 NFP, Abendblatt, 22.11.1916, p.3; Fremden-Blatt, Morgen-Ausgabe, 22.11.1916, p.20. 
21 Auffenberg, p.110; NFPM, 1.2.1908, p.9; 23.6.1911, p.4; 20.12.1912, p.5; 28.1.1913, p.11; 8.2.1913, 
p.11; 1.2.1914, p.10. According to Auffenberg, Karl’s first official appearance was in December 1907 
during a commemoration for Radetzky in Vienna. Karl first represented the emperor at the yearly 
Industrialists’ Ball in Vienna in February 1908, a duty he still performed in 1914. In June 1911, he had 
travelled to London on his behalf for the coronation of George V. In December 1912, he was sent to the 
Russian embassy to deliver Franz Joseph’s congratulations for the tsar’s name day, and the following 
month, presented the German embassy with the emperor’s birthday wishes to Wilhelm. He also 
represented him at the funeral of the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Nagl, in February 1913. 
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Hetzendorf Palace.22 In spite of this, he remained aloof from the public, politics and 
power.23 Not only was there no urgency for the young archduke to fill this void but in 
fact, he privately disapproved of the increasing enterprise and influence of Franz 
Ferdinand, whose Belvedere Palace camarilla he considered an affront to the 
constitution and to imperial authority, and a misfortune for the country.24 
 
By the time war broke out, Franz Joseph, though still unimpaired, was already eighty-
three. Polzer – who wrote that the prospect of the young archduke’s taking the throne 
under these circumstances “weighed on [his] soul like a nightmare” – therefore 
thought it imperative to acquaint the new heir with political affairs and public life to 
avoid his falling “into the toils of interested politicians” upon his accession.25 
Accordingly, he immediately wrote a letter to Wallis on the subject, in which he drew 
attention to a newspaper article which cast doubt on the seriousness of Karl’s 
education and which surmised that two high-ranking functionaries would be entrusted 
with his theoretical and practical initiation in all branches of state administration, for 
foreign and domestic policy. Riled by this frivolity, Polzer set out his vision for the 
heir’s training. Above all, he urged Wallis to ensure that Karl be taught by men 
outside political and government circles, unconnected to parties, individual politicians 
or the press. To this end, he proposed the establishment – only with the emperor’s 
blessing – of an independent private secretariat, composed of reliable civil servants 
from both halves of the Empire. These men were to inform Karl of all significant 
events in political life by drawing on both government and party sources; for matters 
of particular interest to Karl or of exceptional importance, ministers and experts were 
to report to him directly.26 Polzer had originally written the missive days before 
mobilization but had desisted from sending it in the belief that the gravity of the hour 
would prompt imperial advisers to give the matter due priority and allow Karl full 
insight into the business of state.27 Certainly, a few hours after hearing the news of 
                                               
22 Julius Sylvester, Vom toten Parlament und seinen letzten Trägern (Vienna, 1928), p.53; NFPM, 
2.3.1913, p.10; 5.3.1913, p.11; 6.3.1913, p.10. In March 1913, he and Zita received, among others, the 
president of the Lower House, the vice-president of the House of Lords, the mayor of Vienna, as well 
as several ministers, politicians and senior civil servants. 
23 Margutti, p.86; FBM, 22.11.1916, p.19. As the Fremden-Blatt later wrote: “Until [Sarajevo], he lived 
happily in relative seclusion, newly married and fully engrossed by his job.” 
24 Polzer, pp.56-57; Werkmann, pp.70, 72; UR, II, 3, 24.12.1914, p.77. 
25 Polzer, p.50; NPH, p.9. 
26 NPH, Polzer-Wallis, 24.7.1914, pp.18-21. 
27 Ibid., pp.21-22. 
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Franz Ferdinand’s death, Franz Joseph had told the head of his private office, Franz 
Schießl von Perstorff, that Karl would now have to be more involved.28 Later that 
day, several civil servants and ministers – notably Berchtold, the foreign minister, 
Stürgkh, the Austrian prime minister, and Heinold, the interior minister – had 
discussed the issue,29 but no definite plan had emerged. A few days thereafter, upon 
hearing that Karl had been earmarked for troop command in Hungary, the chief of 
general staff Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf objected that he had to be “taught 
to govern” first, as a matter of urgency.30 Consequently, on 5 July, Franz Joseph 
ordered that Karl be “educated through occasional lectures on the conduct of war in 
general, on tactics, army matters, politics and statecraft” by active professionals.31 
But, after the declaration of war, he assigned him to army headquarters, insisting that 
he see the battlefield, though without being exposed to danger.32 (During the war, the 
intrepid Karl would, however often throw caution to the wind, to the dismay of his 
entourage.)33 This posting, of course, prevented any further education. As Karl’s 
friend, the former prime minister Prince Konrad zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, 
complained that autumn: “It is a crime to keep the poor archduke […] away from 
everyone and everything, as if he were a career officer rather than the future ruler”.34 
Equally concerned, Polzer finally sent his letter in early November 1914.35 In his 
accompanying message to Wallis, he reiterated his views, stressed the seriousness of 
the situation, and concluded: “He must enter the arena, he must be seen and 
recognized as the future ruler, he must be felt; for he is the heir!”36 
A few weeks later, Karl received Polzer to discuss the letter. But although he 
admitted that his friend’s advice was entirely right, Karl declared himself unable to 
follow it. He felt that the set-up would remind the emperor too unfavourably of Franz 
Ferdinand’s military chancellery, which had ultimately evolved into a parallel seat of 
power. Karl was therefore unwilling to petition Franz Joseph, lest he perturb their 
                                               
28 Heinrich Friedjung, Geschichte in Gesprächen, Aufzeichnungen 1898-1919, ed. Franz Adlgasser and 
Margret Friedrich (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar, 1997), II, 1904-1919, conversation with Schießl, 
15.5.1919, p.451. 
29 HHStA, Nachlass Berchtold, K2, memoirs, volume IV, part IX, p.412. 
30 Conrad, IV, 2.7.1914, p.107. 
31 Ibid., 5.7.1914, p.108. He was to command troops only during manoeuvres, or simply attend them as 
a spectator – in Franz Joseph’s words, “so that he learns something”. 
32 Ibid., 3.8.1914, p.172. 
33 NBT, K5, diary, 16.4.1916; 2.5.1916; 21.6.1916; Conrad, IV, pp.691-692. 
34 Leopold von Chlumecky, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen (Berlin, 1929), p.52. 
35 NPH, pp.21-22. 
36 Ibid., Polzer-Wallis, 5.11.1914, pp.21-23. 
 21 
good relationship.37 Karl respected and admired him far too much to criticize him or 
take the initiative.38 In fact, Karl revealed that his training had begun, as the emperor 
had ordered relevant ministers and senior civil servants to acquaint him with the 
government’s agenda. Karl, however, confessed that he had learnt little from the few 
hours of instruction he had so far received.39 Polzer conceded defeat, but thereafter 
continually warned Karl of the dangers of insufficient preparation, privately 
lamenting the fact that only Karl’s closest personal acquaintances seemed 
concerned.40 In January 1915, however, the interior minister explained that a suitable 
person “to give Karl an understanding of his future task” had been sought, but not yet 
found. He claimed that prior to the outbreak of war, Franz Joseph had intended to 
teach Karl himself before allowing him access to ministerial files.41 
As it happened, when the Austro-Hungarian high command retreated to 
Teschen in November 1914 after the debacle in the east, Karl – whose role it was to 
liaise between the general staff and the emperor (on personnel rather than operational 
matters)42 – gained easier and more frequent access to his great-uncle, now sedentary 
in Schönbrunn Palace. Karl was able to use his stays in the capital to begin to 
familiarize himself with the machinery of state. It was again rumoured that Franz 
Joseph wished to initiate Karl in politics himself.43 On 8 March, the heir attended his 
first crown council, during which territorial cessions to Italy were reluctantly 
approved in order to buy her neutrality.44 (In January, the military chancellery had 
suggested that he go to Rome to negotiate directly with the King of Italy, but Franz 
Joseph had not thought it necessary;45 previously, in August 1914, Archduke 
Friedrich – commander-in-chief of the armed forces as a result of Franz Joseph’s 
advanced age – had demanded that Karl be sent to King Carol to seek the intervention 
of Romania on the side of the Central Powers.46) In July, the emperor appointed him 
as his personal representative on the front, having decided that his great-nephew 
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should make a name for himself, play an active part in the life of the army and earn its 
esteem. Karl thus embarked on frequent tours, inspecting the troops, meeting the men 
and handing out decorations. But he was now based in Vienna and put up in 
Schönbrunn.47 According to Werkmann – who first met Karl in March 1916 as head 
of his commando’s chancellery in the South Tyrol – Franz Joseph, conscious that he 
was in his twilight, conversed increasingly frequently with him.48 Zita even claimed 
that he found the time each day to give him a personal tutorial;49 meanwhile her 
mother, the Archduchess of Parma, told a German diplomat that all matters of 
significance were now submitted to Karl immediately before their execution by Franz 
Joseph in order to give him the opportunity to express any differing opinions.50 She 
added that relations between emperor and heir had become increasingly warm. The 
German ambassador in Vienna confirmed this and indicated that many channels to 
Karl had recently emerged outside the official route.51 Karl himself told Berchtold the 
following March that his relationship with Franz Joseph was very good.52 
In fact, despite the undoubted rapprochement between the two, Franz Joseph’s 
personal involvement remained limited. According to Franz Joseph’s lord 
chamberlain,53 Prince Alfred von Montenuovo, the emperor had instructed the 
Austrian and Hungarian prime ministers, Counts Karl von Stürgkh and István Tisza, 
as well as the new foreign minister István Burián, to keep Karl abreast of political 
matters; Karl had then reached an agreement with the three men which ensured that he 
was informed of all important matters and handed the appropriate files immediately 
after the emperor, while relevant experts remained at his disposal should he require 
further enlightenment. In practice, Karl did not usually see the ministers themselves, 
but the civil servants of individual departments reported to him in the Hofburg.54 
Foreign affairs – in which Karl showed a particular interest – were not omitted, and 
Karl received a daily batch of telegrams from the various Austro-Hungarian foreign 
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legations, again usually the same as that presented to the emperor. (These bundles had 
stopped completely on the day before Franz Ferdinand’s death and only resumed at 
this time.)55 What is more, Franz Joseph even began to delegate matters of minor 
importance. By the end of the year, Karl was able to show Polzer a mass of 
documents destined for Franz Joseph, with which he had been instructed to deal.56 
Thus, in spite of Karl’s restricted responsibilities and of Franz Joseph’s still distant 
involvement, the heir’s access to political information improved considerably from 
July 1915. 
His confidant Polzer nevertheless remained frustrated by the fact that Karl’s 
introduction into the affairs of government had occurred in the very way against 
which he had counselled: an induction “in the political business of the government but 
not in government business”, as he had warned in his first letter to Wallis.57 He 
objected that the departmental officials ordered by both prime ministers to report to 
Karl “were given strict instructions on what they were to report”. The result, in 
Polzer’s eyes, was valueless.58 Similarly, Montenuovo bemoaned the lack of overall 
leadership, of enlightenment on foreign and internal political developments and of 
guidance from the emperor on the great questions of the day, which the reporting civil 
servants could not dispense due to their insufficiently broad overview.59 This 
apprenticeship was in any case cut short in March 1916, when Karl was sent to 
command a corps on the Italian Front. Simultaneously, however, he was assigned 
Count Leopold Berchtold, the former foreign minister, as lord chamberlain, for the 
purpose of “political orientation”.60 
 
Karl, who had previously described Berchtold as “good man of honour, a good stable 
owner, who has nice collars as though he had swallowed a ramrod, but is a poor 
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foreign minister”,61 and was apparently not keen on his appointment,62 had 
nevertheless offered him the post in person.63 Berchtold asked for time to reflect and, 
in the meantime, discussed the matter with General Wenzel von Wurm, who urged 
him to accept, arguing: “The heir is enchanting and has admirable qualities, but is 
somewhat weak and will be whatever the man he trusts makes of him.”64 Meanwhile, 
Montenuovo noted that Karl was willing and receptive to instructions but lacking in 
training, experience and thus any knowledge of state business.65 Hohenlohe, for his 
part, told Berchtold: “The archduke is still a blank slate and could become a capable 
person with suitably good care, despite his inadequate education and his perhaps not 
brilliant predisposition. At the moment he is showing good willingness but he cannot 
follow a serious lecture for long, he becomes absent-minded, as happens with 
children, and one must hit one’s finger on the table in order to get their attention 
back”.66 (A year earlier, he had told Baernreither that Karl had good qualities, such as 
intellectual curiosity and sense of duty, but was not being given any political 
education.)67 Karl Grabmayr, the president of the Imperial Court of Justice, 
summoned to teach the heir about the institution, later commented that he did not 
know which of the two was more bored, adding that it was far too late to teach Karl 
how to be emperor.68 Such negative judgements were not uncommon. 
 In the years prior to the war, Karl was a peripheral figure, and his credentials 
had therefore seemed of remote relevance in political circles. In the shadow of his 
uncle, the second in line to the throne was rarely discussed, though he was 
occasionally an object of fun. For example, a Polish peer recounted mocking stories to 
Josef Redlich concerning a visit to Galicia by Karl, who was apparently puzzled to 
find out that Cracow, which he thought a fortress, also had a jury court. On top of this, 
he had allegedly asked the minister of railways Stanisław Głąbiński where he had 
been stationmaster.69 Count Ottokar Czernin, a prominent member of Franz 
Ferdinand’s intimate circle, was distinctly unimpressed when he first met Karl in 
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1908 in Bohemia, calling him “childish for his age and devoid of interest in politics.” 
When they met by chance a few weeks later while riding in the woods, Czernin noted 
despairingly that Karl “did not have the faintest idea of the fundamental basics of a 
constitution” and resolved to inform Franz Ferdinand of this large gap in his 
education.70 More damagingly for Karl, rumours of dissolution, carousing and 
womanizing began to appear among the public in late 1908, even reaching Franz 
Joseph and Franz Ferdinand.71 Though obviously untrue in light of Karl’s asceticism 
and piety, which verged on puritanism,72 this gossip continued to be widely believed 
in Vienna,73 while the calumnies concerning his alleged alcoholism stuck well after 
his death.74 On top of this, he seemed to develop a reputation for laziness.75 Tittle-
tattle and jokes aside, nothing seriously suggested that Karl was unequal to the 
position he occupied at the time. In fact, according to the president of the Lower 
House of the Reichsrat, Julius Sylvester, he made the “best imaginable” impression 
on the dignitaries who visited him increasingly frequently in Hetzendorf, in no small 
part due to his lively, friendly and talkative nature.76 
After Sarajevo, Karl naturally came under far greater scrutiny. Again, almost 
all who met him were impressed with his affability, personal charm and lack of 
affectation,77 as well as his willingness and good intentions, but many were shocked 
by his lack of preparedness, and some by his lack of ability. It was, for instance, 
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commonly said that Zita was intellectually superior to her husband.78 In August 1914, 
Conrad, though he thought Karl well-meaning, complained to Redlich: “He has learnt 
nothing, he cannot even spell. His uncle wanted to make him stupid deliberately”.79 In 
early 1915, interior minister Baron Karl Heinold described him as an easily 
influenced child.80 Around the same time, Margrave Sándor Pallavicini – a member of 
the Hungarian House of Lords who had met Karl on several occasions at army 
headquarters – openly informed acquaintances of his inauspicious impressions. Karl 
had apparently told him the previous October that the end of the war was approaching 
and that an offensive against Italy would have to follow immediately.81 (Pallavicini 
commented that Karl showed no concern for what was fair to the people.)82 The 
margrave’s worried nephew – an aide-de-camp to Karl – had even turned to him to 
ask whether somebody could be assigned to the heir to teach him about important 
matters of state. Upon hearing this story, the veteran politician Joseph Maria 
Baernreither despaired that even a young cavalry captain could see this as a necessity, 
and noted in his diary: “One really has to ask oneself: in what kind of hands are now 
the life, wellbeing and woes of thousands upon thousands?” Similarly, the German 
General Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, who met Karl while in post as 
plenipotentiary to Austrian army headquarters, later wrote, despite his fondness for 
him, that he “did not get an impression of outstanding intellectual ability from him, 
rather that of a certain ponderousness”.83 His successor August von Cramon noted 
Karl’s timid restraint, commenting: “Generally, he gave the impression of a nice 
young man who did not yet know how to begin to make something of himself and was 
not particularly seeking to lessen his role as the odd one out”.84 The former Austrian 
prime minister Ernest von Koerber found him “unworldly”.85 Meanwhile, the 
Bohemian diplomat Count Paul Thun-Hohenstein, who had known Karl since 
childhood, described him to Redlich: “He is of naïve nature, without any higher 
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interests, quite the ‘aristocratic cavalry captain’, but with a good heart and well-
meaning.”86 And when Archduchess Isabella obtained permission for the American 
journalist J.T. Roche to visit army headquarters, she was mortified to find out from 
the draft of his report that his judgement of Karl read, in the English original: “He is 
not very intelligent, nor instructed, but he may be one day a good constitutional 
monarch”. When she suggested he rephrase this, he duly complied and wrote: “He is 
not a big star but he may be one day a good constitutional monarch”. In the end, she 
convinced him that noting Karl’s future suitability would be amply sufficient.87 
Few people during Karl’s heirship, however, got to know him as well as the 
German General Hans von Seeckt, his chief of staff on the Russian and Romanian 
fronts between July and November 1916. Despite the embarrassing awkwardness of 
this arrangement, a bond formed between the two men. In his writings, Seeckt 
repeatedly emphasized that Karl was a “good chap”;88 he was impressed by his charm, 
his open and natural manner, and his skilfulness in communication with subordinates 
and strangers.89 Eventually, Seeckt, who saw himself in a “double role of educator 
and helper”, developed considerable affection, indeed a certain love, for Karl.90 For 
his part, the archduke often confided in him, and they spoke openly on a wide range 
of subjects.91 Seeckt at first found Karl “full of interest and dedication towards the 
cause”, “not at all insignificant”, and noted that was “something decidedly sound in 
his nature and his judgement”.92 Yet he worried about Karl’s entourage and its 
mollifying, weakening, coddling, deluding and blinding effect on him.93 Thus, 
although Emperor Wilhelm II and Quartermaster General Ludendorff urged Seeckt to 
work on Karl to win him over to the German standpoint, he quickly concluded that 
“the daily fight for this young soul really [was] hopeless”.94 Despite his confidence in 
Karl’s convictions – his loyalty to the alliance, respect for German interests in Poland, 
and belief in the necessity of German predominance in Austria – he felt that he was 
poorly informed on political matters beyond Berchtold’s “gossip” and could not be 
counted on to exert any influence on Franz Joseph (partly due to his desire to avoid 
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conflict with his great-uncle).95 And, although he thought the heir “far from stupid”, 
Seeckt described him as “intellectually completely unproductive, [with] no 
understanding or knowledge of art, science, literature, music […]. Sometimes still 
somewhat childish and silly, […] a penchant for the easiest jokes, no trace of wit, let 
alone for humour.96 Easily bored, because lacking any inner interest.”97 
Yet overall, the German hierarchy appeared impressed by Karl. After his 
second encounter with Karl in January 1915, Wilhelm told Bethmann “You will get to 
know the young archduke today. Watch out, you will like him a lot.”98 During the 
same visit, chief of general staff Erich von Falkenhayn had several long conversations 
with Karl and praised the latter’s “knowledge in the matters discussed and the 
apposite manner in which he was able to substantiate his views”.99 And Ludendorff, 
who had noted Karl’s “extreme youthfulness” in late 1914, commented that shortly 
before his accession to the throne, “he had developed and become manlier” and 
“spoke well on military subjects”.100 
Karl’s keenness and eagerness to learn impressed many. Redlich noted that 
both Wilhelm Singer, the editor of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt and Hugo Ganz, the 
correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung, enthused about Karl, the former predicting 
a great future for him.101 Baernreither, for his part, revised his opinion after meeting 
him. He found him “completely isolated” from events but “friendly, open, lively, 
fresh”, “very thirsty for knowledge, intelligent”, interested in the great questions of 
government, and filled with a tremendous sense of duty. And although he thought 
Berchtold the wrong person to feed Karl’s mind, he too held great hope for the 
future.102 Tisza, the Hungarian prime minister, praised Karl’s openness and desire to 
inform himself, noting that he always asked pertinent questions.103 Burián, who 
followed Karl’s education keenly during the latter’s stay in Vienna, also remarked on 
his penetrative inquiries, as well as his “innate capacities”, vigorous intelligence, 
industry and ability to listen. Though he thought him too easily swayed by external 
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influences, he felt that his development was “promising and justified the best 
hopes”.104 Future prime minister Ernst Seidler, one of the civil servants who lectured 
Karl at the time, later recalled his lively interest in economics, in trade and in the 
Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich arrangements, and remarked on his quick understanding 
and excellent memory.105 Shortly after his appointment as lord chamberlain, 
Berchtold highlighted these two same qualities,106 which he thought astounding.107 
Most rhapsodic of all, however, was the American war correspondent James F.J. 
Archibald. Reporting in November 1914 on his visit to Austrian army headquarters, 
he declared Karl to have “the most wonderful and sympathetic charm I have ever 
found in a man of public life” and “something which very few possess: personal 
magnetism”. Praising his knowledge, his natural leadership and his willingness to ask 
questions – which he compared to Theodore Roosevelt’s – he concluded: “He is the 
most interesting man Europe currently possesses”.108 In the more sober assessment of 
the American ambassador Frederic C. Penfield: “The new heir […] has certain talents 
which are requisite for rulership and it is predicted that when the time comes for him 
to take up the responsibilities of continuing the work of his great-uncle he will be 
found adequate to the task.” On the other hand, he agreed with the most frequent 
criticism of Karl, according to which he was “immature and unskilled in dealing with 
affairs of great importance”.109 
 
Karl himself was certainly not unaware of his lack of preparedness and of the 
limitations of his overwhelmingly military education. Indeed, he had apparently 
intended to absorb himself in further study when war broke out.110 And, as Freytag-
Loringhoven later testified, during their time in Teschen, he occasionally told him 
openly “how unprepared for his high and difficult future office the death of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand had left him”.111 Conscious of his shortcomings, but chiefly 
frustrated and humiliated by having to lead an non-existent army under the command 
of a German general,112 he began to press for an assignment with greater 
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responsibilities. In September 1916, he ordered Berchtold to travel to Vienna to 
discuss with the leading men his appointment as commander-in-chief of the army or a 
“nebulous use” at the emperor’s side.113 Berchtold agreed and drafted a memorandum 
recording his concerns that the heir to the throne was insufficiently trained for the task 
ahead. Aware that the Monarchy faced one of the gravest crises in its history, he 
deemed it “urgently desirable” to give Karl the opportunity to gain practical 
experience on top of the purely theoretical education he had heretofore received. He 
thought Karl’s current role thankless, time-consuming, monotonous, demeaning for 
Austria-Hungary and overly exposed to danger. Moreover, he worried that any 
military setback would tarnish his prestige and that of the dynasty, while victory – in 
any case unlikely – would be credited to the Germans. But above all, he believed that 
it deprived the archduke of any insight into government business, of exchanges with 
leading politicians and of the wisdom of the emperor.114 Berchtold was invited to put 
these suggestions to Franz Joseph in person but the emperor deemed the moment 
unfavourable, as Wilhelm had just been given the supreme command of both armies 
and the emperor did not want Karl’s transfer to be interpreted as an affront.115 
 But this lack of involvement in the affairs of state did not reflect personal 
disregard or distrust on the part of Franz Joseph, but rather his rigidity and reluctance 
to delegate. Almost until the end, he refused to admit the necessity of assistance.116 
Yet the weary monarch certainly esteemed his great-nephew. When speaking to 
Schießl shortly after hearing the news from Sarajevo, he had commented that, 
fortunately, Karl had talent.117 On 30 June 1914, he told the joint minister of finance 
Leon Biliński that Karl could be educated into becoming a good ruler because he was 
kind and devoted to him.118 When thanking Berchtold for accepting the post of lord 
chamberlain, he described Karl as “clever and filled with eagerness”.119 According to 
the former Hungarian minister Albert Berzeviczy, Franz Joseph had confided in him: 
“I am a very old man and cannot live much longer. But be reassured, my successor is 
a brave and splendid young man. He brings me much joy and one can have complete 
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confidence in him”.120 In the last days of his life, he reflected: “I value Karl very 
highly. He tells me his opinion honestly. He also knows to obey when I stick to my 
view.”121 And, on the day of his death, he allegedly said: “I took over the throne under 
the most difficult conditions and I am leaving it under even worse ones. I would like 
to have spared Karl this. But he is made of the right stuff, and will know how to 
cope.”122 This regard was in evidence in the weeks before his death, as he asked Karl 
for his thoughts on the possible removal of Conrad as chief of general staff.123 
Meanwhile, Karl’s political responsibilities also increased. On 8 October, after an 
audience with Franz Joseph, he received Burián, Stürgkh and the minister of war 
Alexander von Krobatin.124 Yet Karl’s repeated trips to Vienna began to irritate the 
emperor, who asked Montenuovo angrily: “Have you heard? Karl is here again.” The 
lord chamberlain was equally indignant and thought it highly inappropriate, “at a time 
when all eyes are looking fearfully towards the east and to the Russian onslaught, to 
abandon one’s post there to go to Reichenau and peradventure shoot a chamois 
buck”.125 
Karl’s transfer to the Romanian Front in October at first did little to placate 
him. Tisza visited him shortly after his arrival and indicated that his summons to 
Vienna would occur immediately after a decisive victory against Romania.126 At the 
time, Karl had not given up hope of taking over the high command.127 Finally, upon 
news of the assassination of prime minister Stürgkh at the hands of the left-wing 
extremist Friedrich Adler on 21 October, a deeply affected Karl – who told Berchtold 
that it was “the expression of deep discontent in the country, the beginning of a 
revolutionary movement” – resolved to write to Franz Joseph, offering to leave the 
army and return to Vienna in order to relieve him of some of his burdens.128 But 
Berchtold, who was instructed to deliver the letter to Schönbrunn, only got as far as 
Keleti Station in Budapest, when Karl telephoned him to announce the capture of 
Constanţa and the great hopes he now harboured for the further course of operations – 
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he therefore ordered Berchtold “temporarily not to work towards his move to Vienna 
in the proximity of the emperor”.129 Shortly after, he had to return to Vienna on 
account of Franz Joseph’s ill health. There, Burián – who had repeatedly insisted on 
this – informed Berchtold on 18 November that Franz Joseph had finally agreed to 
Karl’s permanent transfer to Vienna (though he had remained silent when the foreign 
minister had brought up his appointment as commander-in-chief).130 However, the 
emperor died three days later without having informed his successor. Indeed, his last 
handwritten letter, due to be issued on 22 November, remained unsigned. In it, he 
praised Karl’s wartime military service and concluded: “I see that the time has arrived 
to recall Your Grace from the front to my side so that you, enriched by your 
experiences, can relieve me in my very extensive activities as commander-in-
chief”.131 Right until Franz Joseph’s passing, speculation had been rife that he would 
either abdicate in Karl’s favour, accept a co-regency or at least surrender some 
significant responsibilities.132 In the end, only his death opened the corridors of power 
to Karl. 
 
Despite his lack of training and practical experience, Karl was not bereft of political 
views, even though these were largely unknown to all but those closest to him.133 
Undeniably, Franz Ferdinand had been his chief influence. From an early stage, he 
had followed Karl’s educational programme closely and ensured that it corresponded 
to his wishes. In a letter to him in May 1905, Wallis wrote: “I am always glad when I 
have the opportunity to speak about Archduke Carl with Your Imperial Highness, 
since it matters greatly to me to be able to work very closely to the intentions of Your 
Imperial Highness; and my work is often really not easy!!”134 After the death of his 
brother Otto, Franz Ferdinand took over his nephew’s guardianship and his 
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involvement grew accordingly.135 He informally approved Karl’s study plan for 
university, attended his first examination, met his professors and asked for regular 
updates on Karl’s progress.136 From his castle of Konopischt, he had easy access to 
Karl in Prague, and effectively took charge of his study arrangements. When prime 
minister Max von Beck contacted Wallis to discuss a change of academics – the strict 
Czech-German parity had apparently upset the German minister for Bohemia – he 
responded that he was not entitled to make any decisions in the matter and would 
have to report to Franz Ferdinand.137 What is more, Franz Ferdinand personally chose 
Karl’s military tutor.138 
The heir to the throne also acted as a political mentor to Karl. Czernin recalled 
that although uncle and nephew liked and respected each other, their relationship was 
always defined by the “absolute subordination” of the latter to the former, and that in 
all political discussions, Karl “was always the listener, absorbing the precepts 
expounded by Franz Ferdinand”.139 Burián offered a more critical assessment of their 
interaction, arguing that Franz Ferdinand had long treated Karl as a child and “had 
permeated him with his own ideas and not allowed him to form his own 
judgements”.140 Franz Ferdinand himself boasted to the Slovak politician Milan 
Hodža that he had initiated Karl into everything and had enlightened him on the 
misgovernment of the Empire.141 For despite rumours to the contrary, Franz 
Ferdinand always saw Karl as his successor.142 The government programme drawn up 
for him in 1910–1911 by the head of his military chancellery Colonel Alexander von 
Brosch specifically designated Karl as “Archduke-Heir” in order to end speculation 
and to clarify his nephew’s position.143 Nevertheless, during a long conversation with 
Seeckt in August 1916, Karl admitted that he had not thought his succession secure 
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until Sarajevo, as he had expected Franz Ferdinand to put forward his own children 
despite having solemnly renounced their claim.144 This seems implausible145 although, 
of course, had Franz Ferdinand contracted a second marriage with someone of equal 
rank and had issue, the succession would have passed to this offspring.146 
Nevertheless, this matter did not affect Franz Ferdinand and Karl’s relationship. 
Again, in spite of the gossip,147 the two had a very good rapport and communicated 
quite frequently.148 In fact, Karl’s correspondence revealed a tremendous degree of 
warmth and affection towards his uncle and aunt, as well as a fervent desire to please 
and obey Franz Ferdinand. Over the years, his letters routinely included emphatic 
averments to this effect: “Thank you [...] for the great lessons which you gave me, 
whose fulfilment will be my utmost endeavour”; “If only to be able to show you my 
gratitude to some extent, I will strive to do everything in such a way as to please you”; 
“I will do everything as you did”; “I swear to you that I will continue to remain as 
loyally devoted to you as I have been hitherto. […] Auntie and you were always so 
good to me that it is merely my duty in gratitude to strive to fulfil your will in 
everything as best I can”; “I, however, assure you [both] again that I will do 
everything within my strength in order to satisfy you”; “Be assured, dear uncle, that I 
did my utmost in order to fulfil your wishes.” 149 In addition, Karl frequently turned to 
his relative for requests and advice, which the latter was always happy to give.150 
Nevertheless, Franz Ferdinand suffered little meddling in his affairs, and 
mostly kept Karl at arm’s length from the Belvedere.151 Some suggested that he 
played a part in his nephew’s postings to faraway garrisons and absence from public 
life.152 Yet Franz Ferdinand was deeply affected by the fact that Franz Joseph had not 
allowed him any insight or participation in the business of state and intended, once 
emperor, not to make the same mistake with Karl.153 On at least two occasions, he 
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sought his nephew’s support in political matters, most notably when he objected to the 
so-called Hungarian constitutional guarantees in January 1908154 and to the change in 
official title from “imperial war minister” to “war minister” in October 1911, both of 
which he saw as a Magyar infringements upon the rights of the crown.155 Karl 
appended his signature to his uncle’s notes of protest, but neither move ever had any 
practical significance. Meanwhile, although Franz Ferdinand and his advisers were 
engrossed in drawing up plans for the reform of Austria-Hungary, it seems that Karl 
was acquainted solely with their contours. This was in any case the view Polzer 
gathered from Karl’s declarations. According to him, Karl only received the bundle of 
papers containing Franz Ferdinand’s programme once on the throne, in May 1917, by 
which time he considered it out of date and inapplicable.156 However, in light of the 
provenance and content described by Polzer, these were probably not Franz 
Ferdinand’s last drafts for constitutional reform,157 which had apparently been 
committed to paper between April and June 1914 with only the knowledge of Baron 
Carl von Bardolff, of Milan Hodža and of Baron Johann von Eichhoff.158 According 
to the last-named, they envisaged the foundation of the “United States of Greater 
Austria”,159 through the creation of fully autonomous, nationally demarcated states 
under the Habsburg crown. Customs, railways, foreign policy and the army would 
remain as the basis of the unitary state.160 But Franz Ferdinand was certainly no full-
fledged federalist,161 and in any case favoured the retention of historic boundaries. 
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Eichhoff had probably misinterpreted or exaggerated the finality of the archduke’s 
commitment,162 and indeed, he was not alone in believing that Franz Ferdinand had 
settled on his project.163 But although Franz Ferdinand’s views constantly evolved – 
and may yet have changed again – they undoubtedly moulded Karl’s outlook. In 
essence, uncle and nephew had no fundamental divergences of opinion. In fact, 
according to the former Hungarian interior minister József Kristóffy, Franz Ferdinand 
had told him – in May 1912 or in 1913, depending on the version – that he had a 
strong presage of death and had signed a deed with Karl, in which he agreed to 
respect his nephew’s rights while the latter promised to execute his political 
testament.164 On this occasion, Franz Ferdinand had apparently said: “I have fully 
initiated [Karl] into my ideas and educated him accordingly; he is honest and capable, 
and he will carry them out himself.”165 Similarly, the Budapest press had reported in 
January 1912 that Franz Ferdinand had once told the Hungarian prime minister 
Wekerle: “I will be able to make sure that the monarch grants no national concessions 
in military matters. You will never get anything from me, and I am already ensuring 
that my successor is of the same mind, because I am educating Otto’s son exactly in 
that spirit”.166 
 
The most enlightening exposé of Karl’s views as heir is provided by the reflections he 
himself wrote down in late 1914.167 At the time, he was still convinced of a victorious 
outcome to the war, which he thought would result in German supremacy in the west, 
and Austro-Hungarian in the east; he even expected to receive colonies from France 
and Britain.168 Nevertheless, his vision for the future was based on the revival of the 
Three Emperors’ Alliance, with Germany and a “somewhat humbled Russia”, and a 
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separation of Austro-Hungarian and Russian spheres of influence in the Balkans.169 
Indeed, he feared that an alliance solely with Germany would reduce the Habsburg 
Empire to the status of a “larger Bavaria”, while alienating her indigenous Slavs. He 
therefore thought the three-way union vital for the internal balance of the Monarchy, 
hypothesizing that pan-German and pan-Slav aspirations would thereby neutralize 
each other.170 This alliance, he believed, would be so strong as to “rule the whole of 
Europe”.171 On the other hand, he wanted nothing to do with “fickle” Italy, from 
whom no gain was possible;172 he saw no expediency in allying with France, whose 
military strength was colossally weakened, and with whom Vienna had no direct 
connections; meanwhile, Berlin would accept an alliance with London only if Britain 
were thoroughly diminished, which would make the arrangement useless.173 In all his 
calculations, Germany remained Austria-Hungary’s chief ally. Indeed, he was acutely 
aware of his country’s diplomatic isolation and knew that disloyalty on Berlin’s part 
would be disastrous for her.174 In this respect, Karl had undeniably inherited the views 
of his uncle, who also desired a restoration of the Three Emperors’ Alliance, an 
understanding with Russia in the Balkans, the thwarting of Serb agitation through the 
good treatment of Austria-Hungary’s South Slavs, and the maintaining of Vienna’s 
independence from Berlin.175 
Domestically, Karl continued to be a sharp critic of dualism, referring to the 
“disastrous Compromise of 1867”.176 He realized that the Ausgleich had denied the 
ethnic composition of the land and had allowed the subjugation and oppression of the 
Transleithanian South Slavs which, in turn, had dented their attachment to the Empire 
and encouraged them to squint over the border at a time when the Russian-sponsored 
Greater Serbian idea was emerging. Karl was pragmatic and understood the 
demographic reality of his Monarchy, and its implications: “Our future lies in 
Slavdom, since the Teutons are increasingly pushed back while the Slavs are 
multiplying like rabbits”; thus, he concluded: “we must direct our main attention to 
the Slavs”. As Karl expected the Central Powers to win a war which he considered a 
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fight for “dominance in Slavdom and in the Balkans”, he understood the necessity of 
consolidating the Habsburg position in the region by securing the loyalty of the 
Monarchy’s South Slavs and eliminating the natural lure of pan-Slavism (all the more 
so since, according to him, “every Slav is a pan-Slavist”).177 To this end, he envisaged 
the removal of the dualist straitjacket and the creation of a South Slav empire 
consisting of the Banat, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro and sections of Albania, “partly united under Austrian leadership as the 
third state of the Monarchy, partly linked to the Monarchy as half-states, like 
Württemberg”. The re-establishment of the Three Emperors’ Alliance would then 
guarantee its viability and the stability of the region. He concluded: “That is the future 
of Austria and should be the guiding star of our policy.” On the other hand, he 
dismissed the erection of a trialist structure through the unification of Russian Poland 
and Galicia with an archduke as governor: “Nonsense and chaos! We cannot find our 
way around our current situation so imagine then!”178 Likewise, he dismissed 
“quadralism”, the creation of a fourth entity for the North Slavs, due to divisions 
between them, to the presence of German-inhabited territories between Czech and 
Polish lands, and to the Ukrainians’ aversion to the Poles.179 There was no question of 
the realization of Bohemian state rights:180 “Bohemia must remain a province as 
before”. However, he was potentially willing to concede a permanent crownland 
minister, a Bohemian Guard, and thought his coronation as King of Bohemia 
essential, as it was the “greatest wish of the Czechs”.181 At any rate, he dismissed any 
policy which reinforced the existing system by seeking “to Magyarize everything in 
Hungary, repress the Slavs and Germanize everything in Austria” as futile, dangerous 
and “stupid”.182 He expressed the necessity of fighting nationalism, “but at the same 
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time of granting each nation within Austria the greatest possible national autonomy 
compatible with the unity of the Empire”.183 
 
No mention was made of federalism, though Karl’s champions later reinterpreted his 
views in this sense. Polzer wrote that, during the Bosnian annexation crisis, Karl had 
confided to him that a bleak future – indeed, a catastrophe – lay ahead for Austria-
Hungary, which had departed too greatly from her federalist tradition. He apparently 
did not believe that his uncle’s plans at the time were sufficient to salvage the 
Monarchy.184 He allegedly reiterated this belief to Zita in April 1911: “Dualism 
cannot be saved. Trialism is not just and anyway does not go far enough. The only 
solution is a truly federal one to give all the peoples a chance.” Still according to Zita, 
Karl wished to return to the old Habsburg way, prior to the centralizing measures of 
Maria Theresa. She even claimed that Karl, following the dictum according to which 
“a father makes no distinction between his children”, was prepared to give “all 
seventeen [sic] nationalities” of the Empire their individual freedom and – quite 
implausibly – that he had no objections to the formation of republics within the state, 
as long as the nations maintained their link with the Monarchy and their identity 
within the unitary state. She insisted that he never wavered in this guiding thought.185 
In reality, Karl’s ideas for domestic reform were far less radical. 
Tellingly, when Pallavicini warned Karl in early 1915 that a drastic domestic 
change was required in Austria, he answered that he had been brought up in the 
strictly conservative tradition of his family and that all old rights and customs had to 
be maintained.186 Indeed, even “the greatest possible national autonomy compatible 
with the unity of the Empire” did not necessarily imply federalization as imagined by 
its champions, let alone the creation of republics. The national autonomy he was 
willing to concede was cultural, economic and linguistic rather than political. Far 
from a devolution of centralized power, it represented an attempt to strengthen the 
dynasty and the unitary state by defusing national tensions and frustrating nationalist 
and irredentist tendencies. In fact, to Karl’s mind, it went hand in hand with openly 
centralizing measures. Berchtold summarized the heir’s views on the question after a 
conversation with him in April 1916: “no repression or gagging of the nationalities, 
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free development with every possible protection of their individuality, economic 
interests and languages but adherence to state necessities, namely the introduction of 
German as language of state.187 The reorganization of the school system must 
constitute the starting point.”188 (However, three months later, he told General Alfred 
Krauß that it was impossible to impose German as the language of state in Austria as 
“we are not German and two states cannot have the same language”.189 Instead, 
German could only be established as “language of communication”.190 Though he had 
possibly changed his mind since speaking to Berchtold, he was perhaps more likely 
reacting defiantly to Krauß’s strident pan-Germanism.) 
Karl assuredly wanted to dismantle the Empire’s dualist structure but his 
substitute plan for trialism was a response to the South Slav and Balkan questions, 
and not intended as a means of federalizing the Empire. His desire to see Bohemia 
remain unchanged and his opposition to trialism with Poland or quadralism with the 
North Slavs revealed the limits of his federalist ambitions. Here, he simply hoped that 
national autonomy would protect the Ukrainians from Polish domination,191 and 
lessen the intensity of the conflict in the Bohemian lands – a few sops would cushion 
the blow for disappointed Czechs. Greater Polish aspirations were simply disregarded. 
Overall, therefore, Karl seemed not to have any concrete or far-sighted programme in 
these matters. Quite obviously, he was not acquainted with Franz Ferdinand’s last 
plans. In any case, it was neither man’s intention to dilute the Monarchy’s central 
power, on the contrary. In the alleged agreement concluded between the two, Karl had 
promised, “in the event of his becoming emperor first, to recover the rights and 
possessions of the Monarchy and the army which have been thrown away”.192 
Incidentally, the thoughts which Karl expressed on the various nationalities of 
the Empire in his notes showed that a father could in fact prefer some of his children 
to others. Karl had a good overall opinion of the South Slavs, whom he considered 
historically and fundamentally Austrophile, and only recently led astray as a result of 
Magyar repression.193 Similarly, he considered the vast majority of Ukrainians to be 
                                               
187 “Staatssprache”. 
188 NBT, K5, 2.4.1916. 
189 Krauß, p.79. 
190 “Verständigungssprache”. 
191 UR, II, 13.10.1914, p.67. He wrote: “Expiation […] after the war should be in the form of Polish 
civil servants dangling from the gallows”. 
192 Polzer, appendix II, p.432. 
193 UR, II, 3, 24.12.1914, p.81. 
 41 
admirably schwarzgelb and kaisertreu – the “Tyroleans of the east” – and ascribed 
their wartime lapses into treachery to the brutality of military persecution, supported 
by the Polish administration.194 Small wonder, he thought, that some of them had 
become traitors for money, since the unjust, corrupt and Polonizing imperial 
bureaucracy of Galicia treated them “as animals”. Certainly, Karl was not enamoured 
of his Polish subjects; to his mind, they had never been Austrophile, only ever 
Polish.195 He believed – not unfairly – that all Poles, whether in Austria, Russia or 
Germany, had one single idea: to restore the old Kingdom of Poland. As the outbreak 
of war had convinced them of the inevitable realization of this dream, they now 
intended to achieve it, irrespective of the winner.196 As a result, Karl virulently 
opposed any “Greater Poland” policy or Polish buffer state, in the hope that Austrian 
Poles would then remain loyal to the Habsburgs, since they were better off under their 
rule than in Germany or Russia.197 Moreover, he categorically rejected the annexation 
of Polish-inhabited Russian territory, as he thought the acquisition of “more Polacks” 
the greatest possible misfortune.198 Nevertheless, he considered the Romanians the 
biggest worry for the Empire, as Romania’s strength had them instinctively ogling 
across the border. Of the Italians he said little. Nor was he particularly loquacious on 
the subject of the Czechs. He did not believe the current Russophile movement to be 
deep-rooted in the population but recommended its energetic repression.199 Karl was 
quite plainly exasperated by the pettiness and parochialism of Cisleithanian national 
politics, especially of the Czech-German conflict: “the representatives of the people, 
worried daily about their ten florins, hold speeches as to whether zde or hier200 should 
be written above a urinal in northern Bohemia, but do not care two hoots if the army, 
the prestige of the state, perishes”.201 (Franz Ferdinand had thought the same and had 
boasted that, given full powers, he would put Bohemia in order in twenty-four 
hours.)202 He felt that the youth of the nation was now paying with its blood for their 
stupidity, adding: “These bastard deputies should be placed on the front line”.203 Karl 
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naturally disliked nationalism and loathed national politics; he was particularly 
contemptuous of the middle-class intelligentsia, the “riffraff” present in every nation 
of the Empire who misled the “stupid populace”.204 
Furthermore, Karl had apparently inherited a degree of his uncle’s aversion to 
the Magyars. Reporting to him on a trip to Budapest in late February 1911 – during 
which he had striven to follow his instructions – he wrote of his boredom and despair 
in the Hungarian capital. He dismissed those present at the Court Ball as “inelegant 
and dreadfully horrible” and complained about the atrociously grating music of the 
“wretched gypsies”. He also boasted that he had spoken Hungarian – a couple of 
sentences at that – only to those who had not addressed him in German. He 
concluded: “During those three days I really recognized the veracity of the old saying: 
‘Vienna is Vienna, Pest is pestilential.’”205 His tone was so forcibly negative, 
however, that he may simply have been indulging his uncle, whose creed was that 
every great Habsburg monarch had to battle with the Hungarians and bend them to his 
will.206  Whether this was the case, or whether his views later changed, Karl never 
evinced such petty anti-Magyar sentiments during his reign. Overall, in fact, his 
preferences and prejudices appear innocuous in comparison to the rabid hatreds of his 
uncle; and importantly, they were virtually unknown. In any case, they did not 
undermine Karl’s understanding of the Habsburg monarch’s supranational mission. 
He knew his country was a “large conglomerate of nations” whose survival as a Great 
Power required a “great, common goal”.207 He bluntly accepted that Austria-
Hungary’s future belonged to Slavdom but his outlook – inevitably for a Habsburg 
ruler – contained at its root an irremediable German bias: “We are on the one hand a 
German land according to our civilization and half-Slav according to our 
inhabitants”.208 In mid-July 1916, Seeckt summarized his Weltanschauung: “Sound 
views, very outspokenly German-minded and still without any discernible fondness 
for the Poles and the Czechs, from which his little-respected late uncle probably 
dissuaded him”.209 A few months later, the general reassured Ludendorff that Karl did 
not pander to the overwhelming Slav influence in Austria and was imbued with the 
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necessity of German preponderance.210 (A year on, however, disappointed by Karl’s 
actions in power and perceived amenability to outside influences, he amended his 
earlier judgement, and confessed that he had thought Karl’s repeatedly expressed 
conviction about the necessity of German and Magyar predominance “more strongly 
grounded”.)211 In this case, Karl had perhaps played up to his German commander’s 
expectations. Yet, shortly before his accession to the throne, Karl allegedly uttered 
incautious words on this topic while in Teschen, which found their way into the press: 
“The Germans should act with self-confidence and pride. They should stress what 
they have done for the state during this war and before. They should express their 
satisfaction about the fact that the German nation was once again able to prove its old 
mission as a state-preserving element and that it has been shown that true 
Germandom, dynastic endeavours and factors which preserve the state are one.”212 
The authorities had to intervene promptly to prevent any further publication of these 
declarations, before ordering the release of a press statement indicating that Karl had 
not been in Teschen for some time and had made no address there.213 Nevertheless, 
Karl’s faux pas was relayed in French newspapers and held up as proof of the heir’s 
unshakeable pro-German sympathies.214 Paradoxically, shortly before, certain German 
Reichsrat members had been up in arms since Karl had purportedly remarked that the 
Czechs were Austria’s best protection against German predominance.215 (For 
unsubstantiated reasons – perhaps simply due to his moderation in national matters – 
Karl was often accused of harbouring pro-Czech sympathies.)216 
 
Karl’s preparation for office was undoubtedly deficient, but he was not without blame 
in the matter. He considered himself a soldier above all,217 and regarded military 
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duties more highly than civilian ones. After the outbreak of war, he had wished to join 
the fight with his regiment though acknowledging that, as heir to the throne, he could 
scarcely afford to be made prisoner.218 But he continued to hope for a front-line 
posting. In July 1915, he asked to take over a corps, but Franz Joseph ordered him to 
stay in Vienna to learn about affairs of state.219 In February 1916, Lieutenant Colonel 
Kundmann noted in his diary that Karl was angry not to have been assigned a 
command.220 When finally sent to the Italian Front, Karl told Burián that this was 
entirely in accordance with his own wishes and that, although he realized the 
importance of being in Vienna, he felt it his duty to take part in the great battles 
ahead.221 Subsequently, as mentioned before, the prospect of heading a victorious 
military campaign in Romania had outweighed his urge to be trained in the business 
of state.222 
Devoted as he was to his great-uncle and to the army, Karl was not ideally 
placed to recognize the disservice which the former and his advisers – the head of his 
private office Schießl, the chief of his military chancellery Baron Arthur von 
Bolfras,223 and his aide-de-camp224 Count Eduard Paar – had done him as heir. These 
aged men – at the outbreak of war eighty-three, seventy, seventy-six and seventy-six 
respectively – were staid, stale,225 resistant to change and protective of their powers. 
Consequently they ignored, consciously or not, the urgency of preparing Karl for his 
future role. In all likelihood, they were relieved to escape the vexatious interference 
they had endured on the part of Franz Ferdinand.226 As Hohenlohe remarked, those in 
Schönbrunn feared him even in death.227 Their eagerness to banish the spectre of the 
former heir and to avoid the establishment of a shadow government probably 
contributed to Karl’s complete exclusion from the fateful decisions of the July 
Crisis228 and subsequent confinement to military duties, often far from Vienna.229 
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(Karl frequently returned, though chiefly to see Zita and his children – his fourth was 
born in May 1916.)230 Franz Joseph had a poor track record in grooming his 
successors, though in his defence, he had perhaps wished to keep his great-nephew 
untainted by the decision to go to war; and he certainly wished to see him serve and 
gain the respect of the armed forces. His aides, more prosaically, were simply fearful 
of losing their influence. The journalist Hugo Ganz told Redlich in mid-1915 that 
when Franz Joseph had started to discuss military matters directly with Karl, Bolfras 
and Paar had offered their resignation in protest.231 Certainly, their attitude to Karl’s 
education appeared remarkably casual. For instance, a few days after Franz 
Ferdinand’s assassination, Bolfras had told Conrad – who had stressed the need for 
civilian rather than military duties – that there was still time for this.232 Among the 
Austro-Hungarian hierarchy, Conrad appeared to show the most concern about Karl’s 
lack of training in statecraft, though he most likely wanted him out of his way.233 
To be sure, Karl’s time at army headquarters was unproductive, unfulfilling 
and of no educational value.234 And for many months, the situation remained 
unchanged. When Leopold von Chlumecky suggested to Hohenlohe that he do 
everything in his power to have Karl called to Vienna and trained by experienced 
statesmen, he responded: “That is impossible! I would have to wade through too much 
dirt to achieve that”.235 Despite improvements in mid-1915, by January of the 
following year, Karl still only had a head of household,236 the plodding Prince Zdenko 
Lobkowitz, by his side. Montenuovo, though he ostensibly lamented this state of 
affairs, and had thought of Berchtold for the post of lord chamberlain as early as 
January 1915, appeared in no rush to organize the appointment. The former foreign 
minister was finally offered the position in January 1916 but although he accepted it 
almost immediately, he began only two months later.237 (Lobkowitz could apparently 
not be made lord chamberlain because the holder of the post had to be a privy 
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councillor and this title would have made him rise above Montenuovo, since his 
family was of a higher rank – this was, it seems, unacceptable.)238 Berchtold, a 
charming and distinguished mondain, was, however, old-fashioned, indecisive and 
uniquely uninterested in domestic affairs.239 Unfortunately for Karl, who only devoted 
a limited amount of time to non-military matters, this was the man in charge of his 
education in the eight months preceding his accession to the throne. 
 
For all these shortcomings, Karl was nevertheless level-headed, dispassionate, 
pragmatic, able, perceptive and keen to learn. The not infrequent contradictions in his 
views reflected partly their ongoing maturation and his personal uncertainty, but also 
his flexibility and open-mindedness (not to mention his oft-noted habit of simply 
agreeing with his interlocutor).240 But the war undoubtedly exerted a decisive 
influence on his outlook. As the conflict dragged on, he understood that irrevocable 
changes made a return to the old order impossible. In particular, he knew that a degree 
of democratization and liberalization was inevitable. In March 1916, he told 
Baernreither: “After the war, one cannot screw things back as Metternich did, because 
that led to 1848.”241 
Understandably for someone who had never seen battle and whose beloved 
relative had just been murdered, Karl had at first eagerly supported the war. Rumour 
had it that during Franz Ferdinand’s wake in Artstetten, an insouciant Karl had 
declared: “Hopefully now, for once, there will finally be war.”242 Even as the conflict 
progressed, Karl was adamant that his country had not been responsible for its 
outbreak. In an interview with J.T. Roche, he defended Austria-Hungary’s original 
action against Serbia as “necessary to protect elementary national rights and to put an 
end to the outrageous agitation” which had reached its pinnacle in Sarajevo. He 
squarely blamed Serbia and Russia for starting the war and maintained that Austria-
Hungary and Germany were fighting for purely defensive reasons.243 Likewise, on the 
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basis of occasional remarks by Karl, Werkmann concluded that he had full 
comprehension for Franz Joseph’s predicament during the July Days.244  
What is more, as the plans he sketched in late 1914 showed, Karl had firmly 
believed that Austria-Hungary would rapidly emerge victorious. By the time he came 
to the throne, however, his faith in victory was shaken. By January 1915, Karl had let 
it be known in conversation that Austria-Hungary could probably conclude peace with 
Russia on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.245 Colonel Theodor von Zeynek 
recounted that, that spring, Karl had remarked over dinner with army commanders 
that he did not understand why they were trying so hard “since everything was in 
vain, the war could not be won, and that he himself would be happy if he retained a 
palace in Vienna”.246 If true, this was probably no more than an off-the-cuff remark 
and a reflection of Karl’s disenchantment with his country’s military leadership. By 
the summer of 1916, however, his confidence was truly broken, and he sincerely 
hoped for a swift end to the war.247 In June, Berchtold – also despondent about the 
prospects of the war he had helped start – noted that his tutee was war-weary.248 Karl 
had even begun to doubt the endurance and fighting ability of his own army, telling 
his lord chamberlain: “The troops are no longer holding out! Curiously, only ever 
ours.”249 He blamed the high command for their change of spirit and now considered 
the situation “critical, very critical”.250 At the same time, Seeckt remarked that Karl 
had a “tremendous yearning for peace”.251 The following month, Karl warned 
Berchtold that the Monarchy’s manpower would be exhausted by March 1917 and 
that peace would have to be concluded by then. He also asked if anything was in 
preparation in this respect.252 When he met Wilhelm in October, he made clear that he 
thought peace with Russia was more likely to come through mutual exhaustion than 
absolute victory, and urged him to accelerate steps towards a peace move.253 
Therefore when, in November, the Central Powers judged the military situation 
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favourable enough to consider a peace offer, in the belief that it would not be 
considered a sign of weakness, Karl approved the idea enthusiastically.254 But he 
thought even the terms originally suggested by Burián “too demanding regarding 
territorial conquests”.255 (In the end, Berlin ensured that it contained no terms at 
all.)256 Still as heir, he sent Pope Benedict XV a draft of the offer and pleaded with 
him to use all his influence on the belligerents to help end the war.257 
By then, Karl was fully aware that he was inheriting – in Franz Ferdinand’s 
words – a “crown of thorns”.258 Fear began to set in. After a long conversation with 
him in August, Seeckt noted that he was “full of the holy shiver before the greatness 
of the task which could face him tomorrow, aware of the thousands of weaknesses of 
his monarchy and apparently without a real man of confidence”.259 His unhappy 
posting on the Russian Front brought increasing anxiety and despondency, and in late 
September he had to ask Franz Joseph for a holiday to spare his nerves.260 To 
Wilhelm, he depicted the domestic mood as uncertain and unfamiliar, since a firm 
hand was lacking.261 Shortly after, he was further shaken by Stürgkh’s assassination – 
as Seeckt wrote at the time: “he shudders before all the burdens and dangers of his 
future office”.262 Having accompanied him to the train station on 11 November when 
he finally returned to Vienna, the German general wrote: “It was very hard for me to 
leave him alone in the night and into his dark fate – so young and so alone – nothing 
but lackeys around him, nothing but stiff servants in front of him. Nobody who tells 
him the truth”.263 Yet despite his foibles, the partial neglect he had endured and the 
cheerless circumstances surrounding his accession to the throne, Karl was – rightly – 
not entirely fatalistic about his prospects as a ruler and the future of his Empire. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE INHERITANCE 
 
The struggle for power in wartime Austria 
 
When Karl ascended the throne,1 the military situation of the Central Powers was not 
unfavourable. In the west, the Germans had just withstood the Somme Offensive – 
albeit at considerable cost – and in the east, thanks largely to their own efforts, they 
and their Austro-Hungarian ally had occupied Russian Poland. Admittedly, the Dual 
Monarchy’s position was more problematic, as Russia had seized eastern Galicia and 
the Bukovina during the Brusilov Offensive, while the Italians, who already held 
small parts of the Trentino and of the Littoral, had captured Gorizia during the Sixth 
Battle of the Isonzo. However, Austria-Hungary had repelled the three subsequent 
Italian attempts at a breakthrough and was now safe for the winter. Both Russia and 
Italy were in any case drained. The original enemy, Serbia, had been beaten, while 
Romania, the latest, was in disarray, leading to the capture of Bucharest on 6 
December and the occupation of Wallachia by the Central Powers (said to promise 
vast new supplies of foodstuffs).2 
Nevertheless, Germany and Austria-Hungary had counted on early victories 
and knew that time was running against them, despite the exhaustion of the Entente. 
The Allied blockade continued to weigh on them,3 and though their armies were still 
unbroken, they were increasingly lacking men and horses.4 Austria-Hungary, in 
particular, had suffered irreplaceable losses in 1914, which, in the words of her future 
chief of general staff, “had done the army out of the largest part of active officers, of 
men and of well-trained reservists”. Indeed, by February 1917, Austria-Hungary had 
used up over three million men and had only 500,000 replacement troops.5 Even 
though her army remained a capable fighting force, boosted by the success of the 
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Romanian campaign,6 its outlook was unpromising. What is more, Germany’s 
succour in the east had considerably increased Austria-Hungary’s military and 
economic dependence on her ally, not to mention her moral indebtedness. It was 
symptomatic of Vienna’s weakness that, in September 1916, a joint high command 
was established under the leadership of Emperor Wilhelm (though, in reality, 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff were in control).7 Karl was displeased, though the 
arrangement stayed in place after his accession.8 
 
On top of this, the Austro-Hungarian high command often appeared at least as 
concerned by the situation in the hinterland and, from the outset, had expended 
considerable efforts on fighting the designated enemy within. Even before the 
declaration of war on Serbia, emergency laws had started to be issued through 
Paragraph Fourteen of the constitution (which gave the government full executive 
power in the absence of parliament). As a result of the raft of decrees promulgated in 
late July 1914, the army high command had been granted the powers of civilian 
administration in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia to the south,9 and in a very 
broadly defined hinterland behind the Eastern Front, englobing Galicia, the Bukovina, 
much of Silesia and several districts in Moravia.10 Throughout Cisleithania, a wide 
range of criminal offences was placed under military jurisdiction,11 civil liberties were 
suspended12 and strict control of communications introduced.13 Additionally, the self-
governing municipalities were ordered to cooperate in enforcing wartime regulations, 
under threat of imprisonment for public servants found in dereliction of this duty.14 In 
late August, trial by jury was suspended in the entire Austrian half of the Empire.15 
On top of this, a secretive and tentacular war surveillance office – the 
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Kriegsüberwachungsamt – was set up under the aegis of the ministry of war to 
“coordinate all the agencies necessary for the internal control of the state”.16 
Mobilization had gone smoothly throughout Austria,17 but as soon as the first 
signs of waning enthusiasm, of hostility to the war or incidences of treacherous 
activities emerged, particularly within the Slav and Latin populations of the Empire, 
the high command – nominally headed by Archduke Friedrich but effectively 
controlled by Conrad – requested the further expansion of its powers at the expense of 
the political, administrative and judicial authorities. Its primary aim was the 
subjugation of a perceived fifth column. In large parts of the Empire, it was able to 
execute this policy unhindered, as many Poles, Ukrainians and South Slavs could 
testify.18 Enforcement was ruthless and often indiscriminate. In Conrad’s own words: 
“Better to arrest a hundred people too many than one person too few”.19 Even outside 
the areas it controlled, the army often acted with little regard for civilian authority. In 
Styria, for example, in the early days of the war, local commanders arbitrarily arrested 
many Slovenes – particularly clergymen – accused of Serbophile and pan-Slav 
sympathies, with neither the agreement nor the knowledge of the local governor.20 
Subsequently, on the day of the Italian declaration of war, the military was able to add 
Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and the Littoral to its 
dominions.21 Given the command of the South-Western Front, Archduke Eugen was 
quickly convinced of the disloyalty of the Slovene intelligentsia (in contrast to the 
loyal peasantry), whose aims to unite all South Slavs inside and outside Austria he 
thought incompatible with the Austrian state idea and as dangerous as Italian 
irredentism.22 Asked to investigate, Lieutenant-General Karl Scotti, the head of the 
Tenth Army, castigated the civilian authorities for their laxness, and requested that the 
leaders of the dominant Pan-Slovene People’s Party23 – Reichsrat member and 
governor of Carniola Ivan Šušteršič, and diet deputy Janez Evangelist Krek – be 
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locked up on trumped-up charges of fraud and embezzlement. In his view, this was 
the easiest way to make them “disappear from public life” without “offering them the 
possibility of playing the comfortable role of “political martyrs”.”24 
Most frustratingly for the high command, since it considered the Czechs 
among the most dangerous and least reliable nations of the Monarchy, Bohemia and 
most of Moravia remained outside the militarized zone. There, it had greater difficulty 
in imposing its will but nevertheless proceeded as energetically as it could. As a result 
of the extension of its jurisdiction, innumerable offences ended up before military 
courts, which often handed out exemplary sentences. Yet although men could be 
judged on the spot and executed simply for distributing propaganda flyers or making a 
speech,25 a great many cases were simply the result of careless public-house talk 
reminiscent of The Good Soldier Švejk.26 Should the wrong person overhear, any 
casual remark against the state, the army, the dynasty or Germany, in favour of the 
enemy or in support of peace – whether out of suffering, weariness, genuine defiance 
or idle bluster – could result in arrest. Even waving at prisoners of war or having 
one’s photo taken with them could land the culprit before a military tribunal.27 
Naturally, the Czechs were targeted with particular zeal (though at least one man 
faced charges for having complained about Czech desertions to the enemy).28 
Seemingly trivial actions could trigger prosecution. For instance, sixteen local 
officials in Radnice were tried for lèse-majesté for supposedly failing to take part in 
high mass on the occasion of the emperor’s birthday and name day in 1914.29 
(Admittedly, any deficient patriotism was treated severely regardless of nationality.)30 
Any sign of the red, blue and white Slavic tricolour – deliberate or not, whether in a 
shop window, on an advertisement, a matchbox31 or a handkerchief – was usually 
enough to warrant a few nights in jail and sometimes led to prosecution.32 
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Many Czechs felt that the military authorities were making the most of 
incidents involving them in order to capitalize on these during and after the war.33 
Men such as Conrad had long believed that only a purge of the Empire’s 
untrustworthy elements – Slavs in particular – could save it. Others settled more 
personal scores. General Eugen von Scheure, the military commander in Leitmeritz 
(responsible for the northern half of Bohemia), himself a German from Prague, 
summed up his views in a plea to the high command for further repression: “The time 
has now definitely come to sweep away all that is bad and rotten with an iron 
broom.”34 (In the same report, he boasted that when receiving a deputation of Czech 
politicians on a local matter, he had lectured them on Czech disloyalty and told them: 
“Do you know, I could safely bet all the gold in the world that since humanity has 
existed, no nation has produced such contemptible, wretched characters as the Czech 
nation.”)35 
Yet despite unrelenting pressure, the military did not succeed in gaining full 
power throughout the Bohemian lands, chiefly due to the opposition of the Austrian 
prime minister. Stürgkh, though he had sent a confidential circular in July to his 
regional chiefs ordering them to bow to all the needs of the army and to show 
implacable severity towards the enemies of the state,36 refused to accede to the 
military’s wishes. Though an exponent of authoritarian rule, he thought its proposed 
course of action in the Bohemian lands damaging to the Monarchy’s domestic and 
foreign interests.37 As a result, he tenaciously opposed army encroachments and stood 
by Prince Franz Thun-Hohenstein, the Czech-friendly governor of Bohemia. Both 
men were deeply concerned by the effect of military repression on the Czech 
population.38 The powers of the civilian state administration had also increased with 
the war and they deemed these sufficient to counter internal threats. Stürgkh’s 
strategy was facilitated by the fact that he had already done away with potential 
political opposition, having closed the Bohemian Diet and prorogued the Reichsrat. 
Rigid press censorship and strict control of public activity completed the muzzling.39 
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In any case, the political parties of Cisleithania – including the Austrian Social 
Democrats40 – were overwhelmingly supportive of the decision to go to war,41 and 
agreed to a domestic truce, the famed Burgfrieden. As long as the war lasted, Stürgkh 
refused to consider the recall of the Reichsrat,42 repeating only days before his 
assassination in October 1916 that Austria could not afford the spectacle of a divided 
House unable to conduct its business. This, he thought, would reveal all her 
weaknesses to the world and be “a presage of imminent collapse”.43 As he considered 
his government responsible only to the emperor, he had no compunction in ruling by 
decree. During this time, use of Paragraph Fourteen broke all records, being employed 
145 times between 25 August 1914 and the end of 1916, almost as much as during the 
previous fifty-three years.44 Stürgkh himself used it 161 times during his tenure, 
which had begun in 1911.45 
 Meanwhile, in Bohemia, his ally Thun strove to attest to Czech loyalty and 
regularly cast doubt on military sources which sought to demonstrate the contrary.46 
But despite the prime minister’s best efforts, Thun’s position grew weaker as reports 
of Czech misbehaviour – which he could not always deny – increased, and as the 
emperor himself expressed his growing concern about the attitude of Czech soldiers 
on the battlefield47 and political conditions in the crownland.48 Stürgkh eventually 
enjoined his friend to act firmly through the use of emergency legislation – 
preventatively in general and repressively in individual cases.49 But Thun’s 
administration had hardly been complacent: numerous clubs, associations and 
newspapers had been banned or suspended, and prominent figures neutralized. The 
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army was informed that between the outbreak of war and the end of 1914, 950 people 
had been arrested for political offences (of which 704 had been handed over to the 
military courts), and that forty-six newspapers and thirty-two clubs had been closed.50 
Notably, Václav Klofáč, the founder and leader of the radical National Social Party,51 
had been arrested on suspicion of high treason and the party’s newspaper, České 
slovo, closed down (though it was soon replaced). Samostatnost, the organ of the 
State-Rights Progressive Party52 and the periodical Čas of Tomáš Masaryk’s Realist 
Party53 suffered the same fate, while Národní listy, the influential mouthpiece of the 
Young Czech Party,54 was forced to cease publication for eight days.55 Yet the 
military continued to excoriate the governor, to press Franz Joseph for his 
replacement by a senior general with special powers – in fact, for the “elimination of 
the administration” – and for the extension of its political and administrative authority 
to Bohemia, and to all of Moravia and Silesia.56 Long unpopular among German 
Bohemians,57 assailed by their political representatives58 and by Berlin’s fiercely anti-
Czech diplomats, ambassador Tschirschky in Vienna and consul general Baron Fritz 
von Gebsattel in Prague, Thun’s position became increasingly untenable.59 In late 
March 1915, plagued by worsening eyesight and undermined by further reports of 
Czech disloyalty,60 he reluctantly resigned.61 The news was greeted enthusiastically 
by the German camp and deplored by the Czechs,62 but Franz Joseph resisted pressure 
to appoint a general in his place and instead named Count Max von Coudenhove, a 
Bohemian noble whose family had previously occupied the post in alternation with 
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the Thuns.63 However, whereas the latter traditionally identified with the Czech 
nation, the Coudenhoves were more German in spirit.64 
 
The new governor was expected to initiate a tougher course, and was quickly forced 
into action. Days after he took office, news emerged that much of the overwhelmingly 
Czech 28th Infantry Regiment had gone over to the Russians during the battle at 
Stebnícka Huta on 3 April. Now debunked,65 this version of events was accepted 
almost unquestioningly at the time. The regiment was promptly dissolved,66 helping 
establish the myth of Czech treachery on the battlefield,67 which both German 
nationalists and anti-Habsburg Czech émigrés would eagerly exploit. (In fact, the 
regiment was discreetly re-formed in December 1915 after a reserve battalion 
originally from its ranks distinguished itself on the Italian Front.)68 This incident led 
to a renewed onslaught by the military authorities, who bombarded Stürgkh with more 
evidence of Czech disloyalty and machinations against the state and the army, both at 
home and abroad, and demanded ruthless repression in order to “sanitize conditions in 
Bohemia”.69 And again they asked Franz Joseph to appoint a senior general as 
governor and thus to place the crownland under military administration.70 On 21 May, 
the high command moved in directly and, without consulting civilian authorities, had 
Karel Kramář, the leader of the Young Czech Party, and Josef Scheiner, the head of 
the Sokol – the nationalist gymnastics society long suspected of being a breeding 
ground for pan-Slavism – arrested on suspicion of high treason.71 In July, Kramář’s 
collaborator and editor of the Národní listy Alois Rašín joined them in jail (though 
Scheiner was released shortly after).72 Stürgkh was furious and Franz Joseph was 
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apparently outraged.73 Unbeknown to them and to the military, however, Kramář, 
Rašín and Scheiner were all deeply involved in the Maffie, the underground 
organization working towards the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy from the 
inside in conjunction with the exiled Masaryk.74 Still unsated, and highlighting further 
reports of Czech misdeeds on the battlefield – for which it blamed “uninhibited, 
enduring anti-dynastic and anti-militaristic propaganda in Bohemia” – the army again 
asked Franz Joseph to appoint a general as governor in mid-June.75 But when he 
received Conrad in audience two days later, the emperor made it clear that he did not 
think this necessary for Bohemia76 (although he relented in the case of Galicia).77 His 
refusal was so categorical that the military authorities never again made this demand. 
The following month, they requested merely the appointment of a military governor 
alongside Coudenhove (as well the nomination of a staff officer as chief of police and, 
again, the extension of the emergency decrees to Bohemia).78 
This was not so much an admission of defeat as a change of tack. Indeed, they 
now demanded the sanitizing of Bohemia through the ending of municipal autonomy, 
the nationalization of the police and of all schools, and the investigation of all civil 
servants to assess their trustworthiness.79 Thereafter, however, the high command 
abandoned its specific strategy for Bohemia and sought instead to initiate these 
fundamental reforms for all of Cisleithania.80 In July 1915, it informed Stürgkh that it 
considered the removal of all learning institutions from the competence of the 
crownlands as one of the most important conditions for Austria’s domestic political 
recovery.81 In September, again pointing to Czech unreliability on the battlefield, 
Friedrich reported to the emperor: “The necessary strengthening of state authority and 
of the armed forces is unthinkable without the complete annihilation of all anti-
Monarchy strivings, the education of all nations in an Austrian spirit, […] the creation 
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of a uniform, reliable corps from the nationally fragmented civil service, a 
fundamental change in administrative, educational and defence law”.82 In December, 
the high command laid out its demands to Stürgkh for the sanitizing of internal 
conditions in Austria. These involved not only the forming of a dependable, 
consistent, loyal civil service but also the development and maintaining of a diligent, 
patriotic teaching body and clergy, impervious to all anti-state and extreme national 
influences. To this end, the military required the removal of all compromised 
elements, the strictest surveillance of teaching institutions and of municipal 
functionaries, the nationalization of the entire school system, the introduction of 
military initiation for all youths, the legal recognition of German as the compulsory 
language of communication,83 and the limitation of municipal autonomy.84 The high 
command did not fail to point out to Stürgkh that it had already sent him notes on all 
these subjects but had only received an answer on the subject of ecclesiastical 
positions.85 Indeed, the prime minister, as he had told Redlich in September 1914, had 
no intention of even engaging in speculation on the future domestic policy of Austria 
during the war.86 
 
In Bohemia, nevertheless, Coudenhove’s appointment ushered in a new era. The 
German Consul cheerily reported that “a new wind [was] blowing”, to the delight of 
local German circles.87 As the high command had wished,88 the Prague chief of police 
and the head of the governor’s office – both Czechs – were replaced by Germans.89 
Also in line with military demands, the two main Bohemian clubs of the Sokol were 
dissolved, followed by several local branches and many other Czech clubs and 
associations.90 Similarly, organizations suspected of fostering separatism – such as the 
Czech Football Association and the Czech Committee for the Olympic Games – were 
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disbanded.91 Furthermore, an increasing number of Czech newspapers was forced to 
stop publication – 80 by June 1916, according to Gebsattel.92 Those that remained 
frequently had articles imposed by the police, under threat of closure.93 In addition, 
throughout the Bohemian lands, the German language made inroads at the expense of 
Czech in both the civilian and military administration, from ministries to barracks.94 
But the climax of anti-Czech persecution came in June 1916 with the sentencing to 
death, after a six-month trial, of Kramář and Rašín for high treason and crimes against 
the military power of the state. (In the same judgement, the secretary of the Národní 
listy Vincenc Červinka and employee Josef Zamazal also received this punishment for 
spying.)95 Though Kramář had indeed been involved in treasonous activity,96 the 
military prosecutor was unable to provide any evidence for this.97 In reality, it had 
been the trial of Czech politics, a reckoning. As Redlich commented: “With this 
judgement, the nigh forty-year period of Czech ascendancy in Austria ends”.98  Much 
of the Czech public, already indignant about the arrest of significant public figures,99 
was further embittered by the verdict, all the more so since the details of the case 
against the accused were not published for several months. Although the authorities 
did not wish to make the men into martyrs by executing them,100 their arrest, 
imprisonment and sentencing had been largely sufficient to elevate them to this status. 
And shortly after, four National Social deputies – Buřival, Choc, Netolický and Vojna 
– received prison sentences ranging from one to five years for having allegedly 
discussed plans for the reception of the victorious Russian army in Bohemia in the 
wake of the fall of Lwów.101 
The heavy-handedness of the military’s actions against the Czechs did little to 
help Coudenhove’s more pedagogical attempts to redress their deficient patriotism. 
Early in his tenure, in response to reports of their allegedly treacherous – mostly 
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Russophile – inclinations and “passive, indifferent and apathetic behaviour”, he had 
instructed local authorities and civil servants to awaken, nurture and promote their 
patriotic sentiments. He ordered active propaganda to be deployed daily, in all 
spheres, at every opportunity.102 The essence of the ideological message was that the 
development of the Czech nation could occur only within the framework of the 
Habsburg state, and that a strong Austria was therefore in its interest.103 On top of 
this, he demanded that entirely new Czech schoolbooks be written, as existing ones 
did not promote the Austrian state idea or the unbreakable bond between the fate of 
the Czech nation and the state.104 The ministry of education responded by requesting a 
review of all teaching materials at Czech-speaking schools in Bohemia, Moravia and 
Silesia.105 (It had previously done the same for Slovene-language books in Styria.)106 
Clearly, Coudenhove did not consider the Czechs fundamentally disloyal or beyond 
salvation. When issuing the instructions in his circular, he had stressed: “It is beyond 
any doubt that the majority of the Czech population of the Empire is completely 
loyally minded and condemns [incidents involving Czech troops on the front]”.107 The 
first results of his initiative soon confirmed to him “the fact that the overwhelming 
part of the Czech population is loyal”.108 Two months later, he boasted that the 
Czechs in Bohemia now displayed flags and decorated their houses after each victory 
of the Central Powers.109 Shortly after, the military commander in Prague reported 
that Franz Joseph’s birthday in August had been celebrated throughout the 
province.110 In January 1916, Coudenhove concluded that the results of this action had 
been satisfactory thus far, and urged its continuation, though he demanded greater 
initiative from local district commissioners, and gave further instructions for 
influencing and surveilling teachers.111 Five months later, he recognized that the heads 
of local authorities had worked “mostly eagerly, systematically and successfully” 
towards the nurturing of the Austrian state idea among the Czech population. To his 
great satisfaction, he had read reports of declarations of loyalty, of numerous patriotic 
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events and meetings, of the erection of Nail Men, of dynastic street-naming, and of 
the successful military training of the youth. He admitted, in light of these 
observations: “the majority of the Czech population is willingly led towards active 
exercising of the Austrian state idea”.112 Military reports concurred. Inspections of 
recruits continued to pass off without incident, and were occasionally accompanied by 
patriotic declarations.113 Dynastic loyalty seemed unperturbed: Franz Joseph’s 
birthday was again keenly celebrated,114 while a new bridge on the Elbe in Hradec 
Králové was named after Karl, as was a street in Vinohrady after Archduke Eugen.115 
Coudenhove was not entirely satisfied, however. He deplored the continued 
existence of indifference and insincerity in certain circles and vowed to root out such 
attitudes in the future through education. As a result, he advocated a purge of the 
Czech teaching body. Only those whose “heart, mind and reason” were “imbued with 
Austrian patriotism” would be suitable to teach.116 A few days later, the minister of 
the interior wrote to his cabinet colleagues urging them to consider measures for the 
review of the mindset of the civil service, and its constant supervision.117 
 
Coudenhove’s predecessor, of course, had always insisted that the majority of the 
Czech population was patriotic, and that nationalistic and pan-Slavic elements 
represented a minority of the intelligentsia. He had pointed to the trouble-free 
mobilization of Czech soldiers, to eager public demonstrations in Prague, to the 
Czechs’ contributions to war welfare organizations and to their sacrifices on the 
battlefield.118 There was certainly evidence of a Czech fighting spirit in the very early 
days of the war.119 In the first few weeks after its outbreak, even Gebsattel had 
reported positively on the behaviour of the Czechs who “seem[ed] to be going to war 
against Serbia and Russia with the same enthusiasm as the Germans”. He had 
buoyantly described a scene before the consulate in which several thousand Czechs 
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and Germans had gathered to celebrate favourable news from the front.120 (Though in 
fact, Thun himself had orchestrated this manifestation with the help of Count Heinrich 
Clam-Martinic.)121 When the Czechs’ fervour waned visibly, Thun explained – quite 
rightly – that this was the result of the war’s development and increasing human cost. 
Further, he blamed their lack of enthusiasm for German military successes on the 
historical antagonism between both peoples and on the widespread fear among 
Czechs that a complete German victory would result in a huge increase of German 
influence in Austria-Hungary, and particularly in Bohemia.122 (He quoted the chief of 
police, according to whom aversion to the Germans was greater than sympathy for 
Russia.)123 Interior minister Heinold, a former governor of Moravia, fully supported 
Thun and repeated the governor’s arguments to the military. He conceded that 
nationalism and pan-Slavism existed but maintained categorically that the 
overwhelming majority of the Czech population did not subscribe to these ideas. He 
thought it unfair to call the entire nation unpatriotic, and insisted that most Czechs 
were loyal to both dynasty and empire.124 (He even accused the military courts of 
laxness.)125 In any case, Thun and Heinold knew that they could count on the solid 
support of Stürgkh who, though he too admitted the existence of a “questionable 
tendency […] in part of the Czech population”,126 likewise refused to generalize. 
Indeed, he understood elements of the Czech predicament. As he told a group of 
dismayed German Bohemian deputies, the Czechs were fighting against feelings 
towards Russia and Serbia which had long been instilled in them, and the Germans of 
Bohemia would feel the same if they had to fight a war against Germany.127 Aware of 
the existence of treacherous inclinations among a minority of Czechs, he, Thun and 
Heinold worried that blind tyranny would only foster them further, and that the 
civilian authorities would have to pick up the pieces.128 Of course, they were also 
defending their record, and fighting to ward off encroachments from the military and 
retain their powers. Though they were therefore prone to underplay the frequency and 
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significance of Czech misdemeanours, they were undoubtedly sincere – and, indeed, 
correct – in their confidence that the nation was predominantly loyal. 
 The military, on the other hand, consistently considered the Czechs inherently 
unreliable, unpatriotic, anti-German, pro-Russian, disengaged from the Austrian state 
idea and desirous of complete autonomy for the lands of the Bohemian crown.129 
Even the traditional political programme of historic Bohemian state rights – common 
to all non-Socialist Czech parties and virtually always envisaged within the Habsburg 
Monarchy – was seen as “frank treason”.130 Though here too treacherous tendencies 
were first and foremost ascribed to educated circles,131 suspicion was frequently 
extended indiscriminately to the entire nation. According to General Scheure, for 
instance, it was “deeply stirred by Russophile feelings, right down to every stratum of 
the population, […] both genders, from ten to over seventy, from privy councillor to 
tramp”.132 In the eyes of such men, any Czech expressions of loyalty were necessarily 
insincere and opportunistic.133 German nationalists, as well as Reich German leaders 
and diplomats134 espoused and propagated these views. Within weeks of the outbreak 
of war, the tales of Czech deceit had become widespread, even though the evidence 
was often anecdotal, biased or based on hearsay or denunciation.135 Many thought the 
Czechs uniquely treacherous and coddled among all the peoples of Austria-Hungary. 
Burián, for example, believed that the other Slav nations, who had felt the full force of 
the state, had “proved their worth outstandingly” in the war, while Czechs at home 
and abroad were pervaded by the desire for an independent Czech-Slovak state under 
a Slav Prince.136 Even Karl had been heard to speak disparagingly about them in the 
opening months of the war, apparently declaring: “In such times, one truly learns to 
know one’s subjects.”137 
 But not even the military considered the Czechs wholly irretrievable, at least 
provided they were treated with an iron hand. In May 1915, the high command wrote 
to Stürgkh: “In places where capable men are at the top and elements hostile to the 
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state are ruthlessly administered their just deserts, the population remains loyal. Even 
today, one can still hope for this change in the case of the Czech element, but only if 
the authority of the state intervenes mercilessly.”138 By mid-1916, it noted with 
satisfaction that the radicals had been culled, and that level-headed, loyal elements 
were coming to the fore in public demonstrations and in the press. In particular, it 
commended the numerous articles against Masaryk and the émigrés in the Agrarian 
Večer, the Social Democratic Právo lidu, and even in Národní listy (which was by 
now in Austrophile hands). Furthermore, the behaviour of Czech troops had 
apparently improved, and various commanders testified that “the Czech peasant is 
generally a brave, reliable soldier, who is wholly removed from the endeavours to tear 
the Bohemian lands away”. It added that national conflicts were rare in mixed Czech-
German regiments, and that political radicalism had not taken hold. Nevertheless, the 
report concluded that these positive developments were the result of the Czechs’ 
acceptance of the inevitable victory of the Central Powers.139 
Indeed, suspicion still prevailed and the military continually sought to extend 
its powers by demonstrating Czech disloyalty. The civilian authorities, however, did 
not yield. When, in August 1916, Conrad’s Intelligence Bureau140 produced a highly 
critical political report on Czech activities at home and abroad,141 the interior ministry 
disputed the domestic accusations point by point.142 First of all, to counter the claim 
that the mood of the Czech population had shown no improvement and continued to 
be hostile to the state and anti-German, it provided police figures for Bohemia, 
Moravia and Silesia which indicated that each month so far that year had witnessed a 
drop in the number of arrests and legal proceedings compared to 1915 (though 
arguably, there were fewer people to arrest). Furthermore, and again based on police 
sources, the ministry denied that the Czechs were secretly cheering on the Russian 
offensive; rather, after Austro-Hungarian victories, the Czech population now – unlike 
in the early days of the war – organized patriotic demonstrations in various localities. 
In addition, it vigorously rejected the assertion that the Czech authorities’ loyalty was 
superficial and hammed up to cover the truth of their treachery. The interior ministry 
had seen no evidence of this, considered the accusation outrageous and maintained 
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that the civil service in the Bohemian lands had fulfilled its duties in exemplary 
fashion and had recorded notable successes in inculcating the idea of state unity in the 
population. It also pointed out that not a single case involving treasonable declarations 
by children had been traced back to a teacher. All other criticisms were likewise 
dismissed, even though the ministry did not deny Czech wartime failings and the 
responsibility of school institutions for the disloyal education of “the majority of 
Czech youth”. Conrad was incensed by this rebuttal and insisted that the years of 
nationalist incitement among the Czechs were the cause of these alarming wartime 
occurrences.143 
 
From the statistics for criminal offences brought to court in Bohemia from 26 July 
1914 to 31 December 1916 compiled by the governor’s office, the Czechs certainly 
appeared disproportionately active (and indeed guilty of more serious offences) or 
disproportionately targeted. Though only 63.22% of the population according to the 
1910 census, they accounted for 73.97% of those charged with offences, while 
Germans represented 17.05%.144 Of those sentenced, 81.51% were Czech and 14.2% 
were German, with the former receiving 84.9% of the prison time to the latter’s 
9.62%. These escalating percentages certainly suggested a more severe treatment of 
the Czechs. Yet the breakdown of offences revealed that these were overwhelmingly 
the result of individual rather than collective actions. Indeed, most cases involved a 
breach of the peace (1705 cases – 37.09% of the total), lèse-majesté (650 – 14.4%), 
public violence (609 – 13.25%), high treason (404 – 8.79%) or the aiding and abetting 
of deserters (401 – 8.72%); insurrections and riots were, on the other hand, 
comparatively infrequent (181 – 3.91%). Only 87 cases of incitement to national or 
religious hatred were recorded. The highest number of offences had occurred between 
26 July and 30 September 1914. Thereafter, whereas the German figures quickly 
dropped and remained consistent, Czech ones stayed high and peaked again in the 
second and third quarters of 1915. However, 1916 witnessed a drop of almost 30% 
from the previous year, doubtless due to the effective repression by the authorities and 
war-weary apathy of the population. 
 Though the high command often pointed to these statistics to prove Czech 
treachery, other figures hinted more plausibly at inadequate Czech patriotism and lack 
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of enthusiasm for the war. Notably, the Czechs in Bohemia contributed far less to the 
war loans than their German counterparts, providing only 20.6% of the total for the 
second, third and fourth war loans.145 Thun had explained that this was partly due to 
the Germans’ greater wealth,146 but the finance ministry disagreed, and pointed to the 
fact that between October 1914 and June 1916, deposits in savings banks had 
increased by 2.2 millions crowns in German institutions (a 0.16% rise), but by 118.2 
million crowns in Czech ones (a 13.38% rise).147 Thun’s excuse was indeed flimsy, 
for although the Czechs were poorer, they still earned 54.1% of the taxable income in 
Bohemia,148 which was not substantially inferior to their weight in the population, and 
could therefore not justify their paltry subscription to war loans. Their suspicion that 
these were bad investments, on the other, could.149 However, according to Gebsattel, 
the Czechs’ contribution to war welfare was also small, accounting for instance for 
only 16% of Red Cross collections in Bohemia.150 
 Of course, any data on nationality had its limitations. It is unclear, for 
instance, whether the figures for criminality were based on census information, on the 
declaration of the offender or the discretion of the official. Likewise, it is hard to 
conceive of a reliable method for establishing nationality in financial matters. In any 
case, information from the census – the last of which had been taken in 1910 – was 
famously flawed. The sole criterion for nationality was “language of daily use”, with 
which it was hardly synonymous. And by forcing respondents to define themselves 
and by restricting them to one answer, the authorities could not take into account 
national indifference or flexibility, or multiple identities, all of which had historically 
been features of the Bohemian lands, and indeed of all mixed regions of the Empire. 
Unsurprisingly, the census had become a fierce battleground for nationalists seeking 
to boost their nation’s numbers and thereby bolster their national claims.151 Yet 
despite the shortcomings of its national data, the census should not be discarded or 
treated with exaggerated suspicion, and should instead be accepted as a fair indication 
of national weight. Since nationalists of all sides sought to influence the results, since 
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biased officials throughout the Empire probably tinkered with the figures, and since 
national switching occurred across the board, the methodological imperfections were, 
to an extent, evened out. Furthermore, by the outbreak of the First World War, 
national and linguistic identities were more clearly defined and more deeply 
entrenched than they had ever been, and politics and public life more nationalized.152 
This even affected the countryside,153 despite the ambiguity and inertia which 
continued to exist there, and which to a lesser extent also lingered in the cities.154 
Overall, this signified a gradual erosion of the multiple and often compatible 
supranational identities which had previously prevailed – whether imperial, 
provincial, local, religious, social or professional – in favour of a more exclusive 
national identity.155 Of course, increased national separation meant increased national 
competition and conflict. The state proved largely unable to respond to these 
challenges, particularly in Bohemia, despite the commonplace assertion that only a 
“paper-thin wall” stood between Germans and Czechs.156 Indeed, neither camp was 
willing to yield on its basic position: for the latter, the indivisibility and fundamental 
Czech character of Bohemia and for the former, autonomy for the German regions of 
the province.157 Even ostensible successes – the compromises in Moravia in 1905 and 
in the Bukovina in 1910, and those agreed upon for Galicia and the Bohemian city of 
Budweis/České Budějovice (but not implemented due to the war) which divided the 
population into nationally exclusive cadastres – were in a sense admissions of defeat. 
For although these arrangements provided a modus vivendi, they nationalized citizens 
by forcing them to define themselves nationally, in effect permanently.158 There was 
no recognition for those who thought themselves anational, binational, Utraquist, 
Budweiser, Moravian, Galician, Bukovinian or, crucially, Austrian.159 These 
compromises represented “the ethnicizing of Austrian politics”,160 a move away from 
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the supranational ideal, and only a short-term solution to the fundamental issues of 
national strife. 
 
Internal war aims 
 
In the first two years of war, national tensions did not obviously intensify within the 
population. In the political arena, however, German nationalists – not least those from 
Bohemia – were hard at work, though censorship and the suppression of public life 
restricted them to conspiratorial plotting. Confident of a decisive victory of Germany 
and Austria-Hungary over Russia and Serbia – of Germandom over Slavdom –, they 
sensed a unique opportunity for winning the domestic war they had waged for 
decades. In particular, the prospect of both parliament and diet remaining closed 
during the conflict encouraged them to press for the definitive resolution in their 
favour of long-standing issues by imperial fiat. At the forefront of their concerns were 
the cementing of constitutional relations with Hungary, the extension and deepening 
of ties with Berlin, the bolstering of German predominance in Austria and the solving 
of the nationality question, particularly in Bohemia. The first impulse in this direction 
was given in August 1914 by Gustav Groß, the chairman of the Deutscher 
Nationalverband, the loose and motley umbrella organization of the German liberal 
parties in parliament.161 By the following spring, a set of radical programmatic 
demands had been agreed upon and submitted to the government. It requested inter 
alia a permanent constitutional alliance with Germany, the removal of Galician 
representation in the Reichsrat to free the state “from the unbearable Slav 
predominance”,162 the establishment of German as the internal language of business 
and communication163 in all state civil and military authorities and higher court 
hearings in Cisleithania, and the administrative division of Bohemia along linguistic 
lines.164 
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Shortly after his initial soundings, and spurred on by some of his colleagues, 
Groß put out feelers to his pre-war allies, the Christian Social Party (Christlichsoziale 
Partei).165 However, the nationalists had to mitigate both the tone and content of their 
claims in order to establish cooperation. Finally, in September 1915, the two parties 
agreed to a ten-point programme, which included a close economic alliance with 
Germany (with a possible tariff and trade union), constitutional changes, new standing 
orders for parliament, the securing of the position of the Germans in Austria, the 
reform of state administration, the organization of crownland autonomy, a special 
status for Galicia166 and a language law.167 Gone were the anti-Slav rhetoric, the 
specific measures for Bohemia and the constitutional alliance with Germany, while 
Galicia’s future position was required to preserve the interests of the Empire, and 
changes to the Austrian constitution were to be made only “insofar as they have 
proved necessary”. German was to be simply the undefined “language of 
communication”,168 and in mixed regions, the linguistic requirements of the non-
German-speaking population were to be respected. Immediately handed to the prime 
minister (who ignored it), these desiderata were eventually published in January 
1916.169 On the surface, it appeared that a compromise had been reached, but doubts 
and fundamental divergences remained, and the two sides had taken precautions 
accordingly. Both insisted that they would continue to safeguard their party 
principles, with the Nationalverband stressing that this was a deliberately broad 
outline and vowing to uphold any demands which exceeded these joint aims.170 It also 
admitted that not all its affiliated groups in the various provinces would agree with 
every point of the programme, notably on the question of autonomy.171 Indeed, 
crownland autonomy, which the Christian Socials supported unequivocally, stood in 
complete contradiction to the goals of the German nationalists in the Bohemian 
lands.172 In fact, schemes for the future of the Monarchy hatched by Christian Social 
politicians and theorists rarely coincided with the nationalists’.173 Thus although the 
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alliance brought potential tactical benefits and political leverage to a party burdened 
with the administration of Vienna,174 many of its members were uncomfortable with it 
and thought it doomed from the outset. The party’s co-founder Albert Geßmann, for 
instance, felt that the Nationalverband’s proposals would place Austria below Bavaria 
and thought its rabble-rousing was “damaging the Germans in Austria 
tremendously”.175 The Christian Socials also often appeared less buoyant about the 
much-trumpeted “victory peace”.176 And in autumn 1915, the party had demanded the 
recall of parliament with only the standing orders as a precondition.177 (Later 
overtures by the Nationalverband towards the Austrian Social Democrats came to 
nothing, as the latter insisted on the prior reconvening of the Reichsrat as a matter of 
principle.178 However, not all Socialists were insensitive to the idea of a German-
dominated Central European economic unit – Karl Renner, most notably – or 
impervious to the belief in the superiority of German culture and necessity of German 
leadership.179 There seems even to have been support within the party for the 
promulgation by decree of German as language of state,180 of the division of 
Bohemia,181 and possibly even of new standing orders for the House, despite its 
professed aversion to Paragraph Fourteen and advocacy of a negotiated settlement.)182 
As a result of his collaboration with the Christian Socials and his comparative 
moderation, Groß was compromised in the eyes of the extremists of the 
Nationalverband, chiefly the German Bohemians of the Radical Party183 such as Karl 
Hermann Wolf and Raphael Pacher. They, in turn, devised their own virulent pan-
German and anti-Slav programme, essentially a re-edition of the political demands of 
the 1882 Linz Programme.184 Their plans had burgeoned in late 1914 in nationalist 
and academic circles in Vienna and, after further consultations the following year 
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between these groups, the German National Councils of the various crownlands and 
the Radicals, had finally appeared in a memorandum at Easter 1916.185 These 
“Demands of the Germans of Austria for Reorganization after the War” – the 
Osterbegehrschrift, or “Easter Demands” – shared many of the goals of Groß’s 
programme, but were far more specific and uncompromising. Underpinning its 
policies was the conviction that “the relation between the Germans and the remaining 
nationalities [had] to be sorted according to the lasting preservation and securing of 
the leading political and cultural position which befits the German nation”. 
Consequently, German was to be established as the official language of state186 – the 
exclusive internal language within and between all state offices, authorities, courts, 
state enterprises and foundations. Deputies from the Bukovina and Dalmatia as well 
as Galicia were to be removed from the Reichsrat to ensure a German majority.187 
German minorities in Carniola, the Littoral and the South Tyrol were to be protected 
and supported by the state. Moreover, all attempts at union between Slovenes and 
Croats were to be resolutely opposed. In Bohemia – the issue closest to the heart of 
many of the programme’s authors – a new constitution was to divide the province into 
German and bilingual administrative areas (with only German civil servants permitted 
in the former). In addition, large nationally demarcated units – circles, or Kreise – 
were to be created, with their own governments and representation, thus emasculating 
the diet in Prague and effectively breaking the unity of the crownland. (To underline 
the partition, Czechs were henceforth to be referred to officially as “Czech” and not as 
“Bohemians” or “Moravians”.)188 In summary, the Germans of Bohemia would gain 
the local self-rule they denied non-German minorities elsewhere in the Empire. 
Exploiting reports of wartime Czech perfidy, and contrasting it with their own 
sacrificial loyalty, the German nationalists of Bohemia sought the unilateral and 
categorical resolution of a question which had failed to be settled in peacetime. Their 
programme, in Wolf’s words, represented their “internal war aims”.189 Shunned by the 
Austrian government, they turned to Berlin for support, urging intervention to prevent 
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the Slavicizing of Austria.190 As one German Bohemian deputy told Gebsattel: “After 
the war, we certainly hope that Germany will tidy up here in Austria.”191 By January 
1916, the German bourgeois parties of Bohemia had succeeded in overcoming 
personal differences in order to revive their pre-war diet union, and were joined by the 
Constitutionally Loyal Landowners,192 a historically pro-German, but moderate, 
group for whom this represented a considerable radicalization.193 
In addition, several other bands of professional and amateur politicians in the 
German camp were eagerly at work to exploit the singular conditions offered by the 
war and the lack of parliament. The group gathered around Gustav Marchet and 
Baernreither194 was notable among these often overlapping ad hoc entities, as was that 
of the historian Heinrich Friedjung.195 Yet irrespective of their divergences, all 
factions agreed that the fulfilment of their demands by decree – or octroi – had to 
precede the reopening of parliament (which would certainly reject them).196 As 
Redlich, a noteworthy opponent of these plans within the Nationalverband,197 pointed 
out: “They did not want it to meet again in its old form”.198 But, under the influence 
of Berlin’s war aims and pan-German agitation, of joint successes on the battlefield, 
of the publication of Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa,199 and of consultations 
between Austrian and German politicians, the climate became increasingly favourable 
to these ideas in 1915.200 In Austria (far more than in Germany),201 the plans for a 
comprehensive economic and military union between Vienna and Berlin found 
considerable resonance – not only in the intelligentsia, the press, parts of the 
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bureaucracy and even big business, but also among broad sections of the population 
including Christian Social and Social Democratic supporters.202 
 
These schemes were consistently encouraged by the German foreign office, with 
varying degrees of insistence. Prior to the war, Tschirschky had written a highly 
pessimistic report to chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, in which he had 
claimed that Austria-Hungary could not be sustained if Germandom were not secured 
in the crownlands.203 He often reminded the Austrians of this – sometimes 
threateningly – and supported political developments in this direction.204 Wilhelm 
himself told Karl in October 1915: “The great danger for the Monarchy represented 
by the Czechs, the Ruthenes and certain Poles can only be thwarted if Germandom is 
allocated the place to which is has a right and which, moreover, it has once again 
earned”. He insisted that every Austrian civil servant and officer speak German, and 
got the impression that Karl agreed with everything he said.205 On a visit to Vienna a 
few weeks later, the Kaiser repeated this point to the leading ministers, lectured them 
on the behaviour of the Czechs and stressed the necessity of an economic alliance.206 
This reflected the Germans’ growing concern regarding their ally’s future. Indeed, 
shortly before, secretary of state Gottlieb von Jagow had suggested to Tschirschky 
that a close military and economic union with Austria was not enough, and that the 
opportunity to strengthen the German element in the organism of state and ensure its 
preponderance over the Slavs had to be seized.207 On 13 November, he drafted a 
memorandum for the attention of his Austrian counterpart in which, having 
established that “the relations between both empires, governments and peoples [had] 
become so intimate and indissoluble” as a result of the war, he stressed the necessity 
of “long-term contracts of a political, economic and military nature”.208 In addition, 
he emphasized that the Dual Alliance had been concluded on the basis of Magyar 
supremacy in Hungary and German supremacy in Austria, and demanded that 
measures be taken to salvage the latter from Slav ascendancy and thus preserve the 
Germanic Eastern March. Burián, though he gave his – admittedly cautious and 
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noncommittal – approval to an economic rapprochement, rejected Jagow’s 
interpretation of the 1879 alliance and his description of the Monarchy as the 
Ostmark. He denied the risk of any Slavicizing of Austria and pointed out curtly: 
“The increase in the significance of other national elements is a result of their 
civilizational progress; rather than being repressed, it must on the contrary be greeted 
with satisfaction.”209 
 As ever, the German high command was in an even greater hurry than the 
foreign office to bring Vienna to heel. In September 1916, Hindenburg wrote to 
Bethmann urging not only a military convention with Austria-Hungary but also direct 
intervention in the country’s internal restructuring before the end of the war.210 The 
chancellor, though he agreed on the need for a reorganization of the Dual Monarchy – 
on the basis of securing German predominance in Austria and Magyar predominance 
on Hungary – countered that the matter could not be addressed before the conclusion 
of peace and a change of leadership in Vienna (which he claimed to want 
desperately).211 He argued that too much pressure from Berlin could result in Austria-
Hungary leaving the war or seeking a compromise with the enemy. As a result, he 
concluded: “For the time being, our activity must be limited to maintaining and 
deepening the feeling in broad Austro-Hungarian circles that things cannot go on as 
before”.212 And indeed, in November of that year, when Wilhelm told Karl of his 
desire for a military convention with Austria-Hungary after the conclusion of peace, 
he mentioned only equal armament and equipment.213 
 
In any case, neither the pressure from Berlin, nor from the Armeeoberkommando, nor 
indeed the propaganda of local German nationalists, could persuade Stürgkh to 
embark on a “German course”. Increasingly openly, however, his opponents sought 
his removal. In September 1915, the army high command asked Franz Joseph directly 
“to entrust a person with the leadership of the administration of [Austria] whose 
recognized capabilities and unshakable energy will guarantee an auspicious resolution 
of the decisive questions concerning the fate of Austria-Hungary.”214 The following 
month, the three main groups of the House of Lords presented him with a vote of no 
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confidence designed to topple him.215 Though he retained the emperor’s trust, the 
prime minister had to reshuffle his cabinet to placate his enemies.216 Most notably, 
Konrad Hohenlohe, the governor of the Littoral, was made minister of the interior. On 
the eve of his official appointment, he visited Tschirschky and assured him of his 
intentions: unqualified, open and sincere connection to the Reich “as the supreme 
foundation of his political activity”, a purge of the civil service and of the teaching 
body, the decreeing of new standing orders for parliament and an Ausgleich for 
Bohemia “which, after the experiences of the war, must be far more in favour of the 
Germans than previous drafts”.217 Privately, he envisaged a quadralist structure for the 
Monarchy.218 Conrad was delighted by Hohenlohe’s nomination, and the high 
command was soon pushing for his appointment as prime minister.219 Hohenlohe 
himself felt that he had entered the cabinet cum jure succedendi.220 
In the meantime, Stürgkh had given himself further breathing space by 
approving the elaboration of a programme for constitutional reform by Handel, the 
governor of Upper Austria who had been drafted into the interior ministry by 
Hohenlohe in January 1916.221 Hohenlohe was determined for these constitutional 
changes to be carried out by decree before the end of the Kramář trial; in particular, 
he wanted a pro-German language law and the dismantling of municipal and 
crownland autonomy.222 Handel drew up his plans accordingly, convinced of a 
complete victory of the Central Powers within the year and of a subsequent “German 
peace”, fully counting on the loosening of ties with Galicia, and aware of the 
“tremendously strong moral depression of the Czechs” in the wake of Russian 
military setbacks.223 He envisaged a strongly centralizing constitution, reinforcing the 
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primary legislative right and veto of the emperor (to the point of absolutism) and 
extending the competence of the Reichsrat at the expense of the provincial diets.224 
He established German as the “general language of state communication” for 
Cisleithania,225 while Bohemia was to be divided into three linguistic groups: 
bilingual, Czech and German. He also followed the nationalists’ demands for the 
creation of large, nationally demarcated autonomous circles, with their own 
constitutions, diets and governments, stripping most power away from Prague. The 
Bohemian Diet, in Redlich’s words, would have become an “empty farce”.226 
Although they were ready by mid-June, Stürgkh used dilatory tactics to postpone their 
implementation, keeping the drafts unread in a drawer, avoiding their discussion in 
cabinet meetings, and arguing that their execution would have to wait until the 
renewal of the economic Ausgleich with Hungary – due every ten years – was 
concluded or the last shot of the war was fired. Finally, after a cursory glance at the 
proposals, he told Handel that he was disappointed by them.227 And while he assured 
the Germans that the octroi would eventually be carried out, he consistently promised 
the Czechs that no such thing would happen.228 Under increasing attack from the 
German nationalists after he had defended Kramář at his trial,229 Stürgkh was 
nevertheless able to steer his chosen course until his assassination. This was in no 
small part due to the fact that the high command, emboldened and energized by the 
success of the Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive in the previous year, had since been 
chastened by Brusilov.230 Handel himself watered down his drafts as a result.231 
 
Karl, though no great admirer of Stürgkh’s, watched passively. In October 1915, 
Tschirschky – who claimed to have “very good direct contact with the heir” – 
informed Jagow that Karl was completely won over to the idea of a change of prime 
minister but had not yet dared approach Franz Joseph about it. (The ambassador 
added that, for his part, he was working on Stürgkh’s removal “as far as is possible for 
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me”.)232 A year later, Karl told Wilhelm that although Stürgkh was an honourable and 
decent man, he was wholly without initiative and a hindrance in many matters. In 
particular, he reproached him for having thwarted Hohenlohe’s plans for school and 
language reform, which he thought “very good” and which Franz Joseph had 
approved. He even suggested the interior minister as a replacement for Stürgkh.233 (In 
fact, at the time, Hohenlohe, angry and despondent as a result of his failure, was 
convalescing, having fallen seriously ill.)234 
 
Political revival 
 
For many people therefore, Stürgkh’s death was a relief.235 Almost immediately, the 
German nationalists claimed that the late prime minister had given the go-ahead for 
the octroi shortly before his death.236 Yet it seems highly unlikely that Stürgkh, who 
was determined until the last to maintain the status quo, would have made too many 
concessions to them at a time when he was also thwarting attempts by the opposing 
camp to have parliament recalled. (Although he had almost certainly decided on a 
new status for Galicia, this was designed first and foremost to prevent any irredentism 
in the province as a result of the imminent proclamation of an independent Kingdom 
of Poland by the Central Powers.)237 Had he really wanted the octroi, he would not 
have discarded Handel’s work. What is more, at the time of his murder, support for 
the plan was losing momentum. Increasingly, the Christian Socials and certain 
members of Nationalverband – usually from the Alpine regions – favoured the 
reconvening of the Reichsrat without the prior fulfilment of the specifically 
nationalist demands. When, in July 1916, Bohemian landowner Count Ernst von 
Silva-Tarouca invited parliamentarians of both Houses in order to discuss the steps to 
be taken to obtain the reopening of parliament,238 the German Radicals were 
characteristically vehement – Friedrich Wichtl spoke of “master races” and “servant 
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races” and of the need to secure “the lasting predominance of the Germans in Austria” 
– but others in the German camp were more muted. Noting the disharmony of the 
meeting, the Christian Social representative Josef Schraffl agreed that parliament 
could not reopen under such circumstances, but mentioned only the necessity for new 
standing orders in order to prevent obstruction. Johann Dobernig, a Nationalverband 
member from Carinthia, explained that he, his friends and many high-placed generals 
supported the recall of parliament. Likewise, those Social Democrats, Czechs and 
Poles present expressed their desire for the House to reconvene.239 
At a similar meeting a month later, the parties agreed to further discussions in 
this direction, though the Nationalverband and Christian Socials remained 
deliberately discreet in the debate.240 But changes were afoot. Most notably, on 12 
September, a new independent liberal group – the Arbeitsgemeinschaft – was formed 
within the Nationalverband241 in order to strengthen its leadership against the 
Radicals and to broaden its appeal.242 Immediately, it succeeded in passing a 
resolution within the union supporting the recall of parliament, against Radical 
opposition.243 The drive to reopen parliament continued to gather pace244 and was 
given a new impulse by Stürgkh’s death. The day after, at a joint meeting of the 
representatives of both chambers of the Reichsrat, almost all Lower House deputies – 
Social Democrats, Poles, Ukrainians and Slovenes – expressed their support for the 
rapid revival of parliamentary life.245 The Czechs, however, were more cautious. 
Staněk, speaking in the name of the Agrarians and of the Young Czechs, ostensibly 
supported the recall, but only if the preconditions were created “for a truly 
parliamentary government system to emerge”. Specifically, he demanded 
parliamentary immunity, freedom of the press and freedom of opinion.246 Šmeral, who 
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had noted his opposition to the recall of parliament in his diary, admitted that 
deliberately unrealizable conditions had been expressed.247 Similarly, Groß, though he 
spoke of the “intolerable and deeply shameful nature of the current situation”, gave a 
lengthy speech effectively discouraging the reopening of the Reichsrat and expressing 
in vague terms the necessity of certain “preconditions”.248 It was indeed paradoxical 
that both the Czechs and the German nationalists favoured the status quo – the former 
in the conviction that as long as the Reichsrat did not reconvene, Stürgkh would 
undertake nothing against them, and the latter in the belief that he might yet enact the 
octroi. The Arbeiter-Zeitung noted caustically that they were the only two groups to 
oppose the reopening of parliament.249 The Christian Socials, on the other hand, again 
restricted themselves to demanding the prior decreeing of new standing orders, 
insisting that the recall was necessary and that they had never believed it would harm 
the country.250 
 This further strained the collaboration between the German bourgeois parties. 
On 9 November, at a joint meeting to discuss economic and financial questions, Groß 
sprang an unpleasant surprise on his allies by declaring that their agreement also 
stretched to “important national demands which we must carry through if the streams 
of German blood which have flowed are not to have been spilt in vain”. He ended his 
speech by proposing a resolution according to which both groups stuck unshakeably 
to their demands and expected the government to take the necessary measures without 
delay.251 Christian Social circles hurried to point out that reports of a unanimous 
adoption of the resolution were untrue.252 Still, the alliance survived and the joint 
committee envisaged for further consultation went ahead.253 
 
To replace Stürgkh, Franz Joseph took no risks and re-appointed Ernest von Koerber, 
who had served as his prime minister between 1900 and 1904.254 (Unsurprisingly, 
Conrad, who had asked Franz Joseph to sack Stürgkh up until, and indeed on, the day 
of his murder, had written to Karl expressing his conviction that a military man 
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should take the post.)255 Both at home and abroad, Koerber was widely considered 
one of the most capable statesmen in Austria, and his nomination was well 
received.256 As an archetypal liberal Josephist bureaucrat, his convictions were firmly 
centralizing and supranational – notwithstanding the inevitable German tendencies 
which they implied – but, during his first tenure, his attempts at constitutional and 
administrative reform in this direction had come to nothing.257 He had, however, 
stabilized parliamentary conditions through negotiations and compromise with as 
many factions as possible, although in the end, this had resulted in general distrust.258 
After his resignation, he had taken no part in active politics for over ten years, until 
his appointment as joint finance minister in February 1915.259 Not only did he now 
have to address all the matters Stürgkh had left unresolved – chiefly the food 
question, the renewal of the economic Ausgleich with Hungary and the restoration of 
parliamentary life in Austria – but no sooner had he taken office than he was 
presented with Polish independence as a fait accompli.260 Indeed, four days later, on 5 
November, Wilhelm and Franz Joseph proclaimed the creation of an independent 
Kingdom of Poland from occupied Russian territories. (Originally, the Germans had 
appeared to agree to the attachment of Congress Poland to Austria – the so-called 
Austro-Polish solution – but by early 1916 had firmly decided on the establishment of 
a Polish buffer state under their control.261 Indebted to Berlin after its military 
assistance in the summer, the Austrians had to abandon their plan, salvaging only the 
ongoing joint administration of the occupied lands.)262 The implications of this move 
were, of course, problematic for Vienna, as many Galician Poles had hoped for the 
unification of all Polish territories.263 To mitigate this disappointment and forestall the 
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development of irredentism in the province, Franz Joseph had issued a handwritten 
letter on the eve of the Two Emperors’ Manifesto, announcing the extension of 
Galician autonomy “to the full extent of what is compatible with its belonging to the 
entirety of the state, and its prosperity.” (The Germans, who had not been informed, 
saw this as foreign political jockeying and were furious.)264 Koerber claimed that he 
had found the document on Galician autonomy completed on Stürgkh’s desk, and had 
had no choice but to accept it. However, he amended it to make it as unclear as 
possible, adding the insistence on “lawful realization” – by parliament, implicitly – 
for obvious dilatory purposes.265 He, like many others, including Karl,266 foresaw the 
inevitable complications.267 
Though the extent and timing of Galicia’s new status were still uncertain (and 
parts of the province was still occupied by the Russian army), its proclamation 
represented – though this was not its primary aim – a step towards the fulfilment of 
the German nationalists’ demands. Yet, as they quickly found out, the new prime 
minister was unsympathetic towards their schemes. A delegation of German 
Bohemian deputies – including Wolf, Pacher and Urban – visited him on 17 
November and emphatically put forward their demands for the implementation of the 
preconditions they considered necessary for their national development and the 
prosperity of the state. Koerber took note of this but informed them that economic 
matters, in particular the food question, were more urgent.268 Though they pointed out 
to him that Stürgkh had made definite promises in the matter, that the Bohemian 
decrees were ready and that the emperor was prepared for them, Koerber claimed not 
to be aware of the existence of any such guarantees, let alone to have inherited any 
written evidence of them.269 Moreover, he took umbrage at their tone of voice and 
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even at the way they sat during his meeting with them.270 He had not forgotten the 
conflict which had opposed them during his first premiership, and had a particular 
dislike of Wolf.271 He had opposed an octroi then and he would do so again.272 In any 
case, his primary long-term concern for Cisleithania was administrative reform, and 
he intended to see through the centralizing programme he had attempted to implement 
twelve years previously.273 Regarding the recall of parliament, he met the presidents 
of both Houses on 9 November and told them that he hoped to open negotiations with 
the parties to this end, but that the government’s chief priority was the food 
question.274 In political circles, the recall of the Reichsrat was therefore not expected 
before late February or March.275 
 
Unsurprisingly, Stürgkh’s death and the proclamation of Galician autonomy caused 
considerable anxiety among Czech politicians.276 (Eleven days later, their protector 
Thun followed his friend to the grave.)277 Moreover, although Koerber enjoyed a 
positive reputation and was welcomed accordingly,278 there was speculation over his 
intentions279 and resentment over the minimal Czech representation in his cabinet.280 
With the reopening of parliament likely to occur within a few months, together with 
the German nationalists’ pushing for the prior fulfilment of their demands, Czech 
fears were understandable.281 On 6 November, the Young Czech politician Zdeněk 
Tobolka wrote in his diary: “What will we Czechs do? Watch all this passively?”282 
For over two years, drastic plans for the future reorganization of Austria – and in 
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particular of Bohemia – had been elaborated without them, as their nation’s stock 
plummeted. Without a public platform, they could do little to defend themselves, save 
for professing their loyalty and goodwill, in the hope that this might delay or alleviate 
their fate.283 (They had even turned to Berlin for support and mediation between them 
and German Bohemians.)284 But this policy of so-called “activism” could bring no 
firm guarantees, dependent as it was on the disposition of the individuals in power 
and on the developments of the war. The Czechs, however, had the advantage of 
increasing unity in adversity. Indeed, beyond the radical fringes of the small Realist 
Party and State-Right Progressive Party, the Czech political establishment was firmly 
activist by the time of Stürgkh’s death. At the forefront of this policy were Antonín 
Švehla’s Agrarian Party,285 the Czech Social Democratic Party,286 under the single-
handed and single-minded – but not entirely unopposed – leadership of Bohumír 
Šmeral,287 and the Young Czech Party, which the moderate Tobolka had taken over 
after the incarceration of Kramář and Rašín. There were certainly tactical reasons for 
the approach of these leaders, not least the desire to safeguard the existence of their 
parties and press, avoid persecution and obtain the liberation of jailed Czech 
politicians. Additionally, most believed in the ultimate victory of the Central Powers 
and sought to curry favour with the government in order to mitigate the effects of a 
likely “German peace”. Šmeral, meanwhile, justified his policy with Marxist slogans 
and explained that the workers, the party and the people needed protection during the 
war in view of the true social struggles of the future.288 But even though wartime 
experiences had inevitably taken their toll on the loyalty and enthusiasm of many a 
Czech politician, the attitude of these parties was by no means entirely opportunistic, 
and they still contained plenty of genuine supporters of the Monarchy. In any case, the 
dissenters were still in a discreet minority, heavily outweighed by the Austrophiles, 
whether sincere, pragmatic or tactical.289 The activist path was an easy one to follow 
for traditionally pro-Habsburg parties such as the Old Czechs,290 the National 
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Catholics and the Czech Christian Socials.291 Now, even the virulent National Social 
Party, broken by official repression and emasculated by Klofáč’s ongoing 
imprisonment without charge, had seemed to fall into line under Otakar 
Hübschmann.292 Those actively working to bring down the Monarchy – Masaryk and 
Beneš abroad, and the Maffie at home – had achieved next to nothing, and still 
wielded very little influence on the domestic political scene. Nevertheless, this secret 
organization had collaborators in several important parties.293 
 
Despite residual ideological differences, however, the war had considerably 
attenuated intranational divisions, and the political representatives of most nations 
understood that their interests were best served by national unity. The Poles had 
already completed their unification on 23 March 1916 when the Polish Social 
Democrats entered the Koło Polskie, or Polish Club.294 Thereafter, the announcement 
of the special status of Galicia quickly prompted the Ukrainian deputies of the 
province to disband their two existing clubs and to found a “Ukrainian Parliamentary 
Representation” on 8 November in light of “the threatening situation facing the 
Ukrainian nation”.295 Indeed, the Ukrainians had apparently been promised by 
Stürgkh that eastern Galicia would be separated from the rest of the province and 
administered autonomously, in close connection with Vienna. But the prime minister 
had eventually yielded to Polish pressure and abandoned the plan.296 The Croat–
Slovene Club,297 meanwhile, continued to work for the unification of Croats and 
Slovenes within the framework of the Empire, though it was affected by the personal 
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divisions within the Pan-Slovene People’s Party, namely between the radical clerics 
Korošec and Krek and the moderate Šusteršič.298 
Fortunately for the Czechs, they suffered no such prominent, overt clashes. 
Nevertheless aware of the need to reinforce and formalize their unity, leading activists 
began to move in this direction in early November.299 (The first attempts at unification 
had begun a year before but had ended in failure.)300 On the ninth, Tobolka wrote to 
the Agrarian deputy František Udržal, insisting that the Galician proclamation made it 
indispensable for the representatives of all Czech parties to take a united stand on the 
matter and formulate their own programme.301 As a result, the three leading activists, 
Tobolka, Švehla and Šmeral, met two days later in Prague and agreed on the creation 
of a unified organization.302 Švehla and Šmeral, the representatives of the two largest 
parliamentary factions – the Agrarians and Social Democrats respectively – insisted 
on majority rule within the future structure in order not only to reflect the dominance 
of their own parties, but also to maintain discipline and harmony by preventing 
minority vetoes.303 At a conference on 15 November in Vienna, the representatives of 
the Social Democrats, the Agrarians, the Young Czechs, the National Socials, the 
Catholics, and the Moravian Progressive People’s Party304 all agreed to unification.305 
Nevertheless, the National Catholic leader Hruban warned that the Social Democrats’ 
traditional insistence on national autonomy (and rejection of the Bohemian state rights 
to which, conversely, all the bourgeois parties subscribed) and lack of dynastic 
foundations could hinder the formation of the new body. In response, the Social 
Democratic representative, Vlastimil Tusar, vouched for his party’s pragmatism and 
gave assurances that its principles would not impede the enterprise. He added that it 
would not oppose any pro-Habsburg proclamations if these were necessary and 
justified.306 (The following day, Czech, Slovene, Ukrainian and Romanian 
representatives held a meeting and agreed that all constitutional changes in Austria 
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should be approved by parliament. Yet, as they came to no formal decision, the result 
of the meeting was not communicated.)307 
 Nothing, therefore, stood in the way of the creation of the Czech Union (Český 
svaz) and National Committee (Národní výbor), which duly occurred on 18 November 
and was made public the following day. The former was made up of Reichsrat 
deputies and was to coordinate policy in all national and constitutional questions, 
while the latter, consisting of party representatives, was solely to support the Union 
and act as the “highest moral instance” in matters outside the parliamentarians’ 
competence.308 The Agrarian František Staněk became chairman of the Union’s 
presidium, flanked by Šmeral and the Young Czech Jindřich Maštálka as his first and 
second deputies respectively.309 In the organization’s parliamentary commission, each 
party was allocated one member for every five Reichsrat seats it held. All parties 
agreed to enter the union and the committee, save for the Realists and State-Right 
Progressives, who objected to their dynastic basis,310 and the Social Democratic 
Centralists, who saw collaboration with the bourgeois parties as the abandonment of 
the class struggle.311 (The Austrian Social Democrats were likewise very critical of 
their Czech counterparts’ decision to join the Union.)312 The party of the Conservative 
Landowners313 also stayed away.314  (Incidentally, as Tobolka noted in his diary, not a 
single participant suggested including the Slovaks, none of whom were present.)315 
The declaration “to the Czech nation” which announced the foundation of both 
organizations confirmed their defensive nature: “Current events are forcing the Czech 
parties to adopt a uniform standpoint towards certain questions […]. Changes are 
looming on the horizon which could affect the very foundations of our state and 
constitution – questions whose unilateral resolution would be neither in the interest of 
the state nor in ours.” The address also paid homage to “the time-honoured dynasty 
and historical mission of the Empire, which consists above all in the unification and 
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perpetuation of the indivisibility of its crownlands and provinces, as well as in the 
absolute equality of rights of all its nations”.316 Though it was well received by those 
in the population who still followed political developments, claims that the action was 
“fulfilling the will of the entire nation” were vastly exaggerated.317 Indeed, as the 
military commander in Prague noted at the end of year, it had had no deep impact on a 
population “almost exclusively preoccupied by the direct consequences of the war”.318 
Undeniably, the concerns of most Czechs – and indeed of most citizens – were by 
now focused on peace, money and food. 
 
War-weariness, poverty and hunger 
 
By November 1916, conditions in Cisleithania were little short of catastrophic. Fertile 
Galicia had been devastated by war,319 and the overall harvest of 1915 had been poor. 
In consequence, food shortages had begun early, particularly for cereals and 
potatoes.320 The crop yield for 1916 proved even worse than the previous year, and by 
early 1917 almost all foodstuffs except meat were under state control.321 To make 
matters worse, the better-off areas of the Monarchy – Hungary in particular, on whom 
Austria already depended for grain in peacetime – resisted efforts to distribute food 
more evenly.322 From spring 1916, wool, cotton, shoes and iron were also in short 
supply.323 Conditions were particularly bad in Vienna.324 In October 1915, Redlich 
had already observed that the city had no flour, no potatoes and no fat, and that milk 
and butter were unaffordable.325 American ambassador Penfield wondered how poor 
people could still find ways of existing, though he admitted that they did, and without 
complaining, at that.326 In May of the following year, however, there were food riots 
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and shops were plundered.327 By winter, there was a dearth of coal for heating and for 
civilian industry.328 In addition, the amount of money in circulation increased almost 
threefold from July 1914 to December 1916, causing tremendous inflation.329 The 
maximum prices set by the state merely encouraged the development of the black 
market, while wage increases made prices go up further.330 
 When Tschirschky went to pay his respects to the members of the ministerial 
council331 on the day of Stürgkh’s murder, the shocked and despondent ministers 
bluntly exposed Austria’s situation. Handel told the ambassador that the country 
would have no food left by late spring if Germany did not help. Trnka, the minister of 
public works, pointed to the “dangerous” mood among miners and likened his 
position to sitting atop a volcano. The minister of railways described the situation 
among his men as “anarchic”, while finance minister von Leth showed him a telegram 
which had just arrived, reporting food riots in Hainburg in Lower Austria.332 These 
incidents, however, were not isolated. Vienna by now regularly witnessed expressions 
of public discontent due to the lack of food, through demonstrations, protests and 
strikes which involved hundreds, sometimes thousands.333 Penfield described the 
mood as one of “utter and complete despair”.334 When this translated into anger and 
agitation, however, the masses were always dispersed with ease or temporarily 
placated with promises. In Graz, however, 500 soldiers were required to put an end to 
rioting due to the lack of flour and potatoes on 11 and 12 October, which resulted in 
the destruction of 120 shop windows, 200 house windows and 130 streetlights, and 48 
arrests.335 Later in the month in Lwów, a crowd of women and adolescents who had 
received no food went through the streets shouting slogans against Germany and 
smashing the windows of public and private buildings. Again the military had to 
intervene but refrained from using its weapons.336 
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The situation in Bohemia, though relatively serene in the first half of the 
year,337 also deteriorated.338 During that summer, throughout the crownland, 
demonstrations and protests grew more frequent, in Czech- as well as German-
speaking localities – indeed particularly in the latter.339 These movements continued 
in October and November, with growing numbers – often hundreds and sometime 
more – involved.340 However, they were generally non-violent and the security forces, 
though they regularly made arrests, restored order in every case without recourse to 
the use of weapons. 
 Yet the authorities had no way of saving the situation, and further 
deterioration seemed inevitable throughout Cisleithania. In late November, just over a 
month after Tschirschky’s discussion with the cabinet, his successor Count Botho von 
Wedel heard much the same from Koerber: Austria lacked bread, grain and potatoes, 
and, in light of Hungarian recalcitrance, she could not last beyond the beginning of 
April without German help.341 A dedicated food office, the Amt für Volksernährung, 
was set up on 1 December342 to coordinate and consolidate the government’s efforts 
but did little to reverse the tide.343 
 
The increasingly dismal circumstances naturally affected public morale. In November 
1916, the monthly report gathered from intercepted correspondence at the border post 
in Feldkirch painted a mixed picture of the popular mood in Austria-Hungary.344 The 
censors scrutinizing German correspondence – who had processed 590,000 letters 
between 1 and 26 November – noted that all German Austrians were “absolutely 
confident and certain of victory”, which they saw as one of “good over evil, of truth 
over lies”. They expressed “boundless repulsion” towards anyone delaying or 
doubting final victory, particularly war profiteers and the Hungarians. The Germans 
of Austria were “entirely reliable politically”, and willing to bear all manner of 
privations for the fatherland. The Hungarians were equally convinced of a favourable 
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outcome of the war. The Poles, meanwhile, almost all manifested their joy with the 
Two Emperors’ Manifesto, describing the jubilation, hugging, crying and laughing 
which this act – “the realization of their most foolhardy dream” – had provoked. On 
the other hand, the Ukrainians were terribly disappointed by the announced extension 
of Galician autonomy, since they had expected the ethnographic division of the 
province to occur during the war; however, they still held out hope for a change of 
policy. Finally, among the Italians of the Monarchy, irredentism continued to 
blossom, chiefly within educated circles. The censor warned that their claims of 
loyalty were not to be believed and that Italian irredentism, as the most dangerous 
political movement in the country, should be fought ruthlessly. Nevertheless, all 
nations were united in hoping for a rapid peace and deploring the lack of food and rise 
in prices. Even among the Germans, 90% of the correspondence, irrespective of social 
stratum, expressed a desire for the war to end. However, no evidence of socialist or 
peace propaganda was recorded.345 
 In mid-December, a more extensive report on the mood in the hinterland – this 
time compiled from the correspondence to prisoners of war – painted a bleaker picture 
of a hungry, indigent and war-weary population.346 The popular mood was primarily 
influenced by price increases and the fear of worsening economic conditions; urban 
dwellers in particular complained about the difficulties in acquiring food. All awaited 
spring with great apprehension. The censor also noted that, unlike previously, 
attention was no longer paid to developments on the battlefield, and that the events of 
the war were mentioned only in connection with the desire for its rapid end. The 
Germans, whether of the Alps or the Sudetenland, remained the most moderate, and 
steadfastly optimistic, leading officials to note with satisfaction: “The confidence in 
victory and the hope for a quick successful outcome constitute here a most agreeable 
contrast to the monotonous letters of grievance of the other nations.” Indeed, the 
remaining peoples of Cisleithania generally bore their hardships less willingly. The 
Italians, for instance, complained bitterly, especially about the authorities’ failings in 
the distribution of food. Patriotic declarations were extremely rare among them, 
though irredentist tendencies had faded somewhat. The Slovenes likewise condemned 
the unfair allocation of food, and denounced profiteering, but displayed strong 
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feelings of loyalty to the Empire, particularly when discussing the war against Italy. 
The Croats of Istria and Dalmatia appeared to face the greatest economic distress and 
were therefore particularly despondent; yet their rectitude and patriotic disposition 
remained unshaken. (Likewise, declarations of loyalty and urgings to suffer patiently 
for emperor and fatherland were not rare among their brethren in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.) Serbs, whether in Dalmatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, all complained 
of their economic conditions, but very few irredentist declarations had been observed 
since the occupation of Serbia and Montenegro. Polish dissatisfaction was expressed 
comparatively mildly. The population in the countryside chiefly lamented requisitions 
of food and restrictions on grain trade, while their urban compatriots denounced the 
rise in prices. All, however, united in celebrating the promised restoration of Poland, 
though younger and more educated elements displayed anxious impatience with 
regard to its realization. Naturally, the Ukrainians feared that it would place them “at 
the mercy of the despotism of the Polish majority”. Otherwise, the refrain from their 
overwhelmingly rural correspondence was typical, revealing war-weariness, hunger 
and bitterness at requisitions of food by the military, often carried out without 
compensation.347 
 Regarding Czech correspondence, the censor bemoaned the large number of 
unpatriotic, often treacherous declarations and the expression of anti-Austrian views 
culminating in the desire for the erection of an “independent Kingdom of Bohemia” 
and hope for Russian liberation. (The Slovaks, however, were reported to be 
impeccably loyal and confident in victory.)348 Yet this was a very selective and 
generalizing interpretation,349 which did not tally with other reports or correspond to 
the reality on the ground. Certainly, the military authorities continued to point to 
numerous cases of alleged Czech treachery,350 but these were still usually amateurish, 
anecdotal or insignificant, from schoolchildren misbehaving during the national 
anthem and towns forgetting to ring church bells on solemn occasions, to provocative 
inscriptions on walls, anonymous letters and idle coffee-house chatter.351 In mid-
December, the war surveillance office had to admit that the number of criminal 
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proceedings for political offences had remained low (though it continued to highlight 
the existence of anti-state and pro-Russian tendencies in the Czech population, as 
proved, apparently, by the frequent appearance of advertisements for Russian 
language classes in newspapers.).352 But General Paul Kestřanek, the new, nationally 
impartial military commander in Prague,353 provided a more nuanced depiction of 
local popular mood in his twice-monthly reports.354 And in his summary of 1916, he 
expressed overall satisfaction: “Through the consolidation of the success of our 
weapons – and perhaps through the lack of parliamentary life – a calming of the 
population has without doubt occurred overall.”355  Though he warned that exceptions 
and excesses still existed, and that Russophilia and unhealthy Slavism had to be 
eradicated from people’s minds, especially among the neglected youth, he remained 
positive. According to him, repeated Russian defeats, the replacement of subversive 
teachers by loyal elements, the neutralizing of openly Slavophile politicians, the 
promotion by the military and political authorities of patriotism, of the Austrian idea, 
and of love for the dynasty, had all had a beneficial effect. He praised the population’s 
discipline and self-denial in the face of severe privations, in particular the heavy 
labourers. Even the tension between the Hungarian troops deployed in the area and 
the local population had abated considerably. Indeed, ethnic strife seemed minimal, 
and Kestřanek thought it high time “to effect the rapprochement of both nationalities 
in Bohemia with the politically less sensitive masses and to be able to establish the 
salvation of the future of the land”. (Yet age-old controversies over matters such as 
the language of street names in Prague continued to rage.)356 And though many 
Czechs expressed little more than indifference or resigned acceptance, there was 
enough evidence of loyalty to cheer Kestřanek, who reported patriotic declarations in 
Klatovy to celebrate the capture of Bucharest and Karl’s accession to the throne, and a 
solemn service in Pilsen on the latter occasion.357 The death of Franz Joseph and 
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Karl’s advent seemed to make a strong impression, albeit chiefly through the hope 
that peace would be brought closer.358 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE EMPEROR IS DEAD – LONG LIVE THE EMPEROR! 
 
Outwardly, Franz Joseph’s death immediately triggered a wave of public mourning 
throughout the Empire. Black flags bedecked the country and expressions of grief 
poured in from representatives of every province, town, party, institution, corporation 
and club, irrespective of nationality or political creed.1 Newspapers fell over 
themselves to celebrate the emperor’s life and lament his death, with non-German-
language publications rivalling their German-speaking counterparts in their 
hagiographical tones.2 In Hungary, the press uniformly extolled Franz Joseph and 
underlined his historical significance – the nationalist, conservative daily Budapesti 
Hírlap called him “greater than the greats”.3 Both Houses of Parliament in Budapest 
likewise paid homage to him and to his life’s work: the 1867 Compromise, the 
Kiegyezés.4 Meanwhile, Polish newspapers – in Cisleithania as well as both occupied 
zones of Congress Poland – praised him unreservedly for allowing the nation’s free 
development in Galicia and proclaiming the creation of a Polish kingdom. The Gazeta 
Wieczorna in Lwów commented: “During the one hundred and twenty-three years of 
our slavery, Emperor Franz Joseph was the only monarch of the partitioned states who 
earned his title as a friend of Poland”. Cracow’s Nowa Reforma concurred and wrote: 
“Of all the citizens of the orphaned Monarchy, the Poles will cry the most fervent 
tears”.5 Echoing these feelings, the Galician provincial committee officially expressed 
its “most reverent homage and boundless pain in the name of the whole population of 
Galicia” and attested to the “steadfast fidelity and devotion” of the crownland.6 And 
the Polish Club, describing Franz Joseph as “the idolized ruler, loved and celebrated 
by all nations of the Monarchy […], and rightly held up by the Polish nation as its 
magnanimous protector”, proclaimed that he would live for ever in Polish memory.7 
At the same time, Ukrainian deputies from eastern Galicia and the Bukovina 
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expressed their gratitude towards the late emperor for having granted their nation a 
new lease of life.8 Testaments of deep mourning also emerged from the Slovene 
camp. The head of the Croat–Slovene Club Anton Korošec expressed the Slovenes’ 
grief and lauded the “lasting and glorious” memory of Franz Joseph, under whom his 
nation had maintained the preconditions for its free development.9 Slovenec, the main 
organ of the Pan-Slovene People’s Party, wrote: “At the bier of its ruler, the Slovene 
nation renews its oath of steadfast loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty.”10 
Czech obituaries were similarly emotional – all the main newspapers bar the 
(nevertheless loyal) Social Democratic Právo lidu carried a black border – and 
bemoaned the immeasurable loss to the nation. There was unanimous agreement that 
Franz Joseph had always shown great benevolence towards the Czechs and that his 
rule had allowed a previously unimaginable upswing in their fortunes. A clear 
distinction was made between his noble intentions on the one hand, and the system of 
government and political opposition on the other. Indeed, the Young Czech Národní 
listy highlighted his national impartiality.11 Kestřanek concluded with satisfaction that 
“regardless of party affiliation, the press took a most dignified and most loyal attitude 
to this world event.”12 The Moravian press displayed particular warmth, pointing out 
that the crownland’s population virtually idolized the deceased monarch.13 Many 
Czech organizations sent their condolences, including the presidium of the Union of 
Czech Districts and that of the Union of Czech Towns in the Kingdom of Bohemia, as 
well as the Council of Professors of Czech Engineering.14 In addition, Prague city 
council held a meeting to commemorate the emperor’s death during which the 
indefatigable mayor Groš described him as a “true father of the nation” and praised 
his “blessed rule”.15 Meanwhile, the presidium of the freshly created Czech Union 
wasted no time in sending a message to the prime minister, stating: “Tremendously 
shaken by the sad news of the sudden death of His Apostolic Majesty, our dearly 
beloved and unforgettable emperor and king, we beseech you to transmit the 
expression of the deepest sympathy of the entire Czech nation to the imperial house. 
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The Czech nation will always look back on the blessed rule of His late Majesty with 
sincere gratitude as a period of cultural and economic upturn.”16 The National Council 
followed suit, and transmitted its address to Coudenhove.17 
Admittedly, failure to express these feelings would have attracted the 
authorities’ suspicion and disfavour, not to mention attacks from political and national 
opponents. But, to an extent, the outpouring of emotion did reflect popular sentiment 
in many parts of the Empire. For instance, the official censor noted the sincere pain 
frequently in evidence in Polish and Ukrainian correspondence.18 However, formal 
displays and declarations of grief could not entirely conceal the apathy of much of the 
population. Redlich noted the weariness and listless indifference of the Viennese, 
discerning “neither sorrow for the deceased nor complete rejoicing for the 
successor”.19 Though Franz Joseph had long been a monumental and widely esteemed 
figure, his tired and hungry subjects scarcely paused to mourn or to contemplate the 
significance of his passing (beyond its potential for peace), even though most had 
known no other ruler.20 Certainly, his stock, as well as the dynasty’s, had fallen since 
the fiasco of the Serbian campaign.21 Subsequent wartime developments had also 
taken their toll, and, in September 1916, Redlich heard that the mood in the Viennese 
popular masses was turning increasingly against the government and the ruling house, 
and that dynastic feelings were weakened among German Austrian officers, who 
apparently had little sympathy for Karl.22 At the same time, Tschirschky reported that 
the Habsburgs’ prestige had “sunk quite extraordinarily” among the masses – even the 
emperor’s and even in thoroughly schwarzgelb Tyrol.23 A local aristocrat had even 
told him that Franz Joseph should be forced to abdicate, like Ferdinand.24 Likewise, 
the German journalist Paul Goldmann noted after his stay in Austria in August and 
September of that year that “the popularity of the emperor, the love and adoration for 
the person of the venerable monarch […] are essentially gone”.25 These were perhaps 
exaggerations by unsympathetic or blinkered observers, but the war had undeniably 
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robbed Franz Joseph and his house of a degree of the popular goodwill which had 
been carefully built up during the decades of peace. On the other hand, men such as 
Polzer believed that public opinion placed the blame solely on Franz Joseph’s 
advisers, statesmen and court dignitaries for isolating him and monopolizing power.26 
 
Karl himself had been spared opprobrium, though this was partly due to the fact that 
he was still comparatively little known among the population.27 As De Telegraaf 
quipped sarcastically after Franz Joseph’s passing: “The emperor is dead! Long 
live…an emperor whose name his subjects barely know”.28 This anonymity was 
certainly an advantage in comparison to his famously misanthropic and bigoted uncle, 
who had been widely loathed.29 But, despite Karl’s increased exposure in the press 
after Sarajevo, the situation did not change significantly.30 Although his image was 
now carefully cultivated,31 old clichés died hard. As Goldmann reported two months 
before Karl’s accession to the throne: “He is seen as a charming, but most 
insignificant, young man who prior to the war devoted his main attention to the 
cinema and operettas.”32 Three days into his reign, the Parisian daily Le Petit Journal 
reproduced pre-war gossip according to which Karl was “a rake, a gambler and 
drunkard, arrogant and unintelligent”.33 Meanwhile, in Austria-Hungary, the 
portrayals of the new emperor in the press were limited to officially sanctioned – or 
indeed officially manufactured – vignettes, often claiming to be from sources in his 
entourage.34 His portrait in the Fremden-Blatt was characteristic of these, highlighting 
his popular appeal, his benevolence, his equanimity, his simultaneous single-
mindedness and receptiveness to the opinions of others, his devotion as a husband and 
father, his love of Viennese music and expertise in the local dialect, his skills as a 
driver, his enjoyment of riding and fishing and, of course, his and Zita’s hunting 
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prowess.35 Newspapers generally emphasized his reputation for modesty, bonhomie, 
kindness, humanity, courage, chivalry – none of which were necessarily untrue.36 
His wartime service, however, provided the most valuable publicity. As the 
emperor’s representative on the front, he had used his linguistic ability,37 affability, 
humour and common touch to good effect, while his active duty – commanding 
Alpine Germans, Magyars, Czechs and Romanians on the Italian Front – had 
established his credentials as “a successful army leader and war hero”.38 That he had 
taken part in battle and witnessed bloodshed certainly brought him closer to millions 
of his future subjects, and helped boost his fame and popularity.39 To compensate for 
Karl’s indisputable inexperience, the press argued that the war had provided all the 
training, maturity and wisdom required for his calling, going so far as to claim that no 
other heir had enjoyed such a valuable apprenticeship.40 
 Uncontroversial, likeable, youthful and surrounded by his picturesque 
family,41 Karl was an easy figure to promote and for whom to drum up enthusiasm. 
And although convention and deference to the monarch – not to mention censorship – 
allowed for nothing less than a grateful, eager and reverent reception of the new 
emperor, there was nonetheless a degree of genuine enthusiasm for Karl. Not only 
was he blameless in the decision to go to war and untainted by the decay, nepotism 
and corruption of the old system, he had never dabbled in politics. As the liberal Neue 
Freie Presse wrote: “He has the advantage of arriving on the throne with the full 
impartiality of youth, without any party able to boast of greater closeness to him or 
any political group having to fear […] that he approaches it with prejudice.”42 As a 
result, he seemed to be welcomed from all quarters. General Krauß noted: 
“Everybody expected from [him] the liberating act, everybody expected 
improvement, recovery”.43 Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.44 Informed 
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circles expected fundamental political changes,45 a purge at the court,46 or even a 
redefining of Austria-Hungary’s relation with Germany.47 
 
Inevitably, each nation of the Empire hoped that the new emperor would satisfy their 
respective (and often mutually incompatible) aspirations. The Polish Club, for 
instance, sent him a telegram with “the assurance of its unbreakable dynastic loyalty 
and deepest reverence”, and wishing him success in the fulfilment of his historical 
mission.48 To be sure, the Poles interpreted this mission very differently from the 
Ukrainians. And while the Czech press universally expressed the desire to see the 
crown of Saint Wenceslas on Karl’s head,49 few local Germans longed for his 
coronation as King of Bohemia. Czech newspapers also made clear their conviction 
that Karl would follow in the footsteps of his predecessor in his munificence towards 
a nation he knew well – having lived,50 studied and served51 in Bohemia – and of 
whose “absolute loyalty and devotion” he was “surely aware”.52 Again, Czechs and 
Germans assessed these footsteps differently. In fact, the military commander in 
Prague had complained to the war surveillance office that the obituary for Franz 
Joseph in Národní listy had intimated that the late emperor had wanted to help the 
Czechs achieve their state rights.53 Still, Karl could genuinely take heart from the 
position of the Czech Union, whose presidium transmitted the following declaration 
to him after his accession to the throne: “The fate of our nation still remains 
inseparably bound to that of the dynasty and of the state, which is currently leading a 
hard fight against a world of enemies. In this solemn and sad moment, we vow to 
contribute with all our strength in order to bring this hard struggle to an honourable 
conclusion as soon as possible, which guarantees the continued existence and further 
untroubled development of the Monarchy and of its peoples […]. Gathered around the 
august person of His Imperial and Royal Majesty Karl, we want to devote all our 
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strength to the peaceful work which will begin after the successful end to the war.”54 
The Croat–Slovene Club also presented Karl “with the most respectful homage of the 
Croats and Slovenes and vow[ed] loyalty to him, as before not only in word, but also 
in deed”. However, it also resolved to “to take every suitable measure for the joining 
of all Slovene and Croat forces and for the unification of the Slovene and Croat 
peoples under the sceptre of the Habsburgs, in order thereby to strengthen the glory 
and power of the dynasty and monarchy, and on the other hand to secure the existence 
and the development of the population”.55 The latter part of the declaration was, 
unsurprisingly, censored.56 Slovene newspapers, while they welcomed Karl warmly, 
expressed their expectation that he would rule on the basis of the equality of all 
nations in Austria.57 Yet the Hungarian press, full of praise for Karl’s knowledge of 
Hungarian, his awe of Hungarian soldiers and his apparent love of the Hungarian 
people, also expected Karl to stay faithful to Franz Joseph’s guiding principles – the 
Pester Lloyd wrote that he could not possibly rule any other way.58 This, of course, 
signified the strict upholding of the dualist system, of German and Magyar 
dominance, and the preservation of the integrity of the lands of the crown of Saint 
Stephen, all of which was intolerable to most other nationalities of the Empire (not to 
mention to the new emperor himself). Largely unaware of Karl’s inclinations, 
convictions and plans, national representatives had to tread carefully. Somewhat 
nervously, therefore, they sought to curry favour with the new emperor by stressing 
their boundless loyalty to him and underlining the inalienable rights which, they 
claimed, his predecessor had granted them. 
 
On the other hand, Reich Germans were confident about Karl: neither the civilian nor 
the military authorities really doubted his good disposition towards them and the 
alliance. In their paternalistic eyes, the heir was not only nibelungentreu and German-
minded but also reasonable and amenable, not to say pliable. Aware of his isolation in 
Vienna, they had sought to fill the void, with Wilhelm the obvious choice of mentor. 
Karl had already met the Kaiser in Breslau in December 191459 and in Mézières in 
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January 191560 but, later that year, Tschirschky pleaded in favour of closer contact 
between the two, arguing that “the young man needs support somewhere; he can and 
should only find it with us”. In particular, he thought that Karl would be more 
receptive to criticism of his country if it came from the Kaiser’s mouth.61 He also 
pointed out that Karl had repeatedly stressed his desire to see more often a man “in 
whom he had full confidence and from whom he had already learnt a lot”.62 The two 
were certainly on very friendly terms and exchanged telegrams.63 Yet Karl apparently 
believed that Archduke Friedrich’s clan – which presumably included his wife 
Isabella as well as Conrad – was preventing this.64 Prince Max Egon zu Fürstenberg, 
vice-president of the Austrian House of Lords and a member of the Prussian House of 
Lords, confirmed to Baernreither that the Austrians were not fostering contact 
between Wilhelm and Karl. He revealed that, upon the recent announcement of the 
Kaiser’s visit to Austrian headquarters, Karl had been deliberately called away. 
Baernreither thought this attitude a grave mistake, believing that Austria-Hungary’s 
fate depended on Karl’s ability to take Wilhelm’s advice and form his political 
thoughts and designs accordingly. He hoped that the German emperor would spare no 
effort “to influence the still malleable mind of our current heir.”65 This was precisely 
Wilhelm’s aim and he therefore approved Tschirschky’s proposal enthusiastically.66 
In the following weeks of October and November 1915, he met Karl twice and spoke 
unsparingly about Austria-Hungary’s need for reform – Karl seemed to agree or, at 
least, did not openly disagree.67 
True, the German hierarchy eventually recognized that Karl was powerless for 
the time being and that no changes would occur as long as Franz Joseph and Stürgkh 
were in power.68 Bethmann lamented the fact that the old emperor could not be made 
to abdicate in favour of his great-nephew, who was not even in a position to lay the 
                                               
60 PA, I, K500, 2-6, G. Hohenlohe-AA, 15.1; G. Hohenlohe-Berchtold, 18.1.1915; Josef Stürgkh, p.112. 
61 Ö86Nr.1G, 4, Tschirschky-Jagow, 16.10.1915. 
62 D180G, 1, Tschirschky-Jagow, Private letter, 10.10; NB, K6, 28.10.1915. According to Baernreither, 
Karl was completely enamoured with Wilhelm. 
63 NSE, K1, 5, Wilhelm-Karl, 9.5.1915; undated (but mentions the recent sacking of Sarrail, which 
occurred on 22.7.1915). In both these messages, Wilhelm thanked Karl warmly for his kind telegrams.  
64 D180G, 1, Tschirschky-Jagow, Private letter, 10.10.1915. This comment was added at the end of 
Tschirschky’s letter to Jagow, perhaps by Jagow himself. 
65 NB, K6, 28.10.1915. 
66 Ö86Nr.1G, 4, Tschirschky-AA, 29.10.1915; NB, K6, 28.10.1915. Tucher, the Bavarian Legate in 
Vienna, told Baernreither that Wilhelm had made Karl the particular object of his care and attention 
and that he was nurturing this relationship most eagerly. 
67 Ö95G, 4, Treutler-AA, 1.11.1915; Ö101, 37, Treutler-Bethmann, 29.11.1915. 
68 D180G, 4, Hindenburg-Bethmann, 19.9; Bethmann-Hindenburg, 29.9.1916. 
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foundations for the transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy.69 Nevertheless, the 
chancellor saw Karl as his best hope of influencing Austrian policy. In September 
1916, he suggested inviting him to army headquarters so that the military and 
Wilhelm could underline the considerable dangers threatening Austria-Hungary, and 
enjoin him to spur Franz Joseph into action.70 It was during Wilhelm and Karl’s long 
discussion a few days later in Pleß that Karl agreed that Stürgkh and Burián were 
dispensable and that the country wanted new men.71 From the summer of 1916, 
Seeckt’s position as Karl’s chief of staff had offered a further opportunity to influence 
Karl, and both Wilhelm and Ludendorff had urged the general to “win him over to the 
German standpoint”.72 But when reports emerged of the increasingly strained 
relationship between Karl and Seeckt, Grünau warned the chancellor and the secretary 
of state that the situation could not be allowed to continue as “it goes against our 
striving to instil confidence in Karl and to get him to act in accordance with our 
views”.73 Convinced that they had a staunch ally in the future emperor of Austria-
Hungary, it was only natural that the Germans sought to cultivate him accordingly. 
Certainly, Karl rarely gave them reason to doubt his understanding for their position 
and respect for their interests. In late August 1916, for example, he told Seeckt that he 
did not wish to annex Poland and that he was happy to support the German–Polish 
solution, as his chief concern was to avoid tension between the allies.74 
This is not to say that Karl was a soft touch. He acquitted himself well of his 
mission to German headquarters in Mézières in January 1915, where he had gone to 
defend both his country’s stance on the Italian question and, in light of alleged Czech 
desertions, its army’s reputation.75 In the former matter, when his hosts suggested that 
Austria-Hungary should sacrifice the South Tyrol to stave off the Italians, he had 
apparently riposted: “The renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine would certainly have 
avoided the World War […]: why did you not cede Alsace-Lorraine long ago? 
                                               
69 D180G, 4, Bethmann-Hindenburg, 29.9.1916. 
70 Ö95G, 4, Tschirschky-Bethmann, 28.9.1916; Ö95G, 4, Bethmann-Wilhelm, 30.9.1916. 
71 W20c, 5, conversation with Wilhelm, 9.10.1916; NBG, Karl’s report, 9.10. Karl named Count 
Nikolaus Szécsen and the ambassador to Berlin Gottfried Hohenlohe as possible successors to Burián 
(and Konrad Hohenlohe as Stürgkh’s replacement). Wilhelm urged him to pursue these changes for the 
sake of his fatherland and his future as emperor. Karl mentioned none of this in his report to Franz 
Joseph. 
72 Seeckt, pp.460, 471. 
73 Ö86Nr.1G, 4, Grünau-AA, 7.10.1916. 
74 Seeckt, Seeckt-Ludendorff, 10.1916, pp.471-472. 
75 Josef Stürgkh, p.112. 
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Moreover, the Tyrol is more to us than Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans.”76 And when 
speaking to Wilhelm in Pleß, Karl insisted that Austria-Hungary had to maintain her 
presence in occupied Poland and that these territories had to remain a bargaining tool 
for future negotiations with Russia. Such views were hardly conducive to avoiding 
tension, and Wilhelm was obviously displeased.77 Nevertheless, the abiding 
impression Karl made was one of loyalty and malleability (although Jagow did once 
express concern about Braganza influences on Karl – that is, those of his family-in-
law).78 As soon as he arrived on the throne, he sent a telegram to Wilhelm, assuring 
him of his unbreakable commitment: “Just as your and [Franz Joseph’s] loyalty to the 
alliance stood firm during this World War, so it will remain for us, as the shining 
memory and the blessing of the immortal lead us on the joint path towards the 
honourable success of our just cause. Amen.”79 
 
In Allied countries, despite his popularity in Germany and his enemy status, Karl’s 
reception was not entirely negative, especially in France. Much to the chagrin of the 
Monarchy’s foes, such as Masaryk and Beneš, the case for Karl was easily (and 
frequently) made: his wife was a Bourbon Princess, two of his brothers-in-law were 
fighting in the Belgian army and, crucially, he had not been responsible for the war. 
Consequently, he would have no interest in prolonging it and endangering his 
throne.80 Newspapers in France, though admitting their ignorance of Karl and his 
intentions, generally appeared to welcome the new imperial couple, even though the 
belief prevailed that they would not succeed in setting the Monarchy upon a different 
foreign political course.81 Karl’s controversial remark in Teschen on the Germans’ 
role and mission in Austria-Hungary was frequently regurgitated as evidence of his 
convictions and of the inevitability of his becoming Wilhelm’s satellite.82 But, as a 
                                               
76 Werkmann, pp.26-27; NB, K6, 7.3.1915; NBT, K5, 26.1.1915. Montenuovo reported gleefully to 
Berchtold that Karl – showered with fatherly advice and instructions on domestic and foreign policy by 
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77 W20G, 5, conversation with Wilhelm, 9.10.1916. He retorted that Austria had to re-conquer her lost 
territories herself since Russia would never swap them for the wasteland of Congress Poland. He also 
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78 NB, K6, 8.11.1915. Baernreither responded that he had it on good authority that Zita did not meddle 
in politics but Jagow had replied “come, come”, as if to say he knew better. 
79 NFPM, 24.11, p.2. 
80 Beneš, I, p.236; Masaryk, p.250. Beneš wrote that Karl’s accession to the throne was “the beginning 
of a tough period for us”. 
81 ZA, K45, French press review, 29.11.1916, 5.2.1917; KÜA, K173, 93123, PDW-KÜA, 29.12.1916. 
82 KÜA, K173, 93123. 
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Bourbon, Zita was considered a beneficial and promising influence.83 In July 1914, Le 
Figaro had already reported with satisfaction that she was “une vraie Française 
d’esprit et de cœur” and that she and Karl spoke French to each other.84 Her keen 
political interest was also reported, as was the apparent concern in Vienna and 
Budapest regarding her future involvement in these matters.85 British newspapers 
were more determinedly of the opinion that Karl would only be a puppet in the hands 
of the German emperor, and that Vienna was condemned to be Berlin’s vassal.86 
According to The New Statesman, the road to Mitteleuropa was now wide open.87 The 
Daily Telegraph described Karl as an unknown quantity, but pointed out that his new 
position required a level of wisdom and tact which there was no reason to expect from 
somebody whose life so far had been no different to that of the average prince of any 
royal family. Austrian policy would in any case stifle any great qualities he might 
have.88 In Italy, the media were even more dismissive, expecting little from a deeply 
clerical Habsburg married to a Parma.89 Conversely, the Vatican’s L’Osservatore 
Romano attracted sharp criticism for its praise of Karl.90 
 Karl also received positive reviews in the neutral press. In Denmark, Politiken 
argued that the war had revealed Austria-Hungary’s resilience and predicted that Karl 
would succeed in his task: “From all sides, praise rings out for his modest manner, his 
strong sense of justice, his enthusiasm for work and his striving for the deepest 
possible understanding of the circumstances. He and his wife enjoy a popularity 
which extends to all strata of society and all nationalities.”91 In Switzerland, 
Germanophone newspapers – unsurprisingly – welcomed Karl with friendly wishes.92 
The Francophone press, however, largely echoed the feelings of the French media in 
adopting a wait-and-see attitude towards the new couple, though fearing that the 
transition signified a further stage in the Germanization of Austria-Hungary and a 
                                               
83 Ibid.; ZA, K45, French press review, 1.12.1916. 
84 Ö86Nr.1, 20, 8.7.1914; ZA, K45, Swiss press review, 27.11.1916. However, she had once told an 
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85 ZA, K45, French press review, 18.12; NFPA, 1.12.1916, p.3; A-H, p.53. 
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87 ZA, K45, British press review, 5.12.1916. 
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90 ZA, K45, Italian press review, 28.11.1916. 
91 Ibid., Danish press review, 27.11.1916. 
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strengthening of the Berlin–Budapest axis.93 The New York Times admitted that Karl 
had the merit of being a twenty-nine-year-old, cheery Wiener Blut. It wondered 
whether Karl would tire of Wilhelm’s domination and of dualism, but concluded: “If 
[he] is a true Habsburg, his main aim will be to increase the glory of his crown.”94 
 All observers could nevertheless agree that Karl’s task was formidable. The 
Extrablatt in Vienna commented that although conditions had been trying when Franz 
Joseph came to the throne, they were now “gloomy and fateful beyond compare”.95 
The Züricher Post remarked that destiny had loaded him with a burden which few 
mortals faced.96 As the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf wrote cheerlessly: “At this 
moment, there is not a beggar on earth who would envy [him] his Dual crown.”97 
It had long become a cliché both at home and abroad that the Monarchy would 
not survive the death of Franz Joseph.98 Yet there were few signs of fissuring upon 
Karl’s accession to the throne. As the Neue Freie Presse pointed out, Karl was 
receiving the crown “in full civil peace”.99 In the population, war-weariness was the 
prevailing emotion. Penfield had already written in April 1916: “Probably there is not 
one person in the Dual Monarchy who is not heartily sick of the war and wishes for an 
early peace.”100 This had undoubtedly begun to damage the people’s confidence in the 
institutions of the Monarchy, and therefore in the dynasty, but had not dented their 
loyalty. Helped by his youth, charm and neutrality, Karl enjoyed popular goodwill, 
albeit bound up with considerable expectations. In order to meet these, good 
preparation, favourable opportunities and considerable skill were required. The first 
he did not have, the second he did not seize and the third he did not show. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
KARL’S PRECARIOUS FIRST STEPS 
 
Astonishingly, none of the statesmen or ministers who oversaw Karl’s limited 
initiation into the business of government had helped him plan his first steps in power. 
In fact, the matter had been ignored, and even as Franz Joseph lay dying, no 
preparations were made to guide him.1 Konrad Hohenlohe therefore took it upon 
himself to discuss the matter with “a few gentlemen”, who agreed to start by advising 
Karl to retain existing ministers and court dignitaries. Caught on the hop, the young 
emperor complied.2 Likewise, no provisions had been made for Karl’s accession 
manifesto, which was hurriedly composed overnight following Franz Joseph’s death, 
in order to be published the following day.3 Two civil servants in the foreign ministry, 
Baron Alexander von Musulin, the original author of the ultimatum to Serbia, and 
Baron Franz von Matscheko, composer of the eponymous memorandum, each 
submitted a draft.4 The former’s contained a panegyric to the late emperor, and a 
pious, modest and emotional declaration by the new monarch; the latter’s, which was 
chosen, was less sentimental and more forward-looking.5 In this version, Karl 
nevertheless praised Franz Joseph for creating “the lasting foundations for peaceful 
coexistence and free development” in Austria-Hungary and – even more 
optimistically – for leading her “to the height of power, where she is now winning the 
battle against enemies all around”. He emphasized the image of a militarily strong 
empire, defiant towards its enemies, ardently loyal to its allies, and fighting only for 
its integrity. Despite this, Karl had ordered the inclusion of a sentence expressing his 
burning desire for peace:6 “I want to do everything to banish the horrors and sacrifices 
of the war as soon as possible and to win back for my peoples the sorely missed 
                                               
1 Polzer, pp.111-112, 122. 
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4 NS, K6, 23.11.1916; Musulin, p.283. 
5 Ibid.; both in HHStA, MdÄ, Administrative Registratur, Fach 1, K58. 
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blessings of peace”. But despite the manifesto’s stylistic excellence, dignified tone, 
and enthusiastic reception by the press,7 it was devoid of real content. In Polzer’s 
words: “It gave the painful impression of a piece of work barren of ideas, carried out 
confusedly and at the last moment”.8 The ill-prepared government contributed 
virtually nothing – Koerber’s only input was the hurried intercalation of a well-
meaning but platitudinous passage:9 “I will be a just and loving prince to my peoples. 
I will maintain their constitutional liberties and other rights, and will carefully guard 
the equity of rights for all. It will be my unceasing endeavour to foster the moral and 
spiritual welfare of my peoples, to protect freedom and order in my states, and to 
secure the fruits of honest toil for all working members of society.” Even though 
reforms were eagerly expected of the young emperor, none were announced.10 Karl 
merely expressed his confidence that his peoples, “carried by the feeling of a common 
bond and by deep love for the fatherland [would] work together in the enterprise of 
peaceful renewal and rejuvenation in order to lead both states of the Monarchy and 
the affiliated lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a time of internal bloom, of uplifting 
and strengthening”.11 If anything, this statement suggested that the dualist structure 
(and the awkward, unsettled status of Bosnia-Herzegovina) would remain unchanged. 
Indeed, he vowed to “continue and complete” the work of his uncle, who had left the 
throne in a state of “undiminished resplendence”. In light of Karl’s lack of political 
preparation and of prior contact with Koerber’s newly formed government, such a 
vague and non-committal manifesto was probably inevitable. And ultimately, it was 
without consequence. 
On the day of its publication, however, Karl took an altogether more fateful 
step when he agreed to be crowned in Budapest. Indeed, the coronation oath bound 
the king to maintain the constitution and the lands of the crown of Saint Stephen, thus 
making him dependent on the gentry-dominated Hungarian parliament and preventing 
any reform of the Empire affecting Hungarian territorial integrity.12 Polzer, who had 
long feared the coronation and its consequences, claimed that he had not had the 
opportunity to discuss the matter with Karl due to the latter’s military postings – an 
                                               
7 NFPM, 23.11.1916, p.1. 
8 Polzer, p.111; NS, K6, 23.11.1916. 
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10 Polzer, pp.111-112. 
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implausible oversight in light of their frequent political exchanges, and contradicted 
elsewhere in his memoirs.13 Only when Franz Joseph’s health took a turn for the 
worse had he composed a memorandum exposing the several contradictions between 
the oaths to the Austrian Reichsrat and to the Hungarian crown and recommending 
their postponement until these legal conflicts were removed – of course, he hoped that 
this process would be lengthy, or even fail.14 However, wary of pestering Karl at such 
a time, he turned to Wallis, although due to the “small vagaries of destiny” he was 
unable to transmit it until the evening of Franz Joseph’s passing. By then, Polzer 
knew he would be beaten to it by Tisza.15 Indeed, the Hungarian prime minister 
appeared in Schönbrunn at 11.00 the following morning16 and obtained Karl’s 
consent. Tisza had the relevant autograph letter drafted immediately after.17 Even 
though according to Hungarian law the new king had up to six months after the death 
of his predecessor to be crowned, Tisza knew he could not afford to waste time, lest 
Karl listen to the counsel of men determined to break Magyar hegemony, such as his 
late uncle’s former advisers, in particular Hohenlohe.18 Indeed, Franz Ferdinand had 
intended immediately to delay the coronation in order to avoid being bound by its 
prescriptions. Eichhoff, who had composed the relevant accession manifesto drafts for 
him, claimed to have had several long conversations with Karl during his heirship – 
obviously not on that subject.19 Thus Tisza, who had cultivated his relationship with 
Karl during the war – he had been the first to present himself to him only a few days 
after Sarajevo20 – had no difficulty in convincing the inexperienced young emperor, 
awed by him,21 still grieving, and unaware of the full implications of his decision. In 
particular, Tisza persuaded him that the coronation was the first step towards peace.22 
Consequently, on 23 November, Karl issued a handwritten letter to Tisza announcing 
his intention of “being crowned as soon as possible King of Hungary, Croatia-
                                               
13 Polzer, pp.50, 112. 
14 Polzer, pp.112-113; NPH, p.52. This had not been a problem for Franz Joseph, as he had never taken 
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16 Polzer, p.115; NFPM, 23.11.1916, p.5. 
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19 NE, 150, p.36. 
20 Margutti, p.87; NPH, p.24; Polzer, p.78. Stürgkh had still not introduced himself to Karl five months 
later. 
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Slavonia and Dalmatia” and instructing him to initiate preparations with parliament 
on the matter.23 
On the same day, Karl also signed a letter for Koerber ordering him to make 
the relevant suggestions for his taking the oath to the Austrian constitution.24 
(According to Article Eight of the 1867 Constitution, the emperor had to swear before 
both Houses of Parliament to “maintain steadfastly the constitution of the kingdoms 
and provinces represented in the Reichsrat and to govern in agreement with the latter 
and with the general laws.”)25 Although there was no deadline for the oath, Koerber, 
having obtained the approval of the cabinet after a lively debate that morning,26 
recommended that Karl take the first steps immediately.27 The prime minister, 
however, knew that the constitution was inadequate and irremediable, and accepted 
that it would have to be violated. Indeed, he had advised Karl to refrain initially from 
rule by decree, take the oath, recall parliament and wait for it to prove itself unfit for 
work before reneging on his word and governing via Paragraph Fourteen.28 In 
Koerber’s eyes, the Reichsrat’s inevitable failure would provide the justification for 
authoritarian action. Thereafter, Koerber even told Karl that, after the oath-taking, he 
would vacate his office in order to give him a completely free hand and let him 
appoint whomever he wanted.29 In the meantime, the oath would re-establish parity 
with Hungary, and serve to inaugurate Karl’s reign with a show of strict 
constitutionality, and thus avoid damaging not only the new emperor and the dynasty, 
but also the state and Koerber himself.30 This was a matter of principle for Koerber 
who, though he opposed parliamentary rule and considered the civil service to be the 
basis of power, did not oppose parliament.31 Bypassing it a priori was therefore 
inconceivable. Aware that his own programme had been torn apart by Franz Joseph’s 
death,32 his chief concern was now to avoid upheaval, to ensure the legitimacy and 
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continuity of the state,33 and to maintain the country’s economic life until a 
satisfactory end to the war.34 
According to Hohenlohe, Karl admitted that Koerber might be right but 
refused, as a new monarch, to adopt his view.35 On the other hand, Karl had told 
Wallis that he intended to be crowned not just in Hungary but also in Austria and 
Bohemia.36 Thus, in spite of his apparent opposition to Koerber’s plan and of his 
awareness of existing conflicts between the Austrian and Hungarian constitutions,37 
he signed the document which the prime minister submitted to him.38 In any case, the 
passage which the prime minister had added to the accession manifesto made any 
evasion of the oath difficult. 
 
Koerber’s fall 
 
Having obtained Karl’s consent, Koerber forged ahead single-mindedly. The same 
afternoon, he met Sylvester, the president of the Lower House, and again confirmed 
his intention to ensure constitutionality and to re-open parliament.39 On 28 November, 
the first steps were taken to clear up the Reichsrat building, which had been turned 
into a hospital – the interior ministry expected it to be ready by 15 December, or 
earlier.40 Most deputies therefore inferred that parliament would reconvene in order to 
settle some formalities – either in late December prior to the Hungarian coronation or 
during January – before beginning work in full a few weeks after.41 In the meantime, 
Koerber did nothing to conciliate those Germans who had expected the prior 
fulfilment by decree of their so-called preconditions.42 Though these men continually 
called attention to the fact that Stürgkh had assented to these shortly before his 
death,43 he remained unmoved. (He was not alone – many expressed derisive 
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scepticism about Stürgkh’s alleged testament, which was nowhere to be found and 
which nobody had ever read.)44 On 28 November, when Koerber met the deputies 
from the German Workers’ Party45 (a small constituent of the Nationalverband), he 
flatly rejected any octroi and insisted that it was parliament’s responsibility to find a 
solution to all outstanding issues.46 Likewise, he reassured the board of the Czech 
Union three days later that he placed the greatest value on the parliamentary 
resolution of all political matters.47 Karl played along, and when he and Zita received 
the presidium of the Lower House on 1 December, he expressed his hope that 
parliament would soon return to prosperous work.48 
The press welcomed Karl’s decision to take the oath on the constitution, and 
pointed to its good reception by the public, and even by German deputies.49 Despite 
patent dismay in certain circles, the German bourgeois camp did initially seem to 
react with equanimity. Indeed, many who were shocked and displeased by the turn of 
events nevertheless believed that Koerber would help achieve their programme, at 
least in part.50 Certainly, the basic outlook of this staunch Josephist bureaucrat was 
not wildly at odds with the nationalists’: he thought the power of the provincial diets a 
“cancer”, he favoured the imposition of German as language of state,51 was enthused 
by Naumann’s Mitteleuropa52 and was by no means pro-Czech.53 Not unreasonably 
therefore, the Nationalverband at first showed benevolence towards the cabinet, even 
though Groß twice expostulated with the prime minister and made no secret of his 
frustration with his lack of amenability.54 The increasingly prominent Deutsche 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft – the largest grouping within the organization with its forty-four 
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members (including Groß himself)55 – was crucial in helping to hold this line by 
officially resolving to adopt a “friendly, patient” attitude towards the government. 
Many of its leading members repeatedly stressed that there was no reason for either 
the Arbeitsgemeinschaft or the Nationalverband to change their attitude.56 But after 
Koerber’s implacable words to the members of the German Workers’ Party became 
known, it was obvious that the prime minister would issue no decree whatever before 
the recall of parliament. The tide now turned against him. 
 At the forefront of this agitation were the irreconcilable German Radicals, who 
refused to countenance the reconvening of the Reichsrat until their demands were 
met.57 They too had shown restraint at first but when, at a club sitting on 1 December, 
Deputy Rudolf Heine confirmed their suspicions by revealing Koerber’s declarations 
to the Workers’ Party, they erupted with indignation and resolved to change their 
stance.58 They made clear to the prime minister that he could spare himself the 
charade of reopening parliament, as they would ensure that the constitution proved 
unworkable.59 Of course, Bohemian voices were often the loudest. Writing in Gustav 
Hummer’s Politische Tagebücher, an unnamed deputy castigated Koerber for having 
appropriated Taaffe’s old policy of “muddling through”, for not being equal to the 
challenge of the times (both morally and physically) and for striving to prevent the 
fulfilment of the demands of the Germans of Austria.60 The Deutschböhmische 
Korrespondenz accused the government of ignoring the lessons of the war and of 
seeking to burden parliament with issues which it had failed to settle with several 
cabinets during peacetime, and which now threatened its viability.61 Wolf’s virulent 
Ostdeutsche Rundschau joined in the attacks.62 Koerber also believed that Wilhelm 
Singer, the editor of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt, was part of the conspiracy.63 At first, 
however, the Radicals’ war cry was not taken entirely seriously, and many thought it 
simply a result of the long-standing personal feud between Wolf and Koerber, or 
revenge for Hochenburger’s removal as minister of justice.64  
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But soon, the Radicals’ vehement and relentless “battue”65 against the prime 
minister forced the remainder of the bourgeois camp to react.66 And though several 
factions in the Nationalverband disassociated themselves from them and denounced 
their methods,67 many members nevertheless concurred that the reopening of 
parliament could occur only with certain guarantees.68 Koerber’s dogmatic refusal to 
consider any use of Paragraph Fourteen could only drive them away.69 Baernreither 
nevertheless thought that the majority of deputies in the organization still supported 
him.70 But there were also loud rumblings among German nobles of the House of 
Lords.71 The Christian Socials too were unhappy with his attitude. Though the party 
generally remained tight-lipped and vague on the nature and extent of the decrees it 
was willing to support, it repeatedly made clear that the House required new standing 
orders.72 Furthermore, its main organ, the Reichspost, urged the “securing of future 
constitutionality […] through prior expedient measures, as recommended by the 
experiences of war”, and denounced the Social Democrats’ and the Liberals’ 
objections.73 Meanwhile, representatives of the party warned Koerber that they would 
not offer parliamentary support for an Ausgleich less favourable to Austria than the 
previous one.74 In this climate, the continued alliance of the Nationalverband and of 
the Christian Socials boded ill for Koerber. And indeed, at the constituent sitting of 
the parties’ joint committee on 9 December, supporters of the octroi took pride of 
place, as the nationalists chose Pacher, Urban and Wolf among their nine 
representatives.75 Ten House of Lords members were soon added to the committee, 
including active champions of the policy such as Baernreither, Fürstenberg and 
Nostitz, whom Koerber considered the ringleaders of the movement against him.76 At 
its inaugural meeting, it discussed domestic political demands (in particular the 
language question), the relationship with Hungary and a closer economic and political 
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union with Germany; it stressed the necessity of joint action on these questions, “for 
the sake of the German nation”.77 The board of the Nationalverband met immediately 
after and insisted that the recall of the Reichsrat be preceded by the fulfilment of 
certain preconditions, in order to avoid lasting damage to Austrian parliamentarism. 
In consequence, the organization’s stance towards the government would now depend 
on its attitude “in this question as well as in other national demands of the 
Germans”.78 And the Deutsche Nachrichten – seen as the union’s semi-official 
publication – echoed its Radical counterparts by also accusing Koerber of muddling 
through, of failing to learn the lessons of the war and of pursuing a policy at odds with 
the desires of the German people.79 
Increasingly isolated and destabilized, the prime minister groped for support. 
He turned to the German ambassador and, complaining about the Radicals’ stinging 
attacks on him, expressed his hope that Berlin would not encourage them.80 But 
Wedel, though he showed perfunctory understanding for Koerber’s predicament, 
made clear to him that the opportunity for an octroi had to be seized immediately, as it 
would never again present itself so favourably. Pointing to the strong impression 
made in Germany by alleged Czech and South Slav disloyalty and by official laxness, 
he declared: “Germany expects the Austrian government – as its self-evident duty – to 
take energetic measures in order to dam the Slavic flood.” Koerber responded 
evasively, arguing that the Czechs had become more docile since men such as Kramář 
had been replaced, and that the Germans were an unreliable political force, less united 
and less skilfully led than the Czechs, Slovenes, Croats, Poles and Italians.81 This was 
perhaps the case, but they nonetheless were strong enough to topple him. 
 Spurned by Berlin, belaboured by the Radicals, under pressure from the 
bourgeois’ joint committee, and out of favour with the emperor, Koerber’s situation 
appeared untenable. It was probably little consolation to him that he had established 
good relations with the Czechs. In early November, he had already attempted to set 
their minds at rest ahead of the proclamation of Galicia.82 When he met the presidium 
of the Czech Union on 1 December,83 he was courteous, considerate and conciliatory. 
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He assured them emphatically that Karl and he would stay on strictly constitutional 
ground.84 Moreover, he condemned any form of repression of the nationalities. He 
also promised them that “in the important questions, the government [would] always 
get in touch with the parties in advance before stepping out onto the smooth parquet 
of parliament, especially in negotiations about national questions”, adding: “You are 
not threatened by any kind of surprise in any respect”. In the Bohemian question, he 
referred them to the plans he had put forward during his first tenure and insisted that 
national demarcation and the division into circles was the best guarantee of efficient 
and peaceful cohabitation.85 The Czechs understood that painful times awaited them 
in crownland and linguistic matters – German as the official language, for instance – 
but they appreciated the fact that Koerber had recognized their political strength and 
committed himself to parliamentary negotiations.86 As Šmeral later explained: “He 
promised no concessions but through his polite handling, he made matters so bearable 
that the Czechs were neither shamed nor insulted.”87 Koerber was, however, vastly 
exaggerating when he later claimed that he had obtained the Czechs’ agreement on 
the circles.88 
In the German camp, the Social Democrats89 and the Liberals90 rallied to his 
defence and denounced the Radicals and their preconditions. (Though routinely 
discussed in nationalist circles, the prospect of German unification on the Czech 
model now seemed very remote indeed.)91 Among the German bourgeois groups, the 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft continued to support him openly. During a speech in Graz on 9 
December, member August Einspinner disavowed the Radicals’ “idiosyncratic 
policy” and denied anybody who supported it the right to speak in the name of the 
Nationalverband.92 The Arbeitsgemeinschaft disputed the rumours of disunity within 
the union, but nobody was taken in. In fact, there were divisions within the 
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Arbeitsgemeinschaft itself. At a sitting on 12 December, Redlich, along with most 
speakers, praised the government’s adherence to constitutionality, but Stölzel insisted 
on the fulfilment of certain preconditions. They could unite only in condemning the 
Radicals’ tactics. A leading member of the formation admitted that its attitude was 
still friendly and patient, but that the government now had to publish its programme.93 
When it met Koerber the following day, it submitted a list of demands in line with the 
German programme – the removal of Galicia, the resolution of the Bohemian 
question, and the tightening of parliamentary procedure – though it objected to its 
promulgation by octroi.94 Unbeknown to them, however, Koerber had just resigned.95 
 
On top of this conflict with the Germans, Koerber’s woeful tenure had also been 
plagued by the issue of the renewal of the economic Compromise – or Ausgleich –
with Hungary, for which negotiations had been ongoing all year.96 The Austrians’ 
insistence on a longer agreement – twenty years instead of ten – in order to lay the 
foundations for the future economic union with Germany97 had strengthened the 
Hungarian bargaining position. Stürgkh had therefore made several concessions, 
which many Austrians thought too dear. Still, he and Tisza had reached an 
understanding, even though nothing had been signed.98 But Koerber, an expert on the 
subject, objected to several of the provisions of this agreement and had travelled to 
Budapest immediately after his nomination in order to renegotiate it.99 Discussions 
continued in both capitals, but divergences remained.100 Tisza, unsettled by the 
appointment of Koerber – often considered an opponent of Hungary101 – and 
unwilling to surrender his gains, was spurred into action by Franz Joseph’s death.102 
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Having easily obtained Karl’s assent to the coronation, he now insisted that the 
renewal of the Compromise be settled before the ceremony, and called attention to 
Koerber’s obstructive and dilatory attitude.103 Tisza’s pressure eventually paid off. 
Only hours after Karl received him in audience on 10 December, the emperor ordered 
Koerber’s dismissal.104 
 
Hohenlohe claimed that Karl had lost confidence in Koerber during their first 
meeting.105 Though this was perhaps true, it is in any case improbable that he ever 
intended to govern with a man of the old guard appointed by his predecessor.106 
Koerber was thus unlikely to survive once the formalities of Karl’s accession had 
been expedited. With hindsight, Koerber also recalled that differences between him 
and the emperor had come to light during their first meeting;107 yet at the time, he had 
been confident of his influence on the emperor, whom he thought “amicable” and 
“very eager to learn”.108 Nevertheless, their relationship deteriorated quickly. A small 
conflict occurred as early as the third day of Karl’s reign. Incensed by a passage in the 
Neue Freie Presse’s front-page editorial on the death of Franz Joseph,109 Karl had 
telephoned Koerber, angrily demanding to know how this had come to pass.110 He had 
ordered an immediate ban on all officers writing for that particular newspaper, though 
he eventually calmed down and grudgingly desisted from this drastic measure on the 
advice of the minister of war.111 In any case, it rapidly became clear that Karl disliked 
Koerber personally.112 Indeed, Pacher later admitted that his party had been 
emboldened in its attempts to topple Koerber upon discovering that Karl wished to be 
rid of him too, as he “did not know where to begin with his awkward, ponderous 
manner”.113 On 1 December, Wedel reported to Bethmann that Koerber would 
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probably not remain in office for long.114 Karl certainly wasted little time in scouting 
for candidates.115 Already on 24 November, he had summoned Hohenlohe and 
explained to him that he valued him too much to make him prime minister – proof 
that he was already thinking about potential replacements for Koerber.116 He 
explained to Hohenlohe that he needed him by his side as a friend and adviser and 
would therefore appoint him lord chamberlain since, as prime minister, he could lose 
him all too quickly.117 In the meantime, however, on 2 December, he named him joint 
finance minister, without informing Koerber.118 Hohenlohe, who had coveted the post 
of prime minister for some time, had already expected to be appointed after Stürgkh’s 
assassination.119 Once again overlooked, he put forward his friend Czernin, whom 
Karl knew superficially from his time in Bohemia.120 (After their first couple of 
meetings in 1908, Czernin had noted that Karl was for him “a closed – and, 
incidentally, a rather uninteresting – book.”)121 The former ambassador to Bucharest, 
an aristocrat who represented the Constitutionally Loyal Landowners in the Bohemian 
Diet, was received in audience on 8 December,122 and for a few days appeared to be 
the premier in waiting.123 His views were nothing if not radical: he opposed the oath 
and fully supported an authoritarian solution to Austria’s problems; in Bohemia, he 
envisaged the full separation of both nationalities, including in the diet.124 Through 
Hohenlohe, he had approached Handel in early December and obtained his 
constitutional drafts for perusal.125 
According to Koerber, around the time of Czernin’s audience, Karl also 
received the former prime minister, Baron Max Wladimir von Beck, and the 
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Bohemian House of Lords member Ernst von Plener,126 who talked him into reneging 
on his promise to take the oath and ruling by octroi. As a result, Koerber claimed, an 
irreconcilable difference of opinion between him and Karl came to the fore during a 
subsequent audience. Owing to Koerber’s inconsistent accounts, doubts surround both 
these meetings.127 A broadly uniform picture nevertheless emerges in the case of his 
discussion with Karl. In one of several differing stories Koerber told Redlich, Karl 
had simply told him that he wanted the Ausgleich renewal concluded by 31 December 
and did not intend to fulfil his promise to take the oath.128 In the version retold to 
General Stjepan Sarkotić, the governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Karl pointed out to 
Koerber that he had heard from “eight to ten” different sides that the introduction of a 
state language,129 the circle division in Bohemia and the Ausgleich agreement with 
Hungary had to be carried out immediately, as this was already the twelfth hour. The 
emperor therefore asked Koerber whether he could do this. Koerber replied that he 
could not make Karl enter history with a breach of the constitution but added that if 
parliament failed, “then our conscience will be clear and I will do everything, within 
twenty-four hours even”.130 On the subject of the Ausgleich renewal, Koerber 
highlighted how unfavourable to Austria Stürgkh’s agreement with Tisza was and 
insisted that major corrections were needed. Karl protested meekly: “But very 
significant people are giving me the opposite advice”. However, Koerber stuck to his 
guns and told Karl that he should appoint somebody else if he were determined to 
follow that path. The emperor asked for time to think.131 Similarly, in the depiction 
which he provided for Friedjung, Koerber responded to Karl’s insistence on the octroi 
by arguing that Franz Joseph, after his many bitter experiences, would have been 
entitled to resort to this but that Karl had to give parliament a chance in order to prove 
his commitment to the constitution. When Karl responded that he could not afford to 
wait several months – Koerber detected Hohenlohe behind these words – the prime 
minister responded that he understood but that he would not take this responsibility. 
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The conversation was polite and ended cordially, but Koerber understood that he and 
Karl were parting ways.132 
 
And indeed, on 10 December, after his audience with Tisza, Karl received 
Berchtold,133 who now held the normally ceremonial post of lord steward,134 and 
informed him that he had a mission for him which, he warned, was “not very 
pleasant”. Berchtold was to go to the prime minister’s the following morning and 
“bring him the silken rope”. The pretext which Karl gave was his disagreement with 
Koerber on the questions of the oath to the Austrian constitution and of the Ausgleich 
renewal.135 When he recalled his meeting with Berchtold, however, Koerber 
mentioned only the latter.136 Though Berchtold expressed Karl’s gratitude and asked 
Koerber whether he wished for any favours,137 such pleasantries could not hide the 
abruptness and finality of Koerber’s sacking, or compensate for the fact that the 
emperor had not dared or deigned tell him in person.138 Koerber was asked to exercise 
discretion for a few days in order not to unsettle the public at a time when the 
deadline for the subscription of war loans was due. Koerber complied: in a 
conversation with Baernreither on the day after his dismissal, he was recalcitrant to 
the point of incoherence, mumbling and whispering incomprehensible answers to his 
interlocutor’s questions on domestic policy.139 However, a meeting between Koerber 
and Karl on 13 December140 resulted in the publication of a handwritten letter the 
following morning announcing the prime minister’s resignation.141 Koerber again 
gave a variety of accounts of the event in the following days.142 According to the most 
sober version, given to Heinrich Friedjung, Karl treated the matter as a fait accompli, 
merely reiterating the necessity of concluding the Ausgleich negotiations and again 
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asking him if he desired anything.143 Likewise, Koerber told Sarkotić that Karl had 
received him with a speech put together “from the sentences of Tisza, Fürstenberg and 
tutti quanti” and had offered him the Imperial Court of Justice.144 Koerber refused any 
honours or position and announced his retirement.145 In his more colourful account to 
Redlich, Koerber claimed that a ninety-minute showdown between him and the 
emperor had taken place, which had led to his resignation. He claimed that Karl had 
“returned to the main theme of all his discussions with [him] since taking power: the 
necessity of an octroi”. Koerber’s contention that it would be more judicious to wait 
and to work on an entirely new constitution was apparently dismissed by Karl, who 
had been “completely won over to the idea of an octroi”, not only by Beck and Plener 
but also by the Fürstenberg-Nostitz group. In the end, again according to Koerber’s 
account, Karl asked him whether he still had reservations about the Ausgleich renewal 
and informed him that if this were the case, he would have to pass over the task to 
somebody else, whereupon Koerber offered his government’s resignation, which Karl 
accepted immediately.146 This description was obviously untrue, since Koerber had 
already been sacked, and the two men therefore had nothing to discuss. Yet their 
meeting caused enough bad blood for Koerber’s resignation to be announced four 
days ahead of schedule.147 The version reported by Wedel seems plausible: Karl had 
apparently “given Koerber a piece of his mind” and had rebuked him for having 
wrongly counselled him. Koerber had responded in kind, whereupon Karl had 
demanded his immediate resignation.148 Margutti claimed to have encountered 
Koerber as he stormed out of his last audience, snapping: “The Emperor Karl is thirty, 
he looks twenty and thinks and speaks like a ten-year-old child”.149 
Although rumours of Koerber’s resignation had circulated,150 the news came 
as a surprise on both sides of the Leitha.151 In the press and in political circles, the 
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speculation surrounding the reasons for his fall was overwhelmingly correct: the 
octroi, the Ausgleich, or both.152 The indignant Arbeiter-Zeitung feigned 
incomprehension but its conjectures were purged by the censor.153 It did, however, 
complain that none of the Vienna newspapers dared to write openly that an Austrian 
government had fallen for failing to fulfil Tisza’s desires.154 In Budapest, meanwhile, 
newspapers ascribed Koerber’s resignation purely to domestic Austrian matters.155 
The Radicals gladly took credit for his demise.156 
 
Koerber himself accepted his fate calmly and even appeared relieved.157 He described 
the time since 21 November as “terrible”.158 He never forgave Karl and never again 
spoke well of him. Such was his resentment that he was suspected of being the author 
of the scathing recollections edited by Schneider.159 Of Karl, he said to Glaise: “The 
poor soul really could not do anything right for anyone. […] For example, he asked 
deputies Korošec and Tusar whether they were happy with me – I do not need to put 
up with this”.160 (He told Redlich that the emperor was far more sympathetic to the 
Slavs than people imagined.)161 He maintained that all would have been fine had he 
been allowed to proceed in peace, and blamed outside influences on Karl. According 
to him, Karl, though benevolent, was open to these interferences in difficult questions 
“due to a lack of insight”.162 Aside from the Baernreither-Fürstenberg-Nostitz group, 
he thought Tisza the main culprit (in collaboration with Czernin and Hohenlohe), and 
was happy to portray himself as a victim of Hungarian pigheadedness.163 Ultimately, 
Koerber had lost the battle against Tisza in the questions of the coronation and of the 
Ausgleich renewal. 
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Not a few eyebrows were raised by the sudden dismissal – after only forty-six 
days in office164 – of a man of Koerber’s experience, ability, popularity and standing. 
According to Czedik, his departure “was universally considered to be the loss of a 
first-class force”.165 This was something of an exaggeration, but several distinguished 
figures did consider his removal a misfortune.166 Spitzmüller thought it particularly 
unwise in the absence of “any firm idea of his successor or of the policy to follow”.167 
Sarkotić regretted Koerber’s rapid dismissal and often suggested to Karl that he recall 
him, in vain. He later wrote: “Perhaps much would have been different and would 
have worked out better.”168 Koerber was certainly a man of exceptional qualities. A 
workhorse, one of the brightest minds of his era, his knowledge and experience were 
unparalleled; an administrative expert, his talents also extended to financial and 
commercial matters.169 Additionally he was a master in the art of press manipulation, 
enjoying close contact and good relations with socialist, liberal, German and Slav 
newspapers – a considerable asset under the circumstances.170 
Yet Koerber was not without his flaws. Chief among these was his near 
pathological pessimism – his despair, in fact – which had worsened during his decade 
of retirement.171 His sharp critical eye everywhere saw problems and obstacles.172 
When, shortly before leaving the country, Masaryk had asked him whether an 
Austrian victory in the war would bring about the necessary reforms, he had 
responded unambiguously: “No! Victory would strengthen the old system, and a new 
system under the young heir-apparent, the Archduke Carl Franz Joseph, would be no 
better than the old. The soldiers would have the upper hand after a victorious war and 
they would centralize and Germanize. It would be absolutism with parliamentary 
embellishments.”173 In October 1915, now joint finance minister, he told Redlich that 
the country’s problems were “utterly incredible”, adding: “Austria-Hungary is like a 
patient for whom medical skill will ultimately fail: one day the organism will simply 
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stop”.174 His reappointment as prime minister did little to lift his scepticism, quite the 
contrary. When the American journalist Karl Henry von Wiegand pointed out that the 
public seemed to harbour great hope for a new era under his leadership, Koerber 
answered that this would be difficult and that there was not enough time.175 Indeed, he 
routinely complained that the task was beyond his strength.176 During his visit to army 
headquarters in Teschen shortly after, when Conrad had asked him his opinion of 
Karl, Koerber said pensively: “The old emperor strove for sixty years to destroy the 
Monarchy but did not succeed. This young ruler will be done in two”.177 A day after 
his return, on 8 December, tired and lying on his couch, he received Redlich and gave 
him the impression that he did not believe in success and was resigned to being 
replaced by Hohenlohe. He admitted that the situation in Austria was so exacting that 
he did not want the burden of heading a government.178 Spitzmüller conceded that this 
aspect of Koerber’s character “left the question open as to whether such a statesman 
was fitted for his position during a war that involved the fate of the Monarchy, when 
only men filled with unconditional faith in its mission could do full justice to so heavy 
a responsibility”.179 Friedjung commented in his otherwise laudatory obituary that he 
lacked “the momentum and the belief in his own salutary mission”.180  
Koerber also suffered from a degree of bureaucratic rigidity and a lack of 
creative ability.181 He favoured small, gradual steps to radical action182 – a quality 
perhaps ill-suited to the times. What is more, during his years of self-imposed exile, 
he had lost touch with the political world; now he was also out of step with its 
mood.183 And though not as impaired as his enemies suggested, he was, at sixty-five, 
no longer the man he had once been.184 Nor was he an easy character. Redlich, a close 
(though somewhat wearied) acquaintance, called him “sensitive, petty and nervous” 
and remarked: “He makes it easy for his enemies and hard for his friends!”185 For 
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these reasons, Koerber was bound to clash with the young, fresh, impatient, new 
emperor. Friedjung characterized his friend as “too serious, too ponderous, too 
independent” for Karl.186  
Though his decision was influenced by men such as Hohenlohe, Czernin and 
Tisza,187 Karl therefore had legitimate reasons to separate from Koerber, even though 
both the timing and the execution of the dismissal left much to be desired. In his post-
war recollections, Karl stated bluntly: “I sacked prime minister Koerber because he 
was a muddler of the old system”.188 At the time, rumour had it that clerical 
influences were responsible for the change.189 Ironically, Koerber himself had been to 
Cardinal Piffl to explain that his conscience could not allow Karl to appear to the 
whole of Europe as a constitution-breaker and a putschist.190 (Zita’s claim that 
Koerber was dismissed for being a freemason need not be investigated further.191 
However, his closeness to the controversial Jewish banker Rudolf Sieghart192 – 
loathed by Karl, Hohenlohe193 and previously by Franz Ferdinand194 – most likely 
played a part.) 
 
The Spitzmüller interlude 
 
In a second handwritten letter published on 14 December, Karl announced that he had 
entrusted Baron Alexander von Spitzmüller with the formation of a new cabinet.195 
Though Spitzmüller had been included in a list of potential prime ministers drawn up 
by Franz Ferdinand,196 this was not a factor in Karl’s choice – he and Spitzmüller had 
never been close.197 Rather, Spitzmüller’s appointment was dictated solely by Karl’s 
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desire to conclude the Ausgleich negotiations. As minister of trade in the last Stürgkh 
cabinet, Spitzmüller had worked on the matter intensely for eleven months, and had 
come to embody, and identify with, the Stürgkh-Tisza Compromise. He was therefore 
a natural choice.198 It was widely believed that Tisza himself had talked Karl into 
choosing Spitzmüller, whom he esteemed for his impartiality and expertise and, most 
importantly, whom he considered the guarantor of his agreement with Stürgkh.199 
Koerber was convinced this was the case.200 
But Hohenlohe and Czernin – who saw themselves as Karl’s mentors201 – also 
played a substantial part in convincing Karl that the next Austrian government’s most 
urgent task was the renewal of the Ausgleich. Once this was complete, they expected 
it to make way for another cabinet whose mission would be the execution of the octroi 
in Bohemia. Indeed, they did not want one administration to be burdened with both 
tasks.202 They had certainly not given up on securing the position for one of their own, 
but had seemingly decided to bide their time while somebody else took responsibility 
for the conclusion of an unpopular Ausgleich arrangement. Spitzmüller appeared 
perfectly suited to their purpose; as Baernreither wrote: “Spitzmüller was to roast the 
chestnuts and take them out of the fire – but then others wanted to eat them.”203 
Therefore on 11 December – while Koerber was being given his notice by Berchtold – 
Hohenlohe approached Spitzmüller on Karl’s instructions, and asked him to form a 
short-term provisional government in order to settle the Ausgleich renewal by 
emergency decree.204 Hohenlohe tried to make the assignment appear easy and 
promised Spitzmüller the post of governor of the Bodenkreditanstalt in replacement 
of Sieghart.205 But Spitzmüller, who thought the use of Paragraph Fourteen 
“extremely dangerous, even beyond discussion” in that matter, refused.206 Hohenlohe 
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therefore told him to report to the emperor in person.207 When Spitzmüller did so on 
the evening of 13 December, Karl – who had dismissed Koerber earlier in the day – 
immediately offered him the premiership and promised him Sieghart’s position in 
case his tenure were cut short.208 Spitzmüller declined both posts,209 and explained the 
reasons for his opposition to the ratification of the Ausgleich renewal by decree. Karl 
was swiftly won over by his arguments and again asked him to form a cabinet.210 The 
men then discussed the government’s other potential tasks, and when Spitzmüller 
dismissed the idea of an octroi in Bohemia, Karl apparently exclaimed: “Thank God 
that I finally have found a politician who is opposed to this octroi!”211 Indeed, Karl 
thought that it required “serious examination and discussion with all concerned 
parties”.212 Reassured, and under the spell of the emperor’s “irresistible charm”, 
Spitzmüller agreed.213 The following day, he set about trying to form a cabinet, 
certain that the emperor intended it to be more than a mere interim administration.214 
Hohenlohe and Czernin were of course dismayed and immediately set about 
thwarting him.215 At first unaware of their machinations, Spitzmüller was surprised to 
find his task so arduous. Several politicians – notably the Bohemian trio of Clam-
Martinic, Baernreither and Urban – turned down his approaches, professing a 
reluctance to enter a temporary government.216 In fact, the real reason was their 
commitment to the implementation of the octroi.217 Since Spitzmüller had made no 
secret of his aversion to the measure, his struggle was unsurprising.218 Michał 
Bobrzyński, who had agreed to stay on as minister for Galicia, felt compelled to ask 
Spitzmüller whether he really wanted to force through a cabinet against the opposition 
of prominent aristocrats close to the court.219 Spitzmüller also found little support 
from the Christian Socials, who feared that he would push through an economically 
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disadvantageous Ausgleich by decree.220 He was also astonished to find out that the 
world of finance did not look favourably upon his appointment, although his later 
complaints that the press had been against him – for which he blamed Koerber and 
Sieghart – were barely justified.221 What is more, despite his belief to the contrary, 
many thought that his mission was limited in scope and time.222 Meanwhile, the 
names of Hohenlohe and Czernin continued to pop up as likely successors.223 In any 
case, should his responsibilities extend beyond the Ausgleich, Spitzmüller’s principles 
and talents would be severely tested. German political circles continued to insist that 
their national-political demands be addressed, and let it be known that no future 
government should share Koerber’s views on the use of extra-parliamentary means.224 
Meanwhile, the Poles indicated that they fully expected him to expedite the special 
status of Galicia; the Ukrainians, the opposite.225  
Despite the difficulties, Spitzmüller persevered and, within three days, had 
managed to cobble together a cabinet list.226 He had settled into his role and was more 
than ever convinced that his government was to be permanent.227 This spurred his 
opponents into action.228 On 17 December,229 he faced a direct onslaught from the 
men determined to frustrate him. Having already fended off Hohenlohe and 
Baernreither, he received the visit of Czernin late that evening.230 The count had 
already been active in the matter, urging Baernreither not to accept a portfolio “for the 
sake of [their] old friendship” while advising Spitzmüller not to turn to 
Baernreither.231 Czernin now explained that “the poor little emperor” needed special 
care at the beginning of his reign, which he, Spitzmüller, was unable to give. What is 
more, Czernin argued that Spitzmüller was not qualified to tackle the Bohemian 
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question, which only an octroi could solve.232 When Spitzmüller pointed out that Karl 
also had doubts on the matter, Czernin snapped: “These doubts will be removed by 
appropriate information.” Czernin then openly admitted to his designs on the 
premiership, and offered Spitzmüller the ministry of finance in his future 
administration. Since Czernin and Hohenlohe obviously had the emperor’s ear, and 
both opposed his appointment, Spitzmüller foresaw the difficulties he would face as 
prime minister, and lost confidence. And, as finance minister, he would have a free 
hand in concluding the Ausgleich renewal, a matter close to his heart. As a result, he 
accepted the plan suggested by Czernin, who acknowledged that he was making “a 
patriotic sacrifice”.233 Nevertheless, the following day,234 Karl informed him – to his 
surprise – that he intended to appoint Czernin as foreign minister, and once again 
offered him the premiership. Dismayed and irritated, but also undermined by the 
events of the previous week,235 he declined – a decision which he later deeply 
regretted.236 
 
The Clam-Martinic cabinet 
 
Ever the cynic, Koerber claimed that Karl had secretly sent Handel to Prague in order 
to offer Coudenhove the position of prime minister while Spitzmüller was still toiling 
to form his government.237 Newspapers did report that Handel had travelled there in 
relation to the cabinet-building, but stated that the discussions he held with 
Coudenhove – in the presence of Czernin – merely concerned preparations towards 
the resolution of the Bohemian question by the future government.238 Czernin had, 
indeed, recently acquired Handel’s drafts. Furthermore, as Handel was only in Prague 
between 14 and 16 December,239 it is unlikely that he was there on Karl’s orders to 
tout the premiership. On the other hand, Coudenhove was perhaps considered as a 
possible executor of the octroi after the conclusion of the Ausgleich negotiations by a 
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Spitzmüller cabinet. In addition, at the time, Czernin still had his prime-ministerial 
ambitions. As it happened, Coudenhove was indeed offered the position, but only 
after Spitzmüller’s withdrawal.240 In any case, he refused and recommended his friend 
Clam.241 
 On the morning of 19 December, Karl consulted Spitzmüller to ask him his 
opinion on this suggestion.242 Spitzmüller gave a favourable assessment of Clam,243 
whereupon Karl received him and offered him the post.244 Yet the delay in the 
appointment of a government had become embarrassing. The press used several 
pretexts, such as Karl’s visit to the Isonzo Front or the difficulties in finding a 
minister for trade, and insisted Spitzmüller’s work was ongoing.245 On the evening of 
19 December, an official announcement was published, according to which 
negotiations were continuing with the aim of forming a permanent government, in 
order to address all national and political questions.246 Spitzmüller’s name was 
conspicuously absent from this announcement, but the newspapers nevertheless kept 
up the pretence, which was believed.247 Meanwhile, unbeknown to most, Clam was 
hurriedly putting his cabinet together. 
 
A member of the historically Czech-friendly Conservative Landowners in the 
Bohemian Diet, Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic248 was still relatively little known 
nationally.249 In Karl Renner’s lapidary assessment, he was a “political nonentity”.250 
For most of his career, he had chiefly concerned himself with Bohemian politics and, 
in particular, had worked for a Czech-German Ausgleich. His profile had risen with 
his nomination as Chairman of the Right in the House of Lords in late December 
1913, and his inclusion as minister of agriculture in Koerber’s last government. 
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Considered a “feudal lord of the purest water”,251 he had, in accordance with his 
family’s tradition, supported Bohemian autonomy and been close to the Czechs.252 
But, having volunteered to fight in 1914, his experience in the trenches had resulted in 
a radical turnaround. Although he had helped stage the Czech–German demonstration 
in Prague in August, he was already dubious of the sincerity of those Czechs 
involved.253 Subsequently, in the first winter of war, he had told Franz Joseph that 
regrettable incidences of unreliability had occurred among Czech units.254 He also 
wrote a letter to Thun to ask him about the allegations of Czech treachery in the 
hinterland. The governor’s reassurances obviously failed to convince him.255 Indeed, 
three months later, in April 1915, he wrote a long memorandum to the parliamentary 
commission of the Conservative Landowners in Bohemia in which he bemoaned “the 
regrettable passivity of most of the Czech population regarding events in the war”, 
which he explained through their antipathy towards Germandom and their affection 
for Slavs outside the Monarchy. In particular, he pointed out the lamentable attitude 
of significant parts of the intelligentsia. Nevertheless, he admitted that, with a few 
exceptions, the situation in Bohemia was neither serious nor alarming, though he 
worried that it might deteriorate if the military situation worsened and the Russian 
army approached. As a result, he recommended – much like Coudenhove – the 
stimulation of patriotism within the Czech population, which he believed 
overwhelmingly loyal.256 His personal contribution was an article in Hlas národa 
entitled: “Away with passivity!”257 However, the alleged desertion of the 28th Prague 
Infantry Regiment (which occurred the day after he had written to his party), and 
continued reports of Czech treachery, eventually led to a complete change of heart.258 
Many called it “trench staggers”.259 His health had certainly suffered on the battlefield 
and, after over two years of distinguished service, he returned to civilian life.260 
Having taken part in the failed attempt of Upper House members to obtain the recall 
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of parliament under Stürgkh,261 he quickly found himself with a ministerial portfolio 
under Koerber. The prime minister urged Czech politicians to treat Clam as a 
conational, but they could not possibly believe this pretence. On the other hand, the 
German Radicals complained to Koerber that he had included somebody of 
“outspoken party political taint” with no German counterbalance.262 By then, 
however, Clam’s feelings were hardly a secret. Goldmann had already reported to 
Berlin in September that Clam’s views had changed as a result of the war.263 Redlich 
later heard that Clam was “denying his Czechness”.264 Furthermore, when he entered 
the cabinet, his friends and supporters fully expected him to help promulgate a new 
Austrian constitution by octroi.265 Koerber, meanwhile, was convinced that Clam 
agreed with him on the necessity of amalgamating state and autonomous 
administration.266 These plans were of course anathema to the Czechs. If they needed 
tangible proof of his new-found hostility, he soon provided it. On 8 December, at a 
meeting of the Conservative Landowners, he put forward a motion to condemn the 
“deplorable” and “shameful” wartime occurrences among the Czech population, and 
to dissociate the party from these in its upcoming declaration on the occasion of the 
change on the throne.267 Despite acknowledging the bravery and sacrifices of many 
Czech men and refusing to extend the above reproaches to the entire nation, the 
address was blunt and severe in parts, calling attention to failings on the battlefield 
and treachery in the hinterland, and to “the cooling of the holy feelings of civic duty 
and military honour in the bosom of members of the Czech nation.”268 When the 
committee rejected these passages, Clam left the party, taking with him some of the 
fine fleur of the Bohemian aristocracy, including Windischgraetz, the president of the 
House of Lords.269 
 Only delusion or lack of information could therefore make anybody think – as 
Spitzmüller, Baernreither and Karl did – that Clam would be able to wield any 
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influence on the Czechs.270 Even Koerber thought that, “as a Slav”, he might succeed 
in imposing German as the official language.271 Most probably, Karl was not 
intimately acquainted with the latest developments in aristocratic Bohemian politics. 
Furthermore, the name Clam-Martinic remained indelibly associated with Heinrich 
Jaroslav, Heinrich’s uncle, who had allied with František Palacký and František 
Rieger in support of Bohemian state rights.272 In any case, Clam had been 
recommended to Karl from many sides, by Coudenhove, Spitzmüller,273 Werkmann274 
and Berchtold;275 possibly also by Polzer,276 and by Koerber, who thought very highly 
of him.277 Much was made of Clam’s loyalty and self-sacrifice.278 Certainly, the fact 
that he had been close to Franz Ferdinand did not harm his cause;279 nor did the fact 
that he had appeared to be in favour with Franz Joseph in the emperor’s twilight.280 
But again, Czernin and Hohenlohe were the decisive influences in Karl’s choice. Just 
as they had succeeded in displacing Spitzmüller, they had convinced Karl to take on 
their friend.281 To this end, they had conferred with Clam all day on 18 and 19 
December.282 It is tempting to agree with Koerber’s contention that the three men 
simply shared out the key posts among themselves: Clam was to become prime 
minister, Czernin foreign minister and Hohenlohe lord chamberlain.283 (Convention 
dictated that if the foreign minister were Austrian, the joint finance minister had to be 
Hungarian, and vice versa; therefore Czernin’s appointment would necessarily lead to 
Hohenlohe’s departure.)284 
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Clam encountered far fewer difficulties than his predecessor in putting together his 
cabinet. Most of those who had given their assent to Spitzmüller285 now entered 
Clam’s government: Baron Josef von Schenk for justice, Baron Zdenko von Forster 
for railways, Trnka for public works, Georgi for defence, Hussarek for religion and 
education, and Bobrzyński for Galicia.286 Spitzmüller himself, as agreed, took the 
ministry of finance, with Tisza’s blessing.287 Furthermore, Clam easily convinced 
Handel to take the interior ministry, by expressing his complete agreement with the 
execution by decree of Galician autonomy, of the Bohemian question, and of the 
language law. Handel was not a little surprised by Clam’s stance, but the latter 
explained that his experience in the trenches had changed his views.288 Finally, where 
his predecessor had faltered on account of his opposition to the octroi, Clam quickly 
succeeded. Swayed by the prospect of finally helping implement the policy, and 
encouraged by important Nationalverband and Christian Social figures, the two 
Prague-born Germans, Urban and Baernreither, joined as minister of trade and as 
minister without portfolio respectively. In Urban’s case, the Nationalverband had 
consulted its Christian Social allies, and then discussed the matter with Clam, before 
unanimously approving of his participation during a plenary session on the evening of 
20 December. It noted that the fact Clam “did not belong to the German nation” was 
not a sufficient reason to prevent one of its members from entering his government.289 
Indeed, Clam himself had told Groß that “he was no German, but that he was a good 
Austrian, who has only ever done Austrian politics and who, in recent years, had 
revised many of his earlier views.”290 Baernreither’s route into the cabinet had been 
less straightforward, and the Christian Socials – who refused a ministry out of 
principle – denied any involvement in his appointment, rather unconvincingly.291 
Unmistakeably, these were highly political and partisan choices. Baernreither, 
though he continually described the octroi as a mere “arbitration”, was not the 
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dispassionate expert he claimed to be.292 He too had been struck by the prevailing 
fever, and his diaries regularly vituperated against endemic Russophilia in the 
Bohemian lands and Czech disloyalty on the battlefield.293 Redlich remarked in 
January 1916: “He is now more anti-Czech than ever”.294 Urban, meanwhile, had 
developed radical views on constitutional reform and had even travelled to Berlin – 
with Tschirschky’s word of recommendation – to present these to the foreign 
office.295 Both Baernreither and Urban had been actively involved in wartime 
nationalist conciliabules – they now had the opportunity to turn their plans into 
reality. 
Karl accepted Clam’s cabinet on 20 December,296 and the news was 
announced the following day, justified publicly “in light of the general political 
situation”.297 Unusually, the government simultaneously announced the outlines of its 
programme. Drafted by Baernreither,298 it proclaimed its chief aim to be “the 
establishment of full constitutional conditions, the creation of the necessary 
preconditions therefor, and the smoothing of the path to parliament”.299 These 
“preconditions” were, of course, a euphemism for the octroi. Consequently, the oath 
to the constitution was mentioned only evasively. Other political goals were expressed 
more explicitly: the conclusion of the Ausgleich renewal, the initiation of closer 
economic ties with Germany (though both conditional upon parliamentary 
approval),300 and the execution of Galician autonomy according to the handwritten 
letter of 4 November, “the guiding line of [the government’s] action”.301 The 
concluding words promised to respect the equality of all nations, and appealed for the 
understanding and cooperation “of all those who have the future of Austria at 
heart”.302 
 Baernreither claimed that the manifesto made a good impression because it 
promised action. Also according to him, the new cabinet was well received and 
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predicted a long life.303 Certainly, German nationalist publications such as the 
Ostdeutsche Rundschau expressed their satisfaction.304 The Prager Tagblatt 
beamingly reported Clam’s promise to Groß, Geßmann and Weiskirchner that his 
government would follow an “outspokenly pro-German course” and would resolve 
the Bohemian question by January, through a patent.305 (This had apparently secured 
Urban’s participation in the cabinet.) Yet much of the Viennese press exercised 
restraint, save for the interested Fremden-Blatt and Neues Wiener Journal.306 Die Zeit 
was particularly cautious, and the Arbeiter-Zeitung sanctimoniously negative.307 The 
Neue Freie Presse, after an initially frosty assessment, appeared pleased with the 
government’s manifesto.308 Meanwhile, the Christian Socials were quick to point out 
in the Reichspost that Baernreither and Urban were not their representatives (contrary 
to claims in the liberal press),309 that they, as a party, were not tied in any way to the 
government and that they would judge it on its actions.310 
 The Czech press had almost contained its consternation upon learning of 
Clam’s appointment, but the announcement of his programme proved too much to 
swallow. The Národní listy complained that Clam had violated convention by 
consulting only the Germans and the Poles and ignoring the Czechs and the South 
Slavs. It insisted that Trnka was no counterweight to Urban and Baernreither, and 
warned against underestimating the power of the Czech Union. Národní politika 
reminded Clam that the Austrian state idea required the equal treatment of all nations. 
Právo Lidu condemned Clam’s one-sided cabinet-formation which, it asserted, 
“cannot and will not make a good impression on the Czechs”. It thought his attitude 
unforgivable in light of Czech Union’s avowed desire for conciliation.311 Indeed, 
Clam’s manifesto was a bitter blow for the union which, for weeks, had stressed its 
loyalty and willingness to cooperate, admittedly from a position of weakness and 
uncertainty. On 10 December, in Venkov, the Agrarian Udržal had vaunted the Austria 
state idea and pleaded: “Let us work with increased intensity towards maintaining and 
extending the independence and power of the state in which we live, and towards 
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strengthening this state to which firm historical ties bind us”. 312 During a speech in 
Brno, the Social Democrat Tusar had called for an end to national radicalism and for 
conciliation between Czechs and Germans. Opposing the octroi, he declared: “We 
Czech Social Democrats, together with the other Czech parties, will not deny the state 
our help in these critical times, but we demand that issues as drastic as the special 
status of Galicia and […] the language question be sorted out in parliament”. He 
insisted that the Czechs were no doctrinaires in linguistic matters.313 In April 1915, 
Clam had stressed the importance of convincing the Czech public that it had no reason 
to fear anti-Czech government rule after the war.314 In fact, it now had good cause to 
fear it during the war. This, in turn, strengthened Czech political unity, and the Český 
svaz closed ranks. 
Shrewdly, Austrian propaganda abroad described Clam (and Czernin) as 
Czechs, and used their appointment to prove Austria’s independence from Germany, 
the equality between her constituent nations, and Karl’s determination to initiate a 
new foreign and domestic course. Beneš admitted that, as a result, the émigrés 
experienced a difficult time, marked by fear and more feverish work.315 There were 
no such illusions at home, however. When he heard of the composition of the new 
government, Tobolka wrote in his diary: “Baron Trnka is the only Czech […] Does 
Clam-Martinic […] count in the Czech tally? Come off it!”316 
 
Czernin and Hohenlohe 
 
Personally, Karl felt no animosity towards the Czechs. He had once told Polzer that 
Bohemia still felt the terrible consequences of the Battle of the White Mountain.317 He 
also complained to Baernreither about the Germans’ failure to learn Czech.318 And 
apparently, his best years had been those spent in Prague and Brandeis/Brandýs.319 In 
that time, however, he did not develop any great understanding of, or sympathy for, 
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Bohemian state rights.320 He thought that a few sops would suffice to placate the 
Czechs. His annoyance at the interminable Czech-German conflict321 was not 
dissimilar to his uncle’s. Save for Koerber, none of the people Karl conferred with 
during his first month on the throne would have disagreed with this sentiment. Since 
the prospect of a Czech-German Ausgleich seemed extinct, Karl followed their 
counsel. In the end, there was not even any sign of the Bohemian ministry which Karl 
had suggested in late 1914 and had openly advocated to Wallis as recently as 25 
November 1916.322 The Czechs could, however, console themselves with the fact that, 
in mid-December, Karl commuted Kramář and Rašín’s death sentences to fifteen and 
ten years in prison respectively.323 (The men’s appeal had been rejected on the eve of 
Karl’s accession.)324 The news was published in early January alongside the reasons 
for their original condemnation.325 
Of the many voices which had urged Karl on the path of the octroi, Czernin’s 
was one of the most persuasive. However, neither his views on domestic reform nor 
his former closeness to Franz Ferdinand had originally brought him to Karl’s 
attention.326 Indeed, it was his desire for a rapid conclusion of peace which had 
singled him out in Karl’s eyes.327 In August 1916, the then heir had received a 
memorandum written by Czernin entitled “Thoughts on Ending the War”, which 
predicted the eventual defeat of the Central Powers, and urged considerable sacrifices 
to be made in order to extract Austria-Hungary from the conflict unscathed.328 Karl, 
who, by then, shared this viewpoint, was obviously impressed.329 Praised (at times) 
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for his diplomatic activity while ambassador to Romania,330 and recommended by 
Hohenlohe as “one of the few men equal to the situation”, Czernin had been quickly 
sought by Karl, once on the throne.331 However, he had at first angled for the post of 
prime minister, though chiefly in order to gain influence on foreign policy.332 As he 
had explained to Clam in late November, domestic affairs were irrelevant under the 
circumstances: “We must first save our life and only then can we discuss how we 
should live.”333 Yet Karl obviously wanted him at the Ballhausplatz to replace Burián, 
whom he considered “a pedantic and excessively boring doctrinaire” with whom 
nothing could be done.334 As Karl later recalled, “I sacked the rather fossilized Burián 
and took on Czernin because, like me, he had the most immediate conclusion of peace 
as his driving political aim.”335 Czernin readily accepted a post on which he had set 
his sights even before the war.336 Unfortunately for Karl, Czernin, despite his dash 
and his brilliance, was a difficult, slippery, unstable character. His own brother-in-
law, Montenuovo, called him an “unpredictable neurasthenic”,337  an “impulsive, 
nervous” man who “simply gives up on an important matter if it is not sorted 
quickly”.338 Karl himself recounted in amusement that Franz Joseph had told 
Montenuovo: “A very nice man, your brother-in-law, but a very bad diplomat”.339 
Many described him as dilettantish.340 Baernreither once called him a charlatan, but 
more often appeared impressed, as did many others.341 Indeed, Czernin could dazzle. 
To Plener, he was “brilliantly superficial, spirited, nervous, arrogant”; Friedrich von 
Wieser, while he agreed with this assessment, thought “ignorant” more appropriate 
than “superficial”.342 Czernin certainly did not doubt his own ability – in Polzer’s 
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words, “he recognized no one as superior to himself, ni Dieu ni maître.”343 
Spitzmüller, still marked by his experience when trying to form a cabinet, thought 
Czernin clever but unscrupulous, and warned Karl against his “violent methods”.344 
 For all his drawbacks, Czernin was not an unreasonable choice of foreign 
minister. His assessments were realistic, his views prescient and insightful, and his 
plans in accordance with Karl’s. His thoughts on domestic policy were, however, 
absolutist, reckless and ruthless, not to say ferocious. The numerous plans for 
constitutional reform which he sketched for Franz Ferdinand in the years before the 
war revealed an extraordinary degree of violence, cynicism, misanthropy and 
hubris.345 He consistently advocated a coup d’état, backed by force, in both Bohemia 
and in Hungary. His methods, as summarized by Robert A. Kann, were: “the jail, the 
bayonet, the intrigue, the lie, the putsch”.346 But Czernin had eventually fallen out of 
favour with Franz Ferdinand,347 and had turned to Tisza, becoming an outspoken 
champion of dualism.348 Tisza, in turn, backed Czernin energetically.349 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, in his inaugural speech as foreign minister on 23 
December, Czernin announced that he stood “entirely on the basis of the 1867 
Ausgleich”.350 Despite his new post, Czernin continued to meddle in internal affairs, 
supervising the execution of his preferred course, while ensuring that it did not harm 
his foreign policy. 
The real spiritus rector was, however, Konrad Hohenlohe.351 He had also been 
close to Franz Ferdinand, and had befriended Karl at Miramare castle.352 He was, in 
Polzer’s words, “one of the few people who had been intimate with the emperor from 
his early days”.353 Later, during Karl’s heirship, he was the only minister who 
                                               
343 Polzer, p.128. 
344 SM, pp.155, 157. 
345 Robert A. Kann, “Count Ottokar Czernin and Archduke Francis Ferdinand”, Journal of Central 
European Affairs, XVI: 2 (Boulder, 1956), p.119. 
346 Ibid., pp.130-131, 144. Kann called him “a man who gauged the mental level of the people from the 
vantage of his own arrogance”. He described a letter from Czernin to Hoyos, written in November 
1913, which expounded on his views of Austria, as a “Wagnerian death raving, intoned by an 
emotionally overcharged, political Don Quixote”. 
347 Ibid., Czernin-Franz Ferdinand, 27.1.1913, p.139. 
348 FJ, II, 5.2.1917, p.426. According to Koerber, Czernin had given Tisza a written guarantee that he 
supported dualism and Hungarian state autonomy. 
349 FJ, II, 5.2.1917, p.426. 
350 NFPM, 23.12, p.1; NFPA, 23.12.1916, p.1. He had been appointed on 22.12. 
351 RT, II, 21.12; 22.12.1916, p.249. 
352 Polzer, pp.116-117; RT, II, 26.11.1916, p.233. 
353 Polzer, p.117. 
 141 
regularly visited him during his training at the Hofburg.354 And, as soon as Karl 
ascended the throne, he was again a most frequent visitor.355 Hohenlohe, who was 
known as the “Red Prince” for his alleged progressiveness,356 had been considered for 
the posts of prime minister and lord chamberlain by Franz Ferdinand.357 But for all his 
charm and empathy,358 he was not held in high intellectual esteem. Koerber and 
Redlich both found him “muddleheaded”, and the former claimed that his stupidity 
was famed.359 Indeed, Stürgkh had said that every time he opened his mouth in the 
ministerial council, he worried that another idiotic comment would spurt out.360 
Baernreither thought him “inept”, and his quadralist plans for the Monarchy so stupid 
that he had at first suspected a joke.361 He and Tschirschky both found him 
dilettantish,362 while Geßmann thought him “incapable”.363 Paul Thun, meanwhile, 
felt that he had no real knowledge of state affairs and that he looked down on 
commoners.364 According to Sieghart, “the only person of whom he had a markedly 
good opinion was himself”; he was “so utterly self-involved that he could not imagine 
himself anywhere but in the centre of the cosmos”.365 Karl was oblivious to these 
foibles and esteemed him highly.366 He therefore wanted him in his entourage, and 
earmarked him for a non-political post (although Hohenlohe was said to prefer 
backroom string-pulling to official responsibility).367 He stood down as joint finance 
minister on 22 December (to make way for a Hungarian: Burián),368 and was 
eventually appointed lord chamberlain in February.369 Hohenlohe’s views, though less 
extreme than Czernin’s, were resolutely pro-German, both in foreign and domestic 
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affairs.370 And his planned restructuring of the Monarchy aimed, in part, to “trap 
Bohemia”.371 
 Of course, it was no coincidence that Karl had immediately sought out men 
who had been close to his uncle. Their proximity to the late archduke inspired 
confidence. But Karl was certainly not the “blind executor of Franz Ferdinand’s 
political testament”, as Biliński, among others, claimed.372 Czernin, despite his later 
boasts,373 was not on Franz Ferdinand’s list of candidates for foreign minister, or 
indeed for any post of importance.374 Meanwhile, Clam had never exerted any 
political influence on the former heir. Furthermore, Hohenlohe was a personal friend 
and adviser of Karl’s in his own right. Spitzmüller, for his part, was chosen as the 
leading Austrian expert on the Ausgleich. Even Sieghart, whose brutal sacking by 
Karl was seen by most as Franz Ferdinand’s posthumous revenge,375 denied that he 
had fallen prey to a provision of his testament.376 Had there been such a testament, 
and had Karl seen it and followed it, he would have sacked Tisza,377 delayed the 
coronation in Budapest, and refused to the take the oath on the Austrian constitution. 
Yet Karl did none of this. As it happened, Franz Ferdinand’s archive was hidden away 
after his death, and Karl never gained – or, indeed, sought – access to it before 
coming to power.378 
Contrary to Koerber’s repeated allegations, Spitzmüller had claimed that Karl 
had expressed serious reservations concerning the octroi.379 Unfortunately for him, if 
such was his aversion, he had surrounded himself with men of a contrary disposition, 
including – in Czernin – one of the plan’s most ardent and abiding champions. The 
boisterous and impatient mood among German bourgeois parties, the violence of the 
Radicals’ attacks on Koerber, and the meekness of the Czechs, further forced Karl’s 
hand. He later admitted that political pressure from the German camp had indeed been 
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a factor in his acceptance.380 Thus whatever his doubts about the octroi – which 
obviously did not weigh too heavily on him – Karl was either persuaded, coaxed or 
cowed into acquiescence. 
 
Karl’s preoccupations 
 
Karl’s chaotic and haphazard first month in power revealed that he had not organized 
his accession, and that he had no ready plans for constitutional reform, nor designated 
candidates to head his governments. A lack of both preparedness and awareness led 
him to agree to take the vow on the Austrian constitution and to be crowned in 
Budapest.381 Admittedly, the circumstances were very different from the ones Franz 
Ferdinand had imagined when drawing up his plans to delay both commitments and 
reorganize the Monarchy. December 1916 was perhaps not a time for experiments. 
Yet, apparently, Karl had grand designs. The former Austrian prime minister Count 
Erich von Kielmansegg had heard “from a very authoritative party” that the emperor 
was determined to carry out big changes after his coronation.382 Karl had also 
suggested to Spitzmüller that a new constitution would be promulgated in the near 
future.383 Karl certainly had room for manoeuvre and faced little opposition. Thanks 
in large part to Stürgkh’s skill and tenacity, Austria had avoided becoming a military 
dictatorship,384 or being saddled with irrevocable, damaging constitutional changes. 
Moreover, the meddling of the high command in policy-making was at its lowest 
since the beginning of the war. In fact, by the summer of 1916, the military had all but 
abandoned attempts to gain acceptance for its projects. When Karl assumed the 
supreme command of the armed forces on 2 December,385 he effectively ended the 
army’s political ambitions by removing Friedrich (and therefore Conrad’s influence) 
and ordering all important domestic matters to be submitted to him.386 On 9 January, 
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he signed an imperial decree rescinding the civilian powers which the military had 
been granted in a large part of the hinterland.387 
Karl had easily done away with military encroachment in political affairs, but 
failed to exploit the free hand he had gained.  He did not resuscitate his uncle’s ideas 
for constitutional reform, or even try to enforce his own – testament, perhaps, to their 
virtual non-existence. Nor did he consult specialists on the question, or set up a 
dedicated commission. Instead, after a few hesitant weeks, he plumped for a narrow, 
one-sided, unimaginative German course which, despite years of prior development, 
still needed writing from scratch. Karl’s thoughts were obviously elsewhere. 
 
Since his accession to the throne, his overwhelming priority had undoubtedly been the 
conclusion of peace.388 According to Polzer, “he was engrossed from the very first 
days of his reign in the endeavour to end the war as soon as possible.”389  When 
Wilhelm met him in late November, he found him not only “in low spirits” and 
burdened by “the heaviness of the responsibility that weighs on him”, but also very 
voluble on the need to obtain peace, especially in light of Austria’s food shortages. 
Karl therefore set great store by the Central Powers’ planned peace note.390 Shortly 
after, he sought to pressurize the Germans into issuing it as soon as possible, but 
encountered opposition from Hindenburg and Ludendorff. From Teschen, he 
telegraphed Burián despondently: “My impression: foreign office completely shut out. 
Pure military dictatorship.”391 The German military finally relented after the 
occupation of Bucharest, and the note to the neutral powers suggesting immediate 
peace negotiations finally went out on 12 December. But, to Karl’s great 
disappointment, it was supercilious and defiant in tone, and failed to specify any 
conditions;392 unsurprisingly, the Allies rejected it.393 Karl obviously doubted Berlin’s 
commitment to peace, and had already investigated other possible channels. Most 
notably, he had beseeched his mother-in-law, the Duchess of Parma, to make contact 
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with her sons Sixtus and Xavier in Belgium; she consequently wrote two letters, on 5 
and 14 December 1916, begging to see them again.394 
Karl’s other paramount concern was his army. Appalled and embittered by his 
experience of the country’s military leadership, he made drastic changes after taking 
over the supreme command, moving the headquarters from Teschen to Baden, outside 
Vienna, imposing a new code of conduct, and ultimately, in late February, sacking 
Conrad and replacing him with the conciliatory and non-political Arz von 
Straußenburg.395 These were not simply symbolic gestures: Karl was a soldier and 
determined to command.396 His preoccupation with war and peace therefore left little 
time for domestic political considerations. When, in late November, Redlich asked 
Koerber whether Karl was aware of “the gravity of the problems of the Empire, the 
danger of the general situation and the great unsolved difficulties in Austro-Hungarian 
relations”, the prime minister shook his head, admitting that Karl saw himself mainly 
as commander-in-chief.397 
 
On 30 December, in tremendous – and, in light of the circumstances, somewhat 
incongruous – pomp, Karl was crowned King of Hungary in Budapest. Effectively, 
this was the end of any possibility of reform involving Transleithania. But, 
astonishingly, Karl also managed to upset the Magyars in the process. Indeed, he 
hurried away from the Hungarian capital very shortly after the ceremony, leaving 
empty the specially prepared royal suite in Buda castle, and thereby provoking the 
considerable dismay and resentment of his hosts.398 Some months later, Karl 
conceded that he had committed a great blunder.399 Unfortunately for him, it was one 
of several. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE GERMAN COURSE: HALF-STEAM AHEAD 
 
Although Clam’s government had promised to go about its task without delay and to 
use the material already at its disposal,1 the octroi project immediately stuttered. Upon 
asking Clam about Handel’s work, Baernreither had been told: “I myself do not yet 
know the drafts, act as if they did not exist, I am completely free in the matter and in 
the form, and only one thing is sure: certain questions must be dealt with outside 
parliament.”2 But as he quickly realized, the renewing of the Ausgleich and the food 
crisis were higher priorities.3 This was not his only frustration. When he first asked to 
see Handel’s papers on 20 December, Clam had promised to hand them over once he 
had read them.4 Having heard nothing by early January, Baernreither reiterated his 
demand, only to receive the same answer.5 By then, he admitted to Redlich that the 
government would not succeed in decreeing much by octroi.6 It was soon rumoured 
that Clam would resign, leaving Hohenlohe and Czernin to press on with the policy.7 
Still, Baernreither persevered, and on 15 January, accompanied by Urban, he paid 
Clam another visit to request the documents urgently; snowed under, the prime 
minister had still not examined them in full, and again asked for a few more days.8 
The two ministers were not alone in their annoyance.9 The Nationalverband, though 
pacified by its first meeting with the prime minister earlier in the month,10 was 
increasingly restless and suspicious of the government’s intentions. At a meeting on 
17 January, Groß informed its members that Clam had refused to set a date for the 
proclamation of the octroi.11 As a result, Baernreither suggested to Clam that a plan be 
promptly drawn up for the execution of the proposals, and handed him a 
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memorandum on the subject. Clam promised to discuss it with the emperor, but 
Baernreither heard nothing back.12 Though he readily admitted that Clam was 
industrious, level-headed and calm, and desirous of “accommodating all known 
wishes of the Germans in Bohemia as far as possible”,13 he became increasingly 
aware of his shortcomings. He complained about his lack of organization, his 
hesitancy and his underestimation of the amount of work ahead.14 Overloaded by 
everyday business, he appeared unable to address the bigger political questions.15  
Baernreither also bemoaned the fact that his partner Urban was entirely engrossed in 
his own ministry.16 At the end of January, he was forced to observe: “Our horizon is 
darkening.” Complaints that the government was “just as inactive as Stürgkh” and 
that “nobody knew where they stood” flooded from all sides. The German nationalists 
of both Houses were especially fretful. Nevertheless, Clam could not be persuaded to 
speak out publicly on the matter and clarify his position. Finally, almost six weeks 
after entering office, Baernreither obtained the language proposals for study; the 
remainder then arrived piecemeal.17 
However, he was bewildered by Handel’s efforts on the Bohemian question, 
describing them as “radical, but without any knowledge of [local] conditions”.18 After 
two days of racking his brains over them, he proclaimed them to be “blooming 
nonsense”. When he showed them to two specialists in the Bohemian governor’s 
office, one of them burst out laughing.19 New drafts therefore had to be produced. 
(Baernreither was equally unimpressed by Handel’s other proposed decrees – for 
Galician autonomy inter alia – and dismissed his colleague as a “constitutional 
trapeze artist”. When Handel read them out, Baernreither remarked that this was va 
banque, to which the former responded: “Yes it is, but there is no other way.”)20 
Only in early February, therefore, did work on the Bohemian octroi start in 
earnest. Consultations began in a small group composed of Clam, Handel, 
Coudenhove, Baernreither and two councillors; later, Urban also became a regular 
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participant. However, their progress was soon halted when Clam developed influenza 
on 10 February and was incapacitated for the rest of the month.21 When he returned, 
still suffering relapses, and further overwhelmed by unattended commitments, the 
momentum was lost. Thereafter, work advanced slowly, lacking drive and concision, 
mired in detail, and overshadowed by more pressing issues. Though Baernreither 
believed that the public’s perception of the government was still positive, he 
acknowledged its desire for concrete action. Despite his insistence, Clam still refused 
to make any announcement.22 In contrast, Baernreither claimed that he took pains to 
update the expectant political world, not simply the Nationalverband, but also the 
Christian Socials, Czechs and Slovenes.23 This was insufficient to alleviate their 
respective concerns. Even the nationalists, whose project he was executing, were 
distrustful. Thanks to their contacts in the interior ministry, they were informed 
whenever he amended the proposals and more than once confronted him to ask 
whether he was changing them in favour of the Czechs. Though Baernreither each 
time explained his position, he did not always gain the impression that he had 
convinced them.24 Furthermore, Clam failed to make contact with the Poles,25 who 
expected the quick realization of Galician autonomy and had speedily set up four 
subcommittees to draw up their demands.26 
 
The Czechs, meanwhile, were rightly anxious. When Clam received the presidium of 
the Czech Union on 12 January (for just thirty minutes),27 he was cold and brusque to 
the point of hostility.28 On the eve of the meeting, rumours were still coursing 
according to which the octroi would only be decreed after a parliamentary deadlock, 
and that the Galician question would be postponed until after the war; but Clam’s 
pronouncements confirmed the Czechs’ worst fears. Although repeatedly asserting his 
desire to work with parliament, he made thoroughly clear that he intended to decree 
the octroi and the autonomy of Galicia. He explained that his government had “a great 
plan for the sanitizing of conditions in Austria”. When Šmeral asked for details, he 
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responded tersely: “I do not want to take the discussion further, what I have said must 
be enough for you”. In addition, he brushed off their request for an audience with the 
emperor, arguing that there was no time for the individual reception of each nation, 
which would anyway lead to competition.29 In their immediate post-mortem, the 
Czechs agreed that Clam had been particularly abrupt and noted that he had not once 
sought their support for his obviously drastic – and, to them, unpleasant – reforms. 
The Agrarian Karel Prášek admitted that the Union had few assets to scupper his 
plans, but argued that its loyalty to the state meant it was not entirely powerless. He 
recommended establishing contact with the aristocrats of the Conservative 
Landowners’ Party, in the hope that they would join the Union and the National 
Committee. (These did subsequently send Clam a strongly worded memorandum 
protesting against his planned coup.)30 Maštálka, who knew Clam personally, had 
stayed alone with the prime minister after the conference; his report was equally 
bleak. When he pleaded with him not to oppose an audience with Karl, since the 
Czechs intended to use the occasion to ask for an amnesty for Kramář, Clam snapped: 
“How can you have a traitor as your friend? If my brother were a traitor, he would 
cease to exist for me.” When Clam escorted him to the door, he said: “Mr Maštálka, I 
will tell you one thing: I am convinced you will not be pleased with me and we will 
often scuffle.”31 
Although it was not mentioned at the audience, Clam was perhaps aware of – 
and therefore influenced by – the essence of the Entente’s response to Woodrow 
Wilson’s request for a statement of war aims.32 A summary of these was published in 
the Vienna evening press on 12 January,33 although the full version, including the 
passage on “the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Romanians and Czechoslovaks from 
foreign rule”,34 only appeared the following morning, misquoted. Indeed, newspapers 
mentioned “Czechs and Slovaks” rather than “Czechoslovaks”.35 The Prager Tagblatt 
                                               
29 Ibid. 
30 RT, II, 9.3.1917, p.283. 
31 Ibid. He added unconvincingly: “You must nevertheless be certain that […], in the end, I will always 
work to make sure that the interests of the [Czech] nation are protected.” 
32 TD, 15.2.1917, p.279. 
33 NFPA, 12.1, pp.1-2; RPN, 12.1, p.1; FBA, 12.1, p.1. 
34 Beneš, I, pp.246-247, 261-266; Masaryk, pp.126-127. The “Czechoslovaks” had been included 
chiefly as a result of Beneš’s lobbying. Since the South Slavs could not be mentioned specifically due 
to Italian opposition, this left the curious juxtaposition of “Slavs” and “Czechoslovaks”. 
35 NFPM, p.2; RPM, p.3; FBM, p.3; AZM, p.1; PLLM, p.3. 
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even wrote “Czechs and Slovenes”.36 The Czech Union, of course, could but disavow 
the Allies. At the same time, this seemed a good opportunity to gain favour with the 
government.37 After consultations of the presidium on 22 and 23 January, an address 
penned by Stránský was adopted and transmitted to Clam and to Czernin.38 Although 
irreproachably – almost fawningly – monarchist, its unfavourable comparisons 
between Czech and Hungarian behaviour in both 1849 and 1866, and its mention of 
the war with Prussia, made it inflammatory. Further, it asked to be received by the 
emperor in order to “respond emphatically and solemnly to the uninvited intervention 
of the enemy”. This was certainly not what Czernin had in mind – he wanted a simple, 
sharp rebuke.39 When he met Staněk, Maštálka and Šmeral on 30 January, he 
presented them with his own version, asking them for their signature and permission 
to publish it. The men acquiesced.40 On Šmeral’s suggestion, the address was 
finalized in the form of a letter to the foreign minister, explicitly allowing him to 
make use of it and renewing “the expression of [the Union’s] deepest respect” 
towards him.41 The wording was certainly much terser than in Stránský’s version, 
merely rejecting an “insinuation based on wholly false assumptions”, and declaring 
that the Czech people would continue, as they always had, to envisage their future 
only under the Habsburg sceptre.42 As a result of its submissive and obsequious tone, 
the publication of the note on 1 February43 outraged all Czech parties, as well as the 
Czech public,44 and was later held up as the most infamous example of complicity 
with the imperial government.45 It also damaged the émigrés’ cause. Beneš admitted: 
“It hit me and Masaryk hard. It was a solemn disavowal, without reservation, decisive 
– a severe blow.”46 Yet, as Masaryk pointed out, the omission of his name and the 
lack of international notoriety of the signatories weakened its impact.47 
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(Paradoxically, both the exiles and the Clam government shared the desire to discredit 
any evidence of Czech loyalty.)48 
 Nevertheless, the Czech Union earned nothing for its toils (nor did the other 
nationalities who had hurried to denounce the Entente’s presumption).49 On top of its 
repudiation of the Allied note, it could now point to its repeated declarations of 
loyalty, its oft-stated willingness to cooperate in the interest of the state, its attendance 
at Franz Joseph’s funeral50 and – most exactingly – Karl’s coronation in Budapest.51 
(All of this in spite of the ongoing political trials and disbanding of allegedly 
nationalist organizations in the Bohemian lands.)52 Yet Clam was unmoved, and 
continued to ignore them.53 Baernreither at least recognized that, since they “had to 
swallow a lot”, the government had to make the octroi palatable.54 This was an 
impossible task, as it fulfilled almost all the German nationalists’ desires: the 
imposition of German as official internal language55 with the establishment of three 
linguistic areas – German, Czech and mixed;56 the creation of administratively, 
politically and legislatively powerful circles, demarcated as strictly as possible 
according to nationality, since, in Baernreither’s words, “considering the existing 
mood of the population, only a separation could lead to both peoples tolerating living 
next to each other”;57 the emasculation of the diet in Prague; and new standing orders 
for the Reichsrat, making obstruction near impossible.58 
Meanwhile, contact between the Czechs and Karl remained almost non-
existent. Admittedly, when seeking to encourage the Czech Union to follow Czernin’s 
instructions regarding the disavowal, Karl had asked minister Trnka to pass on the 
following message: “I want to be a just and benevolent ruler and […] I like the Czech 
                                               
48 Jan Galandauer, “Der misslungene Kampf des letzten Königs von Böhmen um die Rettung seines 
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nation”.59 But without any corresponding action, this was no consolation. Unbeknown 
to the Czechs, Karl was at the time envisaging his coronation as King of Bohemia – 
which he thought the “greatest wish of the Czechs”,60 and which Franz Joseph had 
never carried out – but Clam buried the idea.61 It would, in any case, have provided a 
curious contrast to the carving up of Bohemia through the octroi. 
 
On 15 February, the parliamentary commission of the Czech Union met, and issued a 
stern – if desperate – repudiation of Clam’s policies. It denounced his cabinet 
formation, and demanded the recall of parliament, arguing that this was the worst 
possible time to settle disputed national questions and urging the continuation of the – 
already evaporated – political Burgfrieden.62 But the Czechs’ greatest hope resided in 
Clam’s ineffectiveness. By early March, after over two months in office, his 
government had achieved little, save for an agreement with Hungary on the renewal 
of the economic Ausgleich (which still had to be approved by parliament).63 Czernin, 
Hohenlohe and the prime minister himself were now firmly in the line of fire, and 
serious divisions had appeared within the cabinet. Its disarray was widely known in 
political circles.64 Redlich, who scoffed at this “government of aristocratic and 
bourgeois amateurs”, believed its break-up imminent.65 Although this was not the 
case, several of its members were considerably disaffected. Clam’s leadership 
infuriated all, but octroi supporters particularly resented the sluggish progress of their 
plans,66 while more circumspect ministers questioned the very course of this domestic 
policy.67 Karl, too, was now increasingly doubtful. 
On 6 February, during a long conversation with Baernreither, he expressed 
distinct reservations. When his minister explained that many years of preparatory 
work had paved the way for the measure, Karl urged caution and stressed again and 
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again: “All peoples must feel happy and at home in Austria.”68 In fact, Baernreither 
and Urban noticed that the emperor always evaded the Bohemian question with such 
platitudes.69 Nevertheless, he did not openly oppose the plan, and conceded that the 
matter could not afford to be postponed too long. As a result, Baernreither retained the 
impression that there would be no trouble in obtaining his approval.70 Manifestly, the 
chief patrons of the octroi did not perceive Karl’s discernable want of enthusiasm as a 
serious obstacle. There existed a certain condescension towards the inexperienced 
young emperor and a belief in his malleability, but this attitude was also the 
consequence of his own failure to articulate his misgivings plainly and to offer a 
credible alternative. Indeed, Karl seemed scarcely more enamoured of the idea of 
acceding to the wishes of the nationalities. Baernreither noted that he was “very 
biased against the Poles and their efforts for autonomy”, as he feared the Czechs 
could follow suit.71 
 
But Karl need not have felt alone in his scepticism towards the octroi. The Christian 
Socials, weary of Clam’s inaction,72 were alarmed by some of the government’s plans 
– on education, for instance – which appeared to threaten their much-cherished local 
autonomy.73 In late January, they were able to produce an updated version of their 
joint guidelines with the Nationalverband, although, again, these were subject to the 
“preservation of their party principles”.74 Further, they made even clearer than before 
that measures designed for Bohemia would not affect other crownlands. When the 
Christian Socials spoke out in their name alone, they demanded simply the decreeing 
of new standing orders and the rapid recall of parliament, patently ignoring national 
desiderata.75 
 Support for the octroi was not unanimous in high places either. Czernin, of 
course, remained a bullish proponent of the plan, and stressed its urgency.76 Speaking 
to Baernreither on 19 January, he declared bluntly: “The Poles somehow must leave 
the House. Austria must have a German orientation; the government must rely on the 
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Germans”.77 Five days later, he was equally uncompromising during a conversation 
with Redlich. He was adamant that the octroi – which he had recommended for fifteen 
years – had to be, and indeed would be, carried out.78 But the cabinet itself was 
largely unenthusiastic. Baernreither complained that “the old Stürgkh ministers, 
incidentally very poorly informed by Clam, sat back and watched our policies 
indifferently.”79 Indeed, much of the old guard favoured the stability of the Stürgkh 
system and was reluctant to endorse a radical measure which threatened to rock an 
already unsteady boat. Baernreither lamented: “With every day that went by, it 
became clearer to me that Clam had put together his cabinet very unfortunately.”80 In 
fact, two ministers were overtly hostile to the measure: Spitzmüller and Trnka. The 
former, already known for his opposition to the octroi, had “only entered the 
government with the reservation of a free choice on the subject”, and duly opposed 
the plan at every opportunity. Therefore, by his own admission, he was not brought 
into any further contact with the drafts.81 Trnka, of course, shared his misgivings. 
After the war, he claimed that he had “in fact functioned as a Czech national minister” 
and “had repeatedly declared that [he] would never sign the proposals […] because 
[he] considered this policy to be utterly mistaken.” As a result, he apparently 
threatened to resign on seven occasions: three times to Stürgkh and four to Clam, 
“though quietly and without fuss”.82 But neither Trnka nor Spitzmüller had any 
political leverage. In fact, their continued presence in office throughout Clam’s tenure 
suggests that their opposition was not particularly militant. In any case, the matter was 
never concretely discussed in the council of ministers.83 For its supporters, the octroi 
was not up for debate. Closer to Karl, Polzer – appointed to head his private office in 
early February – also categorically dismissed a solution by octroi to the Bohemian 
question,84 but he too had little influence on the policy-makers who, in any case, 
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viewed him with suspicion and worked to curtail his influence on the emperor. 
Though Karl was aware of existing opposition, of the apathy of several cabinet 
members and of the lack of popular support for the measure outside the Bohemian 
lands, it did not encourage him sufficiently to act. Although he had settled in his role85 
– he had even begun to show distinctly autocratic tendencies86 – and had removed 
much of the old guard in favour of men of his own choice,87 he still lacked the 
confidence to intervene in domestic politics. He had neither the conviction nor the 
knowledge to scotch the octroi and to put forward another scheme. He also remained 
fearful of the German reaction to its abandonment. More importantly, domestic policy 
was not foremost in his mind. 
 
Karl’s most urgent preoccupation was the conclusion of peace, and he made no secret 
of this. In January, for instance, he told Joseph Pomiankowski, his military 
plenipotentiary in the Ottoman Empire, that, as soon as the nations of the Monarchy 
ceased to be in a position to bear the burdens of war – this would occur soon, he 
thought – he would conclude peace, regardless of his allies.88 He was less forthright – 
and more honest – when briefing Musulin, the new ambassador to Switzerland, 
explaining that Austria-Hungary’s aim was to bring about a compromise between 
Germany and the West.89 Yet despite this design and his own displeasure with the 
content of the Central Powers’ peace offer, Karl had little choice but to follow 
Wilhelm in issuing a defiant response to the Entente’s rejection. In his Army and 
Navy Order of 5 January, he demanded more sacrifices and further endurance from 
his forces, and condemned the Allies: “They are rebuffing, without even knowing our 
conditions, the hand we held out to them. […]. Blame lies only with our enemies. God 
is my witness.”90 His hopes of mediating a general peace were then dealt a crushing 
blow by Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February. 
Though he strongly opposed this policy, he had been presented with a fait accompli 
by his ally. He could but comply, and the matter was agreed upon at a crown council 
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on 24 January.91 Although Washington swiftly broke off diplomatic relations with 
Berlin, the American ambassador assured Karl that his country would not do so with 
Vienna.92 This was some consolation for Karl, whose efforts towards peace via his 
brother-in-law were in full swing. 
Indeed, when the Duchess of Parma finally met her sons Sixtus and Xavier 
undercover in Switzerland on 29 January, she brought news that Karl wished to meet 
them as soon as possible. She also carried a letter from Zita urging her brothers to 
help her husband in his quest for peace. Sixtus stated the four fundamental conditions 
he personally believed necessary for peace with the Entente: the return of Alsace-
Lorraine without colonial compensations, the restoration of Belgium, the restoration 
of Serbia enlarged with Albania and the surrender of Constantinople to Russia. 
Buoyed by encouragement in Paris, the siblings returned to Switzerland to meet the 
Austro-Hungarian agent appointed by Karl.93 On 13 February in Neuchâtel the 
brothers met the envoy in question, Count Tamás Erdödy, a childhood friend of 
Karl’s, who apparently informed them that Karl had accepted three of Sixtus’ four 
points as a provisional basis for negotiations. Indeed, he rejected only the restoration 
of Serbia (which was the only issue of direct concern to Austria-Hungary), while 
acquiescing in the remaining points at the expense of his German and Turkish allies.94 
Sixtus, however, relayed the intractability of the Entente on the Serbian question and 
encouraged Austria-Hungary to go ahead and present Germany with a fait accompli, 
since no diplomatic peace was possible.95 On 16 February, Erdödy reported to Karl in 
Baden. The following day, Czernin was informed of the identity of the mediator and 
gave his support to his continued efforts, pressing the empress to summon her brother 
to her.96 On 19 February, he gave Erdödy instructions for his next journey to 
Switzerland, along with written guidelines. To Karl, these seemed an insufficient 
starting point for negotiations and he supplemented them with his own notes, 
unbeknown to his minister.97 Whereas Czernin merely indicated that Austria would 
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not object to a voluntary cession of Alsace-Lorraine, Karl promised to support France 
in her claim and to put pressure on Germany with all means in his power. And while 
Czernin declared categorically in his first point: “The alliance between Austria-
Hungary, Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria is absolutely indissoluble. A separate peace 
of one of these states is for ever excluded”, Karl was not so blunt, though he too 
intended to involve Germany in future peace negotiations. And though both the 
emperor and his foreign minister keenly stressed that Austria was not in German 
vassalage, divergences between them were already in evidence.98 On 21 February, in 
Neuchâtel, both documents, as well as two letters from Zita urging him to come to 
Vienna, were handed to Sixtus, who promptly returned to Paris to inform the French 
government of Karl’s enterprise.99 For a month, Karl heard nothing more of his 
venture. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
VOLTE-FACE 
 
Revolution in Russia 
 
Buoyed by his promising dealings with Sixtus, Karl must have realized that the 
pursuit of a pro-German course by imperial decree could only damage any future 
negotiations with the Entente. Not only was the programme unconstitutional, 
undemocratic and anti-Slav, it also suggested blind subjugation to Germany. But 
whatever the causes or extent of his doubts concerning the octroi previously, Karl had 
taken no action against it and had thereby allowed the German nationalists to forge 
ahead unhindered during the winter, confident of his blessing and of the realization of 
their plans.1 Now that such a course potentially threatened his pursuit of peace, his 
stance firmed somewhat. Even so, he was unlikely to act drastically and unilaterally 
without political support or, at the very least, the acquiescence of his close advisers. 
Thus he cannot have been indifferent to Hohenlohe’s apparent loss of faith in the 
project. In mid-March, Redlich wrote in his diary: “Hohenlohe is supposed to have 
already given up on the octroi idea, Czernin not.”2 The lord chamberlain’s early 
disenchantment with the plan might have emboldened Karl in his opposition, but it 
was not enough for him to disavow it openly. Clam still toed the line, albeit listlessly 
and half-heartedly,3 and Czernin remained committed to the project, although he 
sensed that time was running out. On 6 March, he told Baernreither that matters of 
foreign policy – which he did not specify – might temporarily put the whole project 
on hold.4 Nevertheless, he insisted strongly on its necessity and urgency, and 
complained that time was being wasted, which it was.5 He taunted a frustrated 
Baernreither: “I bet that you will not manage the octroi.”6 The details of the drafts 
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were wholly unimportant to Czernin, he simply wanted them finished; his refrain was: 
“The Czechs will scream regardless, so it hardly matters what is done to them.”7 To 
him, the proclamation of the octroi was imperative and ultimately inevitable; he was 
wary only of its timing. 
Meanwhile, Karl’s faith in its wisdom continued to wane. Concerned by the 
foreign implications of the octroi, Karl knew that the domestic situation was no more 
propitious to the plan. In late February and early March, tensions were on the rise in 
the Bohemian lands. The report of the Prague military command revealed that the lack 
of food, heating materials and tobacco was having an extremely serious effect on the 
mood of the people, who were further exasperated by the perceived incompetence of 
the authorities.8 A subsequent dispatch added that the workers and the population 
everywhere were complaining about the insufficient supplies.9 As a result, the area 
was already awash with popular protests, irrespective of nationality. Riots and 
demonstrations occurred daily in all Czech-speaking parts of Bohemia,10 as well as in 
the overwhelmingly German-speaking industrial regions of the north and north-west 
(where a Czech minority also worked).11 Failure to satisfy the malcontents inevitably 
led to the repetition and escalation of these displays; in Warnsdorf for example, 
demonstrators protesting against the lack of food numbered 50 on 26 February, 500 
on 3 March and 5,000 two days later.12 The situation was most explosive in the 
working-class districts of Prague, where such gatherings often led to violence and 
plunder.13 At the same time, strikes took place in several factories and mines. In 
certain pits, the authorities admitted that conditions were already untenable – and 
worsening – but sympathized with the workers and commended their general 
behaviour.14 Indeed, despite the considerable levels of disgruntlement and the large 
numbers of demonstrators, the peace was rarely breached, calm was always restored 
with relative ease and military assistance called upon only infrequently15 (and even 
then, rarely used). Moreover, the motives of the protestors were only social and 
economic, devoid of political, national or revolutionary overtones. The handful of 
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political protests was the result of individual, isolated actions.16 The government, 
despite its efforts,17 had no means of attenuating the crisis. Consequently, 
disturbances were destined to continue and to intensify, and ongoing events in Russia 
indicated, ominously, how these might evolve. 
On 7 March, the daily report of the foreign ministry relayed to Karl the fears 
of the King of Sweden concerning the revolutionary climate in Russia. Letters Gustav 
had received thence described the gloomiest of situations. With the tsar and his family 
the focus of popular wrath, he believed that the worst was to be expected.18 That 
evening Karl left for Budapest,19 aware of the gravity of the situation in Saint 
Petersburg (by now Petrograd) and inevitably concerned by its implications for his 
country. The following morning, the Reichspost echoed the information of the 
Swedish monarch: turmoil was increasing by the day, as was hatred for the imperial 
family and the government; plots and plans for assassination were openly mooted; the 
republican current was gaining in strength.20 And although Austria-Hungary might 
have gained consolation from the potential collapse of an enemy, the recent exposure 
of the Zimmermann21 Telegram threatened to provide a new one in the form of the 
United States. Particularly unsettled by this, Karl cancelled his planned trip to 
Transylvania and hastily returned to Baden on 9 March, fuelling “all kinds of 
conjectures and rumours” in the process.22 
 
These foreign political developments and their possible domestic repercussions must 
have been foremost in his thoughts, for immediately he got back, he received both 
Czernin and Clam and, for the first time, gave the distinct impression that he was 
against the octroi.23 Karl knew that dramatic developments in Russia could fan the 
flames of domestic disquiet. In the Bohemian lands, the additional imposition of the 
octroi might prove too much for the beleaguered Slav population. At the very least, it 
would betoken significant governmental hostility. Moreover, it risked straining 
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relations with America further, boosting the cause of anti-Habsburg émigrés, as well 
as endangering existing peace overtures in the west and future ones in the east. Karl 
had long thought the octroi questionable; now it was potentially dangerous. Increasing 
rumblings against it can only have confirmed him in his opinion. Baernreither and 
Clam suspected that Czech influences were at work on him, the former singling out 
Trnka and Lobkowitz.24 He noted in his diary: “A certain fear of an octroi, especially 
of a radical one, seems to reveal itself in Karl.”25 Indeed the emperor had begun to 
display a degree of reluctance, though he was neither outspoken nor categorical. 
It was now clear that Karl could not be won over to the original plans, though 
Czernin and Clam gathered from their conversation with him that he would accept a 
watered-down version.26 Rather than contest, Clam decided to amend the project 
without delay. For some time, he too had secretly questioned its timeliness and feared 
its consequences. He met Baernreither the same evening and suggested that the octroi 
programme be limited to its basic elements, thus restricting it to the standing orders, 
to the establishment of German as official internal language, and to the delimitation of 
the circles and their governments, with the possible inclusion of the modification of 
the competence of the Reichsrat and the teaching proposals.27 The plans pertaining to 
Bohemian autonomy, such as the reform of the Bohemian constitution, representation 
for the circles and the electoral laws, would, however, be abandoned. Clam’s prime 
concern was now to ensure a parliamentary majority sympathetic to his government, 
and he therefore wished to retain the proposals excluding Polish deputies from the 
Lower House. Failing that, he envisaged the formation of a coalition between Poles, 
Christian Socials and German nationalists. Baernreither was indignant; he made 
explicitly clear that such a pruning of the octroi would cause the most tremendous 
disappointment among German Bohemians and exhorted the prime minister not to 
commit to this plan without informing them. Even so, he gave no guarantees that they 
would accept, or indeed that they would offer the government parliamentary support. 
He also dismissed Clam’s placatory proposal to carry out the octroi in two stages by 
claiming that Czech protestations after the first phase would inhibit the emperor from 
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further action. In his diary, he blamed Clam for the whole situation and accused him 
of having wasted three months.28 Nevertheless, he remained hopeful of swaying him, 
though he admitted that the matter had become much trickier.29 
By the time they met again two days later, revolution in Russia was 
imminent.30 Clam was no less chary of imposing the octroi on the Czechs. As 
Baernreither urged the vacillating prime minister not to abandon the plan, the latter 
responded mournfully that he would not be able to live out his days in Smečno, his 
Bohemian estate.31 His resolve appeared to dwindle and the inherent contradiction of 
his position seemed to weigh ever more heavily on him. Indeed, in spite of his 
spearheading the Germanic cause, his roots and his past haunted his conscience and 
had begun to restrain his pursuit of an aggressively anti-Czech course, even though he 
continued to believe that many Czechs wished for an enemy victory.32 As 
Baernreither wrote: “He is very loyal, truthful and earnest, but several ghosts inhabit 
his heart”, later adding: “it is hard to judge what remnants of his belonging to the 
Czech nation continued to have an effect on his unconscious.”33 These doubts had 
been present early in his tenure but he had not acted upon them, although his apathy 
was certainly testament to their existence. His own dichotomy was clear: his 
traditional outlook and political background pointed to a federal solution to the 
nationality problem, but he now believed that satisfying the Germans through greater 
centralization was the only way to preserve the authority of the government and the 
unity of the Empire. But this about-face had come at a heavy personal price. 
According to his chief of section, Robert Ehrhart, it was a sacrifice he had made 
without hesitation, but for which he had suffered greatly, and in silence.34 Clam 
remained a proponent of the octroi, but with a heavy heart. Furthermore, acquainted 
as he was with the Czechs, he must have realized that the octroi was most unlikely to 
achieve pacification and stability. As a result, his involvement was dithering and 
spineless. As Baernreither explained, “these undercurrents did not shake his 
convictions but inhibited his actions.”35 He therefore reacted meekly to Karl’s change 
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of attitude and quickly proposed to abandon a significant chunk of the programme. 
Clam simply did not have the courage of his convictions. 
 
By now, Karl and Hohenlohe, as well as Spitzmüller, Trnka and Polzer, all opposed 
the octroi, while Baernreither, Urban, Handel, Hussarek,36 Bobrzyński and Czernin 
still supported it, backed – at least tacitly – by Berlin;37 torn and forlorn, Clam lay in 
the middle. Confusion reigned in political circles, increasingly sceptical about the 
strategy, ability and staying power of the government. On 13 March, Redlich noted: 
“The most conflicting rumours are heard concerning domestic policy: most likely, the 
government itself does not know what to do.” Two days later, he added: “The 
government is completely divided.”38 In the hot seat, Clam still proved incapable of 
leadership, as exemplified by his lack of authority in the ministerial council.39 His 
departure was widely anticipated. In his diary, Hans Schlitter, the director of the 
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv,40 wrote: “New cabinet crisis: Clam is afraid to decree 
the state language law by octroi and is therefore likely to go, replaced by Czernin who 
in turn would be replaced by Burián.”41 The prime minister had in effect disavowed 
his chief policy, and no longer had credibility or political support. Yet Karl retained 
his services. Schlitter remarked: “Clam is still wobbling like a bad tooth that should 
be pulled out but, in this case, the dentist dares not.”42 His failure to remove him must 
have appeared all the more surprising, for Karl was not usually shy of dismissing his 
staff. In early March, Redlich had already commented: “For the young ruler, the 
whole activity of government had dissolved into nothing more than personal 
questions. Every day brings new dismissals and appointments.”43 A joke on the 
subject was already doing the rounds in January: “Hello, Emperor Karl here [on the 
telephone]. I appoint you minister. Who is speaking?”44 Yet Karl felt a degree of 
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loyalty towards Clam, and in any case saw no obvious candidate to replace him for 
this mission. Nevertheless, the emperor was frustrated with the performance of his 
ministers. As a result, he urged them to entertain closer contact with him, and 
officially ordered them thenceforth to report to him immediately and in person on all 
important subject matters.45 They, in turn, can only have taken umbrage at his lack of 
faith in them. Koerber, still embittered by Karl’s treatment of him, quipped to 
Redlich, “No minister will be able to work for any length of time with an emperor 
who treats his ministers as subordinate officers”, adding that conditions in the court 
and in government had become untenable.46 Certainly, disunity reigned at the top 
while the official course had ground to a standstill. Amidst the indecision and 
lethargy, only Czernin had the strength of character and clout to act, but at the time he 
was in two minds about the octroi: his faith in the legitimacy and necessity of the 
measure was unshaken, but he realized that foreign affairs required precedence and 
compromised its implementation, temporarily at least. Brewing unrest in Russia, the 
Sixtus mission and his own pet project in Switzerland47 all threatened to break the 
deadlock. Should opportunities for peace subsequently arise in the east or the west, a 
pro-German octroi would help neither at the negotiating table. 
 
On 16 March, news arrived that Tsar Nicholas had abdicated and that his brother, the 
Grand Duke Michael, had taken over as regent;48 on that day, however, the latter 
surrendered power to the new provisional government under Prince Lvov.49 Though 
welcomed by the public as a step towards peace, these events sent shockwaves 
through the Viennese corridors of power.50 Indeed, though they held out the prospect 
of Russia leaving the war, they also revealed what might result from escalating social 
protests by an impoverished, war-weary and hungry lower class. Moreover, the 
promotion of the right to self-determination of nations which soon emerged from 
Russia threatened to undermine the foundations of the Dual Monarchy. Wedel 
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summarized the mood in Vienna: “On the one hand there is the conviction that it will 
have a crippling effect on Russia’s energy for war and will thus benefit the Central 
Powers; on the other hand there is the fear of infection.”51 Quickly, anxiety set in. The 
German parties in particular were gravely concerned.52 Karl, who, like many, initially 
thought Britain responsible for the putsch,53 was aghast to see ostensibly the most 
powerful monarch in the world toppled without a hand being raised. Scared and 
hesitant, he asked: “Is such a thing possible here?”54 The intense and ubiquitous 
popular discontent suggested it was. 
Polzer, swamped with daily complaints, petitions and memoranda, believed 
these were “the heralds of the revolution which was yeasting up”, while Ferdinand 
von Marterer, the new head of Karl’s military chancellery and another recipient of 
these communications, saw them as a sign of the Monarchy’s increasingly hopeless 
situation.55 The Vienna police department explained that the poorer middle classes 
and the lower classes were now so wrapped up in the question of food that 
preoccupation with military events had vanished into the background. It also noted 
expressions of class hatred, of anti-Semitism and of bitterness against the Hungarians, 
still accused of hoarding their supplies.56 (There was consolation in the observation 
that patriotic feelings remained unspoilt and that the population did not oppose the 
continuation of the war per se, but merely bemoaned the unfair repartition of 
hardships.) District commissioners in Lower Austria witnessed a similarly despondent 
and irritable mood, while the general pessimism seemed to grip even the higher social 
classes. In addition, the more level-headed elements among the workers admitted that 
they no longer had the power to calm the masses, and the governor warned that a 
trifling reason would suffice to cause an explosion.57 Meanwhile, his counterpart in 
Bohemia testified to the abundance of ill feeling expressed by the local population in 
numerous demonstrations, gatherings, riots and threats. However, food was still the 
overwhelming concern of the protesters, regardless of nationality.58 Emboldened by 
events in Russia, better attended – for instance, 3000 women demonstrated in Pilsen59 
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– and better organized,60 they still exclusively demanded more sustenance and higher 
wages. The demonstrations in Bohemia occasionally overflowed into brutality61 and 
looting,62 but were not revolutionary in spirit. The police department in Prague 
reported that, to the starving masses, events in Russia had brought simply the hope of 
a quick end to the war.63 Serious disturbances were again in evidence in the city, 
though, as elsewhere, the authorities succeeded in containing them.64 Nevertheless, 
the food shortages persisted in the province as, in consequence, did the strikes,65 to 
great official concern.66 The local authorities were still largely sympathetic, and 
sometimes conceded that reluctance to work was in fact an inability to do so due to 
malnourishment.67 In reporting the case of the worst-affected mine in the region, the 
Bohemian governorate praised the irreproachable attitude of the workers and 
requested the urgent fulfilment of their demands (which it considered wholly 
justified), warning that otherwise a terrible catastrophe could arise.68 Karl was equally 
understanding and told Tucher that he was devoting his full attention to the alleviation 
of the food problem.69 
Although the intensity and frequency of unrest among German Bohemians 
was substantial, Czech expressions of ire were inevitably more troublesome to the 
authorities. Not only were the Czechs considered less reliable, but the 
overwhelmingly Czech cities of Prague and Pilsen were the most likely epicentres of 
any mass revolt. The military commander in the capital put the turmoil down either to 
the revolutionary wave sweeping across Europe or to a swelling of pan-Slav and 
Russophile emotions.70 While the Germans could be suspected only of the former, the 
Czechs potentially threatened both social and national revolution. Under such 
explosive circumstances, the timing of the octroi policy seemed especially unwise. 
Karl himself was increasingly exasperated by its pursuit, though apparently 
less because of its intrinsic iniquity than because it would fuel enemy propaganda, 
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thwart his quest for peace, aggravate domestic discontent, and therefore threaten to 
topple him. Unable or unwilling to act, he could but bemoan the inaction of his 
government; on the evening of 17 March, he asked Polzer despondently: “Will none 
of my ministers understand that we must take the wind out of our enemies’ sails?”71 
 
But Czernin – who was effectively in charge of government and whose continued 
support for the octroi alone ensured its survival – stuck to his guns. Though shaken by 
events in Saint Petersburg, he realized that they represented the best chance for peace 
in the east since the outbreak of the war, and therefore a decisive boost for the 
remaining fronts.72 Besides, a Russian withdrawal would potentially end Austria’s 
reliance on German military assistance. Czernin hoped that the revolution would bring 
peace without spreading; in this case, the domestic course need not be affected. The 
situation was at any rate too nebulous to take precipitate action at home, especially 
since he espied the possibility of ending hostilities with Russia. Admittedly, the 
provisional government showed no inclination to lay down arms, and its foreign 
minister Milyukov had announced in stridently anti-German terms that Russia fully 
intended to fulfil her treaty obligations, and to fight the common enemy alongside her 
allies, unremittingly and unwaveringly.73 However, aware of the revolution’s disunity, 
Czernin had sent telegrams to his ambassadors immediately upon the tsar’s abdication 
asking for information on the leaders of the “opposition government” in Saint 
Petersburg who wished to pursue peace.74 The socialists, represented most 
prominently by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, certainly 
evinced such intentions.75 Very soon, Vienna sensed that the pacifists were indeed 
gaining ground.76 Equally rapidly, in anticipation of future negotiations with the 
Russian socialists and in the hope of containing revolutionary sentiments at home, 
Czernin enlisted the assistance of the Austrian Social Democrats, for whom he 
otherwise had little affection. For example, he spoke with Friedrich Austerlitz, the 
editor of the Arbeiter-Zeitung, leading to speculation that he thereby hoped to 
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encourage or arrange contact between local and Russian socialists.77 Domestically, the 
Social Democratic leaders were in any case inclined to caution, to the dismay of many 
workers, and of a minority within the party who demanded radical action.78 The 
internal conflict between the moderation of the party’s leadership and its 
revolutionary principles was evident.79 Yet it quickly resolved to nail its schwarzgelb 
colours to the mast, suggesting it had reached an understanding with the government. 
When Victor Adler spoke in front of 1,300 people in Vienna on 27 March on “The 
Russian Revolution and its significance”, he dismissed and ridiculed the idea of 
threatening the government with revolution. In the events of Saint Petersburg he saw 
solely the possibility of obtaining peace, and in this respect commented hopefully on 
Czernin’s discussions with Berlin. At any rate, he urged patience.80 Czernin too could 
but wait and see, and in the meantime, he turned his attention to the conclusion of 
peace in the west. 
To this end, he had already received Bethmann Hollweg in Vienna on 16 
March. Underlining Austria-Hungary’s critical lack of food, raw materials and 
manpower, he told the chancellor unequivocally that his country could not continue 
the war beyond autumn and would have to seize any opportunity for peace.81 Czernin 
had one such opportunity in mind: the recent feelers put out by the French in Bern. 
Having already gained German approval for their pursuit, Czernin now asked 
Bethmann directly for Berlin’s peace conditions towards Paris in order to transmit 
them to his chosen envoy, Count Albert von Mensdorff. The chancellor was 
inflexible: the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine was out of the question and only the 
cession of parts of Alsace or of Lorraine in exchange for the mining region of Briey-
Longwy might be considered.82 Dispirited by his intransigence, the Austrians – and 
indeed the emperor himself, who, contrary to Czernin, placed his hopes in the Sixtus 
mission – repeated the following day that they would not fight another winter and that 
Germany should make peace and give up part of Alsace.83 That evening, the German 
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chancellor broke down in tears at Czernin’s.84 As he floundered, the Austrians hoped 
he would yield. However, despite their unrelenting pressure and the profound effect 
made by Czernin’s dismal report, as well as his own pessimism concerning events in 
Russia, Bethmann could not envisage any compromise peace at this time.85 Though he 
was seemingly prone to vacillation, his military command remained steadfast and was 
in no mood for conciliation.86 Moreover, the only concession towards France to which 
he would accede (as a minimum peace condition, in any case) was in fact an exchange 
favourable to Germany. Yet in a memorandum he wrote on 20 March and submitted 
to Karl, Czernin revealed that Bethmann had promised him in strictest confidence to 
give back “France and Belgium, and something else in addition”.87 Czernin and Karl 
must have believed that this something related to Alsace-Lorraine. But deliberately or 
not, Czernin had almost certainly misconstrued Bethmann’s words. Nevertheless, his 
interpretation enabled him to present an attractive plan to the crown council two days 
later: Austria-Hungary would give up Congress Poland to Germany as an incentive 
for concessions in Alsace-Lorraine, and receive substantial compensation in the 
Balkans and in Romania.88 (Indeed, Czernin had obtained from Bethmann an 
agreement, in principle, on the proportionality of war gains.)89 At a stroke, the 
Monarchy would obtain both peace and large territorial acquisitions. The attendees of 
the council – Karl, Tisza, Clam, Burián, Krobatin, Arz and Marterer – approved his 
scheme.90 In his desperation for peace, Karl himself saw neither the dubiousness of 
Czernin’s claim, nor the fanciful nature of his proposals, and gave his eager support to 
the plan.91 
The emperor was by now in an anxious hurry, aware that his brothers-in-law 
Sixtus and Xavier were on their way to Vienna incognito. On 23 March, he received 
them in Laxenburg, appearing graver than usual, somewhat sad, and grey at the 
temples.92 Almost straight away, he declared: “Il faut absolument faire la paix, je le 
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veux à tout prix.”93 This was possibly an exaggeration in Sixtus’ account, for Karl 
was certainly not willing to obtain peace at all costs, even though at the time the price 
might not have been excessive. (Three days later, in Berlin, Czernin assured the 
Germans that Karl had once declared that he “would rather die than cede even a 
square metre of the Monarchy’s soil to Italy”.)94 In light of the tumult in Russia, the 
idea of a separate peace with Vienna had gained wider currency in Paris and London. 
The withdrawal of Austria-Hungary would compensate for Russian impotence and 
leave Germany isolated and weakened. And indeed, the brothers bore encouraging 
news: Poincaré had seen promise in Karl’s addendum to Czernin’s note and, having 
shared it with Briand, he had vowed to pass it on to the British.95 The French agreed 
that if Austria pledged to respect the four aforementioned points, negotiations could 
go ahead.96 Thus notwithstanding Italian pretensions, which required substantial 
fulfilment but which even France thought exaggerated,97 Austria-Hungary could 
probably expect favourable terms. But, as Sixtus made abundantly clear to Karl, she 
would necessarily have to abandon her implacable German ally, for the Entente had 
no interest in negotiating with Berlin.98 Though the emperor eluded the Italian and 
Romanian questions, he assured Sixtus that he would pursue a separate peace if 
Germany could not be brought to reason. He confessed to the Princes that the 
unshakeable dogma of a victorious peace pervaded the entire German leadership, but 
he thought it his duty to “try the impossible” before breaking away.99 Bethmann’s 
visit had probably convinced him that it was not impossible after all. Later, Czernin 
joined the discussion, during which his aloofness, vagueness, continual bluffing and 
reticence dismayed Sixtus.100 Wary of an enterprise which was not under his aegis and 
which excluded a general peace, the foreign minister was more interested in his 
manoeuvres via Mensdorff, who had left for Switzerland two days earlier.101 
However, according to Sixtus, Czernin eventually concurred that Austria would 
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divorce Germany if she stood in the way of a reasonable peace, which she did due to 
her stubbornness over Alsace-Lorraine.102 He apparently repeated this the following 
morning when visiting him at Erdödy’s,103 where, as maintained by Xavier, he gave 
his agreement to everything that had been discussed the previous day, though not 
without anxiety.104 If Czernin did indeed acquiesce, he did so informally, possibly to 
placate the Princes or to avoid thwarting his master, for these alleged declarations did 
not reflect his views, and he would not have put his name to them. Karl, however, had 
no such reservations and, on the evening of 24 March, he gave Sixtus the infamous 
handwritten letter for Poincaré which essentially agreed to the proposed basis for 
negotiation and which promised to use all means and all his influence to impress upon 
Germany France’s “just claims” to Alsace-Lorraine.105 Although the exact authorship 
of the letter subsequently became controversial, Karl undoubtedly wrote it, though he 
likely got help from his brother-in-law, and possibly from Zita.106 However, despite 
the Bourbon-Parma claims that Czernin also took part in its elaboration,107 the foreign 
minister cannot have seen or approved the wording of the final draft, especially on the 
question of Alsace-Lorraine, even though his sentiments on the matter were similar to 
Karl’s.108 For neither the first nor the last time, Karl had gone over his minister’s 
head. That same night, armed with the letter, the Princes left Austria and returned to 
Paris.109 
Though the emperor was confident of having taken a significant step towards 
peace, considerable obstacles remained. Firstly, he and Czernin still hoped to 
negotiate a general peace and to act as mediators between Germany and the Entente, 
whereas Sixtus believed he was helping orchestrate a separate peace for Austria-
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Hungary. Moreover, the emperor and his minister were unwilling to make 
concessions to Italy110 or to separate from Germany, although these were sine qua non 
conditions for the Entente. By assuring Sixtus that Austria-Hungary would leave 
Germany if she impeded peace and by sidestepping the issue of Italy, Karl and 
Czernin had kept the mission alive; forthrightness would have ended it. However, the 
conciliatory tones of the French overtures in Bern had perhaps convinced the 
Austrians that the abandonment of Germany was not imperative. Still, even a general 
peace necessitated a degree of German moderation and as Czernin quickly discovered, 
it was not forthcoming. On 25 March, he travelled to Berlin in order to pursue with 
the German chancellor the discussions begun in Vienna. Again he stressed that 
Austria-Hungary could fight on only six more months, and therefore had to make 
peace.111 He prepared the ground for his plan by announcing the Monarchy’s 
willingness to make concessions to Serbia and to renounce Congress Poland in 
exchange for Walachia. He then suggested corresponding German sacrifices in the 
west. But whatever Bethmann had promised him in Vienna, there was now no 
question of German conciliation over France or Belgium.112 Unmoved by his contacts 
in Switzerland and by his apocalyptic depiction of the Monarchy’s condition,113 the 
Germans were also furious that he should ask them to cede parts of Alsace-Lorraine 
while refusing to relinquish any territory to Italy, and that he should stress Austria-
Hungary’s desperate need for peace while simultaneously trying to secure generous 
terms for her.114 Czernin did not insist, and instead worked to obtain recognition of his 
Romanian scheme. In the end, only a vague – and ultimately meaningless – 
programme of war aims could be agreed upon.115 Czernin knew that as long as he 
failed to wring concessions from Germany in the west, any plans for a general 
settlement were blocked. 
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Abroad, peace was no nearer; at home, it appeared increasingly threatened. Domestic 
unrest continued to cause ceaseless anxiety in Vienna. Wedel reported to Bethmann: 
“The spectre of revolution has appeared in the east and has shattered the none-too-
strong nerves of the leading men here.” He explained that although Czernin had kept 
his composure like Clam and Tisza, he was nevertheless influenced by the mood of 
apprehension around him. The foreign minister confided to him that the news from 
the industrial regions of Bohemia and Silesia was “alarming” and that a trivial 
incident could unleash a storm. He also worried that the new Russian government 
might succeed in satisfying the starving masses and thus set an ominous precedent for 
Austria.116 Wedel recognized, like his Bavarian counterpart,117 the gravity of the food 
situation, but believed the fear of revolution to be exaggerated as it “did not fit the 
character of the Habsburg peoples”;118 thus to Czernin’s anxiety, he responded that 
victory was near and enjoined him tartly to keep his nerve and to hold out a little 
longer.119 
 Not for the first time, the Germans took Austrian catastrophism with a pinch 
of salt. This was not wholly unwarranted, for Czernin – though he was genuinely, and 
justifiably, concerned – never hesitated to overplay this danger in order to bring 
pressure to bear on Berlin. Yet undeniably, the situation had deteriorated considerably 
since February.120 Throughout the Empire, the lack of food and items of basic 
necessity (particularly potatoes, bread, flour, milk, fat and coal)121 affected all but the 
most privileged classes and those fortunate enough to be self-sufficient. The working 
class suffered most, but civil servants and the middle class were rapidly becoming 
proletarianized.122 Intercepted correspondence revealed universal gloom, war-
weariness, indifference to outside events and to the cause of the Central Powers, a 
boundless yearning for peace and a lack of desire to hold out, alongside endless 
complaints about starvation, child malnutrition, illness, price increases, the moneyed 
classes, requisitions, and the incessant military inspections and drafts. Some simply 
wished for death. Even the stalwart Germans of Bohemia and Moravia, though they 
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still managed a few patriotic declarations and displays of confidence, seemed 
thoroughly depressed.123 
Unsurprisingly, the food shortages had provoked numerous rowdy 
demonstrations in virtually every province of Austria. However, the authorities had 
always restored calm and order, and military assistance had been used only very 
scarcely.124 In several factories and mines of Bohemia, hunger had led to multiple 
interruptions of work but although these were still rife at the end of the month,125 the 
peace was never breached. In the crownland, the protests had been, and indeed 
continued to be, especially intense,126 and the situation in Prague was yet more 
acute.127 But apart from the incidents related to the provision of food, few matters 
relevant to the state police were noted in the aforementioned report. True, of all the 
incidents in the Austrian half of the Empire, two-thirds concerned Bohemia and 
Moravia; but these were the actions of disgruntled or incautious isolated 
individuals.128 The police department in Prague confirmed that there was “no shortage 
of covert subversive activity”, but it considered this to be independent of the Russian 
revolution and a natural corollary of war. It was satisfied that until now there had been 
“no detection of a methodical organization of a revolt”, and dismissed the possibility 
of the Czechs following the Russian example due to the level-headed attitude of the 
Social Democrats and to the well-established presence of the authorities.129 Likewise, 
the March report of the minister of the interior for Cisleithania noted no political or 
ideological element in the incidents recorded.130 In addition, the near half-million 
pieces of correspondences processed by the Vienna censorship office were almost 
entirely devoid of political content, which, according to the censors, was due to the 
fact that “all letter writers, whichever crownland they live in, are governed by one 
concern […], their daily bread”.131 Quite a few revealed “a nigh rebellious mood” but, 
despite the ubiquitous misery and unrest, most authorities recognized that revolution 
was not imminent in the Monarchy. Even when striving to emphasize the direness of 
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the situation to the German ambassador, Clam had to concede that there were no signs 
of revolutionary intent.132 At the end of March, Kestřanek observed: “The […] lack of 
food in the lower social classes, particularly in the working class, gives the basic 
colour of the mood, or rather of the ill feeling of the population.” He stressed the need 
for the whole administration to cooperate in order to resolve the issue and prevent 
agitators from exploiting the masses, whom he considered mainly “politically and 
nationally indifferent”.133 
Nevertheless, many perceived the riots as the forerunners of revolution and, 
although these were still devoid of ideological undertones, they sufficed to unsettle 
the leading men in Vienna. On 6 April, Wedel reported that the previous eight days 
had brought about a sudden anxiety among them and had given a foretaste of the ease 
with which the government might lose its head. The ambassador bemoaned its 
unwarranted weakness and vacillation, but singled out Czernin for “abruptly [losing] 
his nerve in a way that set his own men thinking.”134 Two days later, he delivered a 
blistering assessment of the Viennese hierarchy: “Clam moans that Austria is starving, 
Konrad Hohenlohe is known always to throw in the towel when things get too heated, 
General Arz is spineless and Czernin has become anxious.” He added that since these 
men repeatedly warned Karl of the danger of revolution, it was small wonder that the 
latter, weak by nature and under daily female pressure, had also become restless.135 
 
Panicked by internal tensions and fettered by expectations abroad, the government 
was paralyzed. Indecision and inaction prevailed.136 Domestic policy had come to a 
standstill, impinging even upon the octroi. It seemed nobody, not even in the cabinet, 
knew in what form – if any – the measure would be carried out. Amidst the daily glut 
of contradictory bulletins, Redlich heard that it would apply only to the standing 
orders, to the language law and to the circle governments.137 In the Bohemian press, 
where the subject was animatedly discussed, the view still predominated that the 
internal language of state and the administrative division of the crownland would 
indeed be promulgated by decree.138 Tucher complained that due to the government’s 
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exclusive preoccupation with hunger and revolution, “months and weeks are passing 
by without the much-discussed and oft-announced octroi coming”.139 Yet Wedel 
indicated to Bethmann in early April that Clam was sticking to the plan – “a 
somewhat risky experiment”, the ambassador thought.140 At any rate, the nationalists 
pressed on doggedly, believing that the full realization of their project was 
forthcoming – after all, it remained official policy. Rattled by events in Saint 
Petersburg, the Nationalverband had immediately reaffirmed its steadfast and 
unanimous commitment to the implementation of the octroi, while denouncing Slav 
protestations.141 At a joint committee meeting with the Christian Socials on 22 March, 
Baernreither and Urban had announced that most of the drafts were ready and would 
be issued “in a few days”.142 A week later, the former sent Clam his proposals for the 
new standing orders, which were almost complete and which he hoped to finalize very 
shortly.143 These, however, were increasingly isolated voices, whose clamour failed to 
disguise the languid state of the policy. Much delayed and increasingly questioned, 
the octroi project had in fact already lost considerable support and momentum. In 
particular, the Russian Revolution had eroded the consensus between the German 
bourgeois parties, leaving the Nationalverband alone in its stubborn pursuit. Under 
the influence of its radical Bohemian elements, most members still insisted on the 
wholesale enforcement of the octroi,144 and the measure still enjoyed political support 
among the German minorities in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.145 However, the 
Christian Socials (and indeed a minority of nationalists) now believed the reform of 
the standing orders to be a sufficient precondition to the recall of parliament. To the 
Christian Socials, the latter was imperative in order to prevent the politicization of the 
masses, who – though principally concerned with the scarcity of food – were 
embittered by their lack of representation and susceptible to revolutionary agitation.146 
Though the official communiqué from the common meeting still insisted eagerly on 
the unity of both parties, the ambiguous words of Christian Social chairman Johann 
Hauser hinted at his exasperation with the relentless pleading for the octroi.147 As a 
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result, the liberal pro-octroi press in Vienna and in Bohemia rancorously assailed the 
party for its supposed betrayal of the alliance.148 
Meanwhile, the traditional opponents of the policy seized the opportunity to 
raise their own voices. At this time, the Czechs still feared an imminent proclamation 
by decree but, inspirited by events in Russia and by German disunity, they denounced 
the measure with increased vigour. In a sitting of the National Committee on 15 
March and in the first plenary session of the Czech Union two days later, they 
resolved to resist the octroi by all means possible.149 Certain radical deputies 
suggested the full boycott of a future parliament,150 but the moderates prevailed and 
the resolution of the Union merely demanded that their dispute with the Germans be 
solved through negotiations and mutual agreement.151 Moreover, the Czechs offered 
their “full and sincere” cooperation towards solving existing economic issues, if 
parliament were reconvened immediately and without prerequisites.152 
In addition, the Austrian Social Democrats, long in the doldrums, now 
denounced the octroi with renewed vehemence.153 Liberated by the collapse of tsarism 
– their only reason for having backed the war – and riding the socialist and pacifist 
waves, they sought to capitalize on the increasing disgruntlement and restlessness of 
the workers in Austria. Accordingly, the party swiftly expressed its unconditional 
support for the revolution and for the Russian socialists, and urged the Central Powers 
to act upon their oft-stated readiness for peace.154 This declaration was suppressed by 
the authorities for almost a month,155 but the Arbeiter-Zeitung nevertheless ran several 
leading articles demanding an end to the war and to the plight of the starving, indigent 
masses, the suspension of rule by decree, the recall of parliament and fundamental 
democratic reforms; it continually chastised Clam.156 Attributing the revolution to the 
war-weariness and hunger of the population, it warned of possible emulation in 
Austria, sometimes appearing to favour this outcome.157 The party also became 
increasingly active on the ground. On 25 March, it launched a series of propagandistic 
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assemblies under the title: “Social Democracy, the bourgeois parties and 
parliament”.158 These congregations, which, tellingly, encountered no opposition from 
the authorities,159 emphatically requested the reconvening of the Reichsrat. Speakers 
repeatedly highlighted the fact that Austria remained the only major nation without a 
parliament and dismissed any preconditions to its reopening. In particular, there was 
vigorous opposition to the application of the octroi for the Galician question and the 
standing orders.160 (However, as mentioned before, the Social Democrats had not 
always been adamant opponents of rule by decree.) Still under the effect of the events 
in Saint Petersburg, the government lent an attentive ear. For instance, in late March, 
Clam invited the Social Democrats Adler, Seitz and Pernerstorfer to discuss political 
issues.161 Meanwhile, Czernin, who had likely initiated this rapprochement, continued 
to liaise with them,162 aware of the potential rewards for cultivating their goodwill: 
abroad, they might facilitate negotiations with Russia, and at home, they could 
appease the disgruntled working class.163 He also wished thereby to exert pressure on 
the Germans, who were increasingly disquieted by this strategy. Tucher, dismayed by 
the recent “anti-capitalist” decrees and declarations of the government, reported 
bitterly: “This behaviour […] is dictated by dread of revolution and of hunger revolts, 
and it is plain to see that since the outbreak of the Russian Revolution the government 
is seeking contact with the masses more than ever and is displaying increased 
consideration for the desires of the Socialist Party”.164 Irritation grew in conservative 
circles in Austria.165 Baernreither later complained that the Socialists were coming 
and going from Czernin’s office and asked him if his ballyhooing of their mission was 
really necessary.166 And even the liberal-minded Redlich quipped: “we are becoming 
Social Democrats through pure fear”.167 Nevertheless, this pragmatic cooperation bore 
fruit in the restraint of the party (which was in any case the preferred strategy of its 
leadership) and appeared to culminate on 7 April when the Arbeiter-Zeitung officially 
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urged the working masses once again not to cease work or to demonstrate on the 
coming May Day.168 
 
Aside from its rising unpopularity, the octroi’s intrinsic structural flaws finally 
brought matters to a head. The Polish question, which was inextricably linked to the 
fulfilment of German demands, had reached an insoluble deadlock. The removal of 
Polish deputies from the Reichsrat by means of granting Galicia sub-dualistic 
autonomy within Austria was a cornerstone of the nationalist plan, but the promise of 
an independent Poland in the Two Emperors’ Manifesto had raised the expectations of 
the Poles, just as Vienna’s heavy-handed wartime administration of their homeland 
had eroded their loyalty.169 Nevertheless, no attempt was made to remove the Polish 
question from the programme, as this would have signified the renunciation of 
parliamentary dominance and its assorted standing orders.170 And by the time Clam 
began earnestly to address the issue in February, Polish intransigence was 
entrenched.171 Then came the Russian Revolution. Seeking to garner Polish support, 
the provisional government denounced the Central Powers’ Polish policy as a deceit 
and, in turn, announced the future creation of a Polish state from all territories with a 
majority Polish population.172 This radicalized the Poles further and bolstered their 
dreams of an independent Greater Poland. Thereafter, Baernreither wrote that “the 
Austrian unitary state completely disappeared from their minds”.173 The more 
ebullient Poles, skilfully led by Biliński, demanded a status at least equal to 
Hungary’s.174 Despite numerous ministerial consultations and Bobrzyńki’s repeated 
attempts at mediation between the government and his compatriots, no compromise 
could be found.175 Moreover, the German nationalists were themselves divided on the 
issue: whereas many insisted on Polish withdrawal from parliament at all costs, others 
were reluctant to relinquish control of an area which abounded in mineral riches and 
had seen increasing investment in the years preceding the war.176 In any case, the 
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future status of Galicia chiefly depended on the designs and actions of Russia and 
Germany.177 The Polish conundrum could not, therefore, be resolved before a 
settlement in the east, and the government failed to find even a temporary answer.178 
This issue precluded the full realization of the plan, and brought the cabinet up short. 
Baernreither admitted: “Our failure in the Polish question was catastrophic for the 
cabinet because it prevented us from finishing our work earlier and was thus one of 
the main causes of the non-completion of the octroi”,179 and later concluded that “the 
Polish question was the millstone that hung around the government’s neck and 
dragged it to the bottom”.180 As things stood, a proclamation of the octroi would leave 
a Slav majority in the Reichsrat (including the freshly uncooperative Poles) and 
nullify the new standing orders. Thus in addition to losing significant advocates and 
attracting increased hostility, the octroi faced an inescapable technical impasse. 
 
Czernin, though he still favoured the measure per se, knew that an immediate 
proclamation would be ill-timed and ill-starred. On 30 March, he met Baernreither 
and explained that the events in Russia, the enduring want of the population, the 
consequent strengthening of the Social Democrats and the immoderation of the Poles 
made its proclamation harder than even two weeks prior.181 He conceded that the 
Russian Revolution had bolstered all opponents of the octroi in Austria.182 
Baernreither, already under considerable strain,183 refused any responsibility for the 
delay and instead censured Clam for his wavering and his apathy.184 He stressed the 
necessity and urgency of explaining the entire matter to the emperor in order to obtain 
not just his general consent but his approval of individual proposals. Czernin agreed, 
adding: “The longer we hesitate, the more the emperor will be persuaded by opposing 
influences.” Regardless of its veracity, their belief that Karl could be still won over to 
their cause betrayed their limited esteem for his independence of judgement and 
strength of character. In any case, the octroi was already on hold in Czernin’s mind. 
When Baernreither asked him to exert pressure so as to accelerate the process, 
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Czernin replied that he did not wish to get involved. No doubt he hoped to keep the 
octroi in abeyance whilst he achieved peace, and to revive it thereafter. Accordingly, 
he urged Baernreither to finalize the drafts so they would be ready when the 
opportune moment arose.185 For the time being, peace was his sole concern and he 
would engage in nothing which might jeopardize it. Baernreither observed that a 
yearning for peace imbued Czernin’s every word and that everything subordinated 
him to that idea.186 The situation in Russia, though unclear, had developed less 
explosively than anticipated. Milyukov had raised the stakes by announcing that 
Russia desired “the liberation of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary” and 
“the creation of a solidly organized South Slavdom” – in effect the dismemberment of 
the Habsburg Monarchy – while continuing to call for the pursuit of final victory 
against German imperialism;187 yet Czernin believed that men of the left such as 
Kerensky were amenable to a separate peace.188 Certainly, the pacifists had stepped 
up their campaign for the country to leave the war, with support from the masses, and 
a clash with those in power loomed.189 Austro-Hungarian intelligence thought the 
government’s situation untenable.190 Encouraged by the momentum of the anti-war 
forces in Russia and convinced that Austria-Hungary could not fight on much longer, 
Czernin was now willing to risk all in order to bring everybody to the negotiating 
table. He thought it possible that rival parties might be sitting together within a few 
weeks.191 But whereas peace in the east seemed a realistic prospect, in the west it was 
still dependent on German compromises. Here, Czernin was most pessimistic.192 
 
Nevertheless, the Austrians launched their most ambitious – and desperate – plan yet 
to coax concessions out of the Germans. Upon Czernin’s empty-handed return from 
Berlin, Karl had cancelled a planned trip to Transylvania and, on 28 March, had 
instructed Cramon to inform Wilhelm that he wished to visit him six days later.193 On 
3 April, a vast delegation including Karl, Zita, Czernin, Arz and Polzer duly arrived at 
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German headquarters in Homburg.194 Czernin was especially resolute: though he had 
previously tiptoed around the issue, he now adhered to Musulin’s recent report from 
Switzerland according to which “the question of peace now really [was] a question of 
Alsace-Lorraine”.195 Determined to obtain the necessary allowances from Germany, 
he had prepared the terrain with his habitual tactic. Several days before, he had 
instructed Gottfried Hohenlohe to pass on Musulin’s message to the Germans and to 
notify Bethmann that the atmosphere in all parts of the Monarchy was ever 
worsening.196 He and Clam also warned Wedel that as a result of the food crisis, the 
country could not possibly hold out more than six weeks – only recently, he had 
spoken of six months – and thus needed to conclude peace immediately, adding that 
the mood in the poorest classes and Slav inclinations towards liberal Russia 
threatened a catastrophe.197 The ambassador believed this to be an exaggeration and 
informed his foreign office accordingly.198 The Germans were therefore unmoved, 
and increasingly irritated by Austrian hypocrisy.199 Undeterred, Czernin gave an 
interview to the Fremden-Blatt on 31 March, urging a peace conference of all 
belligerent states, proclaiming that Austria-Hungary was fighting a defensive war and 
only desired guarantees for her continued existence, and assuring Russia and the 
Entente that they could conclude an honourable peace with the Central Powers at any 
time.200 He added that the great masses “disinherited by fate” deserved the greatest 
merit in the war, and promised they would be rewarded for their heroism. As he 
intended, this pleased the Social Democrats and irked the Germans.201  
Karl, buoyed by a secret – though dubious – Italian peace offer,202 and still 
hopeful of German moderation,203 placed great hope on this meeting. Conscious of the 
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stakes, he instructed his men during the journey to Homburg to paint the situation as 
black as possible to the Germans.204 His foreign minister readily obliged and, by his 
side, applied his usual refrain before Wilhelm, Bethmann and Zimmermann: the 
Monarchy could not fight beyond 1917 and any opportunity for a quick and 
honourable peace had to be seized, even if it entailed considerable sacrifices. He 
warned against overblown annexationist ambitions and dangled the spectres of a 
revolution and a socialist peace.205 As he told Admiral Müller, the head of the 
Wilhelm’s Naval Cabinet: “Unless the war ends within three months the people will 
end it without their governments.”206 However, the Germans remained impassive. 
Czernin’s propensity to dramatize was known to all, and he exasperated more than he 
convinced.207 What is more, his own countrymen failed him. Arz for instance refused 
to comply and moderated his dismal predictions,208 while Karl himself, contradicting 
his own directives and gravely undermining his minister, also played down Czernin’s 
declarations. When asked by Wilhelm if his minister’s portrayal was not too gloomy, 
he replied: “Count Czernin always exaggerates.”209 At any rate, the Austrian cause 
was hopeless irrespective of this indiscretion. During a discussion with Arz, 
Bethmann, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the foreign minister had suggested 
relinquishing without compensation – he did not mention Romania – both Congress 
Poland and Galicia to Germany in exchange for her surrendering the whole of Alsace-
Lorraine to France.210 Though the meeting was broken off after ten minutes when 
Czernin and Bethmann were summoned to the emperors, the Germans were dismayed 
by the proposal, which they considered valueless and unacceptable.211 In a tête-à-tête 
with Czernin, Ludendorff made no secret of his indignation, tearing the plan apart and 
declaring that every German party would fight to the death for Alsace-Lorraine. To 
the foreign minister’s bleak depiction of Austria-Hungary’s internal conditions, he 
snapped: “You ought to lead the peoples of the Monarchy with a firmer hand.” 
Czernin responded dolefully that this was impossible.212 Firmly rebuffed, the foreign 
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minister was again unable to count on the support of his master. Indeed, although 
Werkmann claimed that, during the emperors’ conference, Karl had sought to 
convince the Kaiser of the necessity of sacrificing Alsace-Lorraine,213 Zimmermann 
later recalled a remark by Wilhelm according to which Karl had only spoken out in 
favour of the Austro-Polish solution.214 Thus Karl, perhaps because he had never truly 
given up on this option, but most likely as a result of the day’s events and of his own 
unwillingness to confront the German high command and to ruffle Wilhelm, dared not 
press the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, even though he had promised to do so in his letter 
to Sixtus. Instead, he readily accepted the Kaiser’s support for the candidacy of 
Archduke Karl Stephan to the Polish throne.215 In the end, the Austrians, who had 
previously obtained from Germany a vague agreement for the proportionality of war 
gains, obtained a vague agreement for the proportionality of war losses.216 These were 
pitiful consolations, and Karl and his retinue left Homburg dejected.217 Czernin, 
however, gave Wedel the impression that he had returned to Vienna more serene and 
more confident, and wrote up a positive report on the meeting.218 
 
The American declaration of war 
 
Whether or not he had been genuinely comforted by his dealings with Wilhelm and 
Bethmann, and by the aforementioned covenant, Czernin’s nerves were in any case 
shattered shortly after, on 6 April, when America finally declared war on Germany. 
Three days later, Vienna had to announce the severing of its diplomatic relations with 
Washington.219 This was a portentous development for Austria-Hungary, since in 
beseeching approval from Congress, Wilson had announced that the United States 
would “fight […] for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in 
their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations”.220 Thus aside 
from its substantial military implications, the American intervention appeared to 
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threaten the very existence of the Dual Monarchy. Additionally, Milyukov endorsed 
Wilson’s war aims and demanded the reorganization of Austria-Hungary from scratch 
– its destruction, in fact – with the creation of a Czechoslovak state as a barrier 
against German designs over Slav lands, the unification of all Serb areas, and the 
containment of German Austria and Hungary within their ethnographic borders.221 To 
compound Czernin’s woes, his peace moves in Switzerland finally fizzled out, and on 
7 April, he recalled Mensdorff.222 Bolstered by the American resolution223 and led by 
a new, less conciliatory government, the French had lost interest in the Bern 
negotiations. More than ever convinced that a strengthened Entente could hold out 
longer than the Central Powers, Czernin urged the Germans to buy peace in the west 
through far-reaching concessions while they still could. Again, he emphasized the 
Monarchy’s abysmal internal situation and its consequent inability to fight for more 
than a few months.224 His entreaties were by now almost perfunctory; he knew that 
prospects for peace in the west were firmly blocked. 
Accordingly, he redoubled his efforts for its attainment in the east.225 If Russia 
left the war before American involvement could take effect, the Entente might still 
negotiate. Moreover, Austria-Hungary could hardly proclaim her longing for peace 
and independence from Berlin if she toed the German line and fought on against 
Russia. The government, aided by the monarch, therefore continued to cultivate 
Social Democratic support at home. On 7 April, on the pretext of discussing food 
supplies to munitions factories, Karl received Renner to “talk politics”.226 The 
emperor requested that his guest tell his party executive that he was striving for the 
conclusion of peace on the basis of the status quo ante (with the creation of an 
independent Poland).227 He also assured him that he wished to devote the greatest 
attention to workers’ conditions and that a completely new system would emerge in 
the future.228 Meanwhile, Czernin clutched at every Russian straw229 until, on 10 
April, buoyed by the declarations of the Petrograd Soviet and frustrated by the lack of 
progress made by the Central Powers on the subject, he instructed Gottfried 
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Hohenlohe to suggest to Berlin a new and swift peace move towards Russia.230 
Arguing that the situation remained too unclear, the Germans refused.231 When news 
then arrived on 11 April that Prince Lvov had ostensibly adopted the Soviet line by 
announcing a war-aims manifesto in the name of the provisional government which, 
despite upholding Russia’s obligations towards her allies, sought peace without 
further conquests or annexations (on the basis of the self-determination of nations),232 
Czernin requested a joint German and Austrian declaration solemnly renouncing 
these; again, the Germans resisted and again, Czernin yielded.233 Instead, two similar 
but separate statements, conciliatory but non-committal, were published.234 As in the 
west, the German desire for a victorious peace thwarted Austria-Hungary’s hope for 
rapid end to hostilities. 
 
As Vienna’s diplomacy hit the wall, so did its domestic policy. The octroi was in its 
death throes, even though the government continued to endorse it (officially, at least) 
and die-hard German nationalists to champion it. Not only would it now represent a 
serious liability in light of America’s announcement of war aims and of potential 
negotiations with Russia, it would also jeopardize Social Democratic cooperation and 
goodwill. Indeed, at the above-mentioned audience, Renner had made categorically 
clear to Karl that an octroi was impossible after the Russian Revolution.235 Karl 
listened to Renner’s explanation but said nothing concerning the measure itself, 
merely expressing the need for parliament and for order. He confessed: “I have had a 
predominantly military education, I must first train myself in these questions.”236 Yet 
little training was needed to realize how inauspicious the domestic climate was for the 
octroi. Any such open gesture of ill will risked lighting the Czech powder keg. What 
is more, in the first half of April, with insufficient food supplies reaching the 
population, the situation deteriorated considerably. And although violence, unrest and 
work stoppages occurred throughout Austria (in Vienna, Tyrol and Styria, for 
instance),237 the Bohemian lands again witnessed the most serious agitation,238 strikes 
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and protests.239 In the Moravian-Silesian industrial region, which produced coal and 
coke vital to the war effort, the movement gathered pace when the promised potato 
deliveries did not appear.240 For several weeks, the Ostrau-Karwin coal-mining area 
and the Witkowitz241 ironworks – whose workers and dependants numbered 183,000 
– had experienced unrest and intermittent interruptions.242 By 14 April, over 6,000 
workers from fourteen mines were on strike, prompting several interventions from the 
police and the military;243 it took the authorities ten days to appease the workers and 
return them all to work.244 What is more, they had noted that demonstrations had also 
occurred on days when food was plentiful, and admitted that the movement had 
“sailed into national waters”, for which they blamed outside influences, particularly 
the Russian Revolution and its coverage in the press.245 Meanwhile, the situation 
throughout the pits of northern and north-western Bohemia was also critical, and 
likewise led to many strike actions.246 
Worst of all was Prague, where industrial workers, now also taking action in 
their thousands, downed tools and demanded better supplies and higher wages. Three 
interruptions were successfully settled before Easter,247 yet the military leader in 
Vysočany-Libeň remarked portentously: “The representatives of the workers have 
their comrades completely under their thumb, which is something I had not previously 
detected.” Noting that the strikes had seemed well planned and had proceeded with 
“strange calm”, he instinctively came to suspect the agency of a controlling central 
body.248 The military command agreed, warning on 12 April that the movement was 
gathering momentum hour by hour249 and that small concessions would no longer 
suffice.250 It urged a radical improvement in the supply of food and immediate price 
cuts for items of basic necessity in order to relieve the population, in particular the 
working class. But no sooner had these pleas reached Vienna than the situation 
exploded. The movement took hold in almost all factories of the war industry, and in 
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every case bar one, was followed by the entire workforce, despite being under 
military jurisdiction.251 It then spread to the railway workshops,252 bringing the total 
number of strikers to over 10,000.253 
The crisis was so serious than Kestřanek personally travelled to Vienna, where 
he was received in audience by Karl.254 He also handed Marterer a survey of the 
situation, compiled from the testimonies of the military leaders in the Prague area, 
who oversaw 79 factories employing 26,200 workers, themselves providing for 
75,000 relatives.255 The document made for bleak reading: one supervisor explained 
that to feed around 7,000 workers and dependants, there was one pig, a wagon of 
potatoes and a wagon of peas; another pointed out that to buy food a worker needed 
four times as much as he earned; a third noted: “No nasty tendencies. One finds 
crying men, who complain about their distress and that of their family.” 
The manner of the strike action reinforced the impression amongst local 
military authorities that the workers were following precise instructions from an 
increasingly influential organization.256 The police likewise believed that the 
disruption had been plotted, and pointed to the simultaneity of the stoppages, to the 
last-minute changes in the workers’ demands, and to the replacement in many 
companies of the old workers’ committees by more radical elements.257 It was even 
rumoured that some of the agitators had come from Vienna.258 At any rate, this wave 
of strikes revealed for the first time a degree of large-scale coordination, which the 
authorities believed had been agreed upon during the Easter break.259 
Gravely concerned, Kunz, the head of the police, called in the Social 
Democratic party and trade-union representatives, including Šmeral, Soukup and 
Němec, to discuss the matter on 14 April.260 The Socialists had already denied 
knowledge of any outside influence or preparation,261 and now stressed that their 
organizations had no connection with a general strike allegedly planned for 16 
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April.262 In fact they vigorously condemned such actions for political reasons, as they 
feared that concurrent unrest in Prague and calm in Vienna would serve the opponents 
of the Czechs and lead to a national disaster under current political circumstances.263 
As a result, they vowed to exert a calming influence on the workers, and, accordingly, 
issued a message on 15 April in Právo lidu.264 Yet the authorities correctly suspected 
that the masses were increasingly dissatisfied with their traditional leadership and that 
the latter’s influence was thus slipping away.265 Soukup himself implied this to 
Kunz.266 
 Ultimately, the predicted general strike did not occur, chiefly because the 
workers’ delegations had agreed on a wage increase with their employers two days 
beforehand. Instead, work resumed without trouble.267 This settlement and its 
publication in Právo lidu’s appeal, along with the large mobilization of armed 
forces,268 had likely played a greater role in ending the movement than the Socialists’ 
entreaties. For his part, Kestřanek believed that his journey to Vienna had had a 
cooling effect on the workers,269 while the governor thought that the declaration of the 
government concerning peace aims with Russia had contributed to appeasing them 
and to returning them to work.270 Thereupon, Karl intervened personally and gave 
ordered for food supplies from the military storeroom in Prague to be distributed to 
the workers.271 Kunz and Kestřanek both reported glowingly on the impact of this 
order, which, aside from improving the situation, “made an excellent impression” and 
left the workforce “very satisfied and happy”.272 Thus calm returned after only 
infrequent breaches of the peace,273 and Karl’s prestige was boosted. Nevertheless, the 
lack of a solution to the food problem signified that this could be but a temporary 
reprieve, as the police conceded.274 
Moreover, these strikes – more frequent, better attended and better prepared – 
had assumed a new dimension. Most significantly, they had occurred without the 
                                               
262 Ibid., 6205 in 6500. 
263 Ibid., 6205, 6446 in 6500. 
264 Ibid., 6205 in 6500. 
265 Ibid., 6446 in 6500; 6028. 
266 Ibid., 6028. 
267 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/10-2, 17.4.1917; PMV/R, K191, 6704. 
268 FŠ, K18, S137, 17.4.1917, 11am. 
269 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/10-2. 
270 PMV/R, K191, 6446 in 6500, 15.4.1917. 
271 MKSM, K1335, 93-2/31-2, 16.4.1917. 
272 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/10-2; 28-2/10-3; 16, 17, 30.4.1917. 
273 SH, 1767, p.221. 
274 PMV/R, K191, 6704. 
 190 
knowledge or support of the Socialist organizations. And although the police in 
Prague stressed emphatically that political tendencies were “non-existent” in the 
movement,275 these had undeniably played a part in both starting and ending it. 
Further signs of their existence were in evidence throughout Bohemia, even though 
hunger and money were the overwhelming factors in the exacerbation of unrest.276 In 
Žižkov, notices sprang up in several public places with the inscription: “The Czechs 
were forced to fight for the Germans even though their sympathies had long been with 
the Entente states. The Germans and nobody else are our fiercest enemies. They are 
the thieves of our language, the murderers of thousands of Czech people who have to 
bleed on the battlefield for them. […] These scoundrels, starting with their emperor, 
want to Germanize us, they steal our last piece of bread just to pad their stomachs. 
Shame on all of you who deal with the Germans, you wretched servants of a suffering 
nation, you alone are the real traitors. Justice and fairness will prevail. The Entente 
states are still here, the powerful defenders of the small states and in particular of the 
Czech nation. They will inflict defeat on the German dogs, liberate the Bohemian 
lands, and create an independent country out of them.” They urged soldiers to 
surrender and ended with the exhortations: “Our future depends on the victory of the 
Entente, let us help them to victory. […] Not a heller for the war loans! Down with 
Austria! Everything for the Czech state!”277 In addition, there were rumours of the 
existence in Bohemia of an organization with connections to Russia and Switzerland 
committed to freeing the Czechs from the Austrian yoke.278 Meanwhile, a military 
leader in Kladno reported that “Slavophile rabble-rousers” were active, in the form of 
female factory workers allegedly announcing the advent of a “large Slav state in 
which everything will be better”.279 In addition, minor provocations continued, such 
as the inscription in Dvůr Králové declaring: “Down with Karl, long live the Austro-
Hungarian Republic!”280 However, these were still isolated incidents, and very few 
cases of a political nature went before the military courts.281 The only charges brought 
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against the Prague strikers – three men from a phosphate plant in Bubeneč – were 
eventually dropped.282 
In explaining the popular outburst, reports from the Bohemian governorate 
explicitly blamed the influence of the Russian Revolution and of the recent workers’ 
movement in Germany.283 The events in Saint Petersburg had certainly roused the 
Czech masses, who had followed their development attentively, and especially their 
implications for peace. (The military command in Prague complained that the local 
civilian population was more quickly au fait with events on the front than official 
circles.)284 Indeed, the authorities believed that the movement had deliberately sought 
to support efforts to end the war.285 Nevertheless, they rightly persisted in believing 
that the ripples from Russia were insufficient to trigger emulation.286 In fact, they 
harboured “justified hope” that the workers would show consideration for the current 
situation and for the needs of the state.287 Moreover, despite the rising tension in the 
crownland and the latent hostility between Czechs and Germans, there were no 
reports of clashes between them. Rather, there was a surge of anti-Semitism 
throughout all classes of the population, irrespective of nationality, as Jews were 
accused of shirking and profiteering.288 And despite the escalation and extent of the 
troubles, the authorities reacted cautiously and collectedly (if only out of fear), and 
bloodshed was avoided. Wary of radicalizing the masses further, they adopted a 
relatively mild attitude in response to the Russian Revolution; for example, in issuing 
guidelines for its public discussion, the ministry of the interior allowed it to be 
welcomed as a liberation and a step towards peace, and did not oppose declarations of 
sympathy for the proletariat.289 Since little could be done to improve the lot of the 
masses, this strategy at least avoided aggravating a situation which, though critical, 
remained under control. (Many workers saw this benevolent attitude as a sign of 
weakness.)290 Nevertheless, under such circumstances, proclaiming the octroi would 
be foolhardy, if not fatal. 
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Having now expected it apprehensively and increasingly defiantly for over three 
months, the Czechs had had time to prepare themselves and to organize resistance. 
Wedel informed Bethmann that they had forewarned of a general strike among miners 
and munitions workers if the octroi was proclaimed, while several newspapers in 
Prague hinted at the possibility of Czech and South Slav deputies reacting by 
relinquishing their mandates.291 Meanwhile, the censor complained about polemic 
articles in the Czech press which discussed the octroi and the possibilities of a 
coalition cabinet.292 Most significantly, during a plenary session amidst the troubles 
on 13 and 14 April, the Czech Union had been emboldened to pass a resolution urging 
action in the “Austrian confederation of states”, demanding at once democracy, 
parliamentary rule and constitutional changes according to the self-determination of 
nations.293 In his report to Coudenhove, Kunz stressed that the choice of the word 
“self-determination” (sebeurčení) instead of the technical term “autonomy” was not a 
case of linguistic purism but an emulation of the last announcement of the Russian 
Social Democrats; he added: “according to the Czechs [it] translates state-rights views 
and their practical execution within the framework of Austria – federalism – better 
than any other word.”294 He could have added that this also mirrored Wilsonian 
terminology. Although the use of the expression suggested an attempt to court the 
masses with the slogan of the day or to intimidate the government rather than a clearly 
defined political programme, it confirmed the budding radicalization of the Czech 
Union and demonstrated its increasing capacity for unity and adaptation. The exiles 
took heart from this statement, seeing it as the Union’s first manifesto to be “a little 
bit firm”.295 In any case, the opportune moment for the octroi had evidently passed. 
As Wedel pointed out, “if one has to and wants to strike somebody a blow, this is best 
done without delay. However, it is an unfortunate policy to announce the blow and 
then let the victims wait for it for a few months”.296 
 
Nevertheless, Baernreither had travelled to Prague on 8 April, and despite observing 
the pervasive tension, had somehow gained the impression that an octroi was still 
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possible “within reasonable limits.”297 He informed Clam but conceded that this was 
already the eleventh hour. To most, however, the deadline for action had passed. 
Redlich, for instance, divulged to his friend Hermann Bahr that parliament was likely 
to reopen, as the government had all but failed to carry out the octroi.298 Still, the 
despondent prime minister kept up the pretence and dutifully submitted various 
finished drafts to Polzer to present to the emperor. On 11 April, the head of the private 
office went to Maribor to meet Karl, and, during the train journey back to Vienna, 
presented him with the proposals concerning the use of German as the internal 
language of administration and government, and concerning the division of Bohemia 
into administrative districts. He explained the measures to Karl paragraph by 
paragraph but, before he could finish his report, the emperor interrupted him and 
expressed his adamant refusal to breach the constitution.299 But since he had not 
sworn an oath to it – and indeed never would – he could not credibly use the pretext 
of constitutionality. Rather, this spurious legalistic argument provided Karl with the 
appearance of high-mindedness and a convenient justification to renege on a project 
which he distrusted and feared. Karl then set forth his opposition to abuses of 
Paragraph Fourteen. He added that he favoured removing the provision altogether as 
its existence and exploitation fatally undermined the constitution. As the journey 
continued, Karl asked Polzer for his views on the political situation; the latter 
expounded at length on the necessity for the government to abandon the octroi and to 
provide instead a clear and definite programme for the rehabilitation of Austria. 
Polzer indicated that: “He had more than once heard the emperor express his dislike 
for imperial ordinances in favour of one single nation.” Moreover, in preparation for 
coming peace negotiations, the government had all to gain by depriving the Entente of 
its propagandistic trump card, the championing of the minorities.300 Thus for reasons 
of domestic and foreign policy, the government needed to promise national autonomy 
within the framework of the state and to entrust parliament with the corresponding 
constitutional and administrative reforms. However, Polzer warned that the 
announcement of a detailed programme would inflame the national parties, and 
therefore suggested merely a broad and succinct outline. If the Reichsrat disagreed, 
Polzer proposed to make the prolonging of parliamentary mandates conditional upon 
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its cooperation and, failing that, to introduce proportional representation in order to 
bring the bourgeois parties to heel. Moreover, he wished to extend the abolition of 
historical state rights to Hungary and genuinely believed it could be achieved.301 Karl 
apparently listened to Polzer “with breathless attention” and asked him to submit a 
draft manifesto summarizing his project, declaring: “The programme you have 
evolved is your programme, it is entirely in harmony with my intentions and no one 
has hitherto spoken to me on those lines.” Thereupon he ordered Polzer to go to Clam 
and instruct him to halt the octroi and to recall parliament.302 
Karl’s deathly fear of revolution had convinced him of the absolute urgency of 
ending the war and of the need to abandon the octroi and to recall parliament in order 
to present a democratic veneer to the Allies before and during peace negotiations. 
Domestic developments since the fall of the tsar appeared to offer no alternative. 
Indeed, the food situation and associated unrest had worsened steadily and had spread 
far and wide in Austria. In fact, they had reached Karl’s doorstep. On 10 April, whilst 
away on his trip, sixty women had marched to Laxenburg to complain to him 
personally about the lack of potatoes, flour, bread, fat, milk, sugar and petrol, and to 
request his help.303 Two of them were received by the police representative but, 
meanwhile, several other groups from the outlying areas, comprising between fifty 
and two hundred women, also tried to make their way to the palace. They were talked 
out of it by the gendarmerie but they, too, were permitted to send small deputations. 
(Another group repeated this attempt the following day, as did 600 women on 17 
April; on both occasions they were thwarted but small delegations were allowed 
in.)304 It is highly likely that Karl knew about the first incidents when he ordered 
Polzer to terminate the octroi,305 and such an occurrence would certainly have 
exacerbated his concerns and comforted him in his views. 
However, the sudden confidence and resolve he displayed can only have 
occurred with Czernin’s explicit support or at his express instigation. Up to this point, 
despite his qualms and anxieties, the emperor had merely signified his circumspection 
without issuing consequent instructions. But by now, as his foreign minister had 
decided on the discontinuance of the programme, Karl was able to confirm its 
                                               
301 Polzer, pp.282-283. 
302 Polzer, pp.283-284. 
303 MI, K2131, 5995. 
304 MI, K2131, 5995. 
305 Ibid. On 10.4, the policeman on duty had reported the first day’s incidents directly to the emperor’s 
private office. 
 195 
suspension. Arguments against it were compelling and manifold. Firstly, the Russian 
Revolution had emboldened the Slavs and stirred the increasingly war-weary, hungry 
and volatile masses; as Czernin realized even before troubles peaked in mid-April, the 
octroi would assuredly inflame the situation further. Meanwhile, political enthusiasm 
for the measure had waned; several non-Bohemian Nationalverband members and 
virtually all Christian Socials no longer considered it a necessary prerequisite, and the 
Poles now refused to play their part. In any case, the octroi as coveted by the 
nationalists was unfeasible due to the insolubility of the Galician question. 
Furthermore, after the fall of tsarism, and at a time when even Germany was 
announcing democratic reforms,306 the arbitrary promulgation of an 
uncompromisingly pro-German decree would seem untimely and incongruous.307 
Indeed, Czernin did not fail to point out to Wedel that these developments in 
Germany, which had shocked many German Austrians, were the favoured argument 
of the octroi’s opponents; Tucher concurred, adding that this had made the hesitant 
government even more pensive.308 Crucially, the octroi intimated subservience to 
Berlin and stood in complete contradiction to the slogans of self-determination 
bellowed by Russian revolutionaries and by Wilson. Only Baernreither could believe 
that his octroi would pass “without international indignation”.309 Rather, it would 
threaten any peace negotiations with the enemy and potentially condemn the Empire 
in the event of defeat, which Czernin believed inevitable unless the war ended swiftly. 
To this end, the Social Democrats, on whom he counted to appease the workers and to 
bait the Russians, represented his greatest hope. Accordingly, when Renner, Adler 
and Seitz told him on 11 April that the party opposed the octroi due to the 
circumstances arising from the Russian Revolution, he assured them that it would not 
see the light of day as long as he stayed in office.310 In his desperation for peace,311 he 
had sacrificed the project. 
Despite repeated setbacks and his resultant gloom, Czernin had not yet 
despaired of achieving his chief aim. Firstly, on 10 April, he had allowed Social 
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Democratic leaders to travel to Berlin to confer with their German counterparts in 
order to encourage the renunciation of annexations, though he almost certainly 
expected them to work beyond socialist circles and informed Gottfried Hohenlohe 
that, although the men were travelling in their own names, they had his full approval 
and were therefore to be assisted in every respect.312 From there, he expected them to 
head to Stockholm for an International Socialist Conference, where he hoped they 
would broker peace with the Russian delegation, although, in the end, the gathering 
was postponed.313 Secondly, he still entertained the possibility of dealing with 
Paris;314 Sixtus remained his only channel after the failure of the Mensdorff initiative 
but, as far as he knew, the Prince’s mission was ongoing and promising. However, for 
either matter to come to fruition, German concessions were required. In a renewed 
attempt to obtain these, Czernin presented Karl with a bleak and foreboding 
memorandum on 12 April, and requested he pass it on to Wilhelm. His tone was 
glummer than ever. Austria’s military strength was coming to an end due to the 
increasing lack of raw materials for the production of munitions and the exhaustion of 
manpower, but even more significant was “the dull despair that pervades all classes 
owing to under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of the 
sufferings from the war.” He thought Germany no better off, and prophesied: “If the 
monarchs of the Central Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few 
months, it will be done for them by their people, and the tide of revolution will sweep 
away all that for which our brothers and sons are still fighting and dying.” Come 
autumn, the war would have to be ended at all costs; thereafter, Germany could no 
longer count on her ally. (Though this resembled a threat to conclude a separate 
peace, Czernin stressed that Austria-Hungary had already refused several such offers.) 
Calling attention to the inconclusiveness of the U-Boot campaign, he urged the 
initiation of peace negotiations before the Entente recognized the Central Powers’ dire 
situation and benefited decisively from American intervention. Nevertheless, he 
expected that great sacrifices would be required.315 And for once, Czernin 
underscored Austria-Hungary’s desperate straits without attempting to secure 
generous terms in case of victory. In his accompanying letter to Wilhelm, Karl fully 
endorsed the view of his minister: famine was breeding an international revolution – 
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an enemy more dangerous than the Entente – and only a rapid, if painful, peace could 
avert this.316 
 This was an especially candid admission of weakness, which disconcerted 
even Austro-Hungarian statesmen.317 Nevertheless, the Germans once again proved 
unreceptive to Austrian pleas and believed that Czernin had “completely lost his 
nerve” and that it would require “a good and proper injection of camphor to get him 
going again”.318 They refused to believe that a revolution could take place in the 
Habsburg Empire, as Zimmermann made clear: “I consider it impossible that in 
archducal Austria, in Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria and in Hungary there is any thought of 
removing the monarchy.”319 Even Clam confided to Wedel his certainty that 
Czernin’s fears were exaggerated and that he had gone too far in his desperation for 
peace. The ambassador did not need convincing; he had long seen through Czernin’s 
strategy, and once again reported to Berlin that, despite undeniable local 
disgruntlement, there were no revolutionary movements in Austria and that the 
foreign minister was merely trying to intimidate Germany into making sacrifices in 
Alsace-Lorraine.320 Thus, despite the palpable distress and urgency of the 
memorandum, Bethmann took almost a month to respond. His answer, and Wilhelm’s 
appended note, dismissed Austrian fears and firmly reiterated the German belief in a 
final triumph.321 Czernin and Karl’s strivings for peace and Berlin’s war aims 
remained irreconcilable. However, although the Germans were no more inclined to 
heed the concerns of their ally, they did begin seriously to doubt its reliability; as 
Wedel wrote to Bethmann: “I have often heard it said in Germany that Austria was 
completely dependent on us, that whether she wanted to or not, she had to follow and 
obey us. That was once correct. But whoever thinks that this still applies today 
misjudges the situation.”322 
The repealing of the octroi was a sign that Vienna, however reluctantly, was 
loosening its bond with Germany and its own German nationalist elements in order to 
save the Monarchy. Accordingly, the liquidation of the measure was afoot. As soon as 
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he arrived in Vienna, Polzer called on the prime minister as instructed, and informed 
him of the emperor’s decision.323 Clam was apparently unsurprised and unmoved. He 
had known for over a month that Karl distrusted the project and that Czernin, too, had 
cooled on the issue since the Russian Revolution. In any case, Clam himself had never 
been an independent driving force behind the octroi and, according to Polzer, he 
agreed plainly that it should not be carried out. The head of the private office then 
outlined in general terms his thoughts on the internal reorganization of the Monarchy. 
Polzer claimed that Clam believed the idea to be objectively right, despite concerns 
about its impact in Hungary.324 Nevertheless, Polzer was impressed by his 
interlocutor’s ostensible open-mindedness. As he recalled: “I got the feeling that he 
was honestly concerned with the business at hand, and that the peculiarity, so often to 
be observed among statesmen, of turning down other people’s ideas merely because 
they are not their own, was alien to his character, and that he, being concerned only 
for the welfare of Austria, would gladly accept help from any quarter.”325 
 Clam certainly needed all the help he could get; the raison d’être of his 
government had disappeared along with its chief policy. In the face of this adversity, 
he chose to bury his head in the sand, and for several days he dared not reveal to any 
of his ministers the turn of events. Lacking the courage to inform them that months of 
work had gone up in smoke, he sat idly, possibly praying for a reprieve. After all, he 
had only heard the information second-hand from Polzer and might have hoped that 
Karl (or, more importantly, Czernin) would change his mind, or that extraneous 
events would come to his rescue. Meanwhile, the cabinet remained wholly unaware of 
the upheaval.326 Supporters of the octroi in particular remained confident that their 
endeavours would bear fruit, though their impatience began to show. On 12 April, the 
Nationalverband urgently reiterated its demands for the implementation of the “long-
promised” reforms.327 The same day, Biliński met Handel to discuss details of the 
special status of Galicia.328 Urban later indicated that work thereon had continued 
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until the very end, and that there existed a version of the drafts dated 11 April.329 On 
12 April, he assured the Nationalverband that the government’s timetable remained 
unchanged, and, as late as 13 April, he told Redlich that the Bohemian question would 
be swiftly resolved in favour of the Germans so that parliament could be 
reconvened.330 When Clam met Baernreither the following afternoon, he spent an 
hour and a half running through the completed proposals with him, without giving any 
indication that the situation had changed or that he thought any differently about the 
matter. When he hinted vaguely that circumstances might arise that could prevent his 
carrying out the octroi, Baernreither responded that such a case would put him, as 
prime minister, in an untenable situation; Clam seemed to agree that this was self-
evident.331 Thus when the emperor confirmed the news to him in person during a 
private audience the following day, Clam voiced his misgivings and offered to stand 
down.332 This demeanour suggested that he had not, indeed, considered Polzer’s prior 
announcement to be definitive; only upon hearing the emperor’s words did he grasp 
the fate of the octroi and act accordingly. But Karl, although he had in effect just 
removed Clam’s legitimacy and credibility as prime minister, refused his resignation, 
stating that he would only reappoint him thereafter.333 A despondent Clam then took 
himself to Handel’s, broke the news to him, and suggested that the whole government 
step down.334 
 The cabinet would have been well advised to do so; for weeks it had been a 
mere phantom, powerless, illusory and irrelevant. Its work had been voided by foreign 
policy, and its authority superseded by Czernin’s. Whilst it toiled away on 
controversial, Byzantine, time-consuming, often purely academic and at times plainly 
insoluble domestic issues, the pragmatic Czernin considered only the immediate 
reality: Austria-Hungary needed peace before starvation brought about revolution and 
disintegration. Given free rein by Karl to fulfil his mission, and yet unable to obtain 
meaningful diplomatic results, his only resort was to thwart a domestic policy which 
threatened to make his task impossible. In so doing, he emasculated the Austrian 
government and rendered its work redundant. 
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In addition, the cabinet’s battered reputation had been further tainted in early 
April by the involvement of three of its ministers in the high-profile trial of profiteer 
Josef Kranz, who had, amongst others things, provided beer for the army at inflated 
prices.335 Czernin, who had used his services in the past, wanted the charges quashed, 
as did Clam. Spitzmüller, who had also dealt with him, favoured this option, but soon 
found himself in the thick of the scandal. When Krobatin – who as minister of war 
had signed the incriminating contract with Kranz – thoughtlessly transmitted a note to 
the investigating magistrate appearing to defend the accused, Schenk, the minister of 
justice, called upon his old friend Spitzmüller for help. Both men then turned to Karl, 
who ordered them to arrange the matter so as to avoid implicating Krobatin, 
wherefore the damning note was removed and replaced. But the secret soon got out, 
and Krobatin, Spitzmüller and Schenk were all called to testify as witnesses.336 The 
trial caused a sensation, and damaged both the public perception and political 
credibility of the government.337 Eventually, Karl dismissed Krobatin (whose removal 
he had long desired),338 but refused Schenk’s resignation.339 Opprobrium aside, the 
trial also soured ministerial relations. In attempting to stop the trial, Czernin had 
sought to compromise Spitzmüller, who had consequently threatened to stand 
down.340 But “under the impression of Karl’s charm”, he had resolved to stay, though 
he later regretted the decision. Czernin attempted unconvincingly to justify his actions 
to his colleague but nevertheless avoided any contact with him thereafter. Moreover, 
as Spitzmüller wrote, “the relationship of confidence which had reigned heretofore 
between the prime minister on the one hand, and the minister of justice and me on the 
other, was overshadowed by clouds which could not be dispersed.”341 
 
The liquidation of the octroi 
 
Divided, helpless, aimless, publicly discredited and almost universally maligned, the 
government had effectively ceased to function. But instead of administering the 
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required coup de grâce to his cabinet, Karl, by refusing to dismiss Clam, had propped 
up its lifeless body. Maintained against his will, the prime minister at least began to 
face up to his responsibilities. On 16 April, he went round to Baernreither’s at 9.30 
and finally explained that he had to abandon his intention of decreeing an octroi.342 
Nevertheless, it was left to Czernin to act as the policy’s official executioner. At 
11.00, the foreign minister appeared at the Austrian ministerial council (despite 
having no function there)343 and gave a two-hour talk344 in which he declared that 
three reasons prevented the proclamation of the octroi for the time being. First of all, 
he cited the effect of the Russian Revolution in Austria, and although he believed 
dynastic loyalty to be stronger in the Dual Monarchy, he thought it unwise to go 
against prevailing democratic trends and to ignore the fact that a new world had 
emerged since the beginning of the war. (This contradicted his announcement that the 
withdrawal of the octroi was temporary, which nobody present in any case believed.) 
Secondly, he had sent a Socialist delegation to the international conference in 
Stockholm to make contact with its Russian counterpart and to initiate peace talks, 
and thereby reinforce the pro-peace party in Russia. Therefore, no domestic policy 
could be carried out which would be seen as unconstitutional by the Austrian 
Socialists and anti-Slav by the Russians. Thirdly, with the end of the war approaching, 
Austria had to avoid giving the impression that she was unshakeably bound to her 
ally. The Entente now saw the conflict as a world crusade against Germany and would 
be discouraged from negotiating with her vassal; the octroi would be seen as a diktat 
from Berlin and only reinforce this image of Austria.345 
Although these words were later verified by Baernreither, Spitzmüller and 
Urban (who were all in attendance),346 Czernin repudiated them in his memoirs. 
Though he admitted to annulling the octroi in the ministerial council, he refuted the 
idea that this was connected to the Socialist peace mission to Sweden. As intended 
proof, he included an undated letter he had allegedly written to Tisza, in which he 
vigorously denied the link.347 He explained: “I do not want the octroi, as you know, 
but this has absolutely no relation to Stockholm, the Socialists or peace.” In fact, the 
complete opposite was true: he wanted the octroi and had cancelled it with all three in 
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mind. His distorted reminiscence of the event crumbles under the weight of his 
colleagues’ testimonies but, as Spitzmüller wrote, “this was probably related to his 
desire to convince [Tisza] that he was not working together with the Social 
Democrats”, adding that Czernin had “attempted to exonerate himself in every way 
possible in his memoirs”.348 Czernin freely admitted that he had spoken with Austrian 
Social Democratic leaders and granted them passports to go to Stockholm. But since 
they had wished to attend the conference of their own volition, he denied instigating 
the move to the Hungarian prime minister. Moreover, he explained to him that he 
expected the venture to fail but that in permitting their travel, he wished to prove that 
he had tried all expedients in seeking an end to the war. He certainly disapproved of a 
general socialist peace, hoped the conference would fail and even sought to 
compromise it surreptitiously.349 Irrespective of these intrigues, however, the presence 
in Sweden of the Social Democrats was part of Czernin’s scheme to reach out to the 
Russians and to exert pressure on the Germans. He had therefore worked to secure 
their cooperation, so that they left Vienna as government representatives in all but 
name. Moreover, he hoped that his conciliatory attitude would help placate the party 
and its mass following, even though it inevitably bemused some of its members.350 
Whether or not Czernin initiated their trip, he certainly encouraged, endorsed, 
organized and exploited it. And to the ministerial council he explained that this 
collaboration necessitated the forsaking of the octroi.351 This was a highly plausible 
proviso in view of Social Democratic reservations towards the measure, but Czernin, 
who had manifold reasons for cancelling it, made sure he highlighted this point. In 
portraying himself as a hostage to leftist blackmail, he could seek a degree of 
exculpation from the nationalists. 
 Nevertheless, the annulment of the octroi was his decision alone. His 
transformation from apostle to hangman was progressive but swift. Though full of 
bluster in January, he gave the first indication in early March that foreign policy 
might stall the plan temporarily and that time was running out for its implementation. 
(He even presented Karl with a toned-down version.) Meanwhile, Bethmann’s 
announcement of constitutional democratization in Prussia did not help matters. And 
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events in Russia, which promised peace but threatened proliferation, further sobered 
Czernin, who sensed that the octroi could imperil the former and accelerate the latter. 
In the meantime, the failure of his negotiations with the Germans and the growing 
unrest in the Bohemian lands consolidated these respective fears, and prodded him 
towards the Social Democrats, who in turn put pressure on him to abandon the plan. 
He confided to Baernreither that the fortnight following the Russian Revolution had 
rather complicated the matter. Indeed, by the end of the month, the programme had 
effectively run aground, but still Czernin took no action and urged work on it to 
continue. After all, even though he already thought its postponement wise, he still had 
a strategy for peace which did not require its outright cancellation, and the internal 
explosion he feared had not taken place. But, despite his apparent satisfaction with the 
Homburg talks on 3 April, the confirmed failure of the Mensdorff mission the 
following day and the American declaration of war on 6 April finished off his 
illusions. Wilhelm’s “Easter Message” the following day, which confirmed the 
chancellor’s promises of reform in Prussia, made the octroi increasingly unjustifiable. 
Suffering from nervous exhaustion and staring at an increasingly cheerless domestic 
situation, Czernin resigned himself to abrogating the octroi. Karl and Hohenlohe, 
whose approval was certain, were quickly informed.352 On 9 April, when the emperor 
set off to visit the Italian Front,353 he must already have been aware of his minister’s 
conclusion because on the return journey two days later, he was in a position to pass it 
off as his own to Polzer.354 At the same time, Czernin promised the Social Democrat 
leaders that no octroi would occur during his tenure, but he had certainly made up his 
mind beforehand. This places Czernin’s decision between 30 March and 9 April. And 
irrespective of whether he was sincerely heartened or secretly crushed by his time at 
German headquarters, it most likely came after 6 April and the dual blow from Bern 
and Washington. On 7 April, however, Karl remained mute when Renner revealed the 
Socialists’ unconditional rejection of the plan. If this was not compelling enough to 
repudiate it, the severing of diplomatic relations with the United States, and the 
Petrograd Soviet’s offer of peace in return for the renunciation of annexations and 
                                               
352 RT, II, 24.4.1917, p.292. Redlich wrote: “14 days ago [10.4], Hohenlohe had said to Handel-
Mazzetti that the octroi could no longer take place”. 
353 NM, 9.4; FBM, 12.4.1917, p.2. Karl left on 9.4, arriving in Adelsberg in Carniola early on 10.4. 
354 WZ, 12.4.1917, pp.6. 9. And as soon as he returned from his visit to the front – he arrived in 
Laxenburg on 11 April at 2pm – Karl received Czernin in audience. 
 204 
reparations, certainly were. Czernin was in any case free of this burden on 10 April 
when he launched his fresh attempt to get Berlin to act upon Russian overtures. 
Nothing that happened between his final decision and his announcement in the 
ministerial council could have convinced him to reverse the decision. On the contrary, 
events in Prague, the uncompromising stance of the Social Democrats and the failure 
to induce the Germans to make a conciliatory declaration towards Russia can only 
have strengthened his resolve. For a month, arguments against the octroi had 
accumulated in his mind, but the American declaration of war provided perhaps the 
most tangible justification for its renunciation, and probably tipped the scales. 
(Protests from the Czech Union, on the other hand, had no impact.) Decreeing it 
thereafter would merely vindicate émigré propagandists and remove the case for the 
continued existence of Austria-Hungary in the event of an increasingly likely defeat at 
the hands of the Allies. Desperate for peace in the east as a result, he had no hesitation 
in complying with Social Democratic demands. Having ostensibly come to terms with 
the irrevocable socio-political changes engendered by the war,355  he was able to 
relinquish a measure he had long cherished in order to avert revolution and help 
obtain peace (or at least secure an acceptable negotiating position). Against his own 
aristocratic, arch-conservative and pro-German disposition, and belief in the bien-
fondé of the octroi, Czernin acted grudgingly, but pragmatically. 
 
Karl, however, must have rejoiced in this disburdenment. Never an outright champion 
or opponent of the policy – though he had, undeniably, supported some of its 
provisions – his distrust had grown along the same lines as Czernin’s. But despite his 
increasing doubts, he had interfered with its development only belatedly and meekly 
and, in the end, he played only a small part in its revocation. Notwithstanding the 
growing apprehension towards it in his entourage, he had lacked the courage and 
enterprise to take action. By his own admission in exile, he “dragged out the final 
decision until Czernin announced after the Russian Revolution that foreign policy 
matters had now made this absolutist act impossible.”356 The emperor’s disinclination 
towards the programme had long been perceptible to his collaborators, though to 
differing degrees. Assertive when talking to known opponents of the plan such as 
Polzer and Spitzmüller, he was less explicit when confronted with its exponents. 
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Baernreither and Urban frequently noticed his reticence,357 but only in early March 
did he make an open confession of uncertainty, to Clam and Czernin. Baernreither 
remarked at the time: “Thus the matter entered a new stage. The central figure, the 
emperor, appears on the scene.” Karl’s tentative pronouncement – almost three 
months into the cabinet’s tenure – first derailed the octroi, but it was neither 
spontaneous nor independent, since Karl was simply echoing the reservations 
expressed by Czernin to Baernreither three days earlier. Moreover, Karl immediately 
appeared to endorse an amended version of the plan. Shortly after, however, the fall 
of the tsar stiffened Karl’s resolve through fear.358 Theretofore, his circumspection 
had barely troubled the nationalists; as Baernreither later admitted: “Until that point I 
believed that there would have been no difficulties in obtaining the emperor’s consent 
to a properly well-founded octroi.”359 (He blamed Czernin’s contempt for details and 
Clam’s vacillating manner for failing to do so.)360 Although this was somewhat 
optimistic considering Karl’s fundamental misgivings,361 there is no evidence to 
suggest that he would have intervened unless compelled to by external events and 
supported by Czernin. But for these developments, Karl would presumably have 
acquiesced, albeit hesitantly. Indeed, as long as the octroi did not appear to endanger 
the obtainment of peace or the stability of the Empire, Karl countenanced it. And even 
when these concerns materialized, he waited to take his cue from Czernin. 
Overwhelmingly preoccupied by the issue of peace, and trusting his minister’s 
strategy and ability to achieve it, Karl allowed him to direct almost single-handedly 
the domestic and foreign policy of Austria. In so doing, Karl attenuated his own 
responsibility, and had neither to announce nor to justify the suspension of the octroi. 
This also enabled him to dissemble the extent of his aversion towards the policy and 
thus to avoid the brunt of subsequent nationalist discontent. 
Several months later, Polzer confessed to Baernreither that Karl had never 
been fully resolved to go ahead with the octroi.362 Yet in his first weeks in power, the 
emperor had let go of Koerber and Spitzmüller – two adversaries of rule by decree – 
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and had knowingly appointed an almost exclusively German government whose 
primary aim was to enforce it. And in Konrad Hohenlohe, he had chosen a man who 
in his recent tenure as minister of the interior had attempted to fulfil the desires of the 
German nationalists and of the army high command by drawing up plans for a radical 
octroi. By way of exoneration for these nominations and for his ensuing inaction, Karl 
claimed that he had had no choice but to yield to nationalist demands. In his brief 
recollections, he explained that: “this German desire could not be fought openly 
because the national feeling of the Germans in Austria and their incredibly childish 
imperiousness had increased tremendously due to German victories and that, in this 
unfortunate war ‘shoulder to shoulder’, our Germans in Austria could not be 
obviously snubbed.”363 This was a somewhat disingenuous elucidation, for Karl had 
chosen three such “Germans” as his closest collaborators: Czernin, Clam and 
Hohenlohe. Once in place, they had little difficulty in prevailing upon him to pursue 
the German course. His lack of political education and absence of dogmatic 
convictions always left him vulnerable to outside influences and events. Undoubtedly, 
he was wary of antagonizing the obstreperous German nationalists who, in late 1916, 
were especially jingoistic and cocksure of military victory. Moreover, he probably 
underestimated the extent of Czech hostility to the plan, and lacked in-depth 
knowledge of Bohemian conditions and of the intricacies of the programme. In any 
case, the government would need German support in the prospective Pole-free 
Reichsrat. Thus, whatever Karl’s personal thoughts on the internal reorganization of 
the Monarchy, he had eschewed them with scant hesitation when persuaded of the 
necessity of the octroi. The influence of his advisers and his legitimate apprehension 
of German disgruntlement, combined with his aversion to conflict, his inexperience 
and malleability, ensured his compliance. He was scarcely more confident by the 
spring of 1917 when circumstances exposed the folly of this policy, but Czernin came 
to his rescue. Karl’s own unflattering version of events was largely correct: he 
deplored much of the octroi (by April in any case) but dared not oppose it for fear of 
German protestations, and had to wait for external events to discredit it and for 
Czernin to liquidate it. 
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Empowered by the emperor, Czernin had no scruples about dictating internal policy, 
boldly irrupting in a domestic ministerial council in order to lay waste its chief 
programme. As Spitzmüller wrote, “the entire incident illustrates painfully how 
greatly the policy of Clam lacked independence and a concept of its own.”364 Indeed, 
the government’s manifesto had originally been dictated by the imperatives of the 
German nationalists and now found itself subordinated to foreign policy. In the 
process, Clam went from puppet to lame duck. Appointed to preside over the 
enforcement of the octroi, the prime minister never appeared fit for purpose. He had 
been expected to facilitate Czech acceptance of the measure, but had instead angered 
and alienated them; now his failure threatened to arouse German ire as well. 
Moreover, his lethargy – only partly the result of poor health – had disappointed and 
surprised his supporters. As Baernreither put it: “One had expected too energetic an 
action rather than the opposite.”365 Despite being the official standard-bearer of the 
octroi policy, he was ineffectual, wavering and lacking in leadership. In fact, his 
conduct was suspiciously remiss. From the outset, he was oddly uncooperative, 
refusing to hand over the octroi drafts, and allowing ministerial councils to get bogged 
down in technicalities. Considering the deep inner conflicts that bedevilled him, it is 
conceivable that these were dilatory tactics intended to stall the octroi. Not only did 
he drag his feet and hinder its progress, he made no attempt to gain public or political 
approval for the project. Had he wished to put a spoke in the wheels of the octroi 
covertly, he could scarcely have employed a better method. Enraged by his front-line 
experiences, he had come to promote the programme, but inwardly, he knew it had 
little chance of settling the Czecho-German dispute. He might also have begun to feel 
guilty about imposing this ukase on his compatriots. Unlike Czernin, fear of 
revolution did not contribute to his feelings towards the measure;366 his concerns were 
more fundamental. As time went by, his commitment drifted ever more; Baernreither 
sensed his own influence on him ebbing away until it finally disappeared.367 When the 
project first stumbled, Clam promptly watered it down, and when cancellation 
beckoned, he put up no resistance, even nodding his agreement to Polzer’s federalist 
proposals. His elusive behaviour in the following days betrayed his inner torment, and 
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when the definitive verdict arrived, he offered a perfunctory resignation but 
eventually stayed put and endorsed the decision.368 Though he had to feign 
dissatisfaction, this outcome undoubtedly relieved him of his predicament. 
 
His compunction was understandable, for the octroi programme was in essence an 
arbitrary, inequitable and one-sided fulfilment of longstanding Germans ambitions, 
principally at the expense of the Czechs. It was a decisive step in their reassertion of 
the inalienably German character of Austria in the face of rising Slav aspirations. To 
claim, as Baernreither did, that the drafts of April 1917 were well-balanced and 
offered the prospect of internal pacification,369 revealed either delusion or dishonesty. 
The modifications they had undergone since December, though moderating,370 had 
been devised in a vacuum, heedless of the evolving social, economic, political and 
diplomatic realities. Despite the weakening of the German position in the meantime, 
they still made no serious attempt at conciliation. As a result, their content remained 
unacceptable to the non-Germans and could but aggravate the nationality conflict. To 
think otherwise was seriously to misjudge the spirit of the time. For instance, no non-
German nation would now acquiesce in the introduction of German as the official 
internal language of Austria (even though in certain forms, the measure was not 
without its logic), and no amount of tinkering could make the plan for the 
administrative carving up of Bohemia palatable to the Czechs, whose intransigence 
regarding the indivisibility of lands of the crown of Saint Wenceslas was as 
unbendingly dogmatic as their opponents’ insistence on the octroi. (And lest the 
Slovenes and the Italians benefit from its provisions in their homelands, a legalistic 
legerdemain ensured that the programme applied only to Bohemia.) The octroi 
unblushingly served the interests of the German minority in Bohemia while sparing 
the German majority elsewhere. Despite its public cloaking in euphemistic phrases 
and its promotion as a matter of national interest, there was little doubt as to the 
nature and purpose of the measure, or indeed as to its reception. With the possible 
exception of Baernreither, proponents of the octroi in government were under no 
illusion. The prime minister himself understood better than anyone that it was 
grievous and intolerable to the Czechs. Handel, who had elaborated the first drafts, 
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also believed that they would not assent to the plan, irrespective of any 
concessions.371 Czernin too knew that it was not a just arbitration, and after the war he 
discouraged Baernreither from publishing its details, pointing out that the Czechs 
“could hardly find a fair compromise” in the plan and warning that they might use it 
against their political opponents.372 Even Wedel acknowledged this, writing to 
Bethmann: “The planned octroi was a blow for a large part of the citizens of 
Austria.”373 Far from pacification, the octroi was thinly veiled repression, and 
certainly no resolution of the issues at hand. 
 
Nevertheless, had it acted promptly, the government could have succeeded in 
proclaiming the measure (minus the Galician provisions). Between January and 
March it had a window, but failed to exploit it. (Many contended that the best time for 
the octroi would have been in 1915, after the military victories against Serbia or 
Russia, or Italy’s declaration of war.)374 The inadequacy of the previous drafts, the 
belated start to their reworking and the lack of energetic leadership fatally delayed the 
octroi. Baernreither squarely blamed Clam for this lag: “In these first six weeks of his 
tenure, he lost the game.”375 Subsequently, as the certainty of victory receded and the 
fear of collapse took hold, the octroi lost prominent backers one by one. By April, 
only the most fervent nationalists were still ready to fight for it. Czernin, however, 
understood the need for compromise, in order to appease the minorities at home, to 
undermine their representatives abroad and, above all, to convince the Allies of 
Austria-Hungary’s egalitarian domestic policies and independence from Berlin. 
Admittedly, having killed the octroi, Czernin stopped short of burying it. But his 
declaration that it was only temporarily unenforceable seemed little more than a 
cursory placation of its supporters. In the way of their plans there now stood a Slav-
dominated parliament, Social Democratic opposition, Christian Social indifference, a 
reluctant prime minister, a distrustful and fearful emperor, and a realistic foreign 
minister. 
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The demise of the octroi caused some surprise in the ministerial council,376 but 
although Czernin claimed to have felt like Daniel in the lions’ den,377 the general 
reaction was in fact muted. Indeed, many of the ministers were relieved by the 
announcement.378 As the emperor’s reservations were now well known to them379 and 
as the prime minister himself did not oppose the change of course, there was a silent 
acquiescence in the decision.380 Only Baernreither protested, vehemently and at 
length. In particular, he asked Czernin whether the argument concerning Germany – 
expressed rather nebulously – signified disassociation from Berlin, which the latter 
vigorously denied. When Clam confirmed that he sanctioned Czernin’s judgement, 
Baernreither, Urban and Bobrzyński declared that they reserved the right to decide 
any further action themselves. In fact, Baernreither resolved to stand down 
immediately and attempted to convince Clam of the necessity for the entire cabinet to 
follow suit, but the latter refused to abandon his master. Urban and Bobrzyński, 
however, agreed to quit.381 Along with Baernreither, they had been the strongest 
proponents of the octroi in the cabinet and their presence therein had been chiefly for 
the purpose of its execution. Having failed in their mission, the men felt unable to 
continue. On the other hand, Handel, since he represented no constituency or party, 
decided “not to aggravate the current embarrassment by following these gentlemen in 
their resignation”.382 
In contrast to the relative indifference of the cabinet, most nationalists were 
dismayed by the government’s about-turn, and German Bohemians particularly 
furious.383 A few had already surmised that there would be no octroi – certainly, since 
the Russian Revolution, rumours of a partial implementation had circulated – but 
overall, consternation and shock prevailed.384 Coudenhove, for example, was pleading 
with Šmeral to accept the octroi on the evening of 16 April when he received a 
telephone call from the prime minister’s office informing him of the news, leaving 
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him dumbfounded.385 Redlich spoke of “the greatest confusion among German 
politicians”386 while the Neue Freie Presse reported tremendous agitation among the 
“profoundly surprised” bourgeois parties,387 whose stupefied leaders and 
parliamentarians rushed to Vienna following the announcement.388 However, they 
quickly found the scapegoats to make sense of their bewilderment. Indeed, the 
consensus soon prevailed within the Nationalverband that Czernin had abandoned the 
octroi under pressure from the Social Democrats.389 It was believed that Adler and 
Renner had agreed to help him on this condition and that, in turn, he had easily 
persuaded Karl, still gravely concerned about the spread of unrest since the outbreak 
of the Russian Revolution. Handel, though he could not corroborate Socialist 
interference, nevertheless indicated that the main factor behind the decision was 
Czernin’s declaration to the emperor that if the octroi were proclaimed, he would have 
no means of proving to the Russians that the Slavs were not oppressed in Austria.390 
These explanations were essentially correct. Accordingly, the foreign minister bore 
the brunt of nationalist wrath. He admitted to Tisza: “People here are indignant 
towards me, especially in the House of Lords. This is due to the fact that they imagine 
I “bought” the Social Democrats by promising to prevent the octroi if they obtained 
peace […] Wolf made a scene about it in front of me […]. The supposition that their 
octroi has been snatched away from them due to my love of Socialists makes them 
even angrier.”391 But whereas Czernin was seen as the éminence grise, Clam – 
mistakenly thought to have fought for the octroi to the death392 – was merely 
considered incapable.393 Yet the prime minister was not spared, and in the numerous 
meetings and conferences following the cancellation, violent and passionate 
invectives targeted him as well as Czernin.394 The nationalists upbraided the prime 
minister for failing to execute the programme in good time, for displaying such 
incapability, for reneging on his word, for presenting them with a fait accompli, for 
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not resigning and for thereby putting himself in an untenable position.395 His own 
colleagues did not spare him. Handel reproached him for burying himself in so much 
detail – he agonized over of every little village in delimitating the circles – that 
progress had come to a standstill. He also claimed Clam had been anxious not to harm 
Czech interests, fearful of being branded an enemy of the nation.396 Meanwhile, 
Baernreither contended that Clam had committed “three grave errors” which had 
prevented any chance of success. Firstly, he had not succeeded in convincing Karl of 
the merits of the octroi, largely because he himself knew too little about it. Secondly, 
he had formed a cabinet ill-suited to the task and thirdly – his greatest mistake, 
according to his minister – he had displayed a fatal lack of political activity when the 
situation demanded it, particularly in the Polish question.397 Baernreither also 
castigated those reluctant colleagues who had “crippled the capacity for decision of a 
cabinet which was determined to act”.398 Conversely, many pointed the finger at 
Urban and Baernreither himself for continually changing the drafts and for not acting 
opportunely and decisively.399 (Redlich, no champion of the measure, had long 
prophesied an unhappy end to Baernreither’s political career, accusing him of lacking 
the strength of character to lead the government’s policy.)400 
Meanwhile in Berlin, this volte-face was considered symptomatic of Vienna’s 
growing panic and desperation for peace.401 Wedel explained to Bethmann that the 
Austrian government, in fear of a Slav – rather than socialist – revolution, had 
cancelled the octroi to appease the Czechs, who might exploit a hunger revolt to 
emulate the Petersburg coup and destroy the state.402 Though he dismissed this danger 
and bemoaned the Austrian habit of always giving in to the most dangerous 
nationalities,403 he conceded that the timing of the octroi would have been highly 
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unfavourable and that serious reservations spoke against it.404 He nevertheless added: 
“The Germans now find themselves in an extremely difficult situation.”405 
 
Indeed, the nationalist camp was in disarray. The collapse of the octroi project had 
wrecked its endeavours of the previous months and its strategy since the outbreak of 
war. The shock and anger provoked by the decision exposed the deep disappointment 
of a group which had expended much effort in the pursuit of a policy which it had 
come very close to realizing, and which the government had promised them. 
Baernreither commented despondently: “The impression that these events made on 
the German parties and on a large part of the German population was one of 
depression […]. Even the circles which had no clear idea of the planned steps lost that 
general hope that matters would be sorted.”406 This was certainly true among most 
German Bohemians, who were “extremely upset about this development”.407 One 
such malcontent sent an enraged letter to the Mayor of Vienna, fuming: “Once again, 
the loyalty and endless sacrifices of […] the Germans are rewarded with a kick. A 
Czech prime minister and a diplomat alien to the people dared to do this.” The author 
reported that, among other symbolic gestures representing the voice of the people, 
spectacles had been placed on the crucified Christ in Grasslitz so he could better see 
the injustice, while in Eger the word “Austria” had been inscribed on an empty 
gravestone on the day of the government’s declaration.408 Not a few nationalists 
across Cisleithania shared this consternation, but beyond these groups, many Germans 
viewed the measure with indifference, scepticism, contempt or concern, and at any 
rate now considered it an unnecessary requirement to the much longed-for recall of 
parliament.409 And certainly, such a policy was far removed from the daily wartime 
concerns of the population, and insignificant in comparison to recent potential 
upheavals. 
In any event, those affected by the cancellation largely managed to conceal the 
extent of their chagrin. This was understandable: supporters of the octroi wished not 
only to avoid losing face after months of confident trumpeting of their plans, but also 
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to curry favour with the government in the hope that it would eventually satisfy their 
aspirations. As Otto Steinwender of the Nationalverband admitted to Tusar, the 
Germans Nationals feared Clam’s replacement, since they assumed that his successor 
would have to seek support from the Czechs and the Social Democrats, and make 
corresponding concessions.410 In the pro-octroi press, as elsewhere, the reaction was 
conspicuously temperate. The Neue Freie Presse, though it bemoaned the failure of 
the project and urged parliament to fulfil these “inalienable” German demands in due 
time, accepted the precedence of foreign policy over domestic affairs in order to attain 
peace.411 In its pages, Nationalverband committee member Ferdinand von Pantz 
agreed.412 Major German publications in Prague such as Bohemia and the Prager 
Tagblatt echoed this sentiment with equal forbearance, the latter concluding lyrically: 
“The time for demagoguery and chauvinism is over. The people expect practical work 
for a new democratic Austria.”413 As Kestřanek reported (with a telling choice of 
words), “the deferment of the preconditions […] was generally discussed with 
restraint.”414 
The hypocrisy of the press was not lost on Redlich, who noted in his diary: 
“The Neue Freie Presse and the other Vienna papers have written in outrageously 
grovelling tones, offering keen assistance to Czernin and Clam, and denying 
shamefully what only yesterday they had praised as the greatest wisdom.”415 The 
Reichspost concurred, bitterly recalling the attacks from those quarters: “It is 
remarkable that the same Liberal press which brandished the hatchet at the Christian 
Socials a month ago because they were allegedly betraying the Nationalverband with 
their calls for parliament, is now rejoicing in the government’s abandonment of the 
‘preconditions’”.416 Moreover, the Reichspost suggested that the postponement of the 
octroi in fact signified its complete abandonment, since no favourable opportunity for 
its implementation would present itself again.417 It later softened its tone by indicating 
that deferment did not signify abrogation, though it insisted on the parliamentary 
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execution of the plans.418 As this was unlikely to occur, this ostensible conciliation 
was merely glib pacification. 
By now, the break between the Christian Socials and the Nationalverband was 
essentially consummated. Nevertheless, their boards met in the Rathaus on the 
afternoon of 17 April and kept up their unconvincing show of unity by unanimously 
ruing the fate of the drafts while welcoming the recall of parliament and efforts 
towards peace.419 However, when the Christian Social leadership convened alone later 
in the day, it shed few tears for the octroi.420 And in spite of its collective dismay, the 
Nationalverband itself was far from consensual in its strategy. Unsurprisingly, the 
German Bohemian Union was particularly incensed; many therein supported a policy 
of outright opposition,421 while some suggested abstention, as did several members of 
the German Radical Party.422 Other zealots mooted the possibility of all German 
deputies relinquishing their parliamentary mandates. Meanwhile, Carinthian and 
Tyrolean deputies of the Nationalverband urged their Bohemian colleagues to accept 
the matter calmly.423 In the end, the extreme proposals were overwhelmingly rejected 
by the more level-headed majority, but they exposed the vast divergences in an 
increasingly fractious and fragile organization which appeared on the brink of 
breaking up.424 Nevertheless, moderating voices prevailed and by the following day, 
tempers had abated, despite the continued agitation of certain German Bohemians.425 
Most nationalists understood that the Clam cabinet represented not only the best 
chance for the fulfilment of their demands – if these were ever to be realized – but 
also a bulwark against the designs of the Slavs and the Socialists. Withdrawing 
support for the current government risked bringing about the emergence of a hostile 
coalition in its place. As several German parliamentarians confessed to Wedel, they 
had no choice but to enter the House and attempt to put on a brave face.426 
Accordingly, when the joint executive committee of the Nationalverband and 
Christian Socials met on 18 April, it resolved, in the interest of peace, not to impede 
discussions in the Reichsrat or to adopt an oppositional stance towards the 
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government, providing the latter maintained its commitment to the desired reforms 
and to their parliamentary implementation before long.427 As frustrating and 
unsatisfactory as this strategy was for the nationalists, they had no better option.  
In any case, the government still counted on their support and could ill afford 
to eschew them; in this anxious climate,428 Karl and his men desperately sought to 
assuage the disaffected Germans and to retain their loyalty. To this end, early 
precautions had been taken. Notably, the cancellation of the octroi was not confirmed 
by any formal decision, and the relevant ministerial council was not kept in the 
records. Moreover, the newspapers were ordered not to treat the information as 
official.429 Through these actions, the government suggested that the octroi could one 
day be resurrected, which certainly accounted for the relatively restrained reaction of 
many nationalists. And very soon, Karl intervened personally in order to reassure the 
mourners of the project. Even though his lack of enthusiasm for the octroi and assent 
to its cancellation were now known, at least by his ministers, he had largely escaped 
the blame amidst the acrimonious finger-pointing in the wake of its repeal. Politicians 
certainly made more acceptable targets than the still sacrosanct and esteemed figure of 
the emperor, but this exoneration was also the result of his perceived pliability and 
limited political standing. Schlitter noted in his diary: “The German-speaking 
Austrians are cursing the government and saying that the emperor is badly 
advised.”430 Indeed, many nationalists saw his acquiescence not as the expression of 
his personal will but rather as the consequence of his ministers’ failure to prevail upon 
him. Moreover, they ascribed his misgivings concerning the octroi to foreign 
developments and their potential consequences at home rather than to his intrinsic 
reservations. Untainted by his government’s U-turn, shielded by his status and still 
considered sympathetic to the German cause, Karl was in a propitious position to 
mediate. 
Thus, on 19 April, in the presence of Clam, he received in Laxenburg a 
deputation of German nationalists and Christian Socials headed by Weiskirchner.431 
The mayor of Vienna, speaking “in the name of the representatives of the German 
people in Austria”, first assured the emperor of their unconditional loyalty and 
                                               
427 NFPM, 19.4.1917, p.3. 
428 NB, K7, 22.4.1917. 
429 Sitting of the German local council (Ortsrat) in Prague on 12.5.1917, in: Molisch, Bewegung, p.252. 
430 NS, K6, 25-27.4.1917. 
431 RPM, 20.4.1917, pp.1-2. 
 217 
sacrificial devotion. Promising their full collaboration in the future workings of 
parliament, he nevertheless expressed their “deep anxiety that essential state 
necessities concerning the vital interests of the whole of Austria [had] now been 
pushed into the background as a result of pressing external conditions”. In his 
platitudinous response, the emperor gratefully acknowledged, saluted and vowed 
never to forget the “exemplary self-sacrifice which the Germans of Austria have 
shown, their heroic courage, which was put to the test on the battlefield, their loyalty 
to the state, which they unshakeably maintain [and] the steadfastness with which they 
have distinguished themselves in enduring the deprivations of war”. He declared: 
“The Germans of Austria can be assured of my confidence.” Thereupon, he stressed 
the utmost importance of successful parliamentary activity, in which he expected all 
national and political representatives to cooperate for the greater good, adding: “I 
therefore count on the Germans in Austria who, as pillars of state unity, will have a 
great task in the reforms which were already initiated during the war and which must 
be completed single-mindedly after its end. My government will stick unshakeably to 
the goals it has been set.” Though Karl did not specify which reforms or goals, the 
Germans inferred that these were theirs. However vague and noncommittal, this 
statement reassured the visitors, who were comforted further by their subsequent 
discussion with the emperor. Indeed, Karl spoke to each one of his guests432 and, 
according to Baernreither, “salvaged the situation”.433 He certainly made a good 
impression on the men,434 and even the radicals Groß, Wolf and Pacher were 
pleasantly surprised by his informed grasp of affairs.435 Naturally, he said nothing of 
his personal reservations about the octroi; on the contrary, he professed to Wolf that it 
had been very hard for him to come to the decision of changing course.436 Four days 
later, however, he confided to the visiting German politician Matthias Erzberger that 
he would repudiate any Germanization of Austria because “the majority of the 
population consisted of Slavs and he did want to violate his peoples”.437 
But few appreciated the nature and extent of his feelings, and his display 
temporarily soothed the Germans. They, along with the government, had been 
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allowed to save face and effectively to hold on to their plans, albeit by a thread. The 
Fremden-Blatt reported that the German deputies – received for the first time by Karl 
– had left the audience with the conviction that Austria was in safe hands, adding that 
the meeting had permitted “the profound, sincere and trusting relationship between 
the Habsburg dynasty and the Germans of Austria to appear once again in the 
brightest light”.438 The Deutschböhmische Korrespondenz confirmed that the 
audience had satisfied the visitors in the extreme, thanks to the charming manner of 
the emperor and to his declaration that the government would stand by its goals.439 
Meanwhile, a leading member of the Nationalverband relayed to the Neue Freie 
Presse the general agreement that the address of the emperor had been “received with 
particular pride not just by the German deputies but by the entire German 
population”.440 Contrary to the crowing declaration of the Reichspost, the event did 
not unravel the Gordian knot,441 but indisputably it succeeded in bringing about a 
political détente. This was evident in party meetings the following day, notably in the 
consultations of the board of the Nationalverband and in those of the joint executive 
committee of the German bourgeois parties.442 However, the protracted and often 
agitated discussions within the German Bohemian Union, particularly concerning the 
potential resignation of the two ministers, indicated that the crisis had not fully 
abated.443 Indeed, the newspaper Bohemia remarked dismissively that the ceremony 
had been meant merely to “cover the back of an embarrassed government”, prompting 
an intervention by the censor.444 Karl and Clam therefore continued their efforts. 
On 21 April, the emperor received Baernreither in Baden, and discussed in 
earnest the abandoned drafts, the swearing of the oath to the constitution and the 
connection between internal policy and peace prospects.445 On the last subject, 
Baernreither expressed his concern regarding Czernin’s attempted mediation with the 
Russian socialists since he believed that, like their counterparts elsewhere, they only 
desired a general socialist peace. He explained that the conservative elements in 
Austria – also the most loyal, to his mind – were extremely worried about the 
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socialist-Jewish wave currently spilling over Europe, whose flow would be very 
difficult to dam after the war. Karl concurred, but declared that everything had to be 
tried to attain peace. Baernreither noted: “He is full of the most burning desire for 
peace. Longing for peace and fear of the consequences of the Russian Revolution 
completely fill the emperor’s thoughts.”446 The minister hence deduced that Karl had 
in fact decided against decreeing the octroi drafts several weeks prior. Addressing this 
issue, Karl lamented time and again the insoluble contradiction he faced in being 
asked simultaneously to carry out a coup d’état by octroi and to recall parliament. 
Since the Reichsrat would not approve the drafts – an attitude which he ostensibly 
bemoaned to Baernreither – the promulgation of the octroi would be a putsch, for 
which Karl was unwilling to take responsibility. Baernreither, however, was adamant 
that parliament would never sort out certain necessities of the state, whose execution 
could only be achieved through an authoritative act of the crown. He added that 
adherence to constitutionality precluded any possibility for change and that as a result 
“the best Austrians and the most loyal supporters of the dynasty and of the state 
would despair of the future”. Thinking aloud, Karl responded gravely that he neither 
wanted nor would allow this, though according to Baernreither, “like somebody who 
fears he might be forced to”.447 In the end, the emperor requested that his minister 
remain in office and calm the Germans. (Urban, whom Karl had received the previous 
day,448 had presumably heard the same entreaties.) Though he gave no guarantees, 
Baernreither promised to do his utmost.449 Again Karl managed to appear favourably 
disposed to the German cause and to make his qualms regarding the octroi seem 
circumstantial rather than fundamental. He neither challenged the contents of the 
drafts nor gave any indication that their suspension was permanent.  
Karl continued his mission of appeasement by heading for the Tyrol that 
afternoon; according to Marterer, the emperor was travelling partly to please his 
beloved Kaiserjäger regiments, but also “to show mercy to the German city of Bozen 
which, since so many German wishes would remain unfulfilled, might be a good thing 
now”.450 On the following day, he received several Tyrolean nationalist deputies and 
dignitaries, and explained the reasons for the “temporary deferral” of the octroi while 
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reaffirming the necessity of a unanimous declaration of will of the Reichsrat.451 He 
also emphasized the fact that, due to the external situation, it was imperative in the 
interest of peace to avoid disrupting the smooth course of parliamentary negotiations. 
Once more he praised the behaviour of the Germans and urged his guests to bow to 
the inevitable and to facilitate thereby the attainment of peace. Clam, who had 
accompanied Karl on his trip, held similar talks with individual deputies and assured 
them that he was, and remained, determined to execute the octroi, but that foreign 
affairs required an adjournment of the matter until the onset of more advantageous 
circumstances. The parliamentarians reluctantly acquiesced.452 Having at last shaken 
off his torpor, the prime minister had set about winning back the Germans with 
considerable energy, and considerable success. The day after the Laxenburg 
reception, he had already assured Baernreither and Urban that he would not admit to 
the emperor taking the oath on the constitution and that he would rather resign than 
use a Slav-Socialist majority in parliament. Both ministers passed on this declaration 
to the German parties, who now urged them to stay in office and persist.453 This step 
had been widely expected since the audience in Laxenburg, and was finally agreed at 
a sitting of the joint executive committee of the German bourgeois parties on 23 
April.454 The following day, despite the reluctance of its German Bohemian members, 
the plenum of the Nationalverband formally endorsed the remaining in office of 
Baernreither and Urban. However, it warned that its future position towards the 
government would depend on the latter’s attitude. Further, though it reiterated its 
commitment to cooperation in parliament – whose recall it now requested without 
delay – it again warned that it would stand by its national-political demands.455 At the 
same time, the board of the Christian Socials also officially approved the ministers’ 
continued presence in government, and exhorted it to recall the Reichsrat urgently.456 
The support of the German bourgeois parties was thereby safeguarded. 
However, the Poles, equally appalled by the policy change but radicalized 
even beforehand, proved less amenable to conciliation than the Germans. When 
Biliński was received by Clam on 17 April, he vented his countrymen’s ill feeling 
towards the government and warned that their support was also dependent upon the 
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accommodation of their wishes.457 Nevertheless, opinions within the Polish Club 
concerning the attitude to adopt were most divergent, though radical voices rang the 
loudest.458 On Saturday 21 April, the Neue Freie Presse reported that the Galician 
crisis was stagnating, that there were no signs of relaxation whatsoever, and that 
disgruntlement still prevailed in the declarations of Polish deputies.459 That day, Karl 
personally received Biliński460 and, perhaps as a result of their meeting, the situation 
cooled during an otherwise inconclusive weekend.461 On the Monday evening, 
following talks between Clam and the parliamentary commission of the Polish Club, 
the government presented the latter with a statement detailing its position on the 
Galician question.462 It reiterated its commitment to the 4 November declaration, 
vowed to consider Polish demands in order to reach an agreement and promised 
compensation for wartime damage.463 However, during the commission’s 
consultations the following day, numerous members denounced the declaration as 
insufficient;464 only in the late hours did it succeed in finding a formula to submit to 
the plenum of the club, in which it endorsed continued negotiations with the 
government.465 However, another day of negotiations and wrangling was necessary 
before the commission was able to produce a unifying document. Immediately after, 
the much-delayed plenary session of the Polish Club opened and a resolution was 
adopted agreeing to wait for the government’s proposals on the autonomy of Galicia 
and on wartime compensations, and to empower its presidium to engage with it in the 
relevant negotiations. Moreover, Bobrzyński was permitted to stay in the cabinet.466 
(At the same time, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission convened and 
unanimously rejected any extension of Galician autonomy and any amendment of the 
constitution by decree.)467 
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The ministerial crisis had come to an end in just over a week of feverish activity.468 
Karl was able to issue handwritten letters to his mutinous ministers, rejecting their 
resignations and ensuring them of his continued trust;469 at the same time, he 
transmitted a missive to Clam praising his work, loyalty and precious advice, and 
reiterating his unlimited confidence in him and unfaltering support for his efforts.470 
Again expected to fall,471 the embattled government had once more displayed 
unexpected resilience. And though it had merely contained the Poles, it had seemingly 
succeeded in assuaging the Germans and retaining their support, chiefly by 
convincing them that the suspension of the octroi was temporary and in the interest of 
peace. As Urban repeatedly stressed in an interview with the Hungarian newspaper Az 
Est, the government’s programme remained the same in every respect; only the 
method had changed. He confirmed that the administrative division of Bohemia was 
“naturally” still a part of its policy and would be achieved via parliament or 
consensus, though he doubted the possibility of the latter.472 Aside from his473 and 
Baernreither’s mediating work, the recovery was due in no small part to the swift 
intervention and persuasive assurances of the emperor and his prime minister. Though 
still fearful of revolution, Karl was gladdened by the stalling of the octroi and 
sanguine about his country’s prospects for peace. Baernreither had found him “fresh, 
lively, genial and talkative as always”,474 and indeed, his personable manner, energy, 
enthusiasm and considerable charm helped wheedle the Germans into acquiescence. 
More importantly, he dissimulated his aversion to the octroi and used the unassailable 
pretext of peace as a justification for the change of policy, likely gambling that the 
issue would not resurface before the end of the war. 
A rejuvenated Clam employed the same arguments and repeatedly pledged his 
commitment to the future execution of the octroi. As the matter was now largely out 
of his hands, this was pure bravado. But in their desperation to realize their plans, and 
their fear that he might be replaced by a less sympathetic prime minister, the Germans 
chose to believe him. Overlooking his spineless leadership since December and their 
recent accusatory aspersions towards him, they handed him a vote of confidence. (In 
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contrast, the Poles granted him a mere stay of execution). However, despite his 
political survival, Clam did not emerge unscathed; indeed, this episode had shaken 
many loyal Germans to the core and eroded their trust in his government. Wedel 
remarked: “Providence in this country is apparently for the Czechs. This time they 
were supposed to be hit hard but owing to clumsy hesitation and unforeseen events, 
the Germans are again the ones to suffer.”475 Baernreither commented ruefully that 
the government, the state and the emperor had once again gnawed at their goodwill.476 
Affected personally, he summed up this failure in his diary: “I reproach myself for not 
insisting more energetically on the completion of the work. God knows how much I 
toiled – but Clam could not be made to work intensively or to take decisions, his inner 
reluctance grew and he did not succeed in exerting any influence on the emperor to 
accelerate the matter. With time, doubt crept up on the monarch ever more, Czech 
influences (Lobkowitz and Trnka) had time to work against the octroi, and after the 
Russian Revolution, the resolve of the emperor waned altogether. Moreover, the 
Polish question was insoluble – thus the whole plan gradually slipped to the ground 
until Czernin administered the fatal blow.” He concluded mournfully but defiantly: 
“We Germans in Austria have lost a battle. It remains to be seen whether the failure to 
sort out the state language and Bohemian matters can be rectified later. For the time 
being, the Czechs, the South Slavs, the Socialists and the Jewish circles closely 
associated with them, have triumphed.”477 
 
If not triumphantly, the repeal of the octroi was greeted approvingly by the opposing 
camp. The Social Democrats naturally welcomed the decision, but remained highly 
sceptical and critical of Clam.478 The Ukrainians, of course, were relieved to see the 
scotching of the plans for Galician autonomy.479 For the Czechs, who found out 
through Šmeral on the evening of 16 April, the news was, as Wedel reported, “a 
pleasant surprise […] which has naturally boosted their self-confidence”.480 But they 
were immediately warned not to celebrate too ostentatiously. Indeed, Coudenhove 
asked Šmeral to urge Czech newspapers not to scare the German public by reacting 
too buoyantly, and Trnka called Tobolka to request a moderate response highlighting 
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Karl’s friendly attitude towards the Czechs, without goading the Germans.481 
Accordingly, commentaries in the Czech press were restrained and limited to generic 
expressions of a desire for a fruitful recall of parliament.482 Národní listy underlined 
the tremendous responsibility inherited by the Reichsrat, while Hlas národa 
expressed the hope that it would now show a different face. Venkov and Národní 
politika both pointed to the gravity of the hour and urged deputies to focus on 
important matters, and to work with the eagerness, energy and consideration required 
to serve the interests of the state and the people. Czech added that the Czech 
parliamentarians faced a test of their statesmanlike abilities and needed to comply 
with the government. And, writing on behalf of the Social Democratic Party in Právo 
lidu, Šmeral revealed his conviction that the recall of the House would not intensify 
national conflicts, but rather take the sting out of them.483 
 At first, the news was interpreted as defeat for German nationalism and a 
victory for Czech unity. In light of emerging Slav solidarity and of the rifts within the 
German camp, it appeared that the Czech Union had indeed made a remarkable 
tactical advance in a short time.484 As Tobolka commented in his diary on 17 April: 
“Indubitable success of the tactic of the Czech Union”.485 But the tone of the 
government’s announcement, the declarations of its members and the sober reaction 
of the German Bohemian press quickly made clear to the Czechs that this was a 
change of tactic, not a change of policy or system. They realized that their pressure 
had played no part in the decision, and that foreign affairs had forced the 
government’s hand.486 The Czech political world, caught on the hop by the turn of 
events and almost immediately disillusioned by its significance, therefore exercised 
caution. Wedel, who denied accounts according to which the Czechs were now more 
presumptuous and confident than ever, interpreted this as a sign of repentance. Fed by 
a source with direct contact to prominent Czech deputies, he painted a somewhat 
subdued picture of their camp. The ambassador believed that, having seen the error of 
their ways and having abandoned hope of Russian salvation, the Czechs were “again 
chained to Austria and had drawn the appropriate consequences”. Though he still 
considered them capable of betrayal, he believed that pragmatism had prevailed and 
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that they now wished to regain the favourable position they had enjoyed in 
peacetime.487 But, perhaps misleadingly influenced by his informant, whose contacts 
included “several Social Democratic leaders”, he failed to appreciate the more likely 
reasons behind this apparent temperance. For although the events in Saint Petersburg 
had indeed dashed pan-Slav aspirations, they had loudly sounded the clarion call of 
national self-determination. The American declaration of war had greatly boosted this 
cause, and had broadened its appeal to the parties who feared the social implications 
of the Russian Revolution. When meeting to discuss these upheavals, the Czech 
Union had climbed on the bandwagon and invoked the self-determination of nations 
for the first time.488 Thus, even before the collapse of the octroi, outside events had 
stirred the Czechs to press for a reform of the Empire on this basis. In addition, it was 
henceforth axiomatic to most Czechs that an Entente victory was not only preferable, 
but also more likely,489 even though neither they nor the Entente yet envisaged the 
break-up of the Monarchy. Moreover, the Austrian government’s weakness and 
yearning for an end to the war were clear to them. The Czechs therefore had high 
hopes for forthcoming peace negotiations.490 In this context, the laying ad acta of the 
much-dreaded octroi was a comparative irrelevance and therefore greeted 
accordingly, especially since most Czech parties felt that this reluctant surrender 
brought them no closer to the fulfilment of their own demands. 
 In fact, only the Social Democrats believed in future democratic reform as a 
result of the Russian Revolution, and Právo lidu was one of the rare publications 
which described the decision as a change in domestic policy.491 All other parties soon 
expressed considerable scepticism, and indeed disgruntlement.492 Even the 
Austrophile Jaroslav Goll, a member of the House of Lords and Karl’s former 
university tutor, wrote in Venkov that the official announcement of the 
democratization of the state and self-determination of nations was merely a hopeless 
lure to tempt the Russian socialists into a separate peace. Furthermore, the nationalists 
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continued to resent the socialist conception of national autonomy, which was not 
founded on historic state rights.493 
 The government nevertheless immediately sought to capitalize on potential 
Czech goodwill. Trnka, himself greatly relieved by the end of the octroi, tried to 
convince his compatriots that it really signified a complete change of direction.494 
Czernin, meanwhile, held it up as proof that there was not the slightest intention to 
govern against the Czechs and that Austria remained committed to the equal treatment 
of all nations.495 True to their activist line, the Czech Social Democrats assured Clam 
that they would work in the Reichsrat and in the Czech Union to enable constructive 
parliamentary debate, but even they had little faith in him.496 He had wreaked too 
much damage in his relations with the Czechs and was clearly unrepentant and 
unreconstructed. Indeed, though he assured the Czechs that he had no desire to harm 
the nationalities and that they would become convinced of his good intentions, he 
openly admitted that he regretted the failure of the octroi and that he still wished to 
follow the road he had embarked upon. He even suggested that he might submit to 
parliament an outline of his national programme.497 Clam thereby undermined the 
recall of the Reichsrat even before its official announcement. 
 
When, on 26 April, an imperial patent finally decreed the reconvening of parliament 
for 30 May, the government stated that the purpose of this action was “to deal above 
all with the food question and with the other economic issues related to the war, 
particularly social and financial ones”.498 The declaration promised to reach an 
understanding with the parties on the future activity of parliament and to initiate the 
dismantling of political censorship. It expected support for its endeavours “not only to 
do what is necessary for the present, but also to create for the future the foundations 
for a peaceable cohabitation of the peoples of Austria”. Echoing Karl’s words at 
Laxenburg, it again vowed to “stick unshakeably to the goals which it has set itself”, 
this time singling out the language question, which it promised to pursue “promptly” 
and “with vigour”.499 The text made reference to both national and provincial 
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linguistic arrangements, thereby alluding respectively to the establishment of German 
as the internal language of state and to the creation of circle governments in Bohemia. 
It also vowed to proceed in accordance with the intentions of the imperial handwritten 
letter of 26 July 1913 to sort out “pressing” and “urgent” Bohemian matters, and in 
accordance with that of 4 November 1916 to sort out the Galician issue.500 Although 
the details remained sketchy – a draft response considered by the Czech Union 
described these passages as “consciously elliptic and fuzzy”501 – this was the 
government’s clearest official commitment since the demise of the octroi and 
obviously intended to reassure the Germans (and the Poles) further. But by 
announcing in the same breath that “concerning matters within the sphere of activity 
of the Reichsrat, [it would] contact the parties and groups of parliament to establish 
the basis of further action and then submit to it the subsequent proposals,”502 the 
government betrayed the impossibility of fulfilling its aims. The very purpose of the 
octroi had been to enact these reforms by decree in order to avoid a parliament which 
would never support them. Since the composition of the Reichsrat remained largely 
the same, so did the chances of success of these measures. And having only just 
recalled the House, the government could scarcely set about circumventing it. Thus a 
situation arose which the German nationalists had sought to avoid all along; they 
could console themselves with the belief that the government and the emperor 
remained on their side, and the conviction that peace would bring rewards for their 
wartime sacrifices. 
 Meanwhile, the Czech Union considered its response during meetings of its 
presidium and parliamentary commission on 26 and 27 April respectively. On the first 
day, Šmeral suggested a long, detailed statement welcoming the reconvening of 
parliament and the government’s priorities, but rebuking its continued bias towards 
the Germans and the Poles and failure to announce democratic reforms, and 
expounding on the Union’s position and aspirations.503 However, when the visiting 
members of the Slovene-Croat Club Korošec, Spinčić and Krek pointed out that the 
government’s unchanged policy did not call for more than a brief, negative response, 
the Czech Union settled on a terse communiqué stating that its attitude therefore also 
                                               
500 Ibid., pp.2-3. 
501 TD, 26.4, p.351. 
502 NFPM, 26.4.1917, pp.2-3. 
503 TD, 26-27.4, pp.350-351. 
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remained unchanged.504 The two groups met formally the following day and agreed 
that both their statements would end with a sentence “noting their full accord in their 
assessment of the political situation.”505 
 
These were inauspicious beginnings for the future of parliament. The ministerial crisis 
had set the tone for future developments and had marred the reopening of the 
Reichsrat even before it was announced, affecting public mood accordingly.506 The 
war had in fact exacerbated tensions and divisions, and the political atmosphere was, 
if anything, more poisonous than when parliament last convened. It was evident that 
traditional national conflicts would be unleashed at the first opportunity; Wedel 
considered this a “mathematical certainty” and expected that, with the hearts of the 
deputies full to overflowing, stormy scenes would soon prove the fruitlessness of 
parliamentary sittings.507 The Neue Freie Presse was particularly pessimistic, 
bemoaning the unchanged attitudes of the parties and warning of the “most 
unpleasant” task of internal reform ahead.508 Moreover, the fact that there were no 
guarantees that the issues of language and administration would be resolved produced 
an “atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty”.509 In particular, a solution to the Czech–
German problem seemed as far away as ever; indeed, “the line where the life and 
death of a government are decided crosses through Bohemia exactly as before”.510 
 
This issue, however, was likely not at the forefront of Karl’s thoughts. The 
cancellation of the octroi and the recall of parliament served his quest for peace first 
and foremost. Here, the outlook was not unpromising: with Serbia and Romania 
beaten and Russia incapacitated, the threats to the Monarchy’s existence had virtually 
disappeared, as well as its reliance on Germany;511 only the Italian menace remained, 
though seemingly undermined by the aforementioned peace offer. With this in mind, 
and confident in his brother-in-law’s mission, Karl believed that an end to the war 
was close. Accordingly, the ostensible democratization and egalitarianism suggested 
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by the new domestic course constituted a coherent expedient for potential negotiations 
with the Allies. In addition, Karl anticipated that these measures would stymie 
opponents abroad and, rather more hopefully, appease his subjects at home and 
encourage national reconciliation. However, the domestic situation was not propitious 
to a truce. The appalling circumstances of most of the population512 continued to 
exacerbate social tensions and resentment against the authorities, while the drawn-out 
rigmarole of the failed octroi had sharpened political divisions between the 
nationalities. Moreover, though Karl’s prestige remained untarnished, his prime 
minister was a pariah in charge of a discredited government. Under such 
circumstances, Karl hoped peace would come soon enough to stave off social 
revolution and internecine conflicts. In the meantime, he relied on the continued 
loyalty of his peoples to crown and fatherland. In late April, this assumption, though 
already threatened and facing yet graver challenges, was by no means 
unreasonable.513
                                               
512 KÜA, K191, 104.774, report of the censor’s office in Vienna for April. From the correspondence 
surveyed, it gathered that the economic and food situation had worsened in April. 
513 Ibid. The aforementioned report, which reviewed over 420,000 letters, detected no news concerning 
the Czech or South Slav movements, or regarding Italian, Romanian and Ruthene irredentism. Political 
statements remained rare, and the general mood differed little from that of March. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
PAVED WITH BAD INTENTIONS: THE ROAD TO PARLIAMENT 
 
Domestic unrest 
 
For the despondent, war-weary, famished masses,1 the revival of political life offered 
above all the hope of a rapid end to the war and thus a release from hunger and want. 
In the meantime, however, the situation continued to deteriorate, and on 15 April, the 
flour ration was lowered.2 Yet the repartition of suffering remained uneven, with the 
wealthy still largely unconcerned by issues of food. Moreover, whereas 
correspondence from regions such as eastern Galicia, Carinthia, Styria, Carniola, the 
South Tyrol, the Littoral, Istria, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed near 
unbearable privations, few items of necessity appeared to lack in Moravia and 
Silesia.3 Of the Bohemian lands, Bohemia, especially the industrial Sudetenland,4 was 
by far the worst hit, and food shortages in the province were on the rise.5 Protests, 
though more sporadic elsewhere in Austria, were numerous here, and the authorities 
increasingly struggled to contain them.6 The Czechs were once again at the forefront 
of demonstrative unrest, their anger towards Vienna further stoked by the alleged 
export of potatoes and coal to the capital.7 Substantial strikes broke out in Czech 
provincial cities,8 and continued to plague mining areas, particularly the German-
speaking district of Falkenau.9 Prague also endured its usual litany of troubles,10 and 
the yearning for an end to the war was evermore evident among its inhabitants. When 
800 people gathered in Vršovice on 30 April to protest against ration reductions, 
many called out: “We want peace”.11 The district commissioner in Žižkov, though he 
had not observed the influence of any revolutionary movement or socialist pacifist 
                                               
1 KÜA, K191, 104.774. The desire for peace was present in every letter read by the censor in April; 
complaints about hunger and famine were ubiquitous; bad weather suggested worse was to come. 
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propaganda, warned that peace was confidently awaited everywhere.12 Kestřanek, 
however still believed that a secret organization was directing the workers and stoking 
their irritability, and their excellent information on events in Russia made him suspect 
foreign links.13 Yet ideological slogans were still largely absent, except in a few 
isolated cases,14 such as the anonymous leaflet found in Prague which read “Long live 
the Revolution! Freedom! The nation can decide its own fate. Long live Liebknecht 
and Adler. Away with the despots!” and urged soldiers to use their weapons to put an 
end to the misery.15 Statements of the Social Democratic leaders and reports of the 
police appeared to confirm that the labour movement had no political motives, and 
was exclusively the result of the prevailing food crisis.16 
 Czernin therefore appraised the situation correctly when he told Hohenlohe on 
23 April: “It is ever clearer that the food problem is becoming the most burning 
question of the entire war.”17 The poor outlook for the coming harvest further 
convinced him that a separate peace with Russia offered the only possibility of 
countering this threat, through the import of foodstuffs.18 Moreover, he believed it 
would be the first step towards a general peace, and therefore pursued this goal 
relentlessly. Doubtless to his satisfaction, his Social Democratic envoys in Berlin, 
along with their Hungarian colleagues, had won over their German counterparts for a 
joint declaration on 19 April in support of the Soviet manifesto in favour of peace 
without annexations or reparations, which had been announced four days earlier.19 
When the Socialist Internationale Korrespondenz thereupon requested that the 
German government express its readiness to accept this formula, Czernin immediately 
put Berlin on the spot and indicated that he was willing to comply.20 But meanwhile 
in Bad Kreuznach, as yet unbeknownst to him, the German high command had just 
succeeded in imposing its uncompromisingly radical war aims, which included the 
annexation of Courland, Lithuania, and considerable tracts of Polish territory (in 
addition to Liège, the Flanders coast, Arlon, Luxemburg and Briey-Longwy, as well 
                                               
12 Ibid., 1785, 1811, pp.223, 226. 
13 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/10-3. 
14 Ibid., 1783, 1788, 1793, 1821, pp.223-224, 227.  
15 Ibid., 1910, p.239; PMV/R, K191, 7519. 
16 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/10-3. 
17 PA, I, K957, Czernin-G. Hohenlohe, 23.4.1917 
18 Ibid. 
19 NFPN, 16.4, p.1; PA, I, K957, G. Hohenlohe-Czernin, 27.4.1917. During the talks, Adler repeatedly 
pointed to his influence on the government in Vienna. 
20 PA, I, K957, Czernin-G. Hohenlohe, 23.4.1917. 
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as extensive control over the remainder of Poland and Belgium).21 Bethmann, though 
he had reservations about this programme,22 was nevertheless no more inclined to 
listen to Czernin, and instead had an article published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung chiding the Social Democrats and rejecting any German declaration of war 
aims.23 Undiscouraged, Czernin went it alone and gave his “Answer to Social 
Democracy” in the Fremden-Blatt of 26 April, asserting that Austria-Hungary had no 
aggressive plans towards Russia, that she did not contemplate territorial increases at 
her expense, and that the slaughter could come to an end.24 Its stated target 
notwithstanding, this pronouncement was badly received in Germany, by government, 
press and public opinion alike.25 (It was, of course, easy for Austria-Hungary to 
champion this course of action since she stood to retrieve her occupied territories 
while Germany surrendered conquered land.) Through Hohenlohe, Czernin offered 
Bethmann and Zimmermann a disingenuous apology but insisted that he faced much 
tougher domestic circumstances, which he described as “extremely grave”.26 Again, 
he warned of a genuine threat of revolution and again he bemoaned Berlin’s lack of 
comprehension. Pointing to the strong desire amongst the restless Slavs of Austria-
Hungary for an understanding with Russia, he urged cooperation with the like-minded 
Social Democrats, who demanded the renunciation of annexations as the price of their 
cooperation (just as they had previously requested the abandonment of the octroi). 
Boasting of Karl’s full support, he pleaded: “It is a requirement of absolute necessity 
to commit the Social Democratic organization to us and through it, to influence the 
masses.” Czernin urged Hohenlohe to illustrate the gravity of the situation by 
informing Bethmann of the massacre that had taken place in Prostějov in Moravia on 
26 April, in which the military had shot dead twenty-three starving workers and 
wounded thirty-seven during a hunger riot.27 He warned that similar incidents were 
expected in the near future in the different provinces of the Empire, though he vowed 
to respond most vigorously; proof, according to him, that the Austrians followed up 
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their words with deeds.28 Rather less characteristically, Karl displayed the same stern 
determination. Wedel, summoned to breakfast in Laxenburg three days after, found 
him unshaken by the bloodshed.29 (On the contrary, Karl appeared confident and in a 
good mood, and offered his warmest congratulations for recent German successes on 
the Western Front.) The emperor explained that although such events were sad, they 
had to be borne, and that he had ordered any repeats to be put down with the utmost 
energy. And indeed, Wedel was informed that forces armed with machine guns were 
on their way to the Ostrau-Karwin area, where potato reserves for 60,000 workers 
were expected to run out in two weeks.30 Karl might have been grandstanding in order 
to reassure the Germans of his resolve, but Wedel, for one, was unimpressed. When 
first told the news by Czernin, he had riposted dryly: “In Germany, the military would 
no longer shoot at the people.”31 
 
In this tense climate, the government’s understanding with Cisleithanian Social 
Democrats seemed to help bring about a degree of respite on a potentially volatile 
May Day. Very shortly after the abandonment of the octroi, Tusar had approached 
Handel to announce his party’s intention to hold a meeting on 1 May, and had asked 
him to instruct the political authorities in Bohemia and Moravia to ensure that no 
obstacles hampered this.32 He promised that the speakers would show great 
moderation and avoid any declaration likely to intensify the national conflict in 
Bohemia, or likely to be interpreted abroad as a desire for peace at all costs.33 Handel 
raised no objections but urged caution.34 Tusar then took himself off to Czernin’s to 
present this plan and to ascertain the room for manoeuvre.35 In the name of the Czech 
Social Democrats, he promised to respect the interests of the state and, in return, 
asked Czernin for complete openness regarding the country’s situation. The minister 
thanked him for his loyalty and frankness, and told him that Austria-Hungary would 
be in a position to enter peace negotiations with the Entente if she survived until the 
next harvest. Regarding May Day, Czernin warned that any imprudence could cause 
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serious damage to the state, but nevertheless stressed the importance of these 
addresses. He demanded that the Social Democrats express support for an honourable 
peace rather than a peace at all costs, and that they declare their solidarity with his last 
pronouncement on the question36 in order to prove the unanimity of the government 
and the people, as both had one common enemy: the war. Czernin’s reliance on the 
party’s goodwill, and plea for its help, were evident as he averred sycophantically: 
“Without the Social Democrats, it would be impossible to wage this war even for a 
week”. This alliance, however, was not unnatural. Since both desired a rapid end to 
the war and the preservation of the Empire, their interests could but converge. To 
secure Socialist collaboration, Czernin had only to promise a degree of social reform 
and democratization – he again vowed that the masses would be rewarded for their 
heroism – and to banish the spectre of the octroi.37 The criticism he thereby earned 
from conservative circles was a small price to pay in his quest for peace at home and 
abroad. On the other hand, the Social Democratic leadership, still in the firm grip of 
Šmeral, further risked its credibility by cooperating with the imperial government. 
Moreover, having already lost much popular support due to its caution and perceived 
passivity, the party experienced the significant signs of internal opposition in April, 
principally from its potent Pilsen branch, led by Gustav Habrman and Ludvík Pik, 
whose daily newspaper, Nová Doba, started to express reservations concerning the 
strategy pursued by Šmeral.38 He, however, was more interested in cultivating good 
relations with the government than with his colleagues, and, at the time, he could 
argue that the abandonment of the octroi and promises of democratization had 
vindicated his activist policy. 
Two days after his meeting with Czernin, Tusar39 repeated his declaration of 
loyalty to Clam, vowing that the Czech Social Democrats would henceforth always 
serve the state and its interests, in the expectation that, after the war, the government 
would make concessions to the working class in political and social matters in order 
to prevent revolutionary upheaval.40 Clam, impressed by this pledge, acquiesced in 
the necessity of social reform – albeit within the constraints of the budget and of the 
existing order – and assured him that the emperor thought likewise. He conceded that 
                                               
36 His Fremden-Blatt interview on 31.3.1917. 
37 FŠ, K18, S137, 17.4.1917, 7pm. 
38 Galandauer, Šmeral, p.100. 
39 FŠ, K18, S137; NFPM, 22.4.1917, p.5. 
40 FŠ, K18, S137, 19.4.1917. 
 235 
the equivalent of centuries had elapsed since 1914 and that it would be short-sighted 
to go against the extension of civil and democratic rights. As for May Day, he had 
already been briefed by Czernin, and had issued the relevant instructions to the 
governors in Prague and Brno, who were ordered not to make any difficulties as long 
as the speakers followed the foreign minister’s guidelines.41 These required Tusar and 
Šmeral to endorse the government’s efforts towards an honourable peace, to speak out 
against a war of conquest, and lastly to demand that the masses rally around Austria 
and her flag in order to support the conclusion of peace. Both men agreed, and the 
government had no doubt that they would be true to their word.42 
The Czechs’ Austrian counterparts had at first decided against observing a 
holiday on 1 May, but a bitter internal debate had subsequently erupted. Worried 
opponents of an action pointed to the incalculable effect a general strike might have if 
food supplies failed completely, while the minority in favour argued that workers 
needed to emerge from their lethargy, that the party would gain credit amongst them 
for taking the initiative, and that peace would be brought considerably nearer. In the 
first instance, the party resolved to stick to its original plan.43 However, it soon got 
wind of the ministry of war’s instructions to military authorities not to cause any 
difficulties for workers under their jurisdiction, should they wish to stop work 
partially or completely on 1 May.44 Thus receiving an authorization they had not 
dared request, the Austrian Social Democrats reversed their decision on 26 April, 
ostensibly to support international peace efforts.45 Accordingly, the following day, the 
Arbeiter-Zeitung called on workers to mark the event, but instructed them to avoid 
internal political issues and to make an orderly return to their jobs in the morning.46 
The same day, police authorities pored over the matter with Seitz and Tusar.47 As a 
result, the minister of the interior issued a telegram to his provincial governors on 28 
April, ordering them not to make any difficulties for participating workers. And 
though he forbade freely accessible meetings, open-air gatherings and processions, he 
insisted that they should take no action against such activities unless absolutely forced 
to by the threat of riots or by specific local circumstances. Conflicts were to be 
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avoided, he confirmed, since an incident-free day was desirable from both a domestic 
and foreign standpoint. Likewise, the ministry of war stood by its original 
instructions.48 
As a result, the day passed calmly. In fact, work stoppages were not general 
and many enterprises vital for the war effort continued their activity.49 Gatherings 
were well attended in the industrial centres, but there were almost no incidents before, 
during or after.50 Uniform reports from Carinthia, Carniola, Dalmatia, Galicia, the 
Littoral, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol and Silesia testified to the overall tranquillity of 
Cisleithania.51 Vienna too was undisturbed, despite playing host to twenty-two 
gatherings in eighteen districts, attended by around 12,000 people.52 The governor of 
Lower Austria noted that in the rest of the province the gatherings went by without 
incident, and that the speakers stuck to the draft provided by the party and to the 
instructions of the interior ministry. There was praise for Czernin and his peace 
efforts, and in many meetings in the province the efforts of the government on the 
food question were acknowledged. In addition, speakers dismissed the idea of peace 
at any cost and enjoined those present not to get carried away to the point of 
disturbing public order or demonstrating, since this would be seen as weakness 
abroad.53 In individual gatherings in Tyrol, the speakers “adopted a welcomingly 
warm tone by encouraging further self-sacrifice and loyalty to the state”.54 Such 
declarations were not limited to German elements. At an assembly in Freistadt in 
Silesia, the German speaker and his Polish counterpart “not only did not require 
intervention from the authorities, but were bluntly patriotic in their declarations”. 
They explained that the Social Democrats wished to support the Austrian government 
– the first to offer peace – with all their strength.55 
In the Bohemian lands, the overall picture was much the same. The Bohemian 
governorate informed the interior ministry that the day had gone by “in complete 
calm” and “had yielded not the slightest trouble”.56 From Prague, the chief of police 
concluded that it had “passed in the most complete calm and order, above all 
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expectations” while Kestřanek confirmed that the day “went by calmly and that in 
general people worked”.57 Indeed, many chose not to exercise their right to idleness. 
In Moravia, work stoppages had taken place only in individual districts, and in 
Bohemia, the picture was rather mixed.58 In Prague, a mere 7,000 stayed off work, 
mostly from small companies outside military jurisdiction, while the larger concerns, 
in particular the munitions factories, simply sent deputations to the gatherings. On the 
other hand, in Pilsen – Habrman’s territory – around 43,000 out of 44,480 workers 
took the day off. Yet even in these cases, the decision was taken in agreement with the 
factories’ military leadership, and not a single conflict was reported.59 A handful of 
hunger and peace demonstrations did, as usual, take place in Bohemia,60 but these 
were uncoordinated and not specific to the occasion. Nor did they all display anger 
towards the authorities. In Písek, the peace protestors offered to support the 
government with all their strength, if it heeded their request to initiate steps towards a 
quick and honourable peace without annexations or reparations.61 Reports noted that 
the mood in the poorly attended Social Democratic gatherings was placid, and in 
many cases apathetic.62 The addresses obeyed the directives from Vienna, were 
moderate in tone and content, and expressed no ill will. The speakers stressed the 
universal yearning for peace, and their declarations “usually culminated in a welcome 
approval of the position of the foreign minister on the question of annexations”.63 
In his speech in the Municipal House in Prague,64 Tusar made clear that the 
interests of the Czech working class were best served by Austria, declaring: “We see 
the historical necessity in the Austrian state, uniting the nations of Central Europe on 
the bridge from west to east, and by building on Austrian ground we are simply 
echoing what the founders and the greatest leaders of the Czech nation advocated.” 
He also called for a revision of the constitution based on the self-determination of all 
Austrian nations, but stressed that such reforms could not be dictated from abroad.65 
The local police chief observed with satisfaction that he had said nothing about state 
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rights, thereby riling “the so-called middle class, in which the national and state-rights 
spirit is the liveliest”.66 Tusar also denounced a peace at all costs, as per Czernin’s 
instructions.67 Similarly, in Brno, speaker Antonín Němec condemned Wilson’s 
attitude and exclaimed: “We do not want peace at any price but an honourable, fair 
peace, without annexations, as our foreign minister has declared.”68 The resolution 
later adopted maintained that Austria-Hungary had only been dragged into the war to 
defend her existence.69 In his own speech at the Municipal House, Šmeral likewise 
began by justifying the wartime policies of the party, and by apologizing for its lack 
of contact with the workers, who, he acknowledged, had become suspicious and 
distrustful.70 He explained that the Social Democrats wished to participate 
constructively in the business of state, and were therefore making common cause with 
the bourgeois parties within the Czech Union. In the name of the party, he openly 
reached out to the Centralists, to the German Social Democrats and even to the 
German bourgeois parties in order to pave the way for democratization and 
constitutional reform. He expressed his conviction that the “messy” relations between 
Czechs and Germans in the Bohemian lands only played into the hands of the 
opponents of democracy. Yet he also confirmed the party’s commitment to its 
founding principles, to rapturous applause: “Our aim is for a fundamental, 
revolutionary change of the existing political and economic order to emerge from the 
upheaval of this world war. The word “revolutionary” I use in full consciousness of 
its meaning.”71 But in spite of this grandiloquent reassurance, Šmeral’s policy was 
anything but revolutionary. On the contrary, he wished to achieve his goals within the 
framework of Austria-Hungary, and with the assistance of the government. This, as 
Clam had been told, would in fact help avert revolution.72 What is more, his 
promotion of national reconciliation, though no doubt pleasing to the authorities, no 
longer corresponded to the political reality. Although he continually claimed to speak 
in the name of Czech Social Democracy, this was fast becoming a baseless assertion. 
Indeed, Šmeral was increasingly out of step with the mood of his party, of the Czech 
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political world and of the Czech public. Yet for the time being, despite rumblings, he 
faced little organized opposition and pushed on single-mindedly. 
From the point of view of the government, however, the marriage of 
convenience with the Social Democratic leadership had seemingly paid dividends, 
and the latter’s sincerity in this collaboration, and continued loyalty to the state, were 
everywhere in evidence. The May Day congregations ended with the adoption of 
resolutions which echoed Czernin’s own words in the Fremden-Blatt on 31 March 
and 26 April, stating the readiness of the working population for an immediate peace 
without conquests or humiliation of the belligerent nations, and objecting to the 
further outpouring of blood.73 And although they also saluted the Russian proletariat 
for having paved the way towards a new political and social era, it seemed that 
Czernin had already resigned himself to this compromise, ostensibly at least. He 
therefore had cause for satisfaction, while Karl, who fully endorsed his minister’s 
strategy, was able to boast that, unlike Germany, Austria-Hungary had experienced an 
untroubled May Day.74 
 
This, however, was an illusory satisfaction, and the truce in the Austrian half of the 
Empire owed less to the benevolent attitude of the authorities, the calming influence 
of the Social Democrats and the goodwill of the masses, than to the marginal and 
temporary improvement in supplies. Kestřanek recognized this and urged work by 
every means “towards the stabilization and improvement of the current food situation 
[…] in order to maintain peace in the province and thereby perhaps in the whole of 
Austria”.75 As he dreaded, this was not achieved, and the entire month was 
subsequently plagued by incidents. In his summary of events relevant to the state 
police for the month of May, the minister of the interior noted that the difficulty in the 
provision of food and other articles of daily necessity “had caused numerous 
demonstrations by the population in almost all administrative areas” of Cisleithania.76 
The authorities managed these effectively, and in the occasional cases of rioting, the 
summoned military forces refrained from using their weapons. However, this was a 
meagre consolation in light of the extent of the troubles and of the remarkable 
evolution that had taken place over the course of two months. Their concentration was 
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also a source of concern. In his aforementioned compendium, Handel drew a list of 
the demonstrations not included in his daily reports: these had affected four locations 
in Lower Austria (excluding Vienna), one in Upper Austria, one in Salzburg, five in 
Styria, five in the Littoral, two in Tyrol, two in Silesia and two in Galicia, but thirteen 
in Moravia and, Prague aside, forty-three in Bohemia. Further, all three lands of the 
crown of Saint Wenceslas dominated the register of previously unreported strikes. 
The protests and demonstrations across Bohemia were almost always carried out 
before the local seats of authority, and involved mostly women and children.77 Yet 
acts of violence and theft occurred relatively rarely.78 As the authorities reported, 
many of these demonstrations resembled peace rallies.79 The strike movements in 
mines,80 industrial works and factories,81 and among railway workers82 were short and 
relatively small, but very frequent. In some cases, the authorities suspected outside 
influences83 or ulterior political motives,84 suggesting greater planning and 
organization; at least once they blamed the Social Democrats for their involvement in 
the movements,85 but on another occasion they concluded that the party had had no 
inkling of these, and had intervened hurriedly to prevent any imprudence.86 In fact, 
the latter occurrence was more symptomatic of the times, and betrayed the loosening 
grip of the party on the masses. The replacement of the older peacetime 
representatives by younger, politically motivated elements, which had begun in 
Prague during the mid-April troubles, continued.87 
In the Bohemian capital, demonstrations of starving women and children took 
place almost daily in front of the governor’s office and the various town halls, often 
accompanied by the familiar cries for peace and bread.88 In his report on 15 May, 
Kestřanek stood by his judgement of 30 March and still thought it unlikely that the 
workers’ movement was pursuing political and national goals as well as social ones.89 
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However, he stressed its unpredictability and warned of its potential exploitation by 
national chauvinists. He once again urged coordinated efforts to tackle the supply 
problem, and especially to end the pointless and embittering queues for food. Though 
he acknowledged that the mood of the workers had been raised a little by the modest 
improvement of the situation, he insisted that it remained critical in many areas.90 
Alongside – or, indeed, because of – this growing desperation, there was a 
corresponding increase in the frequency and intensity of subversive activities. The 
survey of cases relevant to the state police in May revealed the overwhelming 
predominance of Bohemia and Moravia in acts of insubordination, of treason and of 
hostility towards the state, the army and the imperial house.91 Further, Kestřanek 
reported that the number of anonymous offences against the state was greater than 
usual. One letter, posted to the governor on 4 May and signed by “The Czech nation”, 
threatened him personally, and added: “We draw attention to the fact that as soon as 
Karl moves to Prague, he and his family are lost.”92 Earlier, a letter sent from Karlín 
to the emperor himself had already warned: “We will not let ourselves be tormented 
by hunger – our fathers and brothers have weapons in their hands and will certainly 
know how to turn them against you. Woe betide you! This will be even more terrible 
than in Russia. Austrian democracy will punish the culprits more severely. In a week 
everything will be avenged.”93 Invariably, the authorities had little success in 
punishing the elusive perpetrators; at the time, Kestřanek could point to only two 
cases prosecuted by the military court in Prague, both of which had ended without a 
conviction.94 What is more, acts of insubordination extended beyond the civilian 
population. For example, at the Poldi steelworks in Kladno, forty soldiers ordered to 
unload coal performed their task in a deliberately casual manner, and three-quarters of 
the men failed to show up the following day, prompting charges of mutiny.95 
In addition, this strained atmosphere reawakened traditional national 
antagonisms. Largely latent until then, their emergence did not escape the watchful 
and increasingly worried eye of the authorities. The chief of police in Prague observed 
that the deep-rooted desire for peace and confidence therein was moving in a pan-Slav 
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and anti-German direction due to the “nationalization” of Social Democracy.96 
Meanwhile, Kestřanek also noticed a growth in Slavophile – he thought perhaps even 
Russophile – thoughts in certain strata of the population, as well as an intensification 
of the conflict between Germans and Czechs. The latter’s feelings of animosity 
invariably extended to the German Empire and the Hohenzollerns, at a time when 
Bohemia was awash with rumours of an imminent declaration of war by Berlin on 
Vienna.97 The climate of agitation and uncertainty throughout the crownland was 
propitious to such tales; hearsay at the time also held that Kramář was free and on a 
special mission, that Bohemia was soon to become an independent kingdom, that Karl 
intended to come to Prague to be crowned, and that he would stay until Zita bore him 
a prince.98 Of course, none of this was true, and in light of the overwrought local 
conditions and death threats, even a simple stopover by the emperor in the Bohemian 
capital might have been considered an unnecessary risk. Six months after coming to 
the throne, Karl was yet to visit Prague99 – in fact, he never did throughout his reign. 
 
Yet once again, the emperor needed not travel to the epicentre of unrest in order to 
witness popular discontent and comprehend the gravity of the situation. On 8 May in 
Baden, he noticed from his study in the Kaiserhaus a gathering of over 50 people in 
front of the building, screaming their resentment at the lack of food; though they were 
easily dispersed, he immediately ordered an investigation into the local supply 
situation. As the inquiry concluded that the town was rather better off than others in 
this respect,100 Karl could easily imagine conditions elsewhere in the Empire. 
Sensitive to the plight of his people, he often tried to help directly, but was not always 
as successful as he had been after the Prague crisis in mid-April. For instance, his 
donations of food to the local population around his residence in Laxenburg had 
encouraged mass processions to the palace by poor women demanding help. The 
authorities in the district had noted that the parties whose requests they turned down 
often responded by declaring that they would simply go to the emperor himself.101 
More unfortunately still, Karl had given his moral and financial backing to a relief 
action planned for Zita’s twenty-fifth birthday on 9 May, entitled “Free bread for the 
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poor of Vienna”, whose initial aim was to reach 10,000 people a day.102 Mayor 
Weiskirchner has his doubts from the start, and became increasingly worried when the 
numerous posters and press announcements for the campaign seemed to indicate that 
it was in fact a free addition to the ration. His fears were justified, as thousands 
stormed individual district posts demanding extra bread, in vain. Voices were heard 
shouting: “We want the bread of the empress! The empress wants to give us bread and 
we are not getting any!” In several locations, scenes of pandemonium and violence 
erupted, requiring interventions from security guards, the police and even the fire 
brigade. The female volunteers on duty complained that their safety had been 
endangered, and rejected any further participation in an action planned “without any 
social understanding”. As a result, in order to restore calm, Weiskirchner had to 
organize an emergency distribution at considerable cost. He could scarcely conceal 
his displeasure in informing Marterer of the fiasco, and concluded by highlighting the 
unanimous resolution of all twenty-one district mayors that any such scheme be 
properly vetted in future.103 
 Unable to feed his subjects, Karl could at least thank them for their sacrifices 
and enjoin them to persevere, which he did through a handwritten letter to Clam 
published in the press on 12 May.104 He declared: “The third winter of war with all its 
hardships lies behind us, […] we can expect spring to bring relief to our lives but until 
then it is necessary to hold on, and in this we shall also undoubtedly succeed, even 
with great privations”. He added: “In this difficult time, I feel pressed to tell my 
beloved peoples how deeply their trials and tribulations go to my heart, that I send 
them my warmest thanks for their willingness to make sacrifices and the patience with 
which they have taken upon themselves all the burdens of war.” He also specifically 
acknowledged the achievements of the women of the Empire.105 Although he was 
undoubtedly sincere in his gratitude (and in his fear of social revolution, which many 
still considered inevitable),106 and although the German-speaking educated classes 
continuously praised his compassion, such declarations found little resonance among 
the exasperated and despondent population.107 Though the Neue Freie Presse and the 
Reichspost fell over themselves to extol Karl for his words, the Arbeiter-Zeitung 
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carried the missive without commentary, under the laconic title: “The emperor on 
holding out.”108 
 
The quest for peace 
 
But, at the time, Karl believed in earnest that peace was approaching and that, indeed, 
his people needed to persist only a little longer. Russia’s apparent incapacity to fight 
on (despite Milyukov’s renewed promise that she would honour her alliances and 
fight until the victorious end),109 Italy’s secret peace offer, and his brother-in-law’s 
ongoing mission, all continued to convince him that an agreement with the Entente 
was close. These hopes soon proved misplaced. In the remainder of May, peace with 
Russia remained elusive, Italy launched her tenth offensive on the Isonzo and, 
crucially, Sixtus’s endeavour faltered. Indeed, by the time Karl’s brothers-in-law had 
returned to Paris with his letter in late March, Briand had been replaced by Alexandre 
Ribot, who was considerably less enthusiastic about this channel.110 Lloyd George 
was still keen to pursue the matter but insisted that the Italians be informed.111 But 
when he and his French counterpart met foreign minister Sonnino in Saint-Jean-de-
Maurienne on 19 April, they found him uncompromising, and the negotiations were 
consequently put on hold.112 Sixtus transmitted the news to Erdödy on 25 April in 
Switzerland, urging Karl to make sacrifices towards Italy.113 When they met there 
again, on 4 May, the envoy carried a letter from Karl and one from Zita, both of 
which implored Sixtus to visit them once more.114 He also delivered an oral message 
from the emperor, apparently indicating that he was willing to make a secret peace 
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with the Entente, albeit without openly betraying Germany.115 Sixtus agreed to go to 
Vienna the following day.116 
On 8 May, he met Karl (and later Czernin) in Laxenburg, and stressed that this 
was the best time for peace. He pointed to the failure of unrestricted submarine 
warfare and to the irresistible boost provided by the Americans, who might favour the 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.117 Karl still balked at Italian claims, but was no 
longer quite as categorical. On 1 May, he had put to Arz the simple supposition that 
the surrender of the Trentino might be the key, though upon hearing his general’s stiff 
response, he reassured him that he harboured no such thoughts.118 Karl nevertheless 
told Sixtus that he would consider the cession of land of Italian language and 
sentiment in return for compensation in the form of Italian territory.119 (In a 
conversation with Berchtold in January 1915, he had mentioned relinquishing “a 
small piece” of the Trentino, though this was to buy Italian neutrality.)120 There was 
certainly no sign of desperation, or of a desire for peace at all costs, as Czernin’s 
unrelenting ambitions in Romania (and Karl’s qualified support therefor) showed.121 
Nor had the Austrian strategy changed. As Czernin had written to Musulin on 5 May: 
“We are following our line completely consistently. We hereby have the dual task of 
leaving the Entente in no doubt that we cannot be separated from our ally, but, on the 
other hand, of putting pressure on Germany to obtain moderate demands.”122 This 
was, of course, a fantasy, since peace with the Entente was categorically impossible as 
long as Austria remained committed to her alliance. Czernin, asked by Sixtus how 
Germany would react to a separate Austro-Hungarian peace, responded defiantly that 
his country was not under Berlin’s thumb, that he did not spare the chancellor and that 
the sabre-rattling of the German high command did not impress him.123 Moreover, 
much as he had done during Sixtus’s previous visit, Karl declared: “Si l’Allemagne 
continue à ne pas vouloir écouter nos suggestions raisonnables, nous ferons la paix 
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sans elle, car c’est notre droit et notre devoir et nous en avons les moyens.” He even 
added: “Si, cependant, cela devait se gâter entre nous et l’Allemagne, je dois être en 
mesure de pouvoir compter sur l’appui de l’Entente.” However, he immediately 
qualified his declaration: “D’ailleurs, je compte dès maintenant sur la raison d’une 
grande partie de la population allemande.”124 
Indeed, though undeniably exasperated by the Germans,125 neither Karl nor 
Czernin seriously envisaged breaking the alliance, despite their bluster and the recent 
tensions with Berlin. When speaking to Wedel the very next day, Karl lauded his and 
Czernin’s relations with the chancellor and the state secretary which, he said, 
“ensured a harmonious and consistent collaboration and allowed their holding out 
until the end, faithful and united”.126 On the eve of Sixtus’s visit, Czernin had already 
publicly thanked Bethmann – who had congratulated him on being awarded the Grand 
Cross of the Order of Saint Stephen by Karl – by declaring: “The close alliance with 
the German Empire is the bedrock of the policy of Austria-Hungary.”127 Later in the 
month, when Baernreither warned him that the Czechs were exploiting the strained 
relations with Berlin and causing increasing resentment among the Germans of 
Austria, Czernin emphatically declared that he would rather jump off the balcony than 
abandon the alliance.128 Meanwhile, both Karl and Czernin had recently given express 
assurances to the Bavarian prime minister Hertling that they would not leave 
Germany in the lurch under any circumstances.129 Moreover, the Austrian and 
Hungarian governments had only just met for a joint ministerial conference, under 
Czernin’s chairmanship, to initiate the economic rapprochement of the Monarchy 
with Germany, a prelude to Mitteleuropa.130 (Admittedly, Karl quickly and resolutely 
rejected this.)131 But since neither the emperor nor his minister believed scission from 
Germany to be an indispensable precondition for an agreement with the West, both 
were confident of success in achieving peace, whether a general settlement by dint of 
German moderation or, should this fail, a separate agreement with German 
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approbation. Czernin therefore shook Sixtus’s hand with a smile and added: “J’espère 
que bientôt nous ne serons plus ennemis”,132 while a buoyant Karl promised to write a 
new missive specifying his intentions towards Italy, in the expectation of a clear and 
definitive answer from the Entente. 
The following day, he handed his brother-in-law his second handwritten letter, 
declaring: “C’est assez clair maintenant, je l’espère.” In fact, Karl again stopped short 
of committing himself to any concessions to Italy, and merely indicated that he would 
postpone consideration of her secret offer until France and England responded to his 
own proposal. He adjoined a blunt note by Czernin, which unconditionally refused 
any one-sided cession of land to Rome and demanded guarantees for the Monarchy’s 
territorial integrity. Only after clarification of both points, it explained, would Austria-
Hungary enter into negotiations with her ally. To keep his venture alive, Sixtus 
deliberately mistranslated this point, in order to give the impression that Austria-
Hungary would conclude a separate peace with the Entente upon receipt of the two 
aforementioned guarantees, and inform her allies only after the event.133 But not even 
this deception could save a mission in any case condemned by the question of Italy. 
Nevertheless, the imperial couple were certain that peace was near – Karl believed it 
“three-quarters done” – and that a new life dawned for the Monarchy.134 
Overconfident of Sixtus’s influence, misled by Italy’s dubious offer and blind to the 
Entente’s implacable attitude towards Germany (and vice versa), Karl believed he 
could secure a peace which both denied the claims of his arch-enemy and preserved 
his loyalty towards his ally. But such was now the gap in outlook between him and 
the Entente that the latter did not even deign to answer his missive.135 Sixtus’s 
mission limped on for a few weeks, until the Prince finally gave up and returned to his 
regiment on 25 June, ten days after the date Karl had envisaged for the final 
negotiations in Switzerland with the Entente.136 
 
In any case, the emptiness and futility of Austrian assurances to Sixtus were exposed 
soon after his departure. Determined to involve Germany, Czernin swiftly asked 
Bethmann to Vienna and, on 13 May, indicated to him – without mentioning the 
                                               
132 Sixte, p.172. 
133 All three drafts in: Sixte, pp.177-180. 
134 Ibid., pp.174-175, 192. 
135 Ibid., p.242. 
136 Ibid., pp.185, 241. 
 248 
source, and indeed quite inaccurately – that England, France and Italy had made 
Austria-Hungary a separate peace offer in exchange for ceding the Trentino and a few 
islands to Rome.137 However, Czernin immediately made clear that he would not act 
upon the proposal before consulting his ally, assuring the chancellor that Austria 
would remain loyal and that this hypothetical “legitimate separate peace” would not 
damage Germany in any way.138 The Austrians, exasperated and exhausted, appeared 
to consider a separate peace for the first time, yet still would only proceed with 
Berlin’s blessing. In fact, for Czernin, and, indeed, for Karl, any such offer from the 
Entente was above all a useful means of putting pressure on their ally, not an 
incentive to break the alliance. As Czernin made no threats and sought no concessions 
from Bethmann, he perhaps reasoned that his revelation alone would help sway the 
Germans in the desired direction. He was mistaken. On the other hand, he cannot have 
imagined that Berlin would tolerate any kind of separate peace between Austria-
Hungary and the Entente. Unsurprisingly, Wilhelm was categorical in response to 
Bethmann’s report: “The offer must be rejected”.139 In any case, there was no offer, 
and neither the general nor the separate peace which Karl and Czernin imagined could 
possibly arise from Sixtus’s flawed mission. When Bethmann – who had consented to 
Czernin’s pursuing the matter – later inquired about its progress, the foreign minister 
simply answered that the enemy had not given any news.140 And just as the lights 
went out on Austria’s peace prospects in the west, so too did they in the east. 
 Ever since the declaration of the Austrian, Hungarian and German Socialists, 
and the subsequent publication of the conspicuously discordant newspaper articles, 
relations between Berlin and Vienna had been strained.141 In vain, and assisted by 
Hohenlohe,142 Czernin had continued to press for German moderation towards Russia, 
in order to lay the ground for peace talks. The Austrians again made much of their 
dismal domestic circumstances. Czernin pointed out that, unlike Germany, where both 
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a war and a peace party existed, Austria was home only to the latter;143 meanwhile, 
Karl joined him in emphasizing the need to prevent the Slavs of the Empire from 
being able to claim that Austria-Hungary was fighting only for German war aims.144 
Both warned that the threat of revolution had to be taken particularly seriously in a 
country held together only by its ruling dynasty.145 As Karl told Admiral 
Holtzendorff, in an echo of Grillparzer’s famous words: “Your Kaiser has an easy 
time of it. He rides a proud national horse. I have a team of four horses, all of 
different temperaments.”146 A fatalistic Czernin added: “We shall hold out to the last, 
until the collapse of the Monarchy, but, tell me, where is the advantage if we let 
things go too far?”147 The Germans, once again, thought that the Austrians had lost 
their nerve and that they were desperately seeking a rapid peace at their expense.148 In 
light of their intransigence, Czernin had even abandoned his insistence on the status 
quo ante bellum with Russia, so as to acknowledge German wishes for “border 
rectifications”. He then enlisted the help of Hertling to obtain a joint declaration by 
Vienna and Berlin expressing their wholehearted solidarity with each other’s war 
aims towards Russia: status quo ante in the case of Austria and territorial adjustments 
for Germany (though Czernin undoubtedly envisaged corresponding Austrian gains 
elsewhere).149 They hoped this would, at a stroke, banish the rumours of divergences 
and entice the Russians to the negotiating table. Yet Bethmann, though he had 
repeatedly promised that he would not allow peace negotiations to fail on account of 
annexationist desires, rejected this plan, as did Zimmermann.150 Czernin was incensed 
– he thought Bethmann “short-sighted” and bemoaned his “unreasonable obstinacy”, 
which he ascribed to fear of the pan-Germans – and continued to pester Berlin, 
arguing that the Slavs of the Monarchy already expected a separate peace and a break 
from Germany as a result of these disagreements.151 Diplomatic relations were 
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increasingly strained,152 but the Austrians could not raise their voices too loudly for 
fear of undermining the chancellor, whose position was already under threat from the 
pan-German hardliners. Despite his frequent reticence and impotence, Vienna was 
desperate for him to stay in office, lest a stooge of the high command replace him.153 
And although Karl and Czernin had in fact weakened Bethmann’s position and 
angered the Wilhelmstrasse by dealing directly with the German military,154 
Hohenlohe had succeeded in smoothing over these differences by the time Sixtus 
arrived in Vienna.155 Encouraged by the prospect of a separate peace brought by the 
Prince, Czernin abandoned his pleas for a joint declaration of war aims and ceased to 
put pressure on Germany for moderation in the east. 
In any case, the Russians themselves were not forthcoming. The fall of 
Milyukov and the inclusion of several socialists in the provisional government had 
raised hopes for a quick peace, but its first announcement on 18 May dashed these 
illusions.156 With Kerensky now minister of war, it firmly rejected a separate peace, 
defended a general settlement without annexations or reparations, and sought unity 
with its allies on the basis of Lvov’s April declaration of war aims;157 moreover, it 
announced its concord with the Petersburg Soviet which, in its appeal to the world’s 
socialists three days earlier, had also rejected any separate peace which would give 
the imperialist Austro-German alliance free rein, and had called on the military to 
defend Russian freedom.158 Meanwhile, in his speech to the Reichstag on 15 May, 
Bethmann refused to reveal German war aims (and thus to renounce annexations in 
the east) and emphasized, albeit untruthfully, his complete agreement with the army 
high command. He boasted: “Our military situation is better than it has even been 
since the beginning of the war”, adding: “Time is on our side”. On the other hand, his 
words towards Russia were conciliatory, if vague, and he strove to deny any 
divergence of opinion with Austria in the question of peace.159 For Czernin, who had 
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discussed the content of the address with him during his visit to Vienna,160 this was 
better than nothing. A semi-official reaction was issued in the Fremden-Blatt the 
following day, praising the chancellor, assuring Russia once again that she could 
conclude an honourable peace with Germany and Austria at any moment, and 
asserting bombastically: “no power in this world could tear the Monarchy from the 
side of her ally. […] The bonds which tie us to the German Reich are never to be 
broken.”161 This claim was soon given substance. 
 Having tried and failed, through Wedel, to win over Czernin to the Kreuznach 
plan (which respected neither the parity of war gains and war losses agreed upon, nor 
the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary),162 the Germans had finally asked him to a 
conference on eastern war aims.163 In the meantime, they had become unsettled by the 
news of the Entente’s alleged peace offer to Austria, even though they did not doubt 
Karl’s and Czernin’s loyalty.164 Wedel worried that Austria now faced a potential 
choice between an advantageous peace with the Entente, and continued fighting 
alongside Germany until the bitter end with neither guarantee nor hope of a positive 
outcome.165 But, rather than encourage the Germans to moderate their ambitions in 
the interest of peace, this development prompted them to indulge Austrian 
pretensions, particularly in Romania;166 Czernin played along. Accordingly, the 
Kreuznach Agreement, worked out on 17 and 18 May, marked the end of his 
campaign for peace in the east, and the victory of the German high command. 
According to the terms of the covenant, Austria-Hungary retained her full territorial 
integrity (plus the Lovćen) while Montenegro, northern Albania and a reduced, 
landlocked Serbia would become her military, political and economic dependencies; 
furthermore, if Germany acquired Courland, Lithuania and control of Poland, 
occupied Romania would enter Austria’s sphere of influence (though German 
economic and material interests there would be guaranteed). In any case, the two 
powers agreed to the equality of gains in the east and in the Balkans.167 With Russia 
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now denied the compensation envisaged for her in the original plan, a negotiated 
peace in the east – in any case a dim prospect – was out of the question. This 
agreement implied complete victory. 
Czernin returned from the conference seemingly very satisfied, particularly 
with the guarantees for the preservation of the Monarchy’s integrity and the 
acquisition of Romania.168 He told Wedel that although they had “shared out uncaught 
fish and he doubted whether the catch would succeed”, the prospect of winning the 
war was now more encouraging; he added that Karl thought likewise. In the same 
breath, however, he told the ambassador that the resumption of hostilities with Russia 
had to be avoided at all costs.169 Czernin was evidently not willing to fight for the 
Kreuznach Agreement. Perhaps he intended it as a bargaining chip in future 
negotiations with the Entente for his “legitimate separate peace”, or as an enticement 
towards a general peace. He told Baernreither on 24 May that he would conclude 
peace as soon as the status quo ante was offered, but also indicated that he needed to 
safeguard the Monarchy’s autonomy in order to preserve its chances of being the 
peace mediator, in full agreement with Germany and, indeed, to her advantage.170 
These designs were of course illusory; thus the net result of his stay at German 
headquarters was to tie Austria-Hungary more closely to her ally, to renounce Poland 
and to eliminate the possibility of peace with Russia. 
 
Reform? 
 
Karl was nevertheless sanguine. As yet unaware of Sixtus’s failure, and still 
convinced of imminent diplomatic success, he now sought to pursue the fundamental 
domestic reform which his plan for peace also presupposed. Here, too, his actions fell 
short of his ambitions. Finally rid of the octroi, he proved unable to push through his 
preferred course. On 14 April, he had received from Polzer the draft manifesto so 
keenly requested on the train three days earlier. The document in question “was to 
give expression to [his] resolution to deal justly with all his peoples, to set Austria on 
her natural, because firmest, foundations, and to guarantee national autonomy within 
the limits drawn by the interests of the state as a whole”, and exhorted the Reichsrat 
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to cooperate in the constitutional reorganization of the Monarchy. But when Polzer 
subsequently presented his autonomy programme, he realized that Karl’s enthusiasm 
had been dampened: “I got the impression that the emperor had already discussed the 
question with Count Clam, and had come up against opposition from him, as the 
responsible head of the government. Nor had I any doubt that Count Czernin had also 
taken the liberty of saying a decisive word. The manifesto was dropped, which I 
regretted very much.”171 Karl thus sacrificed a programme apparently “entirely in 
harmony with [his] intentions”172 under pressure from the same men who had 
previously manoeuvred him into accepting a programme wholly at odds with these 
same intentions. Karl had managed to banish the octroi because he had Czernin’s 
support but, by the same token, he failed to implement Polzer’s plan because he 
lacked it. As long as the foreign minister and the Clam cabinet were in place, such a 
reform was inconceivable. Moreover, the German nationalists’ outrage at the 
abandonment of the octroi had deterred Karl from striking a decisive blow to their 
cause. Instead, he had pleaded for their support and had conserved his pro-German 
cabinet. Further, by failing to repudiate the octroi personally and by suggesting to its 
supporters that its suspension was temporary, he kept their hopes alive. For instance, 
after a conversation with him on 10 May, Baernreither once again gained the 
impression that a “consistent, brave and purposeful influence, illustrated by facts (to 
which he is very receptive) and accompanied by a genuine sense of justice, would find 
a ruler within him who could perhaps put Austria back on her feet”. Though he felt it 
would require steady work and the ability to make dry subjects palatable to the 
emperor, he believed that was “by no means unattainable”.173 To Baernreither, of 
course, the country’s salvation lay in the octroi. Notwithstanding Karl’s oft-remarked 
reluctance to speak bluntly and unfailingly sincere demeanour,174 his accommodating 
attitude reflected both his fear of a German revolt and his desire for a political truce at 
home while he concluded peace abroad. 
Yet the internal reorganization of Austria-Hungary he advocated to this end 
seemed driven less by sincere ideological conviction than by his desire to prevent 
social revolution, and to end the war under terms that would preserve both dynasty 
and empire. Polzer himself reasoned that his plan would cut the ground “from beneath 
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the feet of the enemies of the Monarchy and at the same time of the republican-
democratic elements, of whose emergence after the war there could be no doubt”. He 
admitted: “The emperor, like me, was of the opinion that the realization, even the 
proclamation of national autonomy, would deprive the Entente Powers of their trump 
card, pity for and desire to champion the little nations.”175 Seen thus, the “national 
autonomy” promoted by Polzer appeared to be a vague cultural autonomy, devoid any 
of any real decentralized administrative or political power – as Karl had always 
intended. In any case, the emperor desisted from forcing the realization of this 
pragmatic view, and for now, the dismantling of military dictatorship, the repeal of 
the German course and the recall of parliament must have seemed sufficient signals 
for home and abroad that Austria was on the path to democratization.  
Even so, Karl could not fully resign himself to abandoning the plan, especially 
since he thought peace within reach. In early May, he told Haerdtl, a former interior 
minister: “One must govern with the people, for only the people have fought the 
war.”176 On 15 May, while travelling back from Trent, he once again broached the 
subject with Polzer. He admitted that he had encountered the greatest difficulties in 
attempting to convince his ministers of the merits of the programme, which was 
generally considered impracticable. Polzer reiterated his views at length, and stressed 
that the Slavs could be won over to cooperation only if a resolution of the South Slav 
question was announced, and dualism gradually abolished to allow national autonomy 
in Transleithania too.177 Karl listened in silence, and the following morning instructed 
Polzer to telephone Clam at once, and to demand the inclusion of a passage on 
national autonomy in the speech from the throne, which was to be held before 
parliament on 31 May. The prime minister replied that this would “upset his draft 
entirely” and that he would need to speak to the emperor in person. Polzer realized 
that the government adamantly opposed his idea, but he nevertheless insisted to Karl 
that it study the question thoroughly, since a future cabinet facing an emergency ought 
not to be caught unawares. Karl agreed that the matter should be investigated by an ad 
hoc commission of experts within the cabinet office, and ordered Polzer to discuss 
this with Clam. When the two spoke on 19 May, the latter, who had stiffened since 
their last conversation, revealed his fundamental hostility to the programme, which he 
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regarded as unfeasible, but nevertheless considered Polzer’s principles suitable “in the 
unlikely event of [their] ever coming to closer quarters with the idea”.178 In other 
words, it would not be carried out as long as he was prime minister. 
 
This left his government with no policy to present to the Reichsrat. Having drudged 
on the octroi for almost four months, the cabinet had neither the time nor the will to 
prepare an alternative. In the six weeks he had at his disposal, Clam diligently 
addressed all the technicalities and trivialities connected to the recall of the House,179 
but proved far less adept at the formidable task of securing parliamentary support. 
Straight after the octroi’s repeal, it had been thought that he would have to reshuffle 
his cabinet and broaden its support by including both Czech and German deputies.180 
(The idea of forming a new government consisting of parliamentarians or, failing that, 
bureaucrats, was also in the air.) Trnka had approached Tusar on 17 April181 to 
establish whether the Czech Union was willing to “collaborate actively”: in other 
words, to join a future cabinet. Trnka suggested that the Czechs could thereby acquire 
considerable power in affairs of state; he also intimated that the emperor might ask 
him, as a Czech minister, for his opinion on the composition of the next cabinet and 
on suitable candidates. Tusar responded that the parliamentary commission had 
discussed the issue in its last meeting without reaching a decision, but nevertheless 
indicated that the Czech Union was capable of cooperation as long as it was fully 
informed of the government’s future direction. When Trnka inquired about the 
specific participation of the Czech Social Democrats, he was told that this would 
represent a complete turnaround for the party, and was not, therefore, part of its aims. 
Only in the case of the German Social Democrats entering government would the 
Czechs feel compelled to follow. And should the party be forced to do so under other 
circumstances, out of absolute necessity, it would insist on the inclusion of the 
Agrarians. The men ran through a few names, but Tusar indicated that the whole 
discussion was purely academic.182 
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Despite this tepid response, rumour soon had it that Šmeral was to be offered a 
ministerial post (along with Renner).183 Dismayed and worried by this prospect, 
Habrman responded violently in Nová doba.184 Lidové Noviny, Večer, Venkov and 
Národ joined in the agitation against Šmeral’s participation in government.185 Šmeral, 
though he did not object in principle, cannot have been enthusiastic. The risks and 
responsibilities of joining a wartime administration were considerable, the rewards 
uncertain. In any case, he could hardly consider entering Clam’s reviled cabinet. The 
hearsay continued incessantly for several weeks186 until eventually, on 22 May, an 
article by Soukup in Právo lidu confirmed that the Social Democratic leadership had 
no intention of entering government, though it left the door open for such a 
possibility, should it correspond to the will of the people.187 
As it happened, Clam made no such offer to Šmeral and no reshuffle took 
place. The cabinet remained unchanged, as did the prime minister’s outlook. And as 
he had already made clear that he would rather stand down than use a Slav-Socialist 
majority, he could, at best, count on the German bourgeois parties and the Poles. The 
nationalist elements of the former had seemingly been pacified, at least until the 
reopening of parliament, but the latter demanded a substantial down payment for their 
cooperation. As a result, Clam focused all his energies on winning their support, and 
for weeks, to the dismay of many, scarcely sought or made contact with any other 
party.188 Unable to satisfy its traditional allies, whose continued support was in any 
case dependent on the impossible fulfilment of their demands, and unwilling to reach 
out to other partners, the government faced an inescapable predicament. Its inability 
to react attracted scorn and derision, and wreaked further damage on its already low 
standing. Redlich, sharp-tongued as ever, complained that the government’s 
“incompetence and indecision [were] as great as its inactivity”.189 He later added: 
“Here, ‘above’, complete helplessness reigns.”190 Earlier in the month, his friend 
Haerdtl had predicted that the cabinet would last only a few weeks.191 Meanwhile, 
Schlitter noted: “Our Clam cabinet is still wobbling because it is unlikely to get a 
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majority in the Reichsrat.”192 For his part, Koerber was typically negative and 
believed that it no longer wanted to open parliament at all, to avoid the emperor 
having to take the oath on the constitution.193 Klein, the former minister of justice, 
sighed: “Lasciate ogni speranza!”194 Such pessimism was not limited to external 
observers. Baernreither, for one, now regretted not having resigned in February,195 
while Handel admitted that, after the failure of the octroi, “the ground had 
disappeared from under the feet of the Clam cabinet and it could no longer hope to 
consolidate its position again, even to the extent of working in a makeshift way with 
parliament”.196 The day after the octroi’s demise, he had told Tusar that the cabinet 
was doomed, and that he could not wait to get some peace and quiet.197 
Additionally, the beleaguered cabinet remained plagued by internal divisions. 
Baernreither, for instance, rued its lack of organized will. He and Urban continued to 
be frustrated by the passivity of their colleagues, who apparently failed to heed their 
warnings about the impending parliamentary storm. The former complained that the 
old Stürgkh ministers were fully estranged from the Reichsrat; Handel and Schenk, 
for instance, had never been before the House and seemed ruled by “a certain inactive 
fatalism”.198 
Furthermore, there were grave reservations about Clam’s personal 
competence. In early March, Baernreither had already committed his concerns to his 
diary: “Clam is scared of political waters and, truthfully, I do not know how he will 
act in parliament, when facing the pounding of waves which will certainly be as high 
as houses.”199 The Czechs complained to Czernin about his “hapless” methods and 
expressed serious doubts regarding his capacity to lead parliament.200 Steinwender 
told Tusar that if Clam had any understanding of parliamentary life, he would already 
have resigned.201 Austerlitz, the editor of the Arbeiter-Zeitung, thought Clam kind and 
well-intentioned, but incapable and without a hope in parliament.202 Wedel, too, 
worried that the prime minister did not seem up to the task and lacked relevant 
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experience. He added that the fact that the Reichsrat had remained terra incognita for 
Clam made him strongly reliant on his officials and parliamentary advisers, impairing 
his certainty and self-confidence.203 The Neue Freie Presse also admitted that despite 
his political experience, Clam had had only minimal contact with the Lower House, 
and therefore needed, beyond the support of the crown, “the trust of parliament, the 
help of parties willing to work [and] a popular policy [...]”.204 Unfortunately, he 
lacked all three. 
 
Admittedly, Clam had secured the endorsement of the German bourgeois parties, but 
while the continued backing of the Christian Socials appeared safe, the nationalists 
remained wary. As Leopold Waber, a deputy for Lower Austria explained, they 
retained an attitude of “extreme reservation” towards the policy of the government.205 
What is more, the prime minister was in no position to regain their trust and to cement 
their support, since he could not guarantee the execution of their plans, despite 
vowing to stick unshakeably to his goals. Clam, as often in such situations, preferred 
to make himself scarce, leading the German nationalists to bemoan his 
unavailability.206 Frustration increased and spread throughout their camp. At a sitting 
of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft, Redlich noted a strong resentment against the 
government, even among traditional toadies.207 Schlitter, too, remarked upon the 
general embitterment of the Germans.208 In adversity, the Nationalverband closed 
ranks; its Bohemian and Alpine leaders conferred to dispel any semblance of discord 
and expressed their desire for harmonious cooperation.209 Despite this, the former still 
held sway, as was apparent from the organization’s selection of a president for the 
Lower House. (As the largest bloc in parliament, its candidate would be 
unopposed.)210 Although the comparatively consensual Johann Dobernig from 
Carinthia was at first the overwhelming favourite, Wolf and his radicals instigated the 
candidacy of Nationalverband chairman and fellow Sudeten Groß, who was duly 
elected.211 To most, his unexpected nomination seemed a provocation; the German 
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Social Democrats, the Slovenes, the Czechs and the Ukrainians all registered their 
aversion to this choice, but the German Nationals and Christian Socials refused to 
consider a replacement.212 Redlich, who had voted against Groß, commented that it 
boded ill for parliament.213 
Indeed, the revival of constitutional life, and Karl’s urgings towards national 
conciliation, did little to bring about greater temperance within the Nationalverband. 
Certainly, the most radical – and therefore most disaffected – voices in the 
Nationalverband were often the loudest, and the majority of German Bohemians 
showed no inclination to soften their tone or moderate their views. On 13 May, a large 
representation of the German Progressive Party of Bohemia met in Prague to reaffirm 
its intentions.214 Though loyalty to the emperor appeared undiminished and his 
prestige untarnished,215 the government came under heavy criticism. Chairman Kafka 
declared: “The solving of the ministerial crisis in no way signifies the final 
reconciliation […] of the German deputies with the Clam-Martinic cabinet. The 
decision is simply postponed.” He expected the subject of internal reorganization to 
appear on the parliamentary agenda from the start and added that, henceforth, there 
would be neither concessions nor tolerance of delays. Should the constitutional 
execution of the matter fail, he demanded the unhesitant resuscitation of the octroi.216 
At a meeting of the influential German People’s Council for Bohemia a week later, 
the message was much the same. The resolution it adopted stressed the “bitterness and 
indignation” caused by the deferment of the octroi and, appropriating the rhetoric of 
the day, invoked the right to self-determination of the German Bohemians. It insisted 
on the ruthless defence and immediate execution of its demands in parliament, and 
warned that its future attitude towards the government depended on their fulfilment.217 
But there were, nevertheless, level-headed men within the Nationalverband, 
even amongst the Bohemians. Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, for instance, wrote a piece 
in the Neue Freie Presse rejecting the repression of non-Germans and the bias 
towards individual nations; and, despite his paternalistic insistence on the reforming 
mission of the Germans of Austria, he affirmed that the national slogans of the future 
could no longer be “I am a German or a Slav and therefore better than you”, but “I am 
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a German and therefore different from you”.218 (This, of course, suggested separation 
and therefore autonomy for the German-speaking lands.) A few German nationalists, 
distrustful and despairing of the government, sought to negotiate directly with the 
Czechs in order to agree on a modus vivendi and operandi in parliament. In the days 
following the octroi’s repeal, the Carinthian deputy Steinwender – who anticipated 
Clam’s fall and the appointment of a government of national unity – addressed the 
matter with Tusar, while Waber, himself a Moravian German, did so with Šmeral.219 
But these receptive Czechs warned that the matter had to proceed quickly before 
minds on both sides were poisoned.220 In any case, this concerned purely 
parliamentary issues such as the standing orders, the choice of president, the extension 
of mandates, the committees and delegations; nobody could yet envisage tackling the 
thorny national questions.221 These technical discussions did take place, with some 
success,222 but no wounds were healed. This was not solely due to German reticence, 
however. Waber may have complained that the radical members of the 
Nationalverband prevented united action,223 but he soon discovered that the Czechs 
were no more inclined towards cooperation. When he approached Tobolka on 26 
April and explained that he intended to table a motion urging a rapprochement 
between Czechs and Germans, active propaganda for an Ausgleich between both 
nations and opposition to a one-sided settlement of the Galician question, Tobolka 
responded that this was “already entirely too late” and prophesied the failure of his 
action, which duly occurred.224 Likewise, when Lodgman called by Tobolka on 1 
May to ask him what the Czechs really wanted for the future, and whether they would 
support the reorganization of Austria on the basis of national autonomy, the latter 
responded that this was impossible, as it would signify the acceptance of the old 
German programme and the abjuration of their own. Tobolka pointed out to Lodgman 
that time would bring the Czechs far more than his proposals. Since Tobolka was 
considered moderate and well-disposed towards the Germans, Lodgman was 
stunned.225 
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In spite of their heterogeneity, both the Nationalverband and the Czech Union 
were unable to mitigate the strident national influences within their organizations. The 
German Nationals thus stood by their national-political programme, and continued to 
offer the government conditional support, while the Czechs retracted their previously 
announced willingness to negotiate on these issues, and continued to oppose the 
government. 
 
Clam’s only hope of achieving a parliamentary majority lay in obtaining the 
additional backing of the Poles. Previous negotiations with them had failed, and they 
had only narrowly agreed to pursue talks. The outlook was not promising.226 When 
consultations resumed between the cabinet and the presidium of the Polish Club on 1 
May, Biliński declared that the handwritten letter of November promised the creation 
of a state rather than a provincial government, and demanded a corresponding 
political, administrative and financial reorganization.227 He claimed that the aim of the 
Poles of the Monarchy was unification with the Kingdom of Poland, but that if this 
proved impossible, the special status of Galicia was still the lesser evil (compared to 
the status quo). According to Baernreither, his entire speech was based, much to 
Clam’s indignation, “solely on the Polish idea, with no echoes of the unitary state, 
completely detached from any Austrian consciousness”,.228 While the faltering talks 
continued in Vienna,229 Karl adopted a different tactic to woo the Poles. On 2 May, he 
suddenly announced to Marterer that political matters required a trip to Galicia,230 and 
duly set off, officially to visit the front. Three days later, joined by Clam,231 he was 
received by the presidium of the Polish Club in Cracow. On this occasion, he 
declared: “Filled with genuine sympathy for the Polish nation, I want to help build the 
newly formed Poland and to realize the handwritten letter of my predecessor from 4 
November 1916. May the land see in this an important sign of my outstanding trust, in 
order to create harmony between both peoples of the province, and to bind Galicia all 
the more intimately to me and to my house.”232 However, the Polish public was 
disappointed with the timidity of these words on the Polish state and the special status 
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of Galicia, for which the local deputies blamed the prime minister.233 The vagueness 
of the speech was evident to Redlich, who saw it as proof of “the complete lack of 
plan of the government, which will perish on the Polish question alone”.234 
The government could offer little to the Poles, who, in spite of their numerous 
consultations with ministers, deemed its proposals unsatisfactory and its intentions 
unclear.235 Though the Polish Club remained internally divided, disgruntlement 
towards the administration grew steadily within its ranks.236 The Socialists, the Piast 
Party, the People’s Party and the National Democrats displayed particular hostility; 
the last two had already withdrawn from negotiations on the special status of Galicia. 
Officials warned that political agitation and popular discontent were driving more and 
more groups into opposition.237 Requisitions, the export of food from the province, 
delays in the rebuilding effort and in the provision of compensation, and the third 
appointment of a general as governor, all contributed to the alienation of the Poles.238 
Meanwhile, there were violent hunger riots in Cracow.239 Worried authorities reported 
great unrest in the crownland and a nervous tension in expectation of developments in 
Russia and in Vienna.240 Sensing that the tide was turning, Biliński announced his 
resignation on 14 May, which was accepted the following day.241 The “lesser evil” he 
defended represented too much for the government, yet too little for a growing 
number of his compatriots.242 The path was now clear for a drastic change of 
orientation. 
Accordingly, during an extremely agitated plenary session in Vienna on 16 
May, the Polish Club voted to reject any further discussion of the special status of 
Galicia, and to withdraw support from the government. In violent terms, it denounced 
the latter’s indifference and passivity towards the Club throughout the war, its empty 
promises, and the actions and behaviour of the authorities in Galicia.243 On the subject 
of the constitutional future of the Polish lands, the Club eschewed the moderate 
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proposal recommended by its parliamentary commission, and adopted instead an 
uncompromising resolution by the painter and People’s Party deputy Włodzimierz 
Tetmajer demanding a united and independent Poland with access to the sea.244 (Upon 
hearing of these developments, Redlich commented sardonically: “Now that is a 
lovely prelude to the opening of parliament.”)245 Supporters of the decision not to 
back the government claimed that it expressed the mood of the Galician population, 
but, in the immediate aftermath of the declaration, dissenters, such as the 
Conservatives and Democrats, believed that due to the limited participation in the 
vote, it would have little effect, bar the likely resignation of Bobrzyńki.246 Thus, at 
first, the significance of this development was played down in Vienna. The Neue 
Freie Presse had no doubt that the Polish Club would assist parliamentary work, and 
considered the resolution merely a sign of irritation worth noting.247 Karl too was 
possibly unworried; after all, he had recently told Wedel in reference to Congress 
Poland: “The Poles have shown themselves to be men of words, not action.”248 
The government’s Polish policy had unmistakeably failed, and this failure 
turned out to be twofold. Indeed, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation, vexed 
by the government’s unilateral negotiations with the Polish Club, now unanimously 
resolved to take on a staunchly oppositional stance.249 Clam had reassured the 
Ukrainians in late April that the special status of Galicia would not be decreed by 
octroi before the recall of parliament, and had promised to consult them on the 
matter.250 However, he omitted to do this, despite the considerable agitation Karl’s 
declaration in Cracow had caused amongst them.251 (Additionally, they were 
aggrieved by the fact that the emperor had failed to stop in Lwów.)252 Instead, he 
chose to confer exclusively with the Poles, even though they could not be satisfied 
and would almost inevitably withdraw their support. In light of their irreconcilable 
aims, Clam could not hope to win over the Poles and the Ukrainians together; in the 
end, he estranged both. 
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Czech radicalization 
 
Clam had originally required only a few weeks to achieve the same result with the 
Czechs. Their subsequent expressions of loyalty and attempts at dialogue, calculated 
as some of them were, had fallen on deaf ears, and had proved the fruitlessness of 
activism as long as he was prime minister. Even after the cancellation of the octroi, he 
had remained high-handed and inflexible, ensuring continued Czech hostility. At two 
meetings of the Czech Union on 11 and 12 May, Staněk, who had spoken with Clam, 
reiterated that, as a result of his continued intransigence, the Czechs did not need to 
change their stance towards his government.253 In any case, cooperation with a cabinet 
which had been formed specifically to implement the German course and which had 
backed down from this plan only unwillingly, was virtually unthinkable. What is 
more, although the Union had passed a resolution, barely a month earlier, urging a 
joint collaboration of all nations in tackling the political and economic problems 
facing the Empire, and affirming its willingness to work towards a necessary 
understanding,254 such conciliation was now out of the question. The attitude of the 
Nationalverband since the collapse of the octroi – most recently the nomination of 
Groß – showed the futility of such endeavours.255 The Poles likewise made clear that 
they were unwilling to cooperate.256 Nor could they count on the support on the 
Austrian Social Democrats, who had rejected collaboration even with their Czech 
counterparts due to their long-standing differences on the sore question of nationally 
separate trade unions, and had objected to their participation in the bourgeois-
dominated Czech Union.257 The Czechs therefore ceased even to pay lip service to the 
idea of compromise, and prepared for battle, with only the South Slavs as allies. But 
although unanimous in opposing the government, and in seeking constitutional reform 
and greater national autonomy, the Czech Union still lacked a definite programme and 
a concrete strategy. In late April, one possible course of action emerged from abroad, 
in the form of a letter from Masaryk and Beneš.258 Worried that the Union might 
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resume its activism, the exiles urged local politicians not to damage their cause. The 
missive’s guidelines exhorted the Czech parties not to vote for the government on any 
matter, not to attend the emperor’s oath on the constitution, to refrain from 
demonstrations of loyalty in parliament, to initiate passive resistance, not to disavow 
the movement abroad, and to claim historic state rights without compromising the 
attachment of Slovakia. But at the time, this was too extreme a posture for almost all 
Czech politicians. Indeed, the Czech Union wished to engage earnestly in 
parliamentary work.259 Even the nationalists did not yet think beyond their desire for 
the rapid conclusion of a general peace at all costs,260 a development which would 
terminate the émigrés’ ambitions. Moreover, the idea of including the Slovaks was 
virtually unheard of. And those who dared stray from Union orthodoxy were decried 
by activists as “Prague coffeehouse” chatterers, “radicals”, “irresponsible forces” and 
“Masarykian agitators”.261 In any case, the Czech Union was more susceptible to 
domestic pressure. 
Yet at home, expectations were also high, and the reopening of parliament was 
awaited with tremendous excitement throughout the Czech population.262 After more 
than three years of near silence, and at such a crucial juncture, Czech politicians could 
ill afford to be out of step with the mood and hopes of their people. Nor could they 
allow traditional party political divisions to divide them. In the end, the Czech Union 
devised a three-part programme in preparation for the inaugural session of parliament: 
a joint state-rights proclamation to be delivered on the opening day, a proposal for the 
establishment of a committee to revise the constitution, and an interpellation of the 
government regarding its behaviour towards the Czech nation during the war.263 The 
first point proved the most contentious. Though Tobolka had succeeded in convincing 
Social Democratic leaders that Czech national interests now required a declaration of 
state rights,264 the fundamental difficulty lay in defining and expressing these. In 
effect, the Union faced a choice between appealing to Bohemian state rights or to 
natural rights. The implications were not merely academic: the fulfilment of the 
former necessitated the establishment of a Czech state (traditionally understood to be 
within the Habsburg Empire) according to immutable historic frontiers, while the 
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latter, though it could accept the emergence of such an entity within ethnic borders, 
could be realized through territorial, personal or cultural autonomy within the 
Monarchy. A majority of deputies within the Czech Union supported historic state 
rights, although it was clear to them that the original declaration of 1879, which had 
been read out by the bourgeois parties at the beginning of each parliamentary term 
ever since, was now out of date.265 However, the Social Democrats were unwilling to 
comply, since this would signify the abandonment of the principle of national self-
determination, and thus the disavowal of the programme announced by their first 
deputies to the Reichsrat in 1897 and confirmed by the Žofín Resolution at the 
Eleventh Party Congress in 1913.266 The urgings from abroad brought forth two 
additional, confounding considerations: firstly, the potential inclusion of the Slovaks, 
which technically ran counter to both Bohemian state rights and self-determination 
(and violated Hungarian state rights); and secondly, the role, if any, of the Habsburg 
dynasty in the future of the Czech nation. For the time being, however, it seemed 
highly unlikely to many that Austria-Hungary would disappear or that the Magyars 
would fail to uphold the integrity of the lands of the crown of Saint Stephen.267 In any 
case, the Czech Union had no intention of disowning either empire or dynasty in its 
proclamation.268 But despite its desire to read out a unifying and coherent manifesto 
on 30 May, its motley nature made agreement difficult. A common proclamation had 
been discussed,269 but only in the wake of the octroi’s collapse did work begin in 
earnest, encouraged by the Social Democrats.270 Each of the main parties within the 
Union then set about preparing its own proposals for the draft, with the ultimate aim 
of producing a text which would satisfy all political factions, as well as public 
opinion. 
The executive of the Union first discussed the content of the planned address 
at a meeting on 11 May, when three of its parties submitted proposals: the Young 
Czechs, the Agrarians, and the National Socials.271 All three drafts demanded the 
implementation of Bohemian state rights within a federal and democratic Austria 
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under the Habsburg crown, with no mention of Slovakia.272 Unsurprisingly, these 
suggestions were unacceptable to the Social Democrats.273 In fact, only the text of the 
Young Czechs – which reinforced these historic claims with the concepts of self-
determination and full national development – survived the discussion.274 (Two 
further writings received from outside the Union, both highly radical in tone, one by 
State-Rights Progressive deputy Antonín Kalina and another signed by a number of 
Czech authors, were not touched upon, though copies were made for each 
member.)275 As a result of this impasse, the decision was postponed until the next 
series of meetings in Vienna.276 However, this setback did not deter the Czech Union 
from its objective. The following day, members of its parliamentary commission 
stressed the need for a common statement, and all constituent parties declared their 
willingness to work towards a compromise. Immediately after, at its plenary meeting, 
the sixty-eight deputies in attendance unanimously endorsed this endeavour.277 The 
National Committee also approved the work of the Czech Union.278 
In the meantime, negotiations continued, and on 15 May, Tobolka worked out 
a compromise draft with Social Democrats Lev Winter and Adolf Meissner. The 
original proposal of the Young Czechs served as its basis, with the admixture of 
concessions to the Socialists, who nevertheless continued to oppose the appeal to 
mediaeval rights. In effect, the new composition sought “to convey the principles of 
both the so-called historic and natural state rights, without violating one or the 
other”.279 Though it insisted that the majority of its members stood by the 1879 
declaration, it concluded helter-skelter with a demand to reform the 1867 Constitution 
according to the principles of federalization, democratization, self-determination and 
equality between nations. Tobolka presented the text to the Czech Union executive on 
17 May and, after a handful of stylistic modifications, it was submitted to the 
parliamentary commission for the following day.280 But when Šmeral opened this 
meeting by expressing his delight with the attainment of a compromise draft, he 
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encountered a volley of objections.281 At the forefront of this opposition were fellow 
Social Democrat Antonín Němec, Agrarian deputy Josef Špaček and Karel Baxa of 
the National Socials, all of whom proposed amendments during this agitated 
debate.282 Baxa’s words in particular revealed that his party had taken an extremely 
radical direction. Once again, the final resolution on the address had to be postponed 
until a future executive meeting, to which were invited the commission members who 
had suggested changes.283 
 
This sudden stiffening and hostility to compromise was not fortuitous, and occurred 
under the influence of the concurrent publication of the Manifesto of Czech Authors 
(the content of which the Czech Union had discovered a week earlier).284 Announced 
in the press on 17 May, it appeared uncensored in the Agrarian newspaper Večer the 
following day,285 and had a profound, radicalizing effect on Czech political life. This 
declaration, directed at Czech Reichsrat deputies, was largely the work of Jaroslav 
Kvapil, a poet, playwright and director at the Prague National Theatre.286 Under the 
impulse of the Maffie, 222 Czech writers had signed it.287 The piece reflected the 
concern of most domestic literati, which the exiles shared, that the Czech Union 
would fail to promote their own radical opinions in parliament or, worse, that it would 
reiterate the sentiments of the 30 January declaration.288 It therefore exhorted Czech 
politicians to honour their responsibility to the nation by championing “Czech rights 
and Czech desiderata” at a time when “Czech fate was being sealed for centuries”.289 
It warned that the whole world was watching expectantly. Like Masaryk and Beneš in 
their letter, it urged the representatives of the nation to demand the restoration of civil 
liberties, the removal of press censorship, full freedom and immunity in parliament, 
and an amnesty for all political prisoners. In veiled language, it reasserted historic 
state rights and requested an uncompromising and relentless fight for their fulfilment. 
The belief in their realization, it proclaimed, had never been extinguished in 
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“Czechoslav” hearts. Indeed, the declaration described the Reichsrat deputies as the 
“spokesmen of the Czechoslav nation”.290 The appeal ended: “A democratic Europe 
[…] of autonomous and free nations is the Europe of tomorrow and of the future. 
Gentlemen, the nation requires you to be part of this great historic occasion, to devote 
all your skill to it, to sacrifice all other considerations, and to act as independent men 
in this moment, free of personal ties or interests, men of sovereign, moral and national 
consciousness. If you cannot satisfy what the nation expects of you and what duty has 
imposed on you, relinquish your mandates before you enter parliament and defer to 
your supreme authority: your nation.” No mention was made of the Empire or the 
dynasty.  
This was, in effect, the first publication of the exiles’ programme in the 
Bohemian lands.291 And indeed, once they read the manifesto, they ceased to fear the 
reopening of parliament.292 Signed by so many eminent and esteemed men and 
women – first and foremost by the much-loved historical writer Alois Jirásek – it 
caused a popular sensation.293 Maffie operative Hajšman described the scene in 
Prague: “On Friday 18 May at midday […] I ran to the nearest newsagent’s […] but it 
was already sold out, and I could not get a single copy in the whole of the Old Town. 
[…] Wherever I looked, […] everybody was clutching Večer in their hands […]. 
Prague exulted, nobody spoke of anything else. […] Not even the news of the Russian 
Revolution had had the effect of the manifesto. Instead of greeting each other, people 
called out with a gasp: ‘Did you read the address? It’s fabulous, isn’t it?’” He 
continued: “The effect was enormous, moving, indescribable, […] it electrified, lifted 
the nation.” 294 Indeed, the writers claimed that their views were not simply those of 
the Czech cultural and intellectual world, but those of the nation. The Arbeiter-
Zeitung – the only Viennese newspaper to publish the manifesto – agreed, noting that 
“it casts a clearer light on the actual tendencies in the Czech population than all the 
telegrams and audiences”.295 Certainly, few Czechs could object to the sentiments 
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expressed in the text. Hunger and want were no obstacles to national feeling. Indeed, 
on his way home, Hajšman noticed that the famished, ragged women queuing for food 
all held copies of the newspaper and were letting out of cries of joy. The reproduction 
of the address the following day on the front page of Národní politika ensured its 
extensive distribution in the Bohemian lands and beyond.296 Soon, “from all towns 
and villages, from every corner of the Empire, from the front and then from abroad, 
there arrived ardent declarations of approval, a huge, unsuspected public response”.297 
On his subsequent travels in the country, Hajšman observed that framed rescripts and 
pictures of the Bohemian crown had appeared on the walls of private dwellings, clubs 
and public houses.298 Notwithstanding the one-sidedness and embellishments of this 
account, the Writers’ Manifesto certainly made a significant contribution to the 
awakening and stirring of the Czech masses’ national consciousness, dulled by three 
years of war.299 
 What is more, it also hit its intended target, producing considerable political 
repercussions.300 Inveterate Austrophobes like Kalina, who wished for independence, 
were naturally ecstatic. But the nationally minded deputies within the Czech Union, 
whose parties had until now been at the forefront of activist policy, also embraced the 
declaration, men such as the Agrarians Karel Prášek, Jaroslav Rychtera, Isidor 
Zahradník and Josef Žďárský, as well as the Social Democrats Habrman, Pik and 
František Modráček. Stránský was particularly delighted, remarking that the lull 
during which the activists had done as they pleased was now over, and he appeared to 
relish the coming storm. A good number of parliamentarians, however, scowled, not 
least because they resented being usurped, upstaged and admonished by amateurs.301 
They censored the Agrarians for leaking a document they had hoped to conceal.302 
But above all, the activists thought the manifesto irresponsible, dangerous and 
detrimental to their work and to Czech interests. Šmeral took the lead in denouncing it 
and a vigorous condemnation appeared the next day in Právo lidu.303 Brno’s Rovnost 
quickly followed suit.304 This, of course, gave it additional publicity, as did the fact 
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that the main Socialist mouthpiece soon published it in full.305 Though the newspaper 
continued to decry it for several months,306 this was a hopeless crusade. Šmeral’s 
authority had already waned considerably in May. As the champion of activism, he 
had become the focus of hatred for the increasingly numerous opponents of this 
policy. Even before the publication of the Writers’ Manifesto, journalistic attacks on 
him, particularly those of the Agrarian newspaper Venkov, had compelled him to raise 
the issue in the Czech Union.307 But the animosity towards him and his ideology had a 
genuine popular basis. In late March, he and Tobolka had already discussed their 
mistreatment at the hands of public opinion, though he had refused to act upon it.308 
By May, Hajšman claimed that he had heard people threaten to kill him “a hundred 
times in the month, several times daily, everywhere, in Prague and outside”. More 
prosaically, many threatened to box his ears and spit on him. Šmeral and his 
newspaper received a stream of threatening letters, and though he remained defiant, 
he was increasingly isolated.309 The Writers’ Manifesto liberated those who had 
uneasily followed his direction, and amplified popular expectations. Its stark words 
and solemn tone raised the stakes for Czech politicians, who now feared demanding 
too little rather than too much. 
 
Authorities monitoring the mood in Bohemia at first failed to pick up on the 
manifesto,310 suggesting, aside from possible Czech exaggerations of this supposedly 
universally visible jubilation, a crucial intelligence failure. By the time they finally 
discussed it, in mid-June, it was to complain about its noxious effect on the masses.311 
Allowing its publication was, in any case, an extraordinary oversight. Those behind 
the declaration, who had not imagined seeing it in print, were amazed that a willing 
newspaper had been found, and even more so that the censor had not altered a single 
word.312 But on the day of the publication, all eyes were on Vienna, where the trial of 
Friedrich Adler had begun. On 18 and 19 May, he answered for his assassination of 
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prime minister Stürgkh before a juryless special court. His defence delivered an 
eloquent and scathing attack on Austria’s wartime dictatorship, and on his own Social 
Democratic Party’s failure to fight it. He scolded military justice, particularly the 
suspension of trial by jury, which was declared even before the declaration of war and 
which he considered a coup d’état against the constitution and the judicial system. He 
especially denounced censorship, notably in the crownlands: “Prague is a chapter of 
the […] disgrace to itself.” He exonerated the emperor, since the imperial decrees 
were the responsibility of the ministers, but deplored the fact that Austria had mere 
subjects rather than citizens. Yet he reserved his most trenchant criticism for his party, 
rebuking its cowardice in the face of dictatorship, and betrayal of internationalist and 
socialist values through its “Austrian patriotism” and German nationalism, going so 
far as to call it a “semi-official organ of the Berlin foreign office”. For all these 
deviances he chiefly blamed Renner. He summarized: “With the shots, I wanted to 
wash down the dirt which the policy of the Social Democratic Party had amassed”. He 
also delighted in remarking that Czernin himself was now seeking contact with 
“subversives” like him in Russia. 
 Though Adler claimed that he had not expected his action to rouse the 
masses,313 his courtroom defence certainly did. Redlich observed that it had had the 
greatest impact in Vienna,314 while the local police confirmed a considerable increase 
in the number of Adler supporters among the workers.315 As the Social Democrat 
Bretschneider remarked shortly after: “Fritz Adler had a devastating effect on the 
views of party comrades, in particular on the younger minds.”316 Wedel commented 
that the trial had contributed to stirring up the already rebellious mood of the 
Viennese proletariat, and that Adler’s partly justified attacks on the government had 
gained him sympathy far beyond socialist circles.317 Immediately sentenced to die,318 
his martyrdom was almost complete. The ambassador remarked bitterly a few weeks 
later: “Neither Victor Adler, Renner, Seitz, Leuthner or Šmeral enjoys the confidence 
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of the masses; Friedrich Adler, the minister killer, condemned to death, is the hero of 
the day, the man of the people.”319 
 
Adler’s accusations provided an additional complication for Clam, who was fully 
aware that he would have to bear responsibility for the previous government’s 
wartime record.320 As (inaccurate) press reports emerged announcing that all Czech 
parties had agreed to demand Bohemian state rights,321 it seemed inevitable that the 
country’s bitterest national conflict would immediately burst to the fore in parliament. 
The unwavering support of the South Slavs for the Czechs and the irreconcilable rift 
between Poles and Ukrainians completed the picture of national chaos which Vienna 
was so desperate to conceal. The government’s prospects were indeed catastrophic: 
opposed by all Slavs, unwilling to court the Socialists for domestic purposes and 
uncertain even of German nationalist support. Only the Christian Socials offered 
unequivocal backing. 
Aware that time was running out to secure a political truce and the goodwill of 
the reticent nationalities, in order to ensure the smooth running of the Reichsrat and 
present a harmonious front to the outside world, Karl took action. Doubtless 
exasperated by his prime minister’s ineptitude, he convoked, without apparently 
informing him,322 the representatives of the main parties to Laxenburg, for 21 May, to 
discuss the political and parliamentary situation.323 That evening, Karl received, 
separately, members of the Nationalverband, the Czech Union, the Ukrainians, the 
Croat-Slovene Club and the Christian Socials.324 The Poles were not even invited.325 
The essence of the emperor’s appeal to the parliamentarians most likely echoed the 
rhetorical question of the Neue Freie Presse, which asked of future plans of individual 
parties: “What are they in comparison to the food question, to the peace question, and 
to the great problems of financial and monetary policy?”326 In other words, Karl 
hoped that the parties would work together in parliament to solve the country’s 
pressing socio-economic issues and avoid national and political conflicts. He had no 
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concrete, long-term plans for constitutional or administrative reform to present, and 
simply wanted help in extracting the Empire from the war unscathed. The participants 
of these brief meetings were sworn to secrecy, although the Christian Social Hauser 
obtained permission to divulge a few details: the emperor had again impressed with 
his intimate knowledge of internal political questions, and had spoken freely and 
informally with his interlocutors.327 Other delegations got a distinctly different 
impression. During the Czech Union’s meeting, Fiedler spoke about Bohemian state 
rights, Staněk about domestic conditions in Bohemia and Šmeral about the demands 
of the Czech workers. Karl listened attentively but his answers apparently betrayed 
complete ignorance, especially on the matter of state rights and Bohemian 
independence.328 Staněk, however, warned Karl that the incarceration of Czech 
deputies and journalists made it impossible for the Czechs to pursue any kind of 
activist policy.329 The notes of Vjekoslav Spinčić – the only Croatian representative 
from the Croat–Slovene Club330 – revealed that, when told by the South Slav deputies 
of the need to unite their lands, a coy Karl had simply given a friendly smile and 
muttered: “Yes, yes”. In all other matters – peace, hunger, official persecution and 
wrongful imprisonment – Karl was understanding and accommodating. He finished 
by praising the bravery and loyalty of the South Slavs.331  
Karl was seemingly blind – consciously or not – to national aspirations. He 
simply hoped for reconciliation under his aegis. But his considerable charm and 
enthusiasm could not heal existing rifts, particularly between the Germans and the 
Czechs. The Nationalverband delegation, led by Groß, Wolf and Stölzel, left no room 
for illusion. As the last-named wrote the following day in the Neue Freie Presse: 
“The Deutscher Nationalverband will do everything in order to make the sitting of 
parliament fruitful. There are only two boundaries it cannot cross: the interest of the 
state and the interest of the German nation in Austria.”332 Clearly, no concessions 
could be expected from them. The Czech contingent, on the other hand, appeared 
more moderate. Indeed, the parties to which its three members belonged – the 
Agrarians, the Social Democrats and the Young Czechs – had been at the forefront of 
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wartime activism. Moreover, men such as Šmeral and Fiedler were convinced 
Austrophiles whose loyalty was unquestionable. But Staněk, the head of the 
delegation, already had a more ambiguous position, much like his party – notably, he 
had played a part in the disclosure of the Writers’ Manifesto. As Chairman of the still 
irresolute Czech Union, however, he had to maintain decorum. Yet overall, these men 
were unrepresentative of an increasing number of their colleagues and countrymen, 
the extent of whose radicalization they cannot have revealed to Karl, despite their 
allusions. They themselves did not yet know what form the Czech Union’s final draft 
would take. It is thus unlikely that Karl’s encounter with these politicians opened his 
eyes to the extent of Czech dissatisfaction and rebelliousness. Nor did he heed the 
hints of the South Slavs. Indeed, though he worried about social upheaval, there is 
little evidence to suggest that Karl was anything but confident about his peoples’ 
patriotic attachment to crown and fatherland prior to the reopening of parliament. 
 
But had he been aware of the evolution of Czech politics, he would have had 
legitimate cause for disquiet. Indeed, when, on 23 May, five days after the appearance 
of the Writers’ Manifesto, the executive of the Czech Union reconvened in its 
expanded form333 to discuss amendments to the draft of the Reichsrat proclamation, 
Stránský submitted a text of unprecedented radicalism within the organization.334 
Though based on the compromise proposal, it followed the émigrés and the Czech 
authors in demanding, albeit euphemistically, the addition of Slovakia to the 
application of historic state rights. However, all hitherto produced documents were 
effectively rendered redundant by Staněk’s announcement that Karl did not intend to 
take the oath on the constitution and would simply content himself with his speech 
from the throne.335 
Previously touched upon by Koerber, the issue of the emperor’s pledge to 
uphold the constitution – a legal prescription – had finally been settled during a 
lengthy ministerial council on 19 May.336 Nobody in the cabinet wished for the 
monarch to bind himself solemnly to a document, decried from all sides, which had 
proved unusable and irremediable. It was therefore decided unanimously, if 
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unhappily, that he should abstain from doing so.337 But whereas Baernreither and 
Handel also wanted him to dispense with the speech from the throne in order to avoid 
exposing the contradiction between promising to rule constitutionally and shunning 
the vow, all other ministers insisted that Karl should, in fact, address parliament and 
announce the postponement of the oath himself.338 The emperor consented.  
The Czech Union, therefore, had to start afresh, but since agreement on a draft 
still appeared far off, the delay was not unwelcome.339 Aware of its own limitations 
and of the need to reach the broadest possible consensus, the executive resolved to ask 
Antonín Švehla of the National Committee to call a meeting with the representatives 
of all parties for 27 May, in order to decide on the final wording of the declaration.340 
Šmeral was indignant, and wrote a letter to Švehla, complaining that the authority of 
the Czech Union was being undermined.341 He also insisted that pragmatism required 
the mention of dualism in the address. He confessed that he awaited forthcoming 
developments with apprehension. He was right to worry, but rather than a weakening 
of the Czech Union, this was in fact a weakening of his position therein. The radical 
frenzy which threatened to engulf him was typified by the draft of National Social 
deputy Baxa, who was absent from the aforementioned board meeting but wrote up 
the proposals he had made orally on 18 May.342 He had previously followed Union 
doctrine, but his words and tone were now virulent and uncompromising.343 Although 
he stuck to the historic borders and thus omitted the Slovaks, he demanded the 
complete independence of the Czech state. The Habsburgs, deemed foreign rulers, 
were to play no part in the future of the Czech nation. In the end, he urged the 
resolution of the Czech question through an international peace conference. As 
Tobolka wrote, this draft was “the most radical of all, even though it did not coincide 
entirely (on the question of Slovakia) with the Czech revolutionary programme 
abroad”.344 Unsurprisingly, these new radicals also began to fear a separate peace with 
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Russia, believing that this would result in a “German” settlement which would 
destroy their aspirations.345 
In addition, several significant personnel changes compounded the 
radicalization of the Czech political world, particularly in the National Social and 
Young Czech parties, where Hübschmann and Tobolka were respectively replaced. 
On 25 May, the Young Czechs’ executive committee, controlled by František Sís and 
Bohdan Bečka, was hastily expanded, in violation of the party’s statutes, to include 
several new members who endorsed the émigrés’ programme, and shifted the balance 
of power decisively in their favour, at the expense of the Club of Deputies.346 Jindřich 
Metelka, an opponent of activism, was elected chairman.347 Moreover, as Karl had 
granted leave earlier in the month to members of both Houses serving in the army,348 
several radicalized deputies returned from the front in time to assert their influence 
before the opening of parliament. Notable among these was the National Social Jiří 
Stříbrný,349 who seized the leadership of the party and imposed a firm, oppositional 
line in tune with the programme of the exiles.350 The National Socials were henceforth 
at the forefront of Czech radical policy;351 their defiance was evident in the decision 
to elect their imprisoned chairman Václav Klofáč as the party’s representative.352 The 
Agrarian party was, admittedly, divided, but only between men of varying degrees of 
radicalism. Meanwhile, in the Social Democratic party, the strength of the nationalists 
rose, as Habrman’s camp was joined by deputies Rudolf Bechyně (who had also 
returned from military duty) and František Modráček in opposition to Šmeral, whose 
dogmatic views were no longer heeded.353 On 28 May, at the organization’s first 
political meeting, the previously moderate Lev Winter, co-author of the compromise 
draft, announced that the Social Democrats supported “the amalgamation in one entity 
of all parts of the Czech nation, including the Slovaks, within the framework of this 
Empire”, and that they would achieve their aims through opposition.354 Tobolka 
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noted: “In all parties, the radical waves rose.”355 The Maffie now had at least a 
foothold in every party of the Czech Union; only the Clericals stayed immune.356 
 
Clam’s mission to win political support thus appeared more hopeless than ever. He 
had been scheduled to meet the parliamentary party leaders the day after Karl hosted 
them in Laxenburg, and it was indicative of the emperor’s lack of confidence in his 
prime minister that he had stepped in beforehand. Nevertheless, from 22 May 
onwards, Clam received the various groups one after the other, before addressing 
them together two days later.357 The aim of the exercise was to discuss the impending 
Reichsrat session and to present the projected government bills.358 Although he took 
the time to accomplish his task – his talk with the Croat–Slovene Club lasted several 
hours, for instance – this was too little, too late. Ideologically unchanged, and having 
heretofore ignored every faction bar the Poles, he could not realistically expect to 
rally any last-minute support. As Schlitter noted, Clam’s sole backing came from the 
emperor’s handwritten letter.359 In spite of this, when he appeared on 24 May before 
the Convention of Party Leaders, he made a plea for unity.360 He expressed the hope 
that parliamentary activity would be such as to increase the standing of the Monarchy 
abroad. In addition, he announced that the government opposed official censorship of 
parliamentary reports, although he expected the Reichsrat presidium to ensure that 
these reports showed the necessary discretion in matters relating to war and foreign 
affairs, and urged the House itself to ensure that the sittings were as “smooth, 
dignified and successful” as possible. He then gave an overview of the proposals the 
government intended to submit to the House, which concerned a variety of social and 
economic measures, the temporary budget until the end of 1917, the standing orders, 
and the imperial decrees previously enacted through Paragraph Fourteen. By 
remarking that the government had had to stick to absolute necessities, Clam brushed 
the debate on constitutional and administrative reform under the carpet. This was, of 
course, no surprise to the men in the audience. 
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 Straight after his speech, Clam finally received the presidium of the Czech 
Union, consisting of Staněk, Šmeral, Tusar, and Stránský, for a two-hour talk.361 In a 
seemingly conciliatory mood, the prime minister insisted that the deputies speak their 
native Czech (even though he stuck to German, which he spoke better).362 He began 
by expressing his regret that an atmosphere of enmity had developed between them, 
but defended his actions: “I was open enough to tell you directly when I was really 
thinking about an octroi. Perhaps I would have made things easier for you, had I 
behaved less outspokenly and been less loyal.” On the other hand, he readily declared 
that he had not changed his views and was merely seeking different ways to 
implement them. He fully anticipated the Czechs’ opposition in parliament but 
pleaded with them to approve his provisional budget, stressing that in these 
exceptional circumstances, it would not been seen as a vote of confidence. He 
emphasized the unique importance of the coming Reichsrat session, and hoped an 
agreement could be reached: “I do not want there to be an abyss between you and me 
so big that no bridge can be built across it.” He admitted to his political isolation and 
revealed that he would enter parliament and simply announce: “My programme is 
Austria. Who wants to come with me?” Staněk, however, repeated that the Czechs 
could not change their course of action until the government established a basis for 
them to do so; they would therefore adopt an oppositional stance. Moreover, Šmeral 
impressed upon Clam the importance of announcing constitutional changes in the 
speech from the throne in such a manner as to give the non-Germans and non-
Magyars hope of reaching a settlement within the state. He demanded an unfettered 
debate on centralization and federalization. Clam promised both would eventually be 
discussed and all demands considered. He added that he himself had grown up in a 
federalist environment and had “been to the school of state rights”, and therefore had 
a sense for the doctrine, even though he considered it impracticable. Indeed, he made 
clear that certain limits had to be imposed on national autonomy to guarantee the solid 
foundations of the Monarchy. Moreover, he criticized the concept as a mere slogan 
which had never truly been carried out, except in Switzerland, “those happy lands, 
where the nationality of the citizens coincides with the territory”. Yet he conceded 
that it had become a reality which had to be incorporated into future peacetime plans. 
The reform of Austria, as he saw it, necessitated a compromise between historic 
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frontiers, national autonomy and state unity. Furthermore, Clam justified his 
recommendation to withhold the oath, indicating that the emperor would take it once 
parliament had helped modify the constitution. Stránský considered its postponement 
dangerous under a government so close to the Germans, explaining that the Czechs 
would see it as a manoeuvre designed to allow the German nationalists to claim that 
the crown, as well as the government, supported their “preconditions”. Clam, 
however, argued that the two-thirds parliamentary majority necessary for 
constitutional change could never be achieved, and that an oath would thus for ever 
prevent its amendment. But he assured them that there would be no octroi, declaring: 
“When you see what is going on in the world, can you imagine unilateral measures 
which are not state necessities being taken against you as a nation? I cannot.”363 Of 
course, he and the German nationalists had always described the octroi itself as a state 
necessity. In any case, the prime minister’s attempts at conciliation and vague 
promises fell short even of the Czechs’ minimal desires. And his curious mixture of 
desperation, reassurance and rigidity contrasted with the Czechs’ confident resolve. 
No bridge was built; in fact, by now, no bridge could be built. The meeting had been 
quite superfluous, and the press soon reported that it had come to nothing.364 
The belated efforts by Karl and Clam to secure a working majority, and to 
guarantee unperturbed parliamentary activity, had borne little fruit. Almost a month 
had passed since the recall of parliament had been announced, and the combined 
effects of the government’s inflexibility and lethargy on the one hand, and increasing 
popular unrest and political radicalization on the other, meant that the chances of 
national reconciliation and parliamentary unity were by now virtually non-existent. 
The remaining days leading up to the inaugural sitting would make these firmly 
impossible. 
 
Domestic unrest (2) 
 
Firstly, still under the spell of the Adler trial, Vienna was swept by its first mass strike 
movement of the war. On the morning of 22 May, the rumour that a comrade had 
collapsed through exhaustion led all 16,000 workers of the arsenal’s artillery 
production to down tools, and to call for better provision of food and the introduction 
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of an eight-hour working day.365 By 24 May, the movement had reached its zenith, 
totalling 42,000 idle workers from the city’s most significant industrial concerns.366 
Two days later, the movement still affected more than fifty companies and 26,000 
strikers.367 In the end, work resumed everywhere on 29 May, although negotiations 
between workers and union representatives continued.368 
Aside from lack of food and war-weariness, the Vienna police diagnosed the 
Russian Revolution, the Adler trial and the recall of the Reichsrat as the chief 
contributing factors to the workers’ agitation.369 Nevertheless, it concluded that the 
movement was neither revolutionary nor planned, nor intended to bring about an early 
peace by crippling the war effort.370 Indeed, its evolution had been haphazard, and, in 
one case, the workers had apparently not known why they were downing their 
tools;371 furthermore, there had been no great riots, and the strikers had largely 
ignored attempts at political exploitation by revolutionary and left-wing radicals.372 
Thus, although galvanized by political events, the action itself was largely un-
political, and concessions on wages and working conditions sufficed to end it. 
Comparisons with Saint Petersburg were thus misplaced. Tellingly, when Karl twice 
happened to be driven past the Arbeiterheim in Favoriten (where the meetings 
between the union and the workers were being held), he was “greeted most 
deferentially” by those gathering before the building.373 
 Nevertheless, the authorities had reasons for concern, having been unable to 
prevent or to put a rapid end to a rash of strikes which threatened the conduct of war. 
What is more, work interruptions had taken place concurrently outside the capital,374 
with Bohemia again at the forefront.375 In its helplessness, the ministry of war had 
resorted to issuing a plea to the workers, male and female, which was posted on 26 
May in all industries under military administration in Cisleithania.376 In its appeal, 
printed in all local languages, it argued that since the setting-up of Complaints 
                                               
365 MI, K2000, 8987. 
366 Ibid.; 8983 in 8987; MKSM, K1305, 28-2/17. 
367 KBA, 37b, 97/T.R. 
368 MI, K2000, 8987. 
369 Ibid, 8983 in 8987. 
370 Ibid. 
371 MI, K2000, 8987. 
372 MI, K2071, 18658. 
373 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/17. 
374 KBA, 37b, 94/T.R; MI, K2000, 8928, 9238, 9239. In Lower Austria and Galicia, for instance. 
375 SH, 1925, 1930, 1931, 1936, 1939, 1959, pp.241-244, 246. 
376 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/18. 
 282 
Commissions in mid-March, wages and working conditions could no longer be a 
cause for strikes. It admitted that difficulties in the provision of food were inevitable 
after almost three years of war, but gave assurances that the government and all 
competent organs of state were striving tirelessly to remedy these. Striking as a result 
of these privations, it claimed, only played into the hands of the enemy, adding: “Our 
glorious young emperor has done everything in order to bring about a dignified peace. 
The enemies contemptuously reject this!” It continued: “The duty of each individual 
is to place his entire strength at the service of the fatherland and, where necessary, to 
exert his influence on hot-headed elements. Think of the dangers, of the manifold 
trials and tribulations, of the privations and toils, to which your fathers, brothers and 
sons are exposed out there in the trenches! […] Certainly, times are hard, but 
everybody has to make sacrifices.” And although it praised the workers’ behaviour 
(“until recently”), it warned of drastic coercive measures for those who forgot their 
honour and duty. Finally, it urged them to hold out for the good of the state, as well as 
for their own sake, in the coming honourable peace. This desperate patriotic entreaty 
had no obvious impact, as ongoing strikes either dragged on377 or ended only through 
negotiation,378 while new ones sprang up,379 notably in Bohemia.380 
 In addition, the authorities’ connivance with the Social Democrats had proved 
less fruitful than anticipated. In fact, the collaboration itself had contributed to denting 
the party’s credibility in the eyes of the masses and of the radicals, and had earned its 
leaders the scornful epithets of “government socialists” and “social patriots”.381 And 
the industrial action in Vienna further undermined the Socialists’ already broken 
authority. Not only had it begun without the knowledge of the party, the workers’ 
representatives or the trade unions, it had continued against their will.382 Events had 
revealed the growing presence of the radical Left among the workers, and its 
infiltration of the party, particularly of its youth organization. In addition, the Adler 
trial, which the Socialists also acknowledged as a chief factor in the strikes, had a 
devastating effect on the party. Pernerstorfer declared that Adler had inflicted on it 
“the most terrible wounds in its existence”. Gravely concerned, the Social Democrats 
resolved to counter the developments through a public relations offensive. The party 
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had previously agreed to bring to the attention of parliament the indignation of the 
majority of the population concerning Adler’s death sentence and the horrors of 
wartime military justice, but, in the wake of the strike movement, it needed first and 
foremost to reassert its authority, to assuage the restless masses and discourage them 
from revolution.383 As a result, it decided to clarify its position by publishing a 
statement in the Arbeiter-Zeitung on the Adler trial, the strikes and the 
demonstrations.384 However, the influence of the Austrian Social Democratic leaders 
was already greatly diminished, as they themselves admitted and as Wedel reported to 
Berlin.385 
 Their Czech counterparts were in a similar position.386 Having already lost 
ground to the radicals throughout April and May, they too faced serious challenges to 
their authority at the end of the month. Admittedly, food conditions had improved in 
areas of the Bohemian lands which had enjoyed a good early harvest and which had 
been largely spared from requisitions.387 One such zone described a semicircle 
between Teplitz in north-western Bohemia and the Böhmerwald in the south, via 
Eger, Pilsen and Písek, while another spanned southern Moravia.388 Yet northern and 
eastern Bohemia, large stretches of Moravia, and almost all of Silesia, were among 
the worst-affected regions in Cisleithania.389 As a result, the near incessant unrest 
which had characterized the entire month of May in the historic crownlands 
intensified in the week preceding the reopening of parliament.390 On 23 May, the 
director of the Prague Iron and Industry Company informed the military chancellery 
that lack of food had recently led to continual hunger strikes in several of its mines 
and works.391 Having been told not to count on any supplies before the new harvest, 
he announced that he could no longer vouch for the unperturbed activity of his 
enterprises, all of which exclusively served the army. This situation was mirrored in 
numerous localities, and it was therefore no surprise that, at the height of the unrest in 
Vienna, a wave of strikes had erupted, chiefly in Czech-speaking areas. Workers 
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again requested more food and higher wages, but also extra clothing and lower 
working hours. The synchronicity and similarity of these local actions suggested a 
link between them, and perhaps prior planning; at least once, the military authorities 
believed that the movement had originated outside the factory.392 The patriotic appeal 
of the ministry of war was even less likely to succeed among the Czechs, and the 
strikes continued, accompanied by numerous demonstrations protesting against 
requisitions,393 lack of sustenance and the lowering of rations,394 or simply demanding 
peace.395 Discontent sometimes boiled over into violence,396 notably in 
Budweis/České Budějovice, where, on 22 and 23 May, after a demonstration 
degenerated, the entire urban area was subjected to a spree of plunder and vandalism 
which only ended after vigorous military intervention.397 Though these protests were 
caused by the unbearable shortage of food, they were firmly anti-Semitic and anti-
German in character.398 Nevertheless, Kestřanek again played down the significance 
of such sentiments: “Under the influence of the numerous organized political 
agitators, political issues such as the Czech-German or Slavophile ideas may well be 
picked up by the masses, but in light of the lack of food, they cannot see them as 
burning questions. The interest of the masses towards these political questions thus 
seems to be pushed back by the sharp increase in supply difficulties.”399 And when he 
was again received in audience by Karl on 28 May, he told him that the strike 
movement in Bohemia was simply the result of difficulties in the provision of food.400 
Other investigations appeared to corroborate the limited politicization of the workers’ 
movements. For instance, in the Ostrau-Karwin coalmining region, two leaflets signed 
by “Austrian workers” had been found, calling for a strike on 17 May, demanding an 
end to the war and vowing not to hand over coal, cannons or munitions before this 
was achieved and they were provided with food.401 The authorities promptly 
dispatched an undercover agent to assess the mood of the workers, and were reassured 
by his findings. Despite the violent and disparaging remarks against Germany, and the 
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desire for a separate peace with Russia, he could establish no political motives in the 
movement of the previous months. He ascribed the repeated, partial interruptions of 
work simply to the workers’ unhappiness concerning food and wages, and considered 
a general strike unthinkable.402 Nor did the authorities seem to lose much sleep over 
the threats they occasionally received, such as the anonymous letter to the governor in 
Prague which read, in part: “The emperor and empress must also be exterminated. 
Long live the Czech Republic! Away with the government!”403 Nevertheless, 
Kestřanek complained that individual newspapers were exploiting the supply 
difficulties to stoke existing national and social conflicts. He noted pointedly that 
certain articles concerning the Adler trial and domestic party political programmes 
would have been suppressed under previous censorship practice.404 Overall, the 
increased laxness of the authorities, their continued belief in the non-political nature 
of the protest movements, and their frequent inability to bring culprits to justice meant 
that court cases for political and military offences remained extremely rare.405 
 
However, officials were not oblivious to the fact that the popular mood had worsened 
considerably in May.406 Alongside the aforementioned areas of the Bohemian lands, 
the worst living conditions were found in the neighbouring parts of western Galicia, 
and above all, in the Littoral, Istria and Dalmatia. In these areas, complaints about 
lack of food had given way to fears of imminent starvation, and to reports of 
epidemics, of hunger deaths, and of a general decline in health.407 In their summary 
for the month, the Vienna censors described the state of mind of the population across 
Cisleithania as “bad, very depressed and partly despairing”.408 Its patience seemed at 
an end, and numerous letters expressed the desire for an eternal peace through 
death.409 Scarcely a line in all the correspondence indicated either resigned acceptance 
of the present or hope for the future.410 The question of food appeared in every letter, 
as did, inevitably, the issue of peace (which almost all believed near), though no 
                                               
402 MI, K2000, 10212. He had attended gatherings in Witkowitz/Vítkovice on 20 and 28.5.1917. 
403 SH, 1941, p.244. 
404 MKSM, K1305, 28-2/10-7 ad I. 
405 Ibid. 
406 MI, K2069, 10101; 11628. 
407 MI, K2069, 11628. 
408 Ibid.; 10101. 
409 MI, K2069, 10101. 
410 Ibid.; 11628. 
 286 
particular agitation in this direction could be detected.411 The populace still worried 
exclusively about procuring its daily bread, and remained oblivious to “the 
significance of the times”.412 Its preoccupation with the events of the war was no 
more than “modest”, and it had largely forgotten the reasons for having entered it.413 
Only the German-speaking intelligentsia and urban middle classes retained their 
interest in these developments and confidence in their outcome. Hopeful that the 
Russian Revolution would bring peace in the east, they also dismissed the impact of 
the American intervention “with a cool movement of the hand”. The belief in political 
and military victory – thanks in particular to submarine warfare – still held sway 
among these circles’ “less profound thinkers”.414 But the great masses, the urban 
proletariat and rural population saw things very differently. Infuriated by the lowering 
of the bread and flour rations, and scornful of ersatz products, they now brought 
forward their complaints “with a raised fist”.415 The moderation and resigned 
acquiescence of earlier reports had given way to stinging, uninhibited rebukes of local 
and state authorities and of the central food offices,416 denouncing their incompetence, 
indifference and weakness: “The sharpness of the language which now makes itself 
felt in the letters is completely new and most conspicuous”.417 Moreover, a “socialist-
minded ferment” was increasingly perceptible in the correspondence, even in that of 
the middle class.418 Despite the despair and pessimism of previous months, no 
socialist tendencies had been in evidence. Yet these, chiefly influenced by the Russian 
Revolution, had found resonance among the population, particularly the slogans 
decrying the power of the few over the many.419 In addition, the thought appeared 
increasingly frequently that the war was a large capitalist concern, prolonged by those 
allegedly benefiting from it: profiteers, agrarians, peasants, industrialists, Jews, the 
great lords and, occasionally, the bureaucrats. Many believed that the war would end 
only when the rich experienced hunger.420 The censors now worried that the uncritical 
and easily influenced masses, far from following the beaten track towards a sound, 
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egalitarian, moderate democracy, were in thrall to an “unhealthy, all-destructive 
socialism”, epitomized by their violent criticism of the authorities and of the rich. 
They concluded ominously: “the population is in a state of easy irritability and the 
preconditions for the next stage are set.”421 What is more, contrary to the solidarity 
between classes and nations which had developed among soldiers on the front, the 
hinterland revealed frequent symptoms of intensified conflicts between individual 
social strata, while petty epistolary attacks against the non-German nations were not 
uncommon.422 Nevertheless, the question of self-determination of individual nations 
was scarcely discussed.423 
 Not unusually, the censors also remarked on the particular discontent of the 
Czechs. Indeed, in contrast to the mostly moderate declarations prevalent in German 
correspondence, Czech letters revealed a “decidedly harsher tone”.424 Czech peasants, 
for example, had similar grievances to their counterparts throughout Cisleithania but 
appeared “more irritated and rebellious”. Officials observed a tendency to 
sensationalize and to exaggerate reported news, yet the anger was real: “In places, a 
seething undertone asserts itself in threats to wreck and to smash everything to pieces 
soon.” Moreover, unlike the Germans, who feared the censors, many Czechs threw 
caution to the wind, and not a few taunted officials with sentences such as: “The 
gentlemen are welcome to read this just so they know in what high esteem we hold 
them.” This reflected the specific despair and resignation of the Czechs, who awaited 
the future with pessimism and tended to believe that the whole world was against 
them. Most considered it impossible to hold out any longer, and many thought of 
drowning themselves with their starving children. Politics appeared to offer little 
hope, and politicians inspired but contempt. The Russian Revolution was discussed 
only occasionally, and even then with mixed feelings in its implications for peace; 
some writers simply condemned it. In any case, comparisons with Austria were very 
timid.425 
 
The Czechs were undeniably the angriest and most restless nationality in Cisleithania. 
Conditions had worsened considerably since late February, but despite the 
                                               
421 MI, K2069, 10101. 
422 Ibid.; 11628. 
423 MI, K2069, 10101. 
424 MI, K2069, 11628. 
425 Ibid. 
 288 
galvanizing effect of the Russian Revolution, the increased social unrest and 
hankering for peace, as well as the rise in subversive activities, the political and 
national radicalization of the Czech masses had remained limited. Even in May, the 
police noted in its intelligence reports that there was no enthusiasm among them for 
the slogans of democratization; it added that these were being used in Czech political 
circles merely because they coincided with their national strivings.426 Indeed, the 
population’s heightened state of despair and irritation made it more susceptible to 
radical national watchwords. The electoral successes of the National Socials, and the 
emergence of a nationally minded wing in the Social Democratic Party, had 
previously shown that parts of the Czech masses were amenable to nationalist 
ideology; the middle classes had always been less equivocal on the issue, and their 
indigence and embitterment427 guaranteed corresponding radicalization. As elsewhere, 
grievances were directed against the authorities and the state, but in the Bohemian 
lands they began to take on a pronounced ethnic and national dimension. Anti-
Semitism was a habitual feature of Czech protests, but anti-German feelings 
manifested themselves with increasing frequency. These were reinforced by the 
animosity towards the German Reich, and the sense of isolation and persecution many 
Czechs experienced. As the reopening of parliament drew nearer, they looked to their 
deputies to defend their interests. The stance of the Czech Union in the coming 
Reichsrat session became the object of growing interest, fuelled by reports and 
speculation in the press and intensified by the singularly influential Writers’ 
Manifesto. Thereafter, the Adler trial, the industrial strikes in Vienna and the wave of 
unrest in Bohemia, combined with the dwindling influence of the moderate Social 
Democrats, completed the preconditions for the “next stage” of which the censor had 
warned. Kestřanek had previously worried that mass movements with purely social 
aims could be hijacked by nationalists: and indeed, nationally radicalized politicians 
in the Czech Union, confident of popular support and in many cases egged on by the 
Maffie, now made the final push to impose their views. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
THE END OF THE BEGINNING 
 
The final push 
 
Švehla, whose task it was to bring about the adoption of the Czech Union’s definitive 
Reichsrat proclamation, had conducted a cautious policy at the helm of the Agrarians, 
keeping two irons in the fire throughout. While the party filled one of its newspapers 
with attacks against the leading activists in the union, it used the other to endorse the 
organization’s policies.1 Švehla himself encapsulated this opportunism. In the second 
week of May, in the expectancy of an imperial visit to Prague, he had asked the 
historian and university professor Josef Pekař – a conservative Austrophile and 
staunch believer in the realization of state rights within the Habsburg Empire – to 
produce an address for the occasion;2 when the academic presented his draft on 18 
May, he noted that Švehla still contemplated a traditional state-rights proclamation for 
the opening of the Reichsrat.3 Yet a month earlier, on 17 April, as news of the octroi’s 
demise appeared, he had told Přemysl Šámal that he wished to influence Czech 
deputies into making a “declaration for the independence of the Czech nation” in 
parliament. To this end, he had requested the help of writers and scholars from the 
head of the Maffie, who, in turn, had intensified preparations for the authors’ action.4 
In addition, at the end of April, he had met the Slovak politician Vavro Šrobár in 
Prague, who had exposed the plight of his nation and pleaded for its inclusion in the 
Czech Union’s declaration.5 The bleakness of his depiction – he predicted that within 
twenty to thirty years the Slovaks would all but succumb to Magyarization – and his 
insistence that the entire Slovak intelligentsia supported the formation of a state with 
the Czech nation persuaded Švehla to promise him that his people would feature in 
the address.6 Švehla was, therefore, under the triple influence of Šrobár’s appeal, of 
the Writers’ Manifesto and of recent developments abroad when he began to prepare 
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his draft for the forthcoming general meeting.7 In the week leading up to the 
conference, however, the Maffie approached several deputies of his party sympathetic 
to their cause, namely Rychtera, Zahradník and Prášek (who had a personal grudge 
against him);8 in conjunction with the last-named, Maffie agent Bedřich Štěpánek 
produced a draft proclamation for parliament which demanded the establishment of an 
independent, democratic Czech state including Slovakia, and which spoke of neither 
dynasty nor monarchy.9 On 24 May, the proposal was handed over to Švehla, who 
was strongly encouraged to accept it – Rychtera told Šámal that they had “put a pistol 
to his head”.10 They were confident that he would comply.11 
 But despite this pressure and the visible influence of the Maffie draft on his 
own, the text Švehla presented at the meeting of the Union executive and party 
delegates in Prague on 27 May demanded, on the basis of both the natural right to 
self-determination and historic rights, the establishment of a democratic Czech state 
incorporating the Slovaks within a federalized Habsburg Monarchy consisting of free 
and equal nations.12 Worries that the declaration abandoned historic state rights, that 
the Catholic majority in Slovakia did not support attachment to the Czechs and that 
the Magyars would come down even harder on the Slovaks, eventually receded.13 In 
the end, the brevity, clarity and popular appeal of the address won over the majority.14 
Stránský, as the representative of the Czech Union executive, had no objections – the 
proposed draft mirrored his own views.15 As Tobolka wrote, the proclamation 
“testified to the fight against dualism, centralism and its supporters, the Germans and 
the Magyars, in particular the Germans in the Bohemian lands”.16 And, for the first 
time, the Union spoke of a “Czechoslovak nation”.17 Nevertheless, the opinion 
prevailed that it was not yet opportune to request the reorganization of the Czech state 
outside the framework of the Empire.18 It seemed that the matter had finally been 
settled. 
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However, when members of the Czech Union travelled to Vienna the 
following day, it became clear on the train that the chosen text was not universally 
popular. Objections arose from those who believed the addition of Slovakia to be a 
tactical mistake, as well as those who felt that the rejection of the compromise draft 
undermined the Czech Union, but they chiefly came from those who had hoped that 
the declaration would eschew any mention of the Habsburg Monarchy.19 The main 
proponent of this secessionist view, Prášek, resuscitated his Maffie-inspired draft, for 
which he persistently tried to gain acceptance, in the carriages and at the subsequent 
meetings in Vienna.20 Concomitantly, the Maffie produced a text which promoted the 
realization of its maximum aims (Prášek’s draft was only the minimum).21 This 
document was submitted during the journey by Zahradník, who claimed to have 
received it anonymously, and it resurfaced on the chairman’s table during the 
plenum.22 This proclamation accepted the émigrés’ programme in its entirety, siding 
with the Entente against the Central Powers and expecting an international settlement 
of the Czech question;23 when it reappeared again the following day, it was as 
Kalina’s opening declaration to parliament.24 
On 29 May, Czech deputies convened from early morning to late evening in 
the Reichsrat building in order to reach a final decision on the Union’s 
proclamation.25 The prospects for compromise appeared slim, but the organization 
had no choice but to agree on a declaration by the end of the day. Three drafts were 
up for consideration: Švehla’s, Prášek’s and Zahradník’s. The third was disqualified 
by its unknown authorship, while Prášek suffered a major setback when his proposal 
was rejected by his own party club.26 Journalists at the scene heard that talks were 
failing on account of Prášek’s and Šmeral’s intransigence, and that the deputies were 
split into two camps;27 certainly, during the meetings, Prášek was adamant that no 
political agreement would ever be possible with the Germans.28 Stříbrný, for his part, 
insisted “fanatically” that the words concerning dynasty and monarchy be dropped 
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and that the programme of the exiles be proclaimed.29 Quickly, news spread among 
the Germans that the Union was about to break up,30 but the Czechs were not willing 
to see it collapse. Stránský made a passionate plea for unity and for a unanimous 
address.31 Moreover, support for the Prague draft was still strong. Udržal spoke out in 
its favour, as did Tobolka, whose party comrades eventually acquiesced; Tusar 
considered that the matter had been settled two days earlier, and could not understand 
that negotiations were continuing so close to the deadline. Meanwhile, Šmeral 
denounced the radical standpoint. In addition, the Clericals finally acceded to the 
Prague resolution on the condition that the proclamation declare that Czech demands 
were “in the interest of the whole Empire and of the dynasty”.32 The highly 
contentious inclusion of the Slovaks was eventually accepted after the Agrarians 
announced that they would take full responsibility for everything that occurred in 
Slovakia after the proclamation.33 (Udržal revealed that the maverick Hungarian 
politician Count Mihály Károlyi had told him in the summer of 1916 that the 
Hungarians fully expected the Czechs to seek union with the Slovaks.)34 In the end, 
the plenum of the Union adopted a very slightly modified version of the proclamation 
agreed upon in Prague.35 Five deputies, however, refused to give their approval due to 
their fundamental opposition to Habsburg sovereignty: Prášek, and the National 
Socials Baxa, Konečný, Slavíček and Stříbrný.36 
As the meeting ended, Šmeral approached the journalists gathered in the 
building; red as a crayfish, wiping the sweat from his brow, his eyes filled with joy 
and satisfaction, he announced: “Well, it’s done! That was quite some work! Yet I did 
it!”37 Other deputies soon arrived; Zahradník looked indignant but Prášek was 
smiling.38 Arguably, he had greater cause for contentment than Šmeral. The Social 
Democratic leader was relieved to have kept the declaration within the framework of 
Austria-Hungary, yet this had not even been in doubt a fortnight before. The first 
three Union drafts submitted on 11 May had all reckoned with the dynasty and the 
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Empire (and had all omitted Slovakia). The radical current, let loose by the Writers’ 
Manifesto, was evidently in the ascendancy. On the last day of negotiations, Prášek’s 
draft had been supported by sixteen members of the plenum, and had only narrowly 
been voted down in the Agrarian Club.39 (The radicals could also count in their ranks 
the two State-Rights Progressive deputies outside the Union.) What is more, although 
the Czech Union had originally succeeded in amending Švehla’s text, by specifying 
that the future Czech state should come about “within the framework of the Empire”, 
these words were subsequently deleted from the final version agreed upon in 
Vienna.40 This was likely the result of Prášek’s pressure.41 Tobolka considered the 
final document a disavowal of the émigrés, because it nevertheless recognized the 
Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty, but Hajšman, the Maffie agent posing as a reporter in 
parliament, appeared pleased enough with the draft, especially with the inclusion of 
the Slovaks, which he considered “a success, a breakthrough”.42 Indeed, in less than 
two weeks, the Czech Union had come close to aligning itself with the émigré 
programme. And, most likely, several deputies who supported it ideologically had not 
endorsed it for purely tactical reasons. Therefore, the proclamation, though nominally 
loyal to Austria-Hungary, in fact concealed the true extent of Czech radicalization. 
The German journalists present were nevertheless baffled by its content. In 
particular they could not understand the passage concerning the Slovaks. They asked 
Šmeral: “How can you really mean that? You do not have state rights in Hungary! 
Why are you needlessly provoking the Magyars when this cannot be realized? Do you 
want to wage war with the Magyars?”43 German nationalist circles were, of course, 
dismayed that the Czechs should make a state-rights declaration at all, and protested 
that they were exposing an already difficult parliamentary situation to even greater 
danger. As a result, they decided that German deputies from Bohemia, Moravia and 
Silesia would give a corresponding counter-declaration.44 Parliament had not yet 
opened, but the age-old feud was in full swing. 
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There was little consolation elsewhere for the government. The South Slavs had 
followed the Czech example since March, though they remained less organized and 
less radicalized. In late April, the presidium and the parliamentary commission of the 
Croat–Slovene Club had denounced the one-sided position of the government on the 
nationality question for being in conflict with the Austrian state idea,45 and Clam had 
done nothing since to dispel this notion. And, as with the Czechs, the Austrian South 
Slavs were aggrieved by the treatment of their brethren on the other side of the 
Leitha.46 The idea of unifying all branches of the nation within the Empire combined 
with the new slogan of self-determination presaged the content of the South Slavs’ 
opening declaration to parliament. With this in mind, on 29 May, Slovene and 
Cisleithanian Croat deputies united in a South Slav Club, or Jugoslovanski Klub, 
under the leadership of Korošec, and adopted a unanimous resolution on the South 
Slav question.47 
 
Meanwhile, contrary to optimistic predictions, the refractory Poles evinced no 
tendencies towards moderation. Quite the opposite: the police in Cracow and in 
Lwów reported violent agitation throughout Galicia fomented in order to drum up 
support for Tetmajer’s resolution, and thus influence the Polish Club towards a policy 
of unification of all Polish areas into one independent state.48 Throughout the 
province, thousands of signatures were gathered, demanding that his motion be 
adopted.49 The National Democrats, the People’s Party and the Socialists were at the 
forefront of these campaigns. Propaganda also appeared in the press and in numerous 
lithographed appeals and leaflets. Some of these identified and denounced the 
deputies who had voted against Tetmajer’s text.50 In Cracow, where riots had 
continued and political agitation was particularly fierce, the municipal council 
announced its full endorsement of the Vienna resolutions.51 Shortly after, several 
political rallies took place in the city to maintain pressure on the Polish Club. On 25 
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May, a gathering of all parties and of various non-political groups, organized at the 
initiative of the Socialists, passed several resolutions, almost all unanimously, 
welcoming the decisions of 16 May, requesting appropriate leadership and demanding 
that Polish deputies declare before the Reichsrat that “only an independent, united and 
free Poland would satisfy the wishes of the Polish nation”.52 The same feelings were 
also vented at a large meeting of the Cracow Citizens’ Committee organized by the 
National Democrats. The congregation declared that Tetmajer’s resolution 
corresponded “to the feelings, endeavours, rights, will and dignity of the Polish 
nation” and should form the basis of Polish policy. It denounced those who had 
opposed it and expressed the conviction that the Polish Club would listen to the voice 
and desire of the people.53 The scene was set for the decisive final round of meetings. 
Bobrzyński had not waited for these and had tendered his resignation on 24 May, 
though Karl did not accept it immediately.54 
Though the same split emerged from the conferences of individual parties, it 
had obviously become less pronounced. On the one hand, the National Democrats, the 
People’s Party and the Socialists insisted that Tetmajer’s wording or a similar one had 
to be adopted without commentary or ambiguity; on the other hand, the Conservatives 
and the Democrats, though they were willing to declare that the Poles strove for 
independence and unification, wished to adapt Tetmajer’s text to the prevailing 
political conditions, and to stick to the Two Emperors’ Manifesto.55 When the Polish 
Club met on 27 May, acting chairman Ludomił German reported on his audience with 
the emperor two days earlier,56 revealing that Karl wanted to retain Bobrzyński and 
was adamant that, should he resign, he would not appoint another minister for Galicia 
until the end of the war. This threat had no impact on the debate, however, and the 
moderates did not succeed in forcing a compromise. In the end, a resolution submitted 
by Stanisław Łazarski was passed, recommending the adoption of Tetmajer’s draft by 
the plenary gathering of all Reichsrat and diet members.57 It was also unanimously 
agreed to reapply the original statutes of the Club according to which a presidium of 
four men, rather than a single leader, was entitled to negotiate with the government 
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and other parties of the House. This was of considerable significance, since the 
National Democrats and the Socialists would now be represented.58 
The following day, as the plenary meeting approached, Cracow was in 
ferment. The local citizens’ committee had organized a solemn service in the Church 
of Saint Anne, from where a large crowd proceeded to the university to thank its 
academics for the supportive memorandum they had sent to the Polish Club. There, 
three speakers, including Tetmajer, briefly addressed the masses and pointed to the 
historic significance of the moment. Later, the throng also heard short speeches from 
representatives of the National Democrats, the Socialists, the People’s Party, Piast 
and the Progressive Democrats.59 The street demonstrations – apparently organized by 
the National Democrats and Socialists – were attended by thousands, who cheered the 
deputies and sang patriotic and anti-German songs.60 As the Neue Freie Presse 
reported: “Whit Monday turned into an imposing national demonstration”.61 The 
authorities, who described the population as “extremely excited by political agitation 
and by the latest food supply measures”, refrained from intervening.62 The congress 
itself, which brought together in the town hall 150 parliamentarians from both Houses 
of the Reichsrat and the provincial diet, started late due to last-ditch attempts to win 
over the Conservatives.63 The only issue on the agenda was the Polish question, as it 
was now accepted that the Polish Club would not support the government. Tetmajer 
therefore briefly defended his resolution, arguing that it heeded the mood of the 
masses and formulated clearly the wishes of the Polish nation; he then read out a 
stylistically modified version of his draft, whereupon, chairman Juliusz Leo asked the 
assembly to eschew debating in order to give the resolution greater weight.64 
Nevertheless, the aged Conservative spokesman Count Stanisław Tarnowski, though 
agreeing with the proposal, put forward amendments in the name of his party, notably 
a passage stating: “The Club sees in Emperor Karl, who each day shows proof of his 
political recognition of Polish interests, a benevolent and powerful champion and 
advocate of the just Polish cause and, counting on his support with the utmost 
gratitude, the Club looks to the future with confidence.” However, the Socialist 
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Daszyński insisted that, since the Two Emperors’ Manifesto, the Russian Revolution 
and the American entry into the war (along with Wilson’s declarations) had 
transformed the Polish question, as Russia had ceased to be a mortal enemy and 
Washington would have a decisive voice at the peace conference. Germany, he added, 
had no friends among the Poles, and only insane or venal elements could serve her. 
He therefore warned the Conservatives that by ignoring Polish public opinion, they 
risked being swept away by violent currents. Visibly marked by his words, they 
withdrew for consultation during the following speech. When they returned, 
Tarnowski declared that, in light of the need for unanimous action and solidarity in 
this moment of destiny, his party had decided to renounce any amendments and to 
accept Tetmajer’s motion.65 This triggered long, uninterrupted applause; the 
remaining speakers forsook their addresses and the gathering voted unanimously in 
favour of the resolution. The news, announced from the balcony, was welcomed with 
jubilation by the crowd assembled outside.66 Much like the Czechs, the Poles now had 
both political unity and popular support to back their radical national demands. 
 
Having belatedly realized that Polish support was unattainable, Clam had rushed to 
win back the Ukrainians. Receiving representatives from both Houses on 28 May, he 
reassured them that no territorial cessions whatsoever were being considered in 
eastern Galicia or the Bukovina, since the Monarchy desired an honourable peace 
which preserved its territorial integrity.67 Moreover, he praised the “numerous cases 
of exemplary patriotic self-sacrifice of the Ukrainian population of these areas” and 
the success of their national organizations in fighting machinations against the state. 
He added that the government considered the rebuilding of the land to be a “holy 
duty”. Finally, he gave assurances that in the coming reorganization of the Empire, 
the government would take into account the requirements of the Ukrainian nation with 
regard to its development, and that no obstacle would prevent the fulfilment of its 
demand for equal treatment in all spheres of public life.68 Unsurprisingly, these 
desperate last-gasp promises had little effect. 
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Karl can only have been disappointed by political developments since recalling the 
Reichsrat. His hopes for national reconciliation and, at the very least, parliamentary 
support for his government, had not materialized. He himself had failed to impose the 
course he professed to favour. Throughout May, he had remained a peripheral figure 
and, like his prime minister, his chief efforts had been directed at the irreconcilable 
Poles. He also worked to appease the German nationalists, but his domestic political 
activity was otherwise scant. Certainly, his energies were monopolized by his quest 
for peace; further, as a soldier, he was more comfortable visiting the front than the 
hinterland, all the more so in light of the endemic popular unrest. Crucially, though, 
he had believed that Clam was a competent and suitable personality to preside over 
the reopening of parliament after a three-year adjournment, under trying and 
exceptional circumstances. The run-up to 30 May probably shook this conviction, but 
it was too late to part with him. And as long as he maintained him and his discredited 
cabinet, he could not alter the course of events. In Hungary, however, Karl had long 
realized that Tisza represented an insuperable obstacle to the fulfilment of his aims. 
Bound by his oath to the Hungarian crown, he had sought to initiate change through 
electoral reform, in the hope of securing the support of the disenfranchised masses 
and nationalities. Rumours of Tisza’s removal had already circulated at the end of 
1916 and it was known in late March that Karl had fallen out with him and wished to 
be rid of him at the earliest opportunity.69 He had subsequently fashioned such a 
chance on 28 April, by requesting in a handwritten letter the extension of the electoral 
franchise.70 When Tisza dragged his feet and proposed only nugatory changes, Karl 
lost patience and forced his resignation, which ensued on 23 May.71 He had thereby 
removed the last of the men who had gone to war in July 1914. But his hands were 
still tied – willingly so. In May, he had finally discovered the contents of Brosch’s 
programme for Franz Ferdinand’s accession to the throne, but had told Polzer: “The 
matter is very interesting, but it has no significance for me. I have taken my 
coronation oath and I will keep it as long as I live.”72 Tisza in any case retained a 
majority in parliament and remained the most powerful man in Hungary.73 His young 
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and feeble successor Móric Esterházy was unable to overcome this opposition and 
resigned after just over two months.74 
In Austria, meanwhile, Karl’s failure to cashier Clam confirmed the various 
nationalities in their distrust of the government and, by extension, of the system and 
of the Monarchy. Young, charming and untainted, Karl was still a popular figure. 
(The Prague police thought it particularly noteworthy that, since his accession, no 
cases of injury to his honour had been reported.)75 Yet he mistakenly believed that 
this personal goodwill stretched to all he symbolized. Since the overthrow of the tsar, 
his main worry had been the outbreak of social revolution, but the loyal attitude of the 
Social Democrats, the untroubled May Day and the sympathy of the masses towards 
him helped allay his fears. On the other hand, he scarcely considered the possibility of 
national revolutions and remained confident of his subjects’ Austrian patriotism. In 
May, what he heard and saw in the national politics of Cisleithania undoubtedly 
frustrated him; yet what he did not hear or see – or perhaps did not want to hear or see 
– would have horrified him. 
 
Parliament recalled 
 
On 30 May, in stifling heat, the Reichsrat finally reconvened.76 Clam, informed of the 
intentions of the Czechs and South Slavs, pleaded with them beforehand to refrain 
from going ahead with their declarations, for both domestic and foreign political 
reasons.77 Without even discussing the matter among themselves, they refused to 
comply.78 In the House, Staněk fired the first shot: “The deputation of the Czech 
nation, convinced that the present dualist system has led to the creation of dominant 
and dominated nations, to the obvious detriment of the general interest, believes that, 
in order to eliminate all national privilege and to safeguard the all-round development 
of each nation in the interest of the whole Empire and of the dynasty, it is absolutely 
necessary to transform the Habsburg-Lorraine Monarchy into a federal state of free 
and equal nations. Relying, in this historic moment, on the natural rights of nations to 
self-determination and free development, reinforced, in our case, by inalienable 
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historical rights […], we will demand, at the helm of our people, the unification of all 
branches of the Czechoslovak nation in a democratic state; what is more, we cannot 
forget the Slovak branch, which lives contiguously to the historic Czech lands.”79 
Korošec then followed: “The deputies united in the Yugoslav Club declare that, on the 
basis of the nationality principle and of Croatian state rights, they demand the 
unification of all areas of the Monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in an 
autonomous state body,80 free of all foreign dominance, on a democratic basis, under 
the sceptre of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty”.81 Kalina then read out his openly 
secessionist declaration.82 Then came the Ukrainian Yevhen Petruszewycz, who 
denounced the artificiality of the crownland of Galicia and demanded the separation 
of its Ukrainians areas, before concluding: “The representatives of the Ukrainians of 
Austria welcome most sincerely the strivings of the Ukrainians of Russia for the 
obtainment of the constitutional right to self-determination, and declare that they too 
in Austria will not give up the fight, so that the great Ukrainian nation can rightly 
acquire its whole national territory.”83 Pacher, thereafter, expressed the unanimous 
indignation of the Nationalverband and of the Christian Socials,84 before Łazarski 
reiterated the Polish Club’s commitment to the Cracow Resolution and thus to a 
united, independent Poland.85 By any measure, this first day of parliament had been a 
disaster for Karl and his government – indeed, for the Dual Monarchy. 
 These declarations proved seminal. In the Bohemian lands – simultaneously 
hit by a huge wave of strikes and demonstrations, particularly in Prague and Pilsen – 
the Czech Union’s address was immediately picked up by the masses in a variety of 
locations.86 Thereafter, it remained a key point of reference, as social movements took 
on an increasingly nationalist hue. Similarly, in southern Slav – particularly Slovene – 
territories, the words of the Yugoslav Club became the basis of the so-called 
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“Declaration Movement”, which began that autumn.87 Polish crowds, for their part, 
had not waited for parliament to reopen to endorse openly the strivings of their 
political representatives. Karl had, unwittingly, made this tide harder to stem in his 
desire to ease repression. As the interior minister pointed out to him in early August, 
“neither the activity of the censor nor the preventive police measures of the authorities 
can be as far-reaching as in recent years, [therefore] it will be ever more difficult to 
maintain the peace”.88 Unsurprisingly, moderate, activist and loyalist politicians 
disappeared from positions of power, making way for radicals, whose views aligned 
with those of their exiled compatriots. Šmeral was the most prominent casualty of this 
purge. Yet even before his demise, the Czech Union had defiantly refused to take part 
in the parliamentary subcommittee set up to redraft the constitution. Not even the 
amnesty for political prisoners hastily proclaimed by Karl on 2 July89 – which saw the 
release of Kramář, Rašín, Klofáč and others, and which the Union had made a 
precondition of its support – could sway it. The road to November 1918 was still 
sinuous but, after May 1917, the Czech Union, the Yugoslav Club, not to mention the 
Polish Club, never truly looked back. 
 
On 31 May, Karl delivered his speech from the throne to members of both Houses of 
Parliament. He repeated his sincere commitment to constitutional rule, while 
explaining his motives for avoiding the oath on the constitution until the 
establishment of “the foundations of the new, strong, happy Austria”. This, he 
announced, required “the reorganization of the constitutional and administrative basis 
[of the] state, as well as the individual crownlands and provinces, particularly 
Bohemia”. He also reiterated his commitment to Galician autonomy, as per Franz 
Joseph’s handwritten letter. He urged the deputies to unite with him in creating the 
preconditions “within the framework of the unity of the state […] for the free national 
and cultural development of peoples with equal rights”.90 This address, of course, had 
been prepared by the government without knowledge of the speeches uttered the 
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previous day. As a result, it was woefully inadequate – and incongruous. (It also had 
stressed the unbreakable alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary’s readiness to 
fight until the bitter end.) And, as Polzer remarked, it “indicated the direction […] 
reform was to take about as clearly as the Delphic oracles.”91 
Clam took nearly two weeks to respond to the declarations of the opening 
sitting. When he finally did, on 12 June, he announced tritely: “The programme of the 
government is Austria!”92 Ten days later, Karl finally dismissed him.93 In his place, he 
temporarily appointed his trusted acquaintance, the civil servant Ernst Seidler von 
Feuchtenegg94 and, in the following weeks, sought a permanent prime minister 
capable of inaugurating a new course. Although he considered a number of 
distinguished candidates, such as Beck, Redlich and Lammasch,95 he finally reverted 
to Seidler. This politically inexperienced, unimaginative, German-minded jurist and 
agricultural expert quickly proved unable to form a coalition of national unity or even 
a parliamentary government, and stuck with his cabinet of functionaries, which 
plodded on for almost a year. In Hungary, meanwhile, Karl appointed the veteran 
Sándor Wekerle, an uncompromising stalwart of dualism who stayed in his post until 
late October 1918. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
By August 1917, Karl could look back on eight months of failure in his two main 
aims: to secure peace at home, and peace abroad.1 Both were, in fact, further away 
than they had been upon his accession to the throne. Austria-Hungary’s military 
fortunes were, however, in the ascendancy. The counter-attack against the Kerensky 
Offensive swiftly liberated Galicia and the Bukovina, while dealing a decisive blow to 
the Russian army.2 The continuation of war now seemed a less daunting prospect. On 
2 August, the eve of the deliverance of Czernowitz, the interior minister, on Karl’s 
instructions, asked the governors of Cisleithania whether the population could endure 
another winter, and hold out beyond spring without large-scale striking or rioting. 
Their answers, though cautious and conditional, were broadly positive (although the 
governors of Bohemia and Moravia warned of the possibility of further political 
radicalization among the Czechs).3 In addition, in late October, after the resounding 
Austro-German breakthrough at Caporetto, Karl received assurances from Arz that 
the army, too, could survive another winter – in fact, the chief of general staff painted 
a highly favourable picture of his forces which, he believed, would improve by 
spring.4 And although secret diplomatic negotiations continued,5 the American 
declaration of war on Austria-Hungary in early December6 convinced Karl of the 
impossibility of a rapid general peace.7 But, in the first months of 1918, the Treaties 
of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, the preparation of a decisive attack against a 
seemingly broken Italy, and the Ludendorff Offensive, offered the realistic possibility 
of a final victory for the Central Powers. 
 These developments abroad, combined with the failure of the revolutionary 
danger to materialize at home, continually offered Karl a reprieve from the 
gargantuan task of restructuring his Empire. His most serious contemplation of 
constitutional reform occurred in moments of panic, notably in April and May 1917 
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after the Russian Revolution and the American declaration of war on Germany, and in 
October 1918, leading to the proclamation of his derisory, last-gasp manifesto. On 
these occasions,8 his motivation was the conclusion of peace, which – sincere 
humanitarian concerns aside – he hoped would save his throne and his empire. In 
quieter times, he muddled along. Certainly, he desired to set his country on healthier 
foundations,9 but his resolve always collapsed at the first hurdle. His lack of 
willpower – of “moral courage”10 – resulted in a considerable disparity between his 
words and his actions. As heir, he had plainly recognized the dangers of 
Germanization and Magyarization,11 yet, within weeks of coming to power, he had 
acceded to a German course and been crowned in Budapest. In exile, he blamed the 
failure of domestic peace on the “boundlessly stupid behaviour of the Germans and 
Hungarians”,12 but he had done little to confront it. In fact, he had encouraged it. In 
fits and starts, he showed some inclination to reorganize Cisleithania, but, until the 
bitter end, he stuck unwaveringly – indeed, obstinately – to his Hungarian oath.13 Karl 
was an opponent of dualism paradoxically committed to upholding it. (The same 
stubbornness and misplaced sense of honour prevented him from abandoning the 
alliance with Germany, despite the frequent temptation to do so. His fear of a German 
invasion,14 however, was probably justified.) In his defence, the situation was 
uniquely unpropitious for embarking on a collision course with the “master nations”. 
Undoubtedly, many Germans and Magyars would rather have seen the Empire 
collapse than submit to any constitutional overhaul which abolished their 
predominance. 
 
Despite the mythology later developed and cultivated by his supporters, Karl was, 
prior to his fall, as unconvincing a federalist as Franz Ferdinand. (The concept is 
noticeably absent from the vision for the future which he drew up in December 1914. 
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Unsurprisingly, however, it features prominently in his post-war reflections.)15 
Domestic unrest, the Russian Revolution, slogans of self-determination and Allied 
threats to liberate the “oppressed” nations of Europe put him under pressure to avow 
himself as one. Yet, until the Empire was in its death throes, he never did so publicly. 
Even then, his commitment was questionable. 
Expectations had originally been high but, in the early days of his reign, he 
was coy about his plans for reform. Despite their promises of change, both his 
accession manifesto and his speech from the throne were distinctly vague. 
Unfortunately for Karl, these few months represented his only realistic opportunity – 
if there was one at all – for rebuilding the Empire, or at least Cisleithania, on a 
relatively consensual basis.16 By the time he took to the throne, the manifold 
hardships of war, not least the reckless actions of the military, had sorely tried the 
endurance of the Slav population and eroded the loyalty of a number of its political 
representatives. The speed with which many Czech politicians subsequently 
radicalized suggests that their disillusionment with the Empire was already advanced. 
But they were certainly not too far gone. Nor, aside from the Poles, was any other 
nation of Austria-Hungary. 
Although it was not unreasonable, in light of past experiences, to settle certain 
matters by imperial decree, Karl’s initial endorsement of a unilaterally pro-German 
policy was a gamble from which the country did not recover. His appointment of the 
tormented and embittered Clam, whose behaviour towards the Czechs was nothing 
short of egregious, was particularly fateful. That said, having committed to this course 
of action, Karl should either have stuck to it or killed it off after his – or rather, 
Czernin’s – epiphany. The middle path onto which he eventually drifted proved 
catastrophic: alienating then cajoling supporters of the octroi, while failing to win 
back its opponents, over whom the measure continued to hang like the sword of 
Damocles. A year later, in May 1918, it finally fell. Disheartened by his failures, his 
velleities for reform through parliamentary compromise and national reconciliation 
long gone, Karl again nailed his colours to the German mast. He openly admitted to 
Czech politicians that, since they had rejected every opportunity for negotiation and 
had answered his amnesty with intensified opposition, he had now resolved to “try 
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other ways”.17 Shortly after, on 19 May, the future division of Bohemia into twelve 
circles – inheriting previous gubernatorial powers – was decreed.18 On 30 July, a 
circle court was erected in Trautenau,19 thus fulfilling a 25-year-old German 
demand.20 
Not without reason, perhaps, Karl had never been sympathetic to Bohemian 
state rights. He thought that his coronation as King of Bohemia would be largely 
sufficient to placate the Czechs. This ceremony, however, was more than just folklore 
– in its obituary for the ex-emperor, the Národní listy claimed that it had represented 
“the greatest danger for the Czech nation”.21 Certainly, such a powerful, symbolic 
gesture would have complicated the task of the anti-Habsburg émigrés and domestic 
radicals, while providing a boost for the activists. Yet, again, Karl was easily deterred. 
After the war, Staněk claimed that, in April 1917, Karl had received him alone and 
offered the Czechs the independence of the lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia on 
the condition that they declare themselves for the Empire and for the dynasty. Staněk 
allegedly replied that the Czechs did not want anything, that they would never forsake 
the Slovaks and would simply wait for the end of the war; thereupon, Karl had 
apparently dismissed him, categorically rejecting the inclusion of Slovakia by virtue 
of his oath to the Hungarian crown, adding that it would immediately prompt the 
Magyars and the Germans to start a revolution. Karl’s reaction is in character, but his 
offer seems highly implausible – indeed, the story is almost certainly apocryphal.22 
Not only was Karl indifferent to Bohemian state rights and fearful of German 
opposition, he was always more preoccupied with the resolution of the South Slav 
question, though here too he showed neither urgency nor volition. Furthermore, his 
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story in his writings – was undoubtedly trying to make up for his ambiguous behaviour at the helm of 
the Czech Union. 
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(purely theoretical) trialist designs did not include the Slovenes,23 and could not 
therefore satisfy any Yugoslav aspirations. Just how far Karl was from reconciling the 
South Slavs and the Czechs with the Dual Monarchy is shown by the fact that his 
October 1918 manifesto failed even to meet the demands which they had made in 
their opening declarations to parliament in May 1917. And although Karl was aware 
that the Poles were striving for unification and independence, he never quite gave up 
the hope of keeping them under his sceptre, expending considerable time and energy 
to this end. This, in turn, made a successful Ukrainian policy impossible. 
 
Even Koerber was forced to admit that Karl had “found a wreck upon his accession to 
the throne”, although he added that he had nevertheless “swiftly and irretrievably 
made it sink through his behaviour”.24 This severe, but largely correct, judgement is 
particularly apt for his first six months in power. His endorsement of the octroi, his 
recall of parliament and his disastrous amnesty – which yielded no political goodwill 
and estranged many of the Empire’s most loyal subjects – were all rash choices with 
irreparable consequences. Even taking no action at all would have done less 
damage.25 (These failures were, of course, relative. As Czernin wrote to Baernreither 
in 1922: “Whether the octroi was made or not, whether parliament met or not, 
whether the amnesty succeeded or not, was not – as important as it was – decisive. 
What was decisive was the abortive attempts at peace at the time when the author 
[Baernreither] was in government.”)26 
Despite his above-average intelligence, his quick understanding and his often 
penetrating insights, Karl was a poor decision-maker, simultaneously irresolute and 
impulsive. In this respect, he resembled Franz Ferdinand. In 1913, Brosch had 
remarked about the then heir: “He shares the peculiarity of all Habsburgs of not 
immediately taking unpleasant or serious decisions, but instead waiting to see if some 
miracle emerges to offer a way out”.27 Unlike his uncle, however, Karl was popular, 
charming, empathetic, conciliatory and politically untainted. Unfortunately, he was 
unable to exploit any of these assets. 
                                               
23 UR, II, 3, 24.12.1914, p.74. Or, it seems, Dalmatia. 
24 Melbourn (ed.), p.22. 
25 Kann, II, p.235. Kann also makes this point. 
26 NB, K12, 22.2.1922. 
27 Chlumecky, p.357. 
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  Furthermore, an unmistakeable and consistent degree of superficiality 
pervaded Karl’s thoughts on the reform of Austria-Hungary. As he admitted to Polzer, 
he had little time for documents and details.28 It seems that this characteristic had 
been taken into account by his educators.29 Perhaps as a result, Karl lacked rigour and 
depth. The plans he sketched in late 1914 were ordinary and already out of date, and 
barely evolved during the rest of his heirship or, indeed, during his reign. (Curiously, 
he showed very little interest in the work of his late uncle and his advisers.) Karl also 
appears to have been quite extraordinarily ignorant of the scholarship on the topic. 
Karl Renner, one of the most distinguished theorists of the nationality problem for 
nearly two decades,30 was received in audience by Karl in early 1917 in his capacity 
as one of the directors of the food office,31 and managed to steer the conversation onto 
this subject. When, thereupon, he gave Karl a copy of his compiled essays entitled 
“Austria’s Renewal”,32 the latter put it on the table and declared with some surprise: 
“You have also written books…”33 Karl’s military service, his long and frequent 
travels,34 his busy family life and his considerable workload were certainly not 
conducive to further research or to the maturation of his thoughts. 
 These limitations – of which he was partly conscious – made Karl’s choice of 
advisers all the more crucial. His selections proved most unfortunate. Contrary to the 
cliché,35  Karl had several statesmen of stature and brilliant minds at his disposal, such 
as Beck, Koerber, Lammasch, Redlich, Adler, or Renner. But Karl had his prejudices, 
particularly against men of the old guard, Jews,36 socialists and alleged freemasons. 
                                               
28 Polzer, pp.64-65. 
29 Fichtner, “Charles I (IV)”, pp.75-81; Anonymous, pp.134-135; NWT, 23.11.1916, pp.2-4. By Wallis, 
Polzer and his university professors.  
30 First under the pseudonyms “Synopticus” and Rudolf Springer, later under his own name. 
31 AZM, 1.12.1916, p.6. 
32 Karl Renner, Österreichs Erneuerung. Politisch-programmatische Aufsätze (Vienna, 1916). 
33 Ibid., “Kaiser Karl hat Angst vor meinen Mordplänen”, Bunte Woche, 25.12.1932, p.8. 
34 NMö, K1, 1-4, p.394. In mid-August 1917, the press revealed that, since the beginning of the war, 
Karl had spent 450 nights in the imperial train and had covered over 110,100 kilometres. 
35 SM, p.156; Rieder, p.37. Spitzmüller himself thought only he was up to the task. 
36 NFF, Karl-Franz Ferdinand, undated letter (doubtless written on 27.2.1911); UR, II, 2b), Karl-Zita, 
20.6.1911, pp.41-42; 213, 8.9.1920, pp.615, 635; KA, NMö, 1, II, p.266; Seeckt, p.582; NBT, K5, 
26.1.1918; Károlyi, pp.163, 405-408; RT, II, 17.1.1917, p.261. In February 1911, he described 
Budapest as a “nest of Jews” in a letter to Franz Ferdinand. In June that year, while in London, he 
wrote to Zita that the embassy staff contained “nothing but Jews”. In June 1917, he told Seeckt of his 
concern about having sworn in Vilmos Vázsonyi – a Jew – as Hungarian minister of justice on the 
Virgin Mary and Saint Stephen. In January 1918, Berchtold noted in his diary: “The emperor finds the 
presence of three Hebrews in the [Hungarian] cabinet not very pleasing but says that, since they are 
accompanied by seven “respectable” men, the percentage is not so bad after all!!!” Károlyi – who 
thought Karl anti-Semitic – noted that, when Karl made him prime minister on 27 October 1918, the 
emperor was so gloomy and exhausted that “he did not even ask if his future ministers were to be Jews 
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This ruled out most of the above. Renner, surprised by Karl’s timidity and self-
consciousness during their aforementioned meeting, later asked the court official who 
had announced him for an explanation. He was told that Karl had been frightened 
since, as a freemason and a socialist, Renner could have been preparing an 
assassination attempt.37 (Renner later commented somewhat dramatically: “There was 
nothing left to do but prepare for the reshaping of the world.”)38 And although Karl 
had conferred extensively with Redlich in July 1917 with a view to handing him the 
premiership, just over a year later, he told Leopold von Chlumecky, who had 
recommended Redlich: “I know him, he has already been here. But tell me, he is a 
sugar industrialist, is he not? And is he completely reliable?”39 Beck, for his part, lost 
Karl’s confidence after having defended Sieghart during his audience.40 As for 
Lammasch, Karl interpreted his modesty as irresolution and dismissed him as a 
possible candidate.41 This is not to say that any of these men could have secured 
Austria’s future or saved Karl’s throne. But they would, at least, have come closer to 
establishing whether this was at all possible. 
 Karl’s reputation has been unjustly glorified and unjustly sullied.42 Yet he 
cannot escape a substantial degree of blame in the collapse of Austria-Hungary. Until 
the very end, however, he seems not to have realized entirely the gravity of his 
predicament, blinded by his natural insouciance, his unwillingness to hear bad news 
and his overestimation of his subjects’ loyalty.43 On 27 September 1918, long past the 
eleventh hour, Karl called Eichhoff and asked him: “You worked on these questions 
                                                                                                                                      
or not, a question he rarely failed to put.” A colleague of Möller’s handled a Hughes conversation 
between Karl and Czernin in April 1918, in which the emperor described Ludendorff’s wife as a “filthy 
Jewess”. Koerber commented to Redlich that Karl seemed to have little sympathy for Jews. In his 
reminiscences, Karl himself mused that popularity was like a soap bubble and that, no sooner had the 
public started to idolize its ruler than it withdrew its love, “influenced by the short-sighted Jewish 
hacks and other vermin”. He also rued the bad blood caused by the central food offices, which were “so 
harmful because they were staffed only by Jews, who made colossal business”. 
37 Renner, Bunte Woche, 25.12.1932, pp.7-8; “Vom 12. November und den Jahren vorher und 
nachher”, AZM, 11.11.1928, p.4. This was in Laxenburg according to the 1932 version, but in 
Hetzendorf according to the 1928 one (which mentions only freemasonry). 
38 Renner, Bunte Woche, 25.12.1932, p.8. 
39 RT, II, 27.8.1918, p.428. 
40 Polzer, pp.342-343. 
41 Polzer, pp.344-345. 
42 Auffenberg, pp.175, 487; Bethmann, II, p.200; Conrad, Aufzeichnungen, p.265; Gina, p.157; 
Pomiankowski, p.279. Seeckt, p.555; Sieghart, p.244; Margutti, p.85; Anonymous, pp.138-139; Polzer, 
p.228; Arz, p.130; Ö86 Nr.1, 21, Wedel-Bethmann, 25.4.1917. His vulnerability to female influences – 
in particular to Zita’s – is unfailingly highlighted by his critics. Her involvement was perhaps unusual 
in certain respects but, since she and Karl were of one mind on most issues, this reproach does not hold 
water. 
43 Melbourn (ed.), p.22; NW, K1, 2.5.1918; 3.5.1918. Karl remained oblivious to the fact that some of 
the displays of public jubilation he witnessed were manufactured. 
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for Archduke Franz back then; how did he envisage the new constitution?” Taken 
aback, Eichhoff dared not utter the answer on the tip of his tongue: “Your Majesty is 
asking me a little late”.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
44 NE, 150, pp.36, 42-43. 
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